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ABSTRACT 
This PhD project scrutinizes why Turkish mainstream politics turned against EU 
membership. By taking into account three mainstream parties (AKP, CHP and MHP) 
in comparison with the views of the BDP, a pro-Kurdish party, this study seeks to 
explain the main determinants of the rising scepticism against EU accession engulfing 
Turkish politics since 2002. Accordingly, the study applies the term Euroscepticism to 
candidate countries and Turkey in particular by (i) categorizing domestic political 
reactions based on the complex nature of EU conditionality involving both formal 
issue-specific and additional country-specific pressures; (ii) focusing on both 
domestic and external factors behind domestic resistance to accession process; and 
(iii) comparing the Turkish case with other candidate countries focusing on the 
negotiation process.The study argues that Euroscepticism in Turkey and candidate 
countries in general develops as a response to the complex nature of  EU 
conditionality comprising both issue-specific and country-specific accession 
conditions. Euroscepticism in reaction to issue-specific conditions involves an 
opposition to particular reforms deriving from the EU’s formal membership 
conditionality. Euroscepticism in response to country-specific conditionality, 
however, involves broader political resistance against the EU’s extra conditionality 
which targets a particular candidate. To grasp Turkish Euroscepticism, two reform 
areas under the EU’s issue-specific conditionality (minority rights and foreign land 
ownership) and two cases of country-specific pressures (the EU’s Cyprus 
conditionality and the rising Turkish suspicion that the EU won’t accept Turkey’s 
membership) are studied.  Outlining six hypotheses regarding the effects of party 
ideology, strategy, and EU-driven factors on the development of Eurosceptic politics 
in Turkey, the study overall reveals that until 2006, ideology explains the opposition’s 
attitudes while the governmental approach follows strategy. Since the partial 
suspension of negotiations in 2006, both opposition and government reflect similar 
scepticism towards the EU irrespective of their ideology and competition strategies. 
Instead, they provide a case for strong Euroscepticism by emphasizing the role of EU-
driven factors –especially, the rising uncertainty of membership and the EU’s 
‘perceived’ reluctance to accept Turkish accession–in complicating Turkey-EU 
relations.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Turkey–EU relations are in a state of crisis. The golden era of Turkey’s European 
vocation spearheaded by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government has 
been shattered with the partial suspension of the accession negotiations. Several years 
after the initiation of the negotiations, only one chapter has been closed and Turkey’s 
eventual European Union (EU) accession remains dubious. The positive atmosphere 
in Turkey and Europe regarding the prospects for Turkey’s EU accession has been 
replaced with pessimism. On 21-22 September 2012, an interdisciplinary workshop at 
Tilburg University entitled ‘Turkey and the EU: Rethinking a Multifaceted 
Relationship’ brought together leading academics on Turkey-EU relations to discuss 
the future of Turkey’s EU membership quest. The argument shared by almost all 
participants was that Turkey’s EU accession prospects had never been more uncertain. 
The remarks of the conference participants reflected how the initial bursts of 
optimism for Turkey’s EU accession had faltered. As one participant stated; ‘the EU 
made a confession that they have almost reached a dead-end with Turkey’ (Kubicek 
2013).  
Turkey has always attached great importance to become a member of the EU since the 
early 1960s. Initiating the formal association with the European Community (EC) 
with the signature of the Ankara Association agreement in 1963, Turkey made its 
official membership application in 1987 and was granted official candidate status in 
1999. Throughout this long process, Turkish political elites perceived EU membership 
as an ideal for Turkey and highlighted their commitment to the realization of Turkish 
accession to the EU. Coming to power in 2002, the AKP government took 
unprecedented steps pioneering the initiation of accession negotiations with the EU on 
3 October 2005. The golden era of Turkey–EU relations, however, suffered a serious 
stalemate shortly after the curtailment of negotiations due to the EU’s Cyprus 
conditionality.  
On 29 July 2005, the Turkish government signed the additional protocol extending the 
association agreement to the new EU members, fulfilling the last obligation for 
initiating the accession negotiations. Not officially recognizing the Republic of 
Cyprus (RoC) as representing the entire island, the Turkish government issued a 
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unilateral declaration rejecting to extend its commitments to the RoC, an EU member 
since May 2004. However, the EU rejected Turkey’s declaration and pressurized the 
Turkish government to open its airspace and harbours to all EU membership including 
the RoC. After Turkey’s firm denial, the EU partially suspended the accession 
negotiations by freezing eight negotiation chapters1 (European Commission 2012: 5). 
The suspension of the negotiations constitutes a watershed in Turkey-EU relations as 
the reform process has considerably slowed down and the EU membership quest has 
lost its popularity in Turkey.  
This study investigates the underlying factors behind the loss of momentum in 
Turkish politics towards EU membership. Accordingly, the main research question of 
the study is “Why have the main Turkish political actors become sceptical of 
Turkey’s EU accession in the last decade?” Is it solely the EU’s Cyprus conditionality 
that explains the rising Turkish scepticism towards the EU or are there other factors at 
play? Accordingly, the changing EU stances of three mainstream political parties; the 
AKP, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party 
(MHP) will be scrutinized comparatively in order to better understand the main 
determinants of the current rise in reluctance towards EU accession engulfing Turkish 
politics since 2002.    
The AKP was founded in 2001 as a centre-right party despite its organic ties to the 
pro-Islamic Welfare Party (RP) in the sense that many founding members of the AKP 
including the party leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan came from the ranks of the RP. The 
1980 military coup d’état had abolished all political parties and the military regime 
promoted ‘Turkish-Islam Synthesis’ in order to eliminate the left-right clash and to 
nurture unity within the Turkish public. In this turbulent context, the military junta 
encouraged and supported political Islam as they saw it as “an antidote to all forms of 
left-wing politics” (Ahmad 1993: 214). Hence, political Islam found a fertile ground 
to flourish in Turkey which enabled the RP to be established under the leadership of 
Necmettin Erbakan. Forming a coalition government in the early 1990s, the RP was 
however closed down following the 28 February military memorandum in 1997 on 
the grounds that its pro-Islamic activities constituted a serious threat to the Secular 
                                                          
1 The frozen chapters are namely; Free Movement of Goods, Right of Establishment and Freedom to 
Provide Services, Financial Services, Agriculture and Rural Development, Fisheries, Transport Policy, 
Customs Union, and External Relations. 
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identity of the Republic of Turkey. The successors of Erbakan were divided into two 
political camps, namely ‘traditionalists’ and ‘innovationists’; the former was 
represented by the Felicity Party (SP) that followed the RP tradition, while the 
reformist cadre established the AKP (Çağlıyan-İçener 2009: 596).   
Erdoğan, the former mayor of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality formed the AKP 
with 50 former RP officials. Defending social conservatism and economic liberalism, 
the AKP refused to be identified as an ‘ideology-based Islamic party’ and aimed to be 
a catch-all party (Keyman and Öniş 2007: 220). Gathering 34.4% of the total votes in 
the 2002 elections, the AKP acquired 64% of the seats in the Parliament and formed a 
single party government. The economic crisis in Turkey and liberal rhetoric of the 
AKP became the deciding factors behind its popularity in almost all segments of 
Turkish society who hoped that the AKP government would bring more economic and 
political stability and expand liberties (ibid.). Besides, the AKP’s successful 
‘mobilization strategy’ forming a ‘grand coalition’ with the combination of former 
centre-right, centre-left and conservative politicians, and its ‘organizational 
effectiveness’ recruiting 3 million party members played a major role in its electoral 
success (Saatçioğlu and El Basani 2013: 146). The AKP government’s landslide 
victory was interpreted in Turkish academia as a sign of Turkey’s return to fully 
functioning democracy after the 1980 coup d’état (İnsel 2003: 306; Özbudun 2006: 
546).  
Once in power, the AKP concentrated on the realization of Turkey’s EU membership. 
The AKP government adopted numerous laws to comply with the EU’s accession 
criteria and lobbied for Turkey’s accession among EU officials and political leaders of 
EU member states in a proactive manner. Prime Minister Erdoğan even organized an 
amateur soccer match with EU statesmen in order to increase dialogue with ‘Turkey-
sceptic’ leaders such as the Austrian chancellor, Wolfgang Schüssel (Robinson 2006). 
He also worked in close cooperation with Luis Zapatero, the Spanish Prime Minister 
for the ‘Alliance of Civilizations’ project to develop better relations between Europe 
and the Islamic World. The AKP’s cosmopolitan rhetoric nurtured with this project 
proved successful for the AKP to convince the EU to start accession negotiations with 
Turkey (İçener and Çağlıyan-İçener 2011). However, the AKP’s EU-enthusiasm 
faltered after the partial suspension of the negotiations due to Turkey’s failure to 
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comply with the EU’s Cyprus conditionality. Winning three elections in a row, 
however the AKP government has hardly returned to its former pro-EU stance.  
The main opposition party, the CHP is the founding party of the Turkish Republic. 
Established by Ataturk himself in 1923, the CHP stands as the oldest political party in 
Turkey. Formed as an establishment party of traditionalism, authority, and 
nationalism, the CHP’s economic Left rhetoric was first installed by Bülent Ecevit in 
the early 1970s aiming to ‘defend those who could not benefit from the welfare 
system of the society, did not exploit others, could not obtain undue privileges, and 
could not defend their own interests and rights’ (Güneş-Ayata 2002: 103). Despite its 
emphasis on the Left, Keyman and Öniş (2007: 214) argue that the CHP has failed to 
reflect the true image of a European-style Social Democratic party due to its historical 
role in the Turkish political system and ‘failure to break away from it’. The 
establishment of the Turkish Republic was a top-down process in which the Republic 
was ‘made’ by Ataturk and his aides (ibid.). The CHP was formed as an ‘engine … of 
this state-centric modernization and its top-down attempt to create an economically 
advanced and culturally secular nation’ (ibid.).  
 
Having won two elections in 1973 and 1977, the CHP faced a similar fate with other 
political parties which were all closed down after the 1980 coup d’état by the military 
regime. The post-1980 coup period led to the criticisms of statist and ultra-secularist 
policies that constituted the key principles of the CHP (Öniş and Grigoriadis 2010: 
264). Closed for eleven years, the party was re-opened by Deniz Baykal in 1992 who 
used a similar Left rhetoric to the previous CHP leadership. However, the CHP has 
not won any elections since then. The CHP’s inability to adapt to the changing 
demands of the masses, its failure to transform the party’s ideological stance, and the 
unending leadership struggles coupled with factions within the party following its re-
opening have led to big electoral failures; in 1999 obtaining only eight percent of the 
total votes the CHP even failed to enter the parliament (Keyman and Öniş 2007). 
Although the CHP successfully rose to be the main opposition in the Turkish 
parliament after obtaining 19.38 percent of the total votes in the 2002 elections, 
Baykal was generally held responsible for the party’s ill-performance in elections for 
so long and accused of having detached the party from the masses and polarized the 
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public treating them as being either ‘secular or a religious fundamentalist; a 
republican or a separatist; a Kemalist or a second Republican; a patriot or a traitor’ 
(Öniş and Grigoriadis 2010: 267; Ciddi 2008: 446).  
The CHP under Baykal’s leadership proclaimed itself a pro-EU party since the 1960s 
(when the Ankara Association agreement had been concluded) by defining Turkey’s 
EU bids as part of the modernization project that would consolidate the Turkish 
Republic. Baykal (2003) considered Turkey’s EU membership as a ‘national cause’ 
and devoted much energy to the realization of a customs union with the EU in the 
early 1990s during his short term as  the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Ayata and 
Güneş-Ayata 2007: 223). After the 2002 elections however, the CHP’s pro-EU stance 
has remained at the rhetorical level since it adopted a highly critical stance towards 
the EU and opposed many aspects of the EU-led reform process in Turkey (such as 
foreigner and minority rights) with the preoccupation to protect the integrity of the 
Turkish Republic. Since May 2010, the leadership of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who 
replaced Baykal aimed to highlight the CHP’s social democratic identity by 
abandoning Baykal’s nationalistic rhetoric and toning down its criticisms against the 
EU. However, Kılıçdaroğlu conducted a ‘NO’ campaign against the referendum in 
September 2010 which put to vote the adoption of Constitutional amendments that 
were supported by the EU, showing that it was too early to conclude that the CHP had 
become a pro-EU party (Öniş 2012).     
  
The junior opposition party, the MHP was formed in 1969 to spread Turkish 
nationalism and ‘ward off the communist threat’ (Heper and İnce 2006: 873). 
Representing the far right in Turkey, the MHP initially demonstrated poor 
performance in the general elections of 1969, 1973 and 1977 (Arıkan 1998: 121). 
Besides, it was increasingly perceived as supporting undemocratic and ultra-
nationalistic groups who contributed to the eruption of country-wide violence based 
on a left-right conflict, which claimed around 5000 lives and led to the 1980 military 
coup d’état (Arıkan 1998: 120; Heper and İnce 2006: 873). Closed down immediately 
after the coup, the party was reopened with the name of the Party of Nationalist Work 
(MÇP - Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi) in 1985; yet it failed to enter the parliament during 
the 1987 elections. Forming an electoral coalition with the RP, the MÇP managed to 
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enter parliament in the 1991 elections. The party was renamed as the MHP once again 
in 1993 but failed to enter the parliament in the 1995 elections. The electoral 
misfortune of the MHP changed after the death of the party leader Alparslan Türkeş in 
1997. The new MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli aimed to wipe out criminal elements from 
the party, stay away from political patronage and clientelism, and improve the MHP’s 
image as a legitimate political actor (Heper and İnce 2006: 875). The MHP acquired 
17% of total votes in the 1999 elections and became a partner of the coalition 
government in which Bahçeli became a deputy Prime Minister. The most important 
factor behind the electoral success of the MHP was its focus on the fight against PKK 
terrorism during its election campaign (Öniş 2003). However, the 2000 economic 
crisis in Turkey had a remarkable impact in the coalition parties. Held responsible for 
the eruption of the crisis, Turkish voters punished the MHP as well as other governing 
parties by leaving them outside the parliament in the 2002 elections (Keyman and 
Öniş 2007). The MHP returned to the Turkish Parliament in 2007 and has been a 
junior opposition party represented in the Turkish Parliament since then. Although 
detached from its extremist attitudes of the 1970s, the MHP is still regarded as a far-
right ultra-nationalistic party which remains  a strong critic of Turkey’s EU 
membership considering many aspects of the EU-led reform process detrimental to 
Turkey’s national sovereignty (Avcı 2011b).              
 
Overall, the study will focus on the EU policies of these three mainstream political 
parties represented in the Turkish Parliament in the last decade and seek to find out 
the main determinants of their sceptical stances towards the EU. Besides this, it will 
analyze the EU policy of a single-issue party, the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) 
as a control case in order to demonstrate the varying effects of political ideology on 
party stances towards the EU. Established in 2008 right after its predecessor the 
Democratic Society Party (DTP) was closed down by the Constitutional Court on the 
grounds that its pro-Kurdish stance incited separatist violence; the BDP entered its 
first elections in the 2009 local elections. It won 97 municipalities primarily in the 
South-eastern Anatolia overwhelmingly populated by Kurds. The BDP enjoyed a 
bigger victory in the 2011 general elections. The BDP managed to gain 36 seats in the 
Turkish Parliament. In addition to its Leftist and anti-imperialist rhetoric, the BDP is 
known for its Kurdish nationalism and close affinity with the PKK, listed as a terrorist 
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organization by Turkey, the USA and the EU. It stands as a single-issue party since its 
primary political objective is to promote rights and liberties for people of Kurdish 
origin in Turkey. Comparison of its EU policy with other parties is important since its 
policies remarkably diverge from mainstream politics in key policy areas such as 
minority rights and the Cyprus problem. If such a different party as the BDP shows 
similar reactions to EU conditionality, this will help draw important conclusions 
regarding the determinants of party contestations in Turkey against EU membership.    
 
In order to grasp the interplay between different factors that explain the dynamics of 
Turkish political opposition to EU membership, the study will benefit from the term 
Euroscepticism, which is defined as ‘the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as 
well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European 
integration’ (Taggart, 1998: 366). However, Euroscepticism is generally used to 
explain party attitudes in member states. Due to its particular focus on the negotiation 
process of a candidate country, this study aims to apply Euroscepticism to candidate 
countries by (i) categorizing domestic political reactions based on the complex nature 
of EU conditionality involving both formal issue-specific and additional country-
specific pressures; (ii) focusing on both domestic and external/EU-driven factors 
behind domestic resistance to the accession process; and (iii) comparing Turkey with 
other candidate countries with a special focus on the negotiation process. The scope of 
Euroscepticism in candidate countries is narrower than the traditional definition of 
Euroscepticism essentially because it analyzes party responses to the EU’s 
membership conditionality during the EU accession process, whereas the latter aims 
to explain political contestations against European integration in a broader sense. 
 
Overall, the study will evaluate the attitudes of selected political parties in Turkey 
towards the EU’s conditional pressures in different policy areas, including minority 
rights, foreign land ownership and the EU’s Cyprus conditionality and allow 
comparison with the political reactions to similar EU pressures in other accession 
countries. The main objective of the study is to find out: (i) whether political parties 
give different responses to issue-specific and country-specific EU pressures; (ii) to 
what extent domestic factors such as ideology and strategy explain domestic 
responses to the EU’s conditional pressures; (iii) whether external/EU-driven factors 
17 
 
(such as the EU’s selectivity in its conditionality and its perceived ‘reluctance’ 
towards the accession of Turkey) play a major role in party contestations against the 
EU; and finally, (iv) whether the critical EU stance of Turkish political parties is 
exceptional or similar to their counterparts in other accession countries. 
 
Accordingly, the study proposes six hypotheses regarding the effects of ideology, 
strategy and EU-driven factors on the development of Euroscepticism in candidate 
countries in general and Turkey in particular. The first three hypotheses investigate 
the validity of ideological alignments in determining Eurosceptic politics. The study 
examines the ideological standpoints of parties by not only looking at their Leftist or 
Rightist economic views but also relying on their Libertarian or Authoritarian stance 
over social, political and cultural issues, such as individual freedoms and 
environmental awareness (Hooghe et al 2002). Accordingly, the study will discuss to 
what extent Leftist/Rightist and Libertarian/Authoritarian views of political parties 
affect their stance on the EU accession process. The study will then test the credibility 
of political ideology in inducing Euroscepticism when EU-driven factors2 are at play. 
The last three hypotheses will inquire about the explanatory power of stategic party 
competition regarding the development of Euroscepticism. The study will examine 
whether a party’s position in the domestic political system affects its stance over EU 
accession. Therefore, it will focus on mainstream parties as well as marginal/fringe 
parties, comparing their propensity to raise criticisms against the EU accession 
process. Moreover, governing parties as well as opposition parties will be investigated 
to find out whether Euroscepticism is an opposition phenomenon or whether 
governing parties reflect Eurosceptic reactions as well. Finally, the explanatory power 
of strategic party competition will be tested when EU-driven factors materialize. 
Accordingly, the hypotheses are summarized as follows:        
 
H1: The Left-Right ideological distinction does not have a significant role in 
explaining Euroscepticism. 
                                                          
2 EU-driven factors are summarized as follows: the EU’s conditionality is selective; the EU offers no 
credible membership perspective; the EU is perceived to be reluctant towards accession. 
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H2: TAN (Traditional/Authoritarian/Nationalist) parties in accession countries are 
more likely to adopt Euroscepticism than GAL (Green/Alternative/Liberal) parties. 
H3: Both TAN and GAL parties in accession countries are likely to embrace 
Euroscepticism as a reaction to EU-driven factors.  
H4: Electoral popularity does not explain Euroscepticism because both mainstream 
and fringe parties reflect Euroscepticism.  
 
H5: Opposition parties in accession countries are more likely to adopt Eurosceptic 
policies than governing parties. 
 
H6: Governing parties in accession countries are likely to embrace Euroscepticism as 
a response to EU-driven factors. 
 
This study argues that the explanatory power of domestic factors namely, party 
ideology and strategic party competition diminishes when the EU’s conditionality is 
perceived as selective and discriminatory in the domestic arena, and/or the EU is 
perceived by domestic political actors as reluctant towards the accession of a 
candidate country (Turkey in this study). Therefore, if domestic political actors are 
convinced that the EU discriminates against their country or seems reluctant to allow 
their country’s accession, all domestic political actors are likely to grow sceptical of 
the EU’s membership conditionality and reluctant for EU membership regardless of 
their ideological alignments and their positions in the political system. The study also 
assumes that this critical stance is not specific to the Turkish case, since political 
parties in other countries unite in resisting similar types of EU pressures. Throughout 
the thesis, the validity of these arguments will be tested relying on the discussion of 
domestic responses to EU pressures in three cases, namely: minority rights, foreign 
land ownership and the EU’s Cyprus conditionality. Minority rights and foreign land 
ownership imply the EU’s issue-specific pressures since they are both part of the EU’s 
standard membership criteria applicable to all candidates, whereas Cyprus 
conditionality is an additional condition that is specific to a particular country, 
Turkey. Other candidates have also faced additional country-specific pressures of the 
EU, which mainly derive from a bilateral conflict between a candidate and an EU 
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member state. While both minority rights and foreign land ownership represent cases 
of issue-specific pressures, they differ in terms of the domestic perceptions about their 
application. The conditionality of foreign land ownership is conventionally treated as 
a fundamental part of economic integration and is governed by the ‘Community 
method’ allowing supranational institutions to impose standard practice on member 
states (rather than the intergovernmental method that is dominant in the domains of 
foreign policy and justice and home affairs). However, the EU’s application of 
minority rights conditionality has often been described as inconsistent, selective and 
uneven (Ram 2003). By taking this difference into consideration, the study 
investigates whether the perception that the EU’s conditionality is selective ‘matters’ 
in determining domestic attitudes towards the EU negotiations. Moreover, the 
discussion of the EU’s additional conditionality on particular candidates as a separate 
case allows refining the prevailing accounts that focus on solely domestic factors and 
neglect the interplay between domestic and EU-level factors. 
 
Finally, the study will also devote a separate chapter to the discussion of an increasing 
Turkish perception that the EU remains reluctant towards Turkey’s membership and 
scrutinize whether (and if so, how) the EU’s ‘perceived’ reluctance is influential on 
Turkish political attitudes towards EU accession. This is an important question to 
address, because if the EU discourses of Turkish political actors are primarily based 
on the EU’s ‘reluctance’ towards Turkey’s accession, then their EU policies can be 
considered as exceptional or sui generis, implying that Turkish party attitudes are not 
comparable to other cases in Europe, i.e. the EU stances of political actors in other 
accession countries (in particular, the Central and Eastern European countries whose 
accession was framed as ‘return to Europe’ by EU circles). On the flip side, if the 
EU’s perceived reluctance towards Turkey does not alone capture Turkish party 
attitudes towards EU conditionality, then the findings on the Turkish case can be 
applied to other cases as well. Accordingly, the outline of the thesis is as follows:    
 
The first chapter of the study reviews the relevant literature on EU stances on political 
parties across Europe and that of Turkish mainstream parties in particular. The notion 
of Euroscepticism has particularly inspired scholarly discussions on party 
contestations towards European integration and led to the development of different 
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models of Euroscepticism (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004). However, the application 
of the term Euroscepticism to accession countries can be problematic because 
political actors in candidate countries primarily focus their criticisms on the accession 
process rather than European integration and its trajectory. Studies that employ 
models of Euroscepticism in investigating party politics in candidate countries tend to 
confound ‘opposition to Europe’ with ‘opposition to EU membership’ and lump them 
together as examples of Euroscepticism. However, a party’s opposition to EU 
membership does not give sufficient information about its deeper stance on European 
integration (defined in a broader sense) (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008b). Therefore, it 
is useful to re-evaluate the term Euroscepticism in order to better explain political 
party stances in accession countries that focus on EU membership per se. The main 
objective of this study is to contribute to the refinement of the term Euroscepticism so 
that it can better explain party positions in EU candidate countries in general, and to 
Turkey in particular.  
 
In addition, this chapter provides a review of the literature on Turkish political parties 
and stresses the fact that existing analyses on the Turkish political stance towards EU 
membership are either focused on domestic factors such as party competition and 
ideology or the Cyprus conflict as an external constraint on Turkey’s EU membership. 
Some studies also claim that a historical distrust of Europe, the so-called Sèvres 
Syndrome, has been influential in structuring the EU stances of Turkish political 
actors (Yılmaz 2009; Nefes 2013). Finally, there is an emerging literature stressing 
the rising scepticism in Europe against Turkish membership, associating the rise of 
Turkish reluctance to EU membership with it (Öniş 2010 and 2012; Oğuzlu 2012). 
This study will discuss the interaction between these factors arguing that Turkey’s 
critical stance towards EU accession can be better explained by taking into account 
both domestic and EU-driven factors together. 
 
Chapter II discusses in more detail Euroscepticism in candidate countries putting a 
special emphasis on the changing political party attitudes in accession countries 
towards EU membership. Accordingly, the study aims to emphasize the contextual 
character of Turkish political party stances towards Turkey’s accession to the EU 
through a special focus on the complex nature of EU conditionality. The EU’s  
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membership conditionality is complex in the sense that the EU not only imposes 
formal issue-specific accession conditions applicable to all candidate countries, but 
also puts forward additional conditions for certain candidates (generally due to a 
bilateral conflict between an EU member and the candidate in question) and is often 
criticized for applying some of its political conditionality in a selective (if not, 
discriminatory) manner. Accordingly, the study argues that Euroscepticism in 
candidate countries develops in response to the EU’s both issue-specific and country-
specific conditionality, reflecting the complex nature and differential impact of the 
EU’s accession criteria. In the case of issue-specific conditionality deriving from the 
EU’s formal membership criteria that are applicable to all candidates, domestic 
opposition is generally limited to particular reforms and tends to reflect ideological 
differences amongst political parties in the domestic arena. Domestic political actors 
resist certain EU-led reforms either due to high costs of compliance or the perceived 
threats against national sovereignty. However, country-specific conditionality triggers 
a more intensive political resistance that transcends ideological differences, as 
domestic political actors oppose the EU’s extra conditionality which specifically 
targets their own country. The chapter will give a detailed account of candidate 
country Euroscepticism in response to the EU’s issue-specific and country-specific 
conditions relying on examples from Turkey and other accession countries.. 
Chapter III explains the research design and provides justifications for the 
methodological choices based on a single-case study and elite interviewing. 
Accordingly, it explains why the Turkish case has been selected as a test case for the 
analysis of political party constestations against EU accession. The chapter also offers 
justifications on the selection of  particular Turkish political actors (the AKP, the 
CHP, the MHP and the BDP) and reform areas (minority rights, foreign land 
ownership and the EU’s Cyprus conditionality) in the analysis of Turkish responses to 
EU conditionality. Finally, the chapter discusses why elite interviewing has been used 
as a primary data collection technique and explains the details of interviews the author 
conducted with 45 members of the Turkish Parliament between November 2012 and 
April 2013.    
The empirical chapters (IV, V, VI and VII) provide a detailed analysis of Turkish 
responses to the EU’s accession criteria focusing on two problematic reform areas 
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under the EU’s formal conditionality (minority rights and foreign land ownership) and 
two cases of country-specific pressures (the EU’s Cyprus conditionality and the rising 
Turkish suspicion that the EU won’t accept Turkey’s membership). Chapter IV 
studies domestic responses in Turkey to the EU’s conditionality of minority rights and 
Chapter V discusses findings on the reform of foreign land ownership. Both chapters 
demonstrate that in the case of issue-specific conditionality, ideological factors such 
as nationalistic concerns to protect the integrity of state against foreigners constitute 
the basis of the Eurosceptic politics of Turkish political parties. The chapters find that 
Turkish attitudes are highly similar to those of political parties in other accession 
countries.  
Chapter VI discusses Turkish responses to the EU’s Cyprus conditionality. The 
chapter argues that all political actors, despite ideological differences, are united in 
their criticisms of the EU’s membership pressures involving the de facto recognition 
of the RoC. This points to a more intensive Euroscepticism developed as a reaction to 
the EU’s extra conditionality arising out of a bilateral conflict between a candidate 
country and an EU member state. It is crucial to note that such a critical stance is not 
peculiar to the Turkish case, as political actors in other candidate countries such as 
Macedonia and Croatia show similar reactions to similar extra country-specific 
pressures coming from the EU. On the other hand, Chapter VII deals with a particular 
claim peculiar to Turkey about the EU’s reluctance to accept Turkey’s membership 
and investigates to what extent the general perception of the EU as discriminatory 
against Turkey resonates with the rising Eurosceptic stances of Turkish political 
actors.       
The concluding chapter provides a tentative analysis of the findings derived from the 
studied cases with the main argument that Turkish reluctance for EU membership is 
multi-causal and does not only depend on domestic factors such as ideology or 
strategy but also involves a reactionary dimension. In other words, not only domestic 
but also EU-driven factors explain the rise of Euroscepticism in Turkey at different 
stages: domestic factors such as ideology and party competition had considerable 
explanatory power over Eurosceptic responses of the Turkish political elites when 
there were clear incentives towards Turkey’s EU accession (2002-2006). However, 
after the partial suspension of the negotiations (2006 to present), EU-driven factors 
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including the rising uncertainty of membership and the EU’s ‘reluctance’ towards 
Turkish accession, have become more crucial in explaining the rise of Euroscepticism 
in Turkish politics. 
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CHAPTER I 
 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter discusses the prevailing scholarly accounts of party contestations against 
European integration. Accordingly, it will focus on the term Euroscepticism which is 
predominantly employed to explain contending political attitudes towards European 
integration and EU accession in particular. Scrutinizing how Euroscepticism is 
defined and categorized in the mainstream literature, the chapter will also examine the 
scholarly discussions regarding the determinants of party-based Euroscepticism. 
Finally, the chapter will critically evaluate how scholars explain the contending EU 
stances of political parties in accession countries and Turkey in particular.  
 
1.1. Political Party Contestations towards European Integration: Definition and 
Classification 
The mainstream literature abounds with analyses of contending party positions 
towards European integration which are overwhelmingly explained with the term 
‘Euroscepticism’ generally defined as ‘the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, 
as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of 
European integration’ (Taggart, 1998: 366). Numerous scholarly works offered 
various typologies of Euroscepticism to explain party contestations towards Europe. 
The most popular discussion has been introduced by Taggart and Szczerbiak (2004) 
who argue that Euroscepticism involves two different forms of opposition to 
European integration: ‘Hard’ and ‘Soft’ Euroscepticism. Hard Euroscepticism implies 
an ‘outright’ and ‘unqualified’ rejection of European integration both in economic and 
political terms. ‘Hard Eurosceptics’ reject the idea of EU membership, since they 
never desire to be a part of such a Union. Alternatively, Soft Euroscepticism suggests 
a ‘contingent and qualified opposition to European integration’. This means that ‘Soft 
Eurosceptic’ parties are generally in favour of European integration but oppose 
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particular EU policies, or exert opposition with the motivation to preserve national 
interest on a specific domain (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004: 4).  
The Hard-Soft typology has been widely used in the party politics literature as a 
blueprint for categorising political parties in Europe. For instance, the PDS/Left Party 
in Germany is deemed as ‘Soft Eurosceptic’ due to its critique of  Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) and its effects on the German economy (Lees 2008: 21). 
Moreover, the National Alliance in Italy and the Francophone Christian Democrats in 
Belgium could be considered as Soft Eurosceptic since their criticisms exclusively 
focus on certain policy areas such as  EMU rather than European integration as a 
whole (Quaglia 2008; Deschouwer and Van Assche 2008). Besides, not only 
peripheral parties but also mainstream parties are depicted as Soft Eurosceptic; take 
the British Conservative Party which is not opposed to European integration outright 
but object to certain EU policies such as the adoption of a single currency across the 
EU (Gifford 2006). On the other hand, Hard Eurosceptic parties mainly tend to be on 
the extreme edges of the political spectrum. Extreme Right parties such as the 
Northern League in Italy, the Vlaams Belang in Belgium, the Front National (FN) in 
France, and the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and the British National 
Party (BNP) in the UK are generally considered as Hard Eurosceptics (Quaglia, 2008; 
Deschouwer and Van Assche, 2008; Grunberg, 2008; Gifford, 2006). 
Moreover, Usherwood and Sartin (2013: 5-6) categorize Eurosceptic parties into four 
in order to locate them in the context of the Hard-Soft typology. Accordingly, single-
issue parties such as  UKIP, radical right-wing parties including the FN in France and 
the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), and radical left-wing parties such as the Danish 
Socialist People’s Party and the Swedish Left Party are considered Hard Eurosceptic; 
while mainstream parties such as the British Conservative party and the French UMP 
are seen as Soft Eurosceptic (ibid.). 
However, despite its popularity, the Hard-Soft typology has been criticized mainly 
due to the all-inclusive nature of Soft Euroscepticism which causes the confusion that 
any political party which at some point criticizes the EU might be considered as Soft 
Eurosceptic (Riishøj 2007; Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008b; Kaniok 2009). Conti 
(2003: 16) offers a detailed account of Soft Euroscepticism in order to prevent 
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confusion over its scope. He explains Soft Euroscepticism as ‘a reaction to one or a 
number of European policies, a negative evaluation of the European institutional 
setting whose reform is proposed, or a negative evaluation of the impact of Europe on 
the domestic system that can be still corrected through reforms’. Conti (2003: 16) 
states that unlike Hard Euroscepticism, Soft Euroscepticism neither questions the 
legitimacy of the entire European integration process, nor suggests a country’s 
withdrawal from the EU. Instead, Soft Eurosceptics offer solutions to the problems of 
integration through ‘pro-active’ but ‘non-radical’ proposals of reform (ibid.).  
Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008b: 250) refine the term by focusing on both the quantity 
and the quality of opposition to EU policies in order to determine who is (Soft) 
Eurosceptic and who isn’t. Accordingly, they reject the consideration of political 
parties which only oppose one or two EU policy areas as Eurosceptic (ibid.). They 
suggest differentiating between ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ policies of the EU. In this 
respect, parties which oppose core EU policies such as  EMU qualify as Eurosceptic, 
while those who oppose only peripheral EU policies such as the Common Fisheries 
Policy (CFP) do not (ibid.). Similarly, they also distinguish between opposition to the 
‘deepening’ and the ‘widening’ of European integration. Accordingly, Eurosceptics 
are those who oppose the deepening of the EU, while opposition to the widening of 
the EU (i.e. opposition to further EU enlargement) doesn’t necessarily count as 
Euroscepticism (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008b: 251).           
With the aim of refining the Hard-Soft Euroscepticism typology, Conti (2003: 17) 
introduces neutral and pro-EU elements to the analysis of party positions towards 
Europe. Accordingly, he suggests ‘No commitment/No mention’ as  evidence for a 
neutral stance towards European integration. He also offers pro-EU categories which 
are ‘Functional Europeanism’ and ‘Identity Europeanism’. While Functional 
Europeanism indicates a strategic support for European integration based on domestic 
interests, Identity Europeanism involves a principled support aiming for an 
advancement towards Federal Europe and European citizenship (ibid.). However, 
Conti (2003: 19) admits the measurement problems associated with this classification. 
Actually, it is difficult to decide whether a party is Soft Eurosceptic or Functional 
Europeanist based on its attitudes towards European integration. The difference 
between ‘qualified opposition’ defined as Soft Euroscepticism and ‘qualified support’ 
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implying Functional Europeanism is unclear. Both Functional Europeanism and Soft 
Euroscepticism condition their support for European integration on the preservation of 
domestic interests. In a recent contribution co-authored with Memoli, Conti, contrary 
to his early work, has refused to lock Euroscepticism ‘into one static definition of 
categorical or typological nature’ (Conti and Memoli 2012: 105). Yet, they still tend 
to differentiate between Euroscepticism and Euro-criticism which is more or less 
similar to the Hard-Soft typology (ibid.).    
Kopecký and Mudde (2002) suggest an alternative classification. They differentiate 
between Eurosceptics and Euro-rejects by advancing four new categories: 
‘Europhiles’ vs. ‘Europhobes’ (depending on the level of one’s support to European 
integration), and ‘EU-optimists’ vs. ‘EU-pessimists’ (depending on one’s attitude 
towards the current and future directions of the EU as a polity). In this context, 
Euroscepticism refers to a combination of ‘Europhiles’ and ‘EU-pessimists’, while 
‘Euro-rejects’ are simultaneously both ‘Europhobe’ and ‘EU-pessimist’. Eurosceptics 
are not against the cooperation of European states for greater peace and prosperity in 
Europe; but they are pessimistic about the current and/or future direction towards 
which European integration is heading (Kopecký and Mudde 2002: 304). 
Kopecký and Mudde also propose two other categories to explain pro-EU circles. 
Accordingly, parties which are both Europhile and EU-optimists are considered as 
Euroenthusiasts; whereas parties that are Europhobe but optimist about the EU’s 
future (EU-optimists) are deemed as Europragmatists (Kopecký and Mudde 2002: 
303). The model advanced by Kopecký and Mudde innovatively suggests that all 
Eurosceptics are Europhiles since they favour the idea of European integration in 
principle; and thus excludes ‘Hard Euroscepticism’/outright rejection of European 
integration/‘Euro-rejects’ from the definition of Euroscepticism. Although not as 
popular as the Hard/Soft typology, their model has attracted much academic attention 
(Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008a). 
Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008b: 243) however extend certain criticisms to this 
alternative typology. They argue that the classification of Kopecký and Mudde 
(2002), although having merits, does not fit in the Western European political context 
(ibid.). Accordingly, the alternative categorization they offer confines the term 
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Euroscepticism ‘to a subset of what would generally be considered Eurosceptic 
attitudes’ (ibid.). By introducing the terms Europhobes and Eurorejects, Kopecký and 
Mudde (2002) altered the meaning and the scope of Euroscepticism which led to a 
confusion in the categorization of certain political parties such as  UKIP as 
Eurosceptic (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008b: 244). Moreover, the category of 
‘Europragmatism’ paradoxically suggests that a party that demonstrates a principled 
opposition to European integration could support the deepening of the European 
integration project (ibid.). According to Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008b: 244), it is 
very difficult to find a party in ‘old’ EU members that fits into this category.  
Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008b: 244) also claim that the ‘Euroenthusiast’ category is 
too inclusive generating ‘strange bedfellows’ placing irrelevant parties ‘in the same 
box’. For instance, Kopecký and Mudde (2002) place the Polish Peasant Party and 
Hungarian Fidesz party in the same box as the Polish Civic Platform and Hungarian 
Alliance of Free Democrats, although those parties have different views about the 
development of European integration (ibid.). Therefore, the Kopecký–Mudde 
classification fails to acknowledge the fact that ‘just as opposition to the European 
integration project as embodied in the EU can be both principled and contingent so 
can support for it’ (ibid.). Overall, Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008b: 246) criticize 
Kopecký and Mudde (2002) for attempting to formulate a new framework of 
Euroscepticism just focusing on candidate countries in which ‘it is difficult to identify 
a party’s stance on either European integration through the EU in principle or on the 
EU’s current trajectory because most of them do not articulate them, or simply have 
not even considered them’.  
Another scholarly attempt to categorize party-based Euroscepticism is advanced by 
Flood and Soborski (2011). They criticize the prevailing literature for isolating 
‘opposition to integration from support for it’ (Flood and Soborski 2011: 4). They 
think that ‘most groups described as Eurosceptical do not have simple positions but 
complex mixtures which include support for some aspects of integration’ (ibid.). In 
order to remedy the gap in the literature, they offer a new typology comprising six 
categories based not only on the degree of support for, but also opposition to, ‘EU 
integration in general or some specified aspect(s) of it’ (Flood and Soborski 2011: 5). 
Pro-EU parties include (i) Maximalists desiring integration to be pushed ‘as far and as 
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fast as’ possible; (ii) Reformists who endorse further integration provided that ‘the 
deficiencies of what has already been achieved’ are remedied; and (iii) Gradualists 
who accept ‘some advance of integration, as long as it is slow and piecemeal’; while 
Eurosceptics include (iv) Minimalists who accept the status quo and aim to prevent 
further integration; (v) Revisionists who wish to ‘return to an earlier state, usually 
before a treaty revision’, and finally (vi) Rejectionists who reject European integration 
outright (Flood and Soborski 2011: 6). 
Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008b: 246) bring two main criticisms to this typology. First, 
since these categories are not mutually exclusive, ‘some parties might comfortably be 
located in more than one of them’ (ibid.). Second, and more importantly such a 
‘complex and fine-grained’ typology (similar to that of Kopecký and Mudde (2002)) 
necessitates ‘a lot of data in order to categorize broad underlying party positions with 
the degree of precision that is required to fully operationalize them’; but such detailed 
information is often not available, because ‘parties rarely elaborate their policies on 
the key issues on European integration in such detail that we can properly categorize 
them’ (ibid.).  
Finally, Riishøj (2007: 508-509) offers an exhaustive list explaining different 
categories of Euroscepticism. He introduces nine types of Euroscepticism including 
(i) Identity-based Euroscepticism ‘involving a contradiction between national identity 
and European identity’, (ii) Cleavage-based Euroscepticism focusing on main 
divisions in a society such as ‘town–country, work–capital, religion–secularism’, (iii) 
Policy-based Euroscepticism identifying ‘resistance against concrete policies and 
single issues’ such as the Common Agricultural Policy and the EMU, (iv) 
Institutionally based Euroscepticism arising out of low level of trust in EU 
institutions, (v) National interest-based Euroscepticism due to ‘contradiction(s) 
between common European goals and national goals’, (vi) Experience-based 
Euroscepticism stemming from unfair and asymmetric accession negotiation process, 
(vii) Party-based Euroscepticism which is formed ‘in a top-down manner from 
political parties and charismatic political leaders’, (viii) Atlantic-based scepticism 
pointing to ‘a contradiction or dilemma between pro-Americanism and pro-
Europeanism’, and finally (ix) Practice-based Euroscepticism due to differences 
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between the EU and candidate countries in the interpretation of the Copenhagen 
criteria.  
However, this typology is far from offering a robust and parsimonious approach to the 
study of Euroscepticism due to a couple of reasons. First, the typology of Riishøj 
(2007) does not pay much attention to differences between stances towards European 
integration and EU membership; some categories he offers focus on European 
integration while some others including the practice-based and the experience-based 
Euroscepticism limit their focus to EU accession. Furthermore, it discusses the EU 
stances of member states and accession countries together as if they operate in the 
same political context. Therefore, it disregards the asymmetrical relationship between 
accession states and the EU, which implies the candidate states’ inability to directly 
affect the EU decisions and rules that are imposed on them as membership criteria 
(Börzel and Risse 2012: 195). However, some types of Euroscepticism Riishøj (2007) 
offers are only applicable to candidate countries as they exclusively focus on the 
accession process. Moreover, the practice-based and the experience-based types of 
Euroscepticism do not seem to be different from each other as they both indicate 
scepticism towards the accession process. Finally, to reiterate the argument of 
Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008b: 246), ‘the more complex and fine-grained the 
typology, the more difficult it is to operationalize and categorize the parties’. This 
issue is also applicable to the typology of Riishøj (2007) as he attempts to introduce 
too many concepts and arguments under the term Euroscepticism.      
Overall, despite numerous scholarly attempts to classify Euroscepticism, the most 
widely used classification is the Hard-Soft categorization; because, despite some 
limitations, it offers a parsimonious typology which facilitates the operationalization 
and the mapping of Eurosceptic political parties across Europe. However, there is one 
important issue with the Hard-Soft typology. It primarily focuses on European 
integration which leads the authors to attach priority to EU member states rather than 
accession countries. This is mainly because, political parties in candidate countries do 
not tend to elaborate on European integration but rather concentrate on their own 
accession process (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008b: 246). Therefore, it becomes 
problematic to associate candidate countries with Euroscepticism, because Szczerbiak 
and Taggart (2008b: 243) argue that attitudes towards EU membership do not 
31 
 
necessarily explain a party’s ‘deeper position’ on European integration in a broader 
sense. In this sense, there emerges a necessity to formulate a framework to better 
explain party-based Euroscepticism in accession countries. As discussed in Chapter II, 
the study applies the term Euroscepticism to candidate countries by distinguishing 
between opposition to Europe (i.e. objection to European integration as a whole), and 
opposition to the EU (i.e. resistance to the EU’s accession conditionality).  
 
1.2. Determinants of Party Stances towards European Integration 
The academic literature is particularly interested in the underlying causes of political 
party attitudes towards European integration. The main question is about ‘what 
determines a political party’s support for or opposition to European integration’. In 
the prevailing literature, the causes are primarily divided into those that privilege 
either party ideology or strategic party competition (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008b: 
254). If ideology determines party politics, then parties are expected to act in 
accordance with their predetermined approach even though this proves detrimental to 
party interests. Alternatively, if strategy influences party behaviours, then parties are 
expected to act according to their interests which rely upon, for instance, voter 
preferences, the political agenda of party leaders and political competition with other 
parties. The bulk of the prevailing studies dealing with party stances towards 
European integration emphasize the importance of party ideology. Alternatively, a 
developing literature puts forward party strategy as another important factor in the 
explanation of attitudinal variation towards European integration. Finally, there are 
studies that reject the ‘either/or’ approach and criticize the binary thinking that 
reduces explanatory factors to the categories of ideology and strategy. They thus 
‘bring back’ domestic cultural peculiarities such as religion in the analysis of political 
party stances towards European integration. 
 
1.2.1. Ideology 
There are voluminous scholarly works which attach priority to ideological alignments 
in order to explain the EU stances of political parties. Accordingly, the Left/Right and 
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Libertarian/Authoritarian divide as well as social and political cleavages have been 
introduced as the root causes of party contestations against European integration. For 
instance, Aspinwall (2002: 82) claims that the location of parties in the Left-Right 
spectrum explains their preferences on European integration. He categorizes 
ideological alignments of parties as centre, left and right, and claims that both left and 
right parties are likely to reflect sceptical attitudes towards European integration for 
different reasons. Leftist parties are reserved about ‘its market orientation and the 
potential erosion of state welfare institutions’, while rightist parties fear ‘the erosion 
of national power and the threat to national identity’ that European integration might 
bring (Aspinwall 2002: 87). On the other hand, centre parties tend to take a 
‘pragmatic view of integration, seeing it as a useful step for ensuring economic 
prosperity and peace’ (Aspinwall 2002: 86). Therefore, he argues that parties with 
centrist ideologies (either centre-right or centre-left parties) are more likely to favour 
European integration while the ones with non-centrist ideologies (either extreme right 
or extreme left parties) tend to be against European integration (Aspinwall 2002: 
105). 
In a more recent analysis, Aspinwall (2007) argues that ideology not only determines 
the EU stances of political parties but governments as well. Accordingly, leftist 
governments are more supportive of European integration than rightist governments 
(ibid.). For instance, in the Council of Ministers, leftist governments tend to choose 
‘co-operation’, while rightist governments are more inclined to defend ‘autonomy’ 
(Aspinwall 2007: 112). Challenging the mainstream International Relations literature 
which highlights ‘national interests’ and ‘distribution of power’ as the determinants of 
government preference, Aspinwall (2007: 112) considers ideology as an important 
explanatory factor, because ‘governments are made up of parties, who appear to bring 
their ideological predispositions to government policy choice’. 
Similar to Aspinwall (2002), Conti and Memoli (2012: 104) find that Eurosceptcism 
is mostly associated with extreme right and extreme left parties, while centre parties 
are generally supportive of European integration. They explain that unconditional 
opposition to European integration (Hard Euroscepticism) is largely attributed to 
extreme right parties since extreme left tends to express less radical and more 
reformist criticisms against the European project (Conti and Memoli 2012: 105). 
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Previous studies that accepted the importance of the Left/Right ideological divide to 
explain political contestations against European integration did not necessarily rely 
upon the difference between extreme and centre ideologies. For instance, Hix and 
Lord (1997) introduced the independence/integration dimension to better explain the 
effects of the ‘national sovereignty’ argument in the formulation of domestic stances 
towards the EU project. In other words, the Left/Right division is not sufficient to 
explain party stances towards European integration because, both left and right parties 
are internally divided between party members who emphasize national sovereignty 
and independence and those who have a more transnational outlook. In this context, it 
is possible to depict the European political space as essentially ‘two-dimensional’ 
including ‘an Integration-Independence dimension, arising from the different 
identities and interests of national and territorial groups; and a Left-Right dimension, 
arising from the different interests of (transnational) socio-economic groups (i.e. 
classes)’ (Hix 1999: 92). The independence/integration dimension emphasizes that 
political parties are positioned on ‘a continuum from ‘more’ to ‘less’ integration’ (Hix 
1999: 73). Accordingly,  there are four possible types of party attitudes towards 
European integration, namely; Left/more integration, Left/less integration, Right/more 
integration, and Right/less integration (Hix and Lord 1997). 
Alternatively, Marks and Steenbergen (2002: 883) explain that the mainstream study 
of International Relations considers European integration free from ideological 
contestations. Realist scholars argue that national leaders formulate their EU policies 
according to national interests; Liberal intergovernmentalists claim that economic 
pressures determine domestic attitudes towards European integration, and 
Neofunctionalists believe in the cost-benefit assessments of elite actors (not only 
leaders, party officials but also bureaucrats) to determine their approach towards 
European integration ‘in a dynamic context of problem solving, spillover, and 
learning’ (ibid.). Therefore, despite their differences in the analysis of elite response 
to European integration, they have a common argument: ‘contestation [against 
European integration] is independent of the Left/Right concerns that frame domestic 
politics’ (Marks and Steenbergen 2002: 884). However, Marks and Steenbergen 
(2002: 889) claim that EU positions of political actors are coherently structured on the 
basis of Left/Right ideological alignments since the Left/Right dimension primarily 
34 
 
determines ‘the opinions, stances, and behavior of citizens, social movements, and 
political parties’. Referring to Marks et al (2002), they suggest adding the ‘libertarian-
authoritarian’ dimension into the analysis (Marks and Steenbergen 2002: 890). 
Accordingly, libertarian parties are more likely to be pro-EU, while authoritarian 
parties rather tend to be Eurosceptic (ibid.).  
Building upon the independence/integration dyad advanced by Hix and Lord (1997) 
and the libertarian-authoritarian dichotomy discussed by Marks et al (2002), a new 
ideological category has been introduced by Marks et al. (2006: 157); namely, the 
GAL (green/alternative/libertarian) - TAN (traditionalism/authority/nationalism) 
distinction that is informed by party preferences on non-economic issues such as 
environmental protection, traditional values rooted in secular-religious divide and/or 
immigration and preservation of national community (ibid.). A political party 
categorized as TAN party is likely to defend nationalism, conservatism and traditional 
cultural values; oppose immigrants and minority rights, and remain indifferent to 
environmental degradation; prefer order to ‘unbridled participation and freedom’ and 
claim that ‘the government should be a firm authority that expresses moral voice’. 
(Hooghe et al 2002: 967). Alternatively, a political party can be qualified as a GAL 
party, if it supports equal chances for everybody regardless of religion, ethnicity, 
gender and race; supports abortion, doctor-assisted suicide, same-sex marriages; 
favours increased democratic participation and freedom of speech; gives priority to 
environmental concerns and urges expansion of rights for immigrants and minorities 
(ibid.). Marks et al. (2006) argue that GAL parties tend to be pro-EU while TAN 
parties show more Eurosceptic reflexes in both Western and Eastern European 
countries. It is actually not surprising for GAL parties to support European 
integration, because the main principles of the European integration project (in 
particular, the ‘four freedoms’ promoting the free movement of people, goods, capital 
and services) emphasize the notion of human rights and social, cultural, economic and 
political exchange at the expense of national boundaries, much in line with the liberal 
outlook of GAL parties. Likewise, TAN parties are expected to reflect Euroscepticism 
as they tend to oppose supranational decision-making which undermines national 
sovereignty.   
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Similarly, Hooghe and Marks (2008: 15) explain that the Left/Right contestation can 
structure party competition on European integration; yet they admit that economic 
Left/Right approaches are not sufficient to determine the EU stances of political 
parties. For instance, it is not possible to measure the effects of ‘national identity’ on 
party attitudes towards Europe by only relying on a Left/Right distinction (Hooghe 
and Marks 2008: 17). Therefore, they suggest employing the GAL/TAN distinction in 
order to identify the effects of non-economic determinants of party positions towards 
European integration (ibid.). For instance, TAN parties (such as the FN that represents 
the extreme right in France) oppose European integration which allegedly weakens 
national sovereignty and damages national identity (ibid.). Conservative parties only 
reflect a moderate TAN stance since although they defend national sovereignty and 
identity, their economic neo-liberalism supports pooling national sovereignty to 
achieve more economic integration (ibid.). Therefore, conservative parties, including 
the British Conservatives, the French Gaullist party and the German Christian 
Democrats often face a dilemma between nationalist and neoliberal elements sending 
mixed signals regarding their EU stances (ibid.).  
For their part, Left/GAL parties find the European project’s emphasis on market 
policies incompatible with Leftist economic policies (Hooghe and Marks 2008: 17). 
Nevertheless, Left/GAL parties such as Green Parties mostly endorse European 
integration due to its support for the establishment of ‘a multi-cultural European 
society’ notwithstanding its different economic approach and the so-called 
‘democratic deficit’ it suffers from (ibid.). Therefore, their GAL stance determines 
their support for European integration although their Leftist economic approach 
contests the economic liberalism of the European integration project. However, this 
often leads to internal divisions within Left/GAL parties as in the example of the 2005 
French and Dutch Referenda on the European Constitution which led to the creation 
of  ‘NO’ camps within Social Democrat parties (ibid.). On the other hand, party 
stances towards European integration in the CEECs are more clearly polarized 
‘because GAL/TAN and Left/Right positions reinforce, rather than crosscut, each 
other’ (Hooghe and Marks 2008: 18). For instance, Left parties, including the 
unreformed Communist parties, tend to be TAN, and TAN parties, including agrarian 
and populist parties, tend to be Left (ibid.). Therefore, in the CEECs, Left/TAN 
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parties tend to be Eurosceptics while Right/GAL parties are likely to be pro-EU 
(ibid.).  
Flood and Soborski (2011: 22) believe that the GAL-TAN model is valuable in the 
analysis of party ideology since ‘it is more hard-edged, less fuzzy and capable of 
covering much larger numbers of cases in a more economical way’. However, they 
criticize it for overlooking significant factors that may explain ideological variation 
within and between parties, and thus can have an important bearing on their behaviour 
(ibid.). For instance, the significant influence of ‘traditional Catholicism’ in Polish 
politics make both rightist and leftist parties adopt TAN ideology disproving Marks et 
al (2006) who claim that ‘in Central and Eastern Europe TAN values correlate with 
left-wing positions in favour of state economic control, and GAL values with 
economic liberalism’ (ibid.). 
To further elaborate on party ideology, some scholars emphasize the importance of 
long standing cleavages within societies which shape political ideologies and structure 
party positions. For instance, Marks and Wilson (2000: 433) rely on social and 
political cleavages to explain the determinants of party attitudes towards European 
integration. They investigate to what extent the response of political parties to 
European integration is ‘filtered by historical predispositions rooted in social 
cleavages that structure political competition in West European party systems’ (ibid.). 
Benefitting from the cleavage theory of Lipset and Rokkan (1967), they explain that 
the era from the Protestant Reformation to the Industrial Revolution in which modern 
European party systems were shaped through ‘a series of historical conflicts about 
state building, religion and class’, resulted into the creation of ‘distinct and highly 
durable identities, social institutions and patterns of political contestation’ (ibid.). 
According to Marks and Wilson (2000: 434), these long standing ideological stances 
determine how today’s political parties react to new issues such as European 
integration. They don’t consider political parties as ‘empty vessels into which issue 
positions are poured in response to electoral or constituency pressures’, but as 
organizations with ‘historically rooted orientations that guide their response to new 
issues’ (ibid.). In this line of thinking, it is the long standing cleavages rather than 
strategic party competition which primarily govern the EU policies of political parties. 
Marks and Wilson (2000: 437-9) give examples of party positions towards the EU 
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stimulated by (class, religious and core-periphery) cleavages. European integration 
has both an economic and political character which creates tension for political parties 
competing on the class (or Left/Right) cleavage (Marks and Wilson 2000: 437). For 
instance, social democratic parties are challenged by the fact that economic 
integration threatens their regulatory economic approach for their own country, while 
political integration offers a prospect for establishing authoritative regulation at the 
European level (ibid.). For right wing parties, it is the same logic in reverse. European 
integration is economically advantageous since it promotes free market economy but 
politically it is undesirable because it ‘threatens to create a supranational government 
for the EU as a whole that can regulate markets while negating regime competition 
among individual states’ (Marks and Wilson 2000: 438). Therefore, European 
integration is both desirable and irritating at the same time for these political parties 
having contending ideological stances. 
Moreover, religious cleavages can structure party positions towards Europe as well. 
For instance, a Catholic party can support European integration because it is 
‘consistent with the supranational aspirations of the Catholic Church and the anti-
national bias of Catholic parties’, whereas the nationalistic character of Protestant 
churches is likely to lead Protestant parties to be rather sceptical of European 
supranationalism (ibid.). Finally, the centre–periphery cleavage is useful, in particular, 
to explain the EU policies of peripheral minority parties. Peripheral parties oppose 
centralization of authority; therefore, they are more likely to support European 
integration which facilitates decentralization (ibid.). On the other hand, nationalist 
parties are more likely to oppose European integration as it diffuses central authority 
and undermines state sovereignty (Marks and Wilson 2000: 439).  
Similarly, Marks et al (2002: 585) stress the importance of cleavages which ‘give rise 
to ideological commitments or “prisms” through which political parties respond to … 
European integration’ in Western Europe. Political parties formulate policies in 
conformity with their ‘long-lasting’ political agendas; therefore the ideological 
location of a party in a party family stands as a crucial determinant of its position 
towards European integration (Marks et al 2002: 585). Accordingly, liberals, 
conservatives, Christian democrats, social democrats, green and regionalist parties are 
listed as Europhile parties; while agrarian, extreme right and communist/extreme left 
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parties are generally considered as Eurosceptic (Marks et al 2002: 590). Similar to 
Aspinwall (2002), they point out that parties on the opposite edges of ideological 
spectrum tend to oppose European integration while centre parties tend to be more 
supportive of the EU project (Marks et al 2002).     
 
1.2.2. Strategy 
On the other hand, it is claimed that party stances towards European integration are 
rather strategic choices of parties due to stiff domestic competition with other parties 
and changing voter preferences. For instance, Sitter (2001), relying on the cases of 
Nordic countries, attributes a greater role to party competition in the analysis of party-
based Euroscepticism. He claims that Euroscepticism is ‘the politics of opposition’. 
Being in government or opposition, according to Sitter (2001), makes a significant 
difference in the EU policies of political parties. For instance, ‘catch-all’ parties when 
in opposition experience difficulties in pursuing pro-EU policies, especially if party 
electorate is divided over the issue of European integration creating opposing factions 
within the party (Sitter 2001: 25). According to this argument, if a party is relegated 
from government to opposition, it tends to pursue Eurosceptic policies. On the other 
hand, Sitter (2001: 27) also argues that Eurosceptic parties are likely ‘to modify or 
avoid Euro-scepticism to the extent that they aspire to or actually participate in 
governing coalitions’. Therefore, ‘strategies of opposition and coalition-building’ 
change the dynamics of Euroscepticism and Euro-supportiveness in party politics 
(ibid.). Overall, Sitter (2001: 37) does not accept Euroscepticism as ‘a single coherent 
stance on the EU as a polity’, because not only ideology but also strategic decision-
making due to government-opposition positioning contributes to the development of 
Eurosceptic party politics. Similarly, Gaffney (1996: 19) downgrades the importance 
of party ideology arguing that ‘the EU can in principle engender allegiance or 
hostility from any ideological perspective’. He argues that once in government, 
political parties turn out to be more supportive of the EU project; for instance the 
French Communist Party toned down its critical stance towards the European 
Community after securing a place in the coalition government of 1981 (ibid.). 
Likewise, Taggart and Szczerbiak (2013: 21-29), although highlighting the fact that 
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not only opposition parties but also governments pursue Eurosceptic policies, explain 
how some Eurosceptic parties, such as  AKEL in Cyprus, the Centre Party in Estonia 
and the Green Party in Sweden, moderated their Euroscepticism and decreased the 
salience of the European issue when they were in government.    
Kopecký and Mudde (2002) argue that both ideology and strategy play a role in 
political party attitudes towards European integration. They suggest distinguishing 
those who support ‘the ideas underlying the process of European integration’ and 
criticize ‘the current and/or future direction of the EU’ from those who support both 
the ideas behind  EU integration and the current state of the EU (including EU 
institutions and policies). In their opinion, ideology determines ‘a party’s support for 
the ideas underlying the process of European integration’ but fails to explain whether 
a party will support the current EU polity or not (Kopecký and Mudde 2002: 319-
320). They argue that the likelihood of a party’s support for the idea of European 
integration can be inferred by looking at which party family it belongs to. Beyme 
(1985) identifies nine party families including liberal/radical, socialist/social 
democrat, conservative, communist, Christian democratic, agrarian, regional/ethnic, 
extreme right, and ecologist. Accordingly, parties that are affiliated with social 
democratic, conservative, Christian democrat, regional/ethnic and liberal traditions 
tend to generally endorse European integration whereas extreme right and extreme 
left/communist parties tend to reject the idea of European integration outright 
(Kopecký and Mudde 2002: 320). However, it is difficult, if not impossible to 
understand their attitudinal variation towards the EU institutions and policies by 
simply looking at political parties’ ideological alignments. It is thus necessary to 
consider the factor of strategy. For instance, in support of Gaffney (1996) and Sitter 
(2001), Kopecký and Mudde (2002: 321) claim that  being in opposition or 
government influences party stances towards the EU. Accordingly, those in 
opposition tend to be more sceptical of EU policies and institutional rules than 
governing parties.   
Hooghe and Marks (2008: 19) stress the fact that party leaders may extend strategic 
support for European integration if it carries an important potential to provide 
electoral popularity (ibid.). However, they claim that ‘the ability of party leaders to 
chase votes by strategic positioning is constrained by reputational considerations and 
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the ideological commitment of party activists’ (ibid.). According to Hooghe and 
Marks (2008: 19), political parties have long-term ideological commitments which 
‘constrain strategic positioning’; therefore, party leaders will not risk dividing the 
party, because ‘disunity not only reduces a party’s electoral popularity; it is the most 
frequent cause of party death’.   
Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008b) approach the ‘ideology vs strategy’ debate from a 
different angle. They stand against the arguments presenting the effects of ideology 
and strategy in dichotomous terms (as ‘either/or’), and they suggest acknowledging 
the significance of both ideology and strategy as the key determinants of party 
Euroscepticism (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008b: 239). Accordingly, party preferences 
on the EU project are determined by two underlying factors: (1) a party’s ideological 
profile and values, and (2) the perceived interests of party supporters (Szczerbiak and 
Taggart 2008b: 256). Which factor plays a greater role in party preferences depends 
on whether the party under scrutiny ‘is primarily a more ideological, value-based 
goal-seeking or a more pragmatic office-seeking party’ (ibid.). A goal-seeking party 
will base its actions on its ideology whereas the office-seeking party will ‘undertake a 
cruder economic cost–benefit analysis of how European integration is likely to benefit 
its supporters’ (ibid.). It is not an easy task ‘to “read” a party’s position [on European 
integration] from whatever ideological family it belongs to’, because not all parties 
act in accordance with their ideological traditions (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008b: 
257). Overall, contrary to the expectation of Hooghe and Marks (2008), there is no 
‘straightforward linear relationship between general party ideology and party position 
on Europe’ (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008b: 257).  
 
1.2.3. Other factors 
Ideology and strategy are not the sole determinant factors influencing party 
behaviours towards European integration. National specificities are also depicted as 
important triggers of Euroscepticism. For instance, Gaffney (1996: 5) highlights the 
‘national character’ of political parties and challenges the effects of party families on 
attitudes towards European integration. He argues that numerous parties which are 
considered within the same party family, such as the German SPD and the Spanish 
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Socialists, turn out to be very much different from each other due to their ‘national 
specificities’ (Gaffney 1996: 4).  
Similarly, Flood and Soborski (2011: 3) find that positive and negative perceptions of 
EU integration in general, and of specific EU policies in particular, cannot be directly 
explained by ‘the broad ideological orientations associated with a given party family 
or its characteristic location on the left/right axis’. For example, the British 
Conservative Party, the French UMP, the Polish PO and the PiS are all considered as 
centre right parties but they demonstrate varying degrees of support for and 
opposition to European integration (ibid.). Flood and Soborski (2011: 4) believe that 
domestic specificities such as factions within parties, varying degrees of nationalism 
and the role of religion in domestic politics are influential for parties to prioritize their 
policy choices regarding the ‘relative costs and benefits of integration’. For instance, 
although the UMP in France was largely a pro-EU party, the emergence of a 
nationalist faction against the adoption of the Treaty of European Union (TEU) in 
1992 constituted a significant challenge to the UMP’s support for European 
integration (Flood and Soborski 2011: 9). Moreover, the strong attachment of the PiS 
in Poland to traditional Catholicism jeopardizes its support for European integration 
due to the secular character of EU politics (Flood and Soborski 2011: 24). 
Finally, Conti and Memoli (2012) argue that party attitudes to European integration 
are different in new and old member states. They claim that parties in new member 
states (including mainstream parties) rather remain cautious to further advancement in 
the EU project and grow more reluctant than parties in old member states about ‘the 
supranational mode of decision-making’, as they are ‘more concerned about the 
defence of national identity’ (Conti and Memoli 2012: 106).     
Overall, the extant literature focuses on ideology and strategic choices as well as 
national character and religion as the underlying factors which determine whether a 
political party supports or opposes European integration. However, these factors are 
all domestic in nature and fail to offer a definitive explanation to the changing party 
positions towards the EU especially in accession countries. This study claims that not 
only domestic factors such as ideology and party competition but also external factors 
(caused by the EU) determine party stances in candidate countries towards the EU and 
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their EU accession in particular, because, as elaborated in Chapter II, opposition to the 
EU often materializes as a reaction to the EU’s accession conditionality which is 
perceived as selective and discriminatory in accession countries. For instance, the 
EU’s selectivity in the application of its minority rights condition led many political 
parties in different candidate countries to revise their support for EU accession (Fawn 
2001; Jovic 2006; Koinova, 2011).    
 
1.3. Euroscepticism in Accession Countries 
As elaborated in Chapter II, concerning party-based Euroscepticism, Szczerbiak and 
Taggart (2008a:242) attach priority to ‘underlying support for or opposition to the 
European integration project as embodied in the EU’ and ‘attitudes towards further 
actual or planned extensions of EU competencies’ rather than ‘a party’s support for or 
opposition to their country’s membership at any given time’. They differentiate 
between opposition to European integration and opposition to EU membership, 
because it is not possible to trace a party’s ‘deeper position’ on European integration 
from its attitudes towards EU membership (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008b: 243). 
Therefore, it is difficult to apply Euroscepticsm to candidate countries because 
domestic political actors are not much interested in broader discussions on European 
integration; they rather focus on the membership process (Szczerbiak 2008). The most 
popular exception is the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) in the Czech Republic whose 
leader Vaclav Klaus denounced the EU as ‘too bureaucratic and too economically 
interventionist as a result of its origins in the post-war West European social and 
Christian democracy’ (Hanley 2008: 255).  
Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008a: 4) emphasize that one ‘must be wary of confusing the 
tough negotiating positions of parties when in government and engaged in the 
negotiations for EU membership with “Euroscepticism”’. However, the mainstream 
literature is replete with analyses which fail to differentiate between opposition to 
European integration and opposition to EU membership, and use the Hard-Soft 
typology for candidate countries. For instance, scrutinizing Polish political parties 
during the accession process, Markowski and Tucker (2010) treat any critical stance 
against Polish membership process as an example of Euroscepticism. Ladrech (2009: 
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11) depicts critical party responses to EU accession conditionality in Croatia, 
Montenegro, and Serbia as Soft Euroscepticism. Agapiou-Josephides (2011: 169) 
discusses the EU policies of Cypriot political parties in the context of a transition 
from Hard Euroscepticism to Soft Euroscepticism, implying a shift from opposing EU 
entry to ‘accepting EU membership but [remaining] critical of it’. Similarly, Batory 
(2008) applies the Hard-Soft typology to Hungarian political parties based on their 
critical stance towards their country’s EU negotiation process. Accordingly, she 
considers the Justice and Life Party (MIEP) as Hard Eurosceptic since the MIEP 
rejects EU membership outright; on the other hand, the Hungarian Fidesz party is Soft 
Eurosceptic due to its criticisms against the negotiation process (ibid.).  
Moreover, Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2006: 143) explain the increasing number 
of party contestations against EU membership in accession countries as the 
accumulation of Euroscepticism triggered by both nationalism and domestic cost-
benefit calculation. This argument supports Lindstrom (2002) who claims that 
Euroscepticism in Croatia is essentially triggered by nationalist sentiments while 
political contestations against EU membership in Slovenia are mainly of pragmatic 
nature.  
Finally, Hughes et al (2002) discuss party contestations in the CEECs and tend to use 
opposition to European integration and opposition to EU membership 
interchangeably. They define Soft Euroscepticism in accession countries as a critical 
position against ‘the impact of EU membership as regards (a) specific sectoral 
interests and policy areas, (b) the purchase of land by foreigners, or (c) national 
interests and loss of sovereignty’, ‘without opposing membership outright’ (Hughes et 
al 2002: 334). They nevertheless revise their approach to Euroscepticism in a recent 
article admitting the fact that critical stance in accession countries against EU 
membership negotiations is prone to be confused with Euroscepticism (Hughes et all 
2008: 190).  
The application of Hard and Soft Euroscepticism to candidate countries is observed in 
scholarly works on the Turkish case as well (Güneş-Ayata, 2003; Spiering 2007; 
Gülmez, 2008, Gülmez and Buhari-Gülmez, 2008; Taraktaş, 2008; Yıldırım et al., 
2008; Avcı 2011b; Celep 2011; Verney 2011; Yılmaz 2011). The main opposition 
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party in Turkey, the CHP has often been depicted as a Soft Eurosceptic party due to 
its hard-line position against EU-led reforms despite its traditional pro-EU orientation 
(Spiering 2007; Gülmez, 2008; Gülmez & Buhari-Gülmez, 2008; Celep 2011; Verney 
2011; Yılmaz 2011). The MHP’s EU stance on the other hand has been more 
controversial due to its far right nationalism. Güneş-Ayata (2003: 212) and Spiering 
(2007: 176) consider the MHP as a Hard Eurosceptic party since party officials had 
called for the withdrawal of Turkey’s EU membership bid, and stressed the necessity 
for Turkey to seek new alliances outside Europe. Avcı (2011b: 445) and Yılmaz 
(2011: 195) explain that the MHP often navigates between Hard and Soft 
Euroscepticism due to strategic considerations: it becomes Soft Eurosceptic when in 
government and Hard Eurosceptic when in opposition. On the other hand, the AKP 
government and the pro-Kurdish BDP have been considered as the only true pro-EU 
parties in the Turkish parliament (Yılmaz 2011).  
The Hard-Soft typology has become so popular in  Turkish academia that it has even 
been used to explain the EU stances of public opinion and trade unions in Turkey 
(Güneş-Ayata 2003; Yıldırım et al 2008). Güneş-Ayata (2003: 206) depicts the 
Turkish public as Soft Eurosceptic due to its tendency to oppose EU-led reforms 
despite its traditionally high level of support for membership. Yıldırım et al (2008) 
consider Turkish trade unions as Soft Eurosceptic relying on their official statements 
finding particular EU reforms (such as reforms of minority rights) detrimental to 
national sovereignty.         
Overall, the relevant literature tends to apply the typology of Hard-Soft 
Euroscepticism to accession countries despite the fact that party contestations against 
EU membership do not necessarily qualify as Euroscepticism. Some scholars seek to 
escape this tendency by emphasizing the difference between opposition to European 
integration and opposition to EU accession. For instance, Rulikova (2004) highlights 
the distinct context of the accession process which makes party-based Euroscepticism 
in candidate countries completely different from Eurosceptic attitudes in EU member 
states. She states that political parties in accession countries take a critical stance 
against their own EU accession process rather than European integration as a whole 
(Rulikova 2004: 34). As the accession process dictates a candidate to ‘tacitly adapt 
most, if not all, external outputs to its legal domestic order’, domestic political actors 
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tend to react to such top-down reforms (ibid.). Accordingly, most political parties 
officially support membership but ‘schizophrenically’ react to membership conditions 
which would allegedly ‘damage’ the country (Rulikova 2004:40). However, Rulikova 
(2004) does not elaborate on how party-based Euroscepticism in candidate countries 
develops as a reaction to the complexities deriving from the application of the EU’s 
membership conditionality. Stojic (2011: 4) admits the fact that it is difficult to 
identify Serbian political parties as Eurosceptical as no Serbian party shares any views 
on European integration; instead, they all concentrate upon Serbia’s membership 
process (ibid.). However, Stojic does not offer a framework to apply Euroscepticism 
to candidate countries. The main objective of this study is to fill the gap in the 
literature by developing a framework based on Euroscepticism that better explains the 
case of accession countries and Turkey in particular.    
 
1.4. Party attitudes towards European integration in Turkey 
Opposition to EU accession had penetrated into the rhetoric of political forces located 
on the fringes of the Turkish political system since the 1960s (Yılmaz 2009a). Radical 
leftist groups perceived Turkey’s EU membership as ‘an appendance of American 
imperialism’, Islamist groups opposed it since they considered the EU as a ‘Christian 
club’, and finally radical right groups rejected membership as it would disintegrate the 
Turkish Republic (ibid.). For their part, mainstream political parties rather praised EU 
membership as the fulfilment of Ataturk’s modernization project emphasizing the 
economic and democratic developments Turkey’s EU accession would bring (Gülmez 
2008; Celep 2011). 
Initiating the formal association with the European Community (EC) through the 
signature of the Ankara association agreement in 1963, Turkey sought to become a 
part of the EC ever since. Although the 1980 coup d’état jeopardized its European 
vocation for a brief period, Turkey   made its official membership application in 1987 
and was granted the official candidate status in 1999 (Öniş and Grigoriadis 2010: 
264). The AKP’s rise to power in 2002 remarkably increased Turkey’s EU accession 
prospects. Shortly after its electoral victory, the AKP government devoted much 
energy to comply with the Copenhagen criteria through a series of economic and 
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political reforms which triggered the golden age of Turkey-EU relations resulting in 
the initiation of accession negotiations (Öniş 2008: 38). The AKP’s active 
Europeanism divided the scholarly literature. On the one hand, some scholars 
explained the AKP’s EU policy with its liberal agenda aiming to democratize Turkey 
more than ever. The AKP was depicted as a ‘conservative globalist’ which 
successfully mobilized the masses to achieve democratization through EU 
membership (Öniş 2007). It was also praised by some as the bringer of Kantian peace 
to Turkey that had long been struggling with internal conflicts (Kirişci 2006). 
Accordingly, the AKP’s pro-EU policies carried a great potential to establish  ‘New 
Turkey’ which is conservative but more democratic and prosperous (Fuller 2008). 
On the other hand, numerous scholars argue that the AKP’s pro-EU stance was purely 
strategic. As a pro-Islamic political actor, the AKP approached EU accession process 
as a survival strategy through which it aimed to gain political leverage against 
Kemalist veto players including the Army, the Judiciary and the CHP that had closed 
down the Welfare Party (RP), the predecessor of the AKP (Çınar 2008; Yavuz 2009; 
Öniş 2010; Saatçioğlu 2010; Baudner 2012; Kaliber 2013; Saatçioğlu and El Basani 
2013). The AKP government supported EU membership as long as the accession 
criteria aligned with its political preferences and survival strategies (Kirişci 2009; 
Kubicek 2011; Baudner 2012; Börzel 2012). The AKP’s commitment to EU reforms 
is often criticized as ‘arbitrary and functional’ (if not ‘phony’), and there is a question 
mark over whether the party is ever devoted to ‘European collective identity, norms 
and rules, or policy coordination’ (Rahigh-Aghsan 2011: 44). After the suspension of 
negotiations in 2006, the AKP resorted to ‘loose Europeanization’ implying that ‘the 
EU will be no longer at the center-stage’ of the AKP’s foreign policy agenda (Öniş 
and Yılmaz 2009: 20). According to Avcı (2011a: 419) and Oğuzlu (2012: 233), this 
‘passive activism’ involving a minimum stay in the EU game is necessary for the 
AKP, since abandoning the EU quest might damage the AKP’s external credibility 
and even give credit to the accusations of its secular rivals that the AKP had a hidden-
agenda to Islamize Turkey. On the other hand, others claim that the AKP no longer 
needs to hide its pro-Islamic political agenda and it no longer requires a pro-EU 
outlook in its policy making, since it has already consolidated its authority and power 
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at home neutralising its secular rivals including the Turkish army and the Judiciary 
(Baudner 2013; Kubicek 2013; Saatçioğlu and El Basani 2013). 
The EU policy of the CHP, the main opposition party is rather contradictory. The 
party has long been supporting EU membership with the justification that EU 
accession will help the realization of Kemal Ataturk’s ideals for a modern and 
Westernized Turkey. However, its self-proclaimed historical legacy to preserve 
Ataturk’s Republic forces the CHP to resist the EU-led reform processes that have 
sought to empower domestic rivals of the Kemalist establishment, including the 
Kurdish minority and political Islamist groups (Keyman and Öniş 2007: 214). 
Therefore, it is the Kemalist principles which make the CHP support and criticize EU 
membership at the same time (Celep 2011). The CHP’s hard-line approach towards 
Turkey’s EU membership process has become stronger during the leadership of Deniz 
Baykal whose self-declared duty was to protect the integrity of the Turkish Republic 
against internal and external threats (Yılmaz 2011). Öniş (2010: 361) explains that the 
CHP as well as other secular political elites in Turkey supported EU membership in 
order to consolidate the secular and modern character of Turkey and prevent the 
Islamisation of Turkish society, but they were annoyed by the EU’s support for the 
pro-Islamic AKP government’s reformist policies.    
The literature offers two main explanations (strategy and ideology) to the CHP’s 
critical stance towards EU membership. For instance, Celep (2011) explains the 
CHP’s critical stance towards the EU with government-opposition dynamics. He 
argues that the CHP adopted a critical position against EU accession in order to 
challenge the AKP government’s pro-EU policy and weaken its electoral popularity 
(Celep 2011: 424). Likewise, Baudner (2012: 935) contends that the CHP’s critical 
EU policy did not necessarily stem from ‘a pure vote-maximizing strategy’; it was 
rather based on a more comprehensive strategy to delegitimize and even overthrow 
the pro-Islamic AKP government.  
On the other hand, Keyman and Öniş (2007: 214) highlight the CHP’s ideological 
commitment to Republican principles which structure its position towards Turkey’s 
EU membership. Although the CHP proclaims to be a Social Democrat party, its 
historical attachment to the protection of the Republic constrains its liberal rhetoric 
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and restricts its pro-EU stance (ibid.). The CHP’s hard-line stance against the EU 
further intensified with the realization that the EU membership process shifted ‘the 
balance of forces in Turkish politics in the direction of strengthening religious 
conservatives’ (Öniş 2010: 369). Accordingly, there emerged a paradoxical political 
climate in Turkey whereby the pro-Islamic AKP established itself as a vigorous 
supporter of EU accession, while the ‘Social democrat’ CHP turned out to be a 
‘defensive nationalist’ resisting the EU-led reform process (Öniş 2007: 247).  
Contrary to his predecessor (Deniz Baykal), the new leader of the CHP (Kemal 
Kılıçdaroğlu) embraced a liberal rhetoric aiming to revive Turkey’s EU accession 
perspective (Celep 2011; Baudner 2012; Kaliber 2013). He refrained from resorting to 
Baykal’s nationalism during his first election campaign and rather focused on 
domestic economic problems and fight against corruption (Cengiz and Hoffmann 
2012: 261). He also abandoned Baykal’s hard-line EU stance and often reiterated the 
CHP’s commitment to Turkey’s EU accession. Many scholars are convinced that the 
leadership change initiated a reform process within the CHP to abandon its 
conservative and nationalist rhetoric; yet they find it too early to talk about a liberal 
and pro-EU transformation of the CHP (Celep 2011; Baudner 2012; Oğuzlu 2012; 
Öniş 2012; Özipek 2012; Yanık 2012; Kaliber 2013).  
The MHP, as a far-right ultra-nationalist party, approaches EU membership with 
suspicion. Europeanization has never been an objective for the MHP since party 
officials rather consider Turkey-EU relations as ‘a matter of primarily economical and 
security-related alliances’ (Canefe and Bora 2003: 144). Despite several scholars who 
consider the MHP as Hard Eurosceptic, Öniş (2010: 369) states that the MHP’s 
opposition is ‘not to the idea of a EU membership per se, but to the conditions 
attached to a membership’ (similar to the CHP’s EU stance). Its long-standing 
dismissal of Turkey’s Kurdish problem and assumption that the EU-led reforms 
granting more rights to Kurds will ensure the partition of Turkey mainly structure its 
critical stance towards Turkey’s EU accession process (Avcı, 2011b: 441; Öniş, 2003: 
45). During its term in the office as a coalition partner between 1999 and 2002, the 
MHP opposed many EU-led reforms such as the freedom of speech and the abolition 
of the death penalty in order to protect the Turkish state against Kurdish separatism 
(Avcı, 2011b: 440). Nevertheless, the MHP’s EU stance is not only guided by its 
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nationalist ideology but it also follows strategy. As previously pointed out, the MHP 
adopted a softer stance towards EU membership when in government (1999-2002), 
whereas it has demonstrated a hard-line stance when in opposition (Avcı 2011b: 445).    
Finally, the pro-Kurdish BDP has often been taken for granted as a pro-EU party 
without much elaboration (Öniş 2010; Yılmaz 2011; Oğuzlu 2012). There are a few 
scholarly works scrutinizing the EU policy of the BDP in detail. A recent study by 
Balcı (2013) argues that it is the combination of ideological commitments and 
strategic party competition which has forced the BDP to reflect an ‘in-between’ 
position towards EU membership. Accordingly, since the party is ideologically 
affiliated with the PKK that is accepted as a terrorist organization by the EU, the BDP 
had to revise its pro-EU stance after the PKK’s recent critical turn towards EU 
accession (ibid.). However, the BDP did not totally abandon its support for EU 
accession and party officials did not desire to be identified as Eurosceptic, because 
they had no intention to be considered in the same camp with their traditional 
Kemalist rivals including the CHP and the MHP (Balcı 2013: 15).   
The Cyprus problem and the EU’s Cyprus conditionality have also been discussed by 
some as important external triggers of party contestations against EU membership in 
Turkey (Eylemer and Taş 2007; Spiering 2007; Gülmez and Buhari-Gülmez 2008; 
Öniş and Yılmaz 2009; Öniş 2010; Oğuzlu 2012). Until the AKP era, there was a 
consensus among Turkish political parties to attach priority to Turkey’s Cyprus policy 
over EU membership (Gülmez and Buhari-Gülmez 2008). The AKP government’s 
support for the Annan Plan changed the traditionally conservative Turkish approach 
towards the Cyprus problem and was faced with strong resistance at home mainly led 
by the opposition parties, the CHP and the MHP (ibid.). However, the failure of the 
Annan Plan and the partial suspension of accession negotiations in 2006 due to 
Turkey’s failure to comply with the EU’s Cyprus conditionality diminished the 
enthusiasm of the AKP government not only to solve the Cyprus problem but also 
work for the realization of Turkey’s EU membership (Öniş and Yılmaz 2009; Öniş 
2010; Oğuzlu 2012). 
Another explanatory factor that is emphasized in the Turkish case is the ‘Sèvres 
Syndrome’ which may structure the critical EU stances of Turkish political parties. 
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The ‘Sèvres Syndrome’ refers to ‘fear of plots by external enemies, especially the 
Western countries, and their alleged internal collaborators –ethnic and religious 
minorities in Turkey– to weaken, carve up and terminate the existence of the Turkish 
Republic’ (Nefes 2013: 252). Fear of division is well-entrenched within  Turkish 
society. Recent studies indicate that an important portion of the Turkish public 
believes in the existence of foreign conspiracies to dismantle the Turkish Republic 
(Guida 2008; Yılmaz 2006 and 2009a).  
The ‘Sèvres Syndrome’ has also a religious connotation as it secures a deep-seated 
conviction that the West (in particular, Europe) acts with a Crusader mentality to 
sweep Muslim Turks away from Anatolia and return those lands back to their rightful 
owners, i.e. the Christians (Yılmaz 2006: 36-37). Therefore, it is not only embraced 
by Republicans but also conservative Muslims who fear the reincarnation of the 
Crusader spirit to destroy the Muslim presence in Anatolia (Yılmaz 2006; Guida 
2008). The recent murders of several Christians in Turkey including a reverend in 
Trabzon have been explained in the literature as the culmination of this ‘insecurity 
complex’ in the public against foreigners who are often seen as missionaries and 
conspirators against Turkey (Guida 2008: 38-42).  
       
The CHP and the MHP are depicted in the literature as the primary political actors 
reflecting the Sèvres Syndrome due to their strong bonds with the Republican regime 
and their self-proclaimed duty to protect it against foreign conspiracies (Guida 2008; 
Göçek 2011; Nefes 2013). According to this line of thinking, the CHP and the MHP 
grow sceptical of EU membership because they inherited a historical lack of trust 
against Europeans. On the other hand, the AKP government is often considered 
‘immune’ to the Sèvres Syndrome, since it does not share a Republican and statist 
ideology and its policies are mostly reformist in nature (Guida 2008; Göçek 2011; 
Nefes 2013). 
 
Finally, the literature points to the burgeoning Turkey-scepticism within the EU as an 
impediment to Turkey’s eventual accession. Utilitarian concerns such as a possible 
rise in unemployment and inflation in Europe after Turkey’s membership due to its 
large population and ailing economy; as well as its alarming human rights records, 
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Kurdish problem, its exposure to PKK terrorism, proximity to the troubled regions 
such as the Middle East are emphasized as the main justifications behind the growing 
reluctance of public and political elite in the EU against Turkish accession (Ruiz-
Jiménez & Torreblanca, 2007:2-3, Vreese et al., 2008: 513, Taraktas, 2008: 254). 
Moreover, according to some authors (Güneş-Ayata 2003; Yılmaz 2007; Canan-
Sokullu 2011), Turkey is not desired in the EU because it is not considered European. 
Güneş-Ayata (2003: 218) argues that throughout history, Europeans always perceived 
Turks as brutes and invaders, and European opposition to Turkey’s EU accession 
stands as the reincarnation of this mentality. Yılmaz (2007: 293) claims that Turkey is 
treated as an ‘other’ in the mental maps of many Europeans, primarily because Turks 
do not share the Christian tradition. A common fear within the European public is that 
Turkish membership will result in a step towards the Islamisation of Europe (Canan-
Sokullu 2011: 484). Overall, it is increasingly assumed that there is a significant trend 
of political opposition within Europe against Turkey’s EU entry. Recent scholarly 
works associate the rising Euroscepticism in Turkish politics with the increasing 
questioning of the very basis of Turkish membership by important European political 
figures such as Nicholas Sarkozy in France and Angela Merkel in Germany (Öniş and 
Yılmaz 2009; Öniş 2010 and 2012; Oğuzlu 2012).  However, the existing literature 
fails to discuss to what extent the EU stances of Turkish political actors can be 
associated with ‘opposition’ to Turkey coming from within the EU.   
Overall, this chapter discussed the prevailing literature about political contestations 
against European integration as a whole and the EU membership process. There are 
two problematic tendencies in the relevant literature. First, scholars use 
Euroscepticism to discuss party politics in accession countries although political 
actors in candidate countries primarily focus their criticisms on their country’s 
accession process rather than European integration and its trajectory. Second, the 
difference between opposition to Europe and opposition to the EU membership 
process often go unnoticed, since scholars lump them together as Euroscepticism. The 
Turkish case reflects a similar tendency. Turkish political parties focus on Turkey’s 
EU accession only. Hence, the scholarly works use Euroscepticism to explain Turkish 
opposition to EU membership, because of the general indifference in Turkish politics 
to wider discussions about European integration. However, opposition to EU 
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membership does not necessarily qualify as Euroscepticism in a broader sense since it 
does not give a clear idea about a party’s deeper stance on European integration. 
Therefore, it is necessary to develop a framework that explains Euroscepticism in 
candidate countries  bydistinguishing between opposition to European integration and 
party opposition to the membership process. Moreover, the scholarly works focusing 
on Turkey’s EU membership primarily explain the EU stances of Turkish political 
parties with domestic factors; namely strategy and ideology. Some studies also 
highlight the Cyprus conflict as an external trigger of political scepticism against EU 
membership in Turkey, while others emphasize the effects of the Sèvres Syndrome on 
the Euroscepticism of Turkish political parties. However, the prevailing tendency is to 
discuss domestic factors as if they are independent from external developments. Even 
though there is a growing literature that seeks to take into account EU-level factors 
such as European ‘reluctance’ towards Turkey’s accession, it fails to explain whether 
or how such ‘reluctance’ in Europe influences party politics in Turkey. This study 
suggests considering the interaction between domestic and external factors by 
discussing their effects on Turkish political parties comparatively. The study thus 
investigates whether Turkish political elites perceive an emerging opposition to 
Turkey in Europe and (if so), whether or how this perception structures their stance 
towards EU membership. Finally, the prevailing literature often offers only single-
party studies in the discussion of Turkish EU membership with a clear omission of the 
BDP’s EU policy. In order to remedy this gap, the study compares and contrasts the 
EU stances of all four political parties represented in the Turkish Parliament relying 
on original primary data gathered through elite interviews conducted by the author. 
The next chapter will offer a detailed discussion of the term Euroscepticism to explain 
political party contestations in candidate countries against the EU accession process. 
Identifying Euroscepticism  reflected by political actors in accession countries as a 
critical stance against EU membership in response to the complex nature of the EU’s 
membership conditionality (consisting of both issue-specific and country-specific 
conditions), the chapter will finally specify six main hypotheses in order to find out 
the main determinants of Eurosceptic politics in accession countries and Turkey in 
particular.  
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CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: 
EUROSCEPTICISM IN CANDIDATE COUNTRIES 
 
This thesis follows the suggestion that there is a need for a different analytical 
framework for the study of political party positions towards European Union (EU) 
membership in candidate countries. It demonstrates that the explanatory power of 
models based on Euroscepticism –defined as opposing Europe– diminishes when the 
focus of the study shifts from member countries to the accession countries and from a 
holistic view of European integration process to the particular stage of accession 
negotiations. A critical stance embraced in candidate countries does not necessarily 
qualify as opposition to Europe as a whole, but it rather tends to target EU 
membership conditionality and its membership negotiations. In order to highlight this 
point, the study suggests applying the term Euroscepticism to candidate countries  
emphasizing the domestic resistance against EU membership in reaction to the 
complications and the uncertainty that arise from bilateral negotiations over EU 
membership. Euroscepticism in candidate countries can be distinguished from 
Euroscepticism in member states by its specific focus on accession negotiations and a 
strong emphasis on the reactionary nature of sceptical attitudes in candidate countries 
as opposed to a broader perspective that is applied mostly to member states.   
In this context, Euroscepticism in candidate countries stresses  the rise of negative 
reactions during accession negotiations, deriving not only from domestic 
considerations (domestic cost-benefit calculations and threat perceptions) but also 
from the EU’s perceived selectivity in the application of its conditionality. The EU’s 
application of conditionality is perceived as highly selective when it expands its 
membership criteria by introducing additional conditions or applies its conditions in a 
selective and discriminatory manner. This sparks negative reactions because of the 
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uncertainty it generates. Assuming that different degrees and forms of uncertainty 
create different types of reactions in candidate countries, this study will examine the 
reactionary nature of Euroscepticism and the significance of the EU’s selectivity in its 
accession conditionality as a key determinant factor in explaining Eurosceptic party 
attitudes.  
Developing six hypotheses concerning the effects of party ideology and party 
competition (government-opposition positioning and electoral popularity) on 
Eurosceptic party behaviour, the chapter suggests that party-based Euroscepticism in 
candidate countries is only partly explained by political ideology and party 
competition. The explanatory power of these factors tends to diminish as the 
perception of selectivity in the application of EU’s conditionality increases. 
Accordingly, dissimilar parties (with different ideologies and positions in domestic 
political system) in candidate states tend to take a common stance towards EU 
membership process: they resist the EU accession process by claiming that the EU 
treats their candidacy unfairly. In this regard, focusing on political attitudes of a 
candidate country during the accession negotiations with the EU, this study aims to go 
beyond the prevailing accounts that explain scepticism towards the EU as merely 
reflecting domestic dispositions (like ideology or strategic choices). In order to grasp 
the reactionary nature of scepticism towards EU membership in a candidate country, 
it is necessary to consider the context in which the candidate country and the EU 
interact and how the EU’s treatment of accession negotiations is perceived by the 
candidate country.  
This chapter will first elaborate on Euroscepticism in candidate countries, which seeks 
to emphasize the interactionary context of the accession process. Euroscepticism is 
embraced by political actors against two types of EU conditionality (issue-specific 
and country-specific). Then, it will discuss the main determinants of party attitudes 
towards the EU in accession countries during membership negotiations under two 
categories: ideological and strategic. It will propose six hypotheses based on ideology 
(Left-Right and GAL/TAN dimensions of party ideology) and on strategy (party-
competition based on mainstream-fringe and government-opposition positioning). The 
main innovation of this research is to consider the effect of the EU-driven factors as a 
key determinant in explaining Euroscepticism in accession states.  
55 
 
 
2.1. A particular focus on the stage of EU accession negotiations in accession 
countries 
As previously discussed, the prevailing literature mainly explains party positions 
towards the EU with reference to the term ‘Euroscepticism’ defined as ‘the idea of 
contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified 
opposition to the process of European integration’ (Taggart 1998: 366). Despite the 
abundance of scholarly efforts to categorize Euroscepticism (Kopecký and Mudde 
2002; Conti 2003; Riishøj 2007; Flood and Soborski 2011), the most popular 
classification has been introduced by Taggart and Szczerbiak (2004) who argue that 
Euroscepticism involves two different forms of opposition to European integration: 
‘Hard’ and ‘Soft’ Euroscepticisms. ‘Hard Euroscepticism’ implies an ‘outright’ and 
‘unqualified’ rejection of European integration, while ‘Soft Euroscepticism’ suggests 
a ‘contingent and qualified opposition to European integration’. However, the 
Euroscepticism-based categories have been mainly designed for EU member states. 
Scholars often replicated the same categories in candidate countries rather than 
developing new models (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004: 2). This suggests some 
limitations. For instance while defining ‘Hard Eurosceptics’, Szczerbiak and Taggart 
(2008a: 2) more specifically refer to ‘parties who think that their countries should 
withdraw from membership’. Since candidate countries are not yet EU members, 
rather than demanding withdrawal from membership, hard Eurosceptics would be 
inclined to campaign for the withdrawal of their candidacy for EU membership. 
Application of the Kopecký and Mudde typology to candidate countries seems to be 
more problematic. For instance, Eurosceptics defined as both Europhile and EU-
pessimist do not make sense for a candidate country (Batory 2008: 267). If you are 
pessimistic about the EU’s current or future projection, why would you wish to join 
the EU in the first place? 
In response to critics, Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008b) refined their typology, which in 
the end better emphasized its focus on member states at the expense of candidate 
states. Accordingly, the priority is to grasp the ‘underlying support for or opposition 
to the European integration project as embodied in the EU’ and ‘attitudes towards 
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further actual or planned extensions of EU competencies’ rather than ‘a party’s 
support for or opposition to their country’s membership at any given time’ 
(Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008b:242). In other words, Euroscepticism in a broader 
sense is essentially used to categorize parties which oppose European integration, not 
necessarily the parties which only oppose their country’s accession to that project. 
The publications of other prominent scholars on European studies support Taggart 
and Szczerbiak as they associate Euroscepticism exclusively with opposition to 
European integration, not EU accession and they focus on member states, not 
candidate countries (Hix 2007). Hence, numerous academic works which used the 
same typology for analysing party reactions during the accession negotiation process 
have proven limited. An important reason is that, rather than the idea of integration or 
particular policy fields, it is the membership prospects which gather much attention in 
the candidate states (Szczerbiak 2008). Overall, this chapter aims to go beyond the 
mainstream literature by studying party attitudes towards EU membership in 
candidate countries and thus, focusing on the accession process rather than the post-
accession phase. In so doing, the study will use the concept of Euroscepticism to 
specifically scrutinize party attitudes in candidate countries towards EU membership. 
The next section explains the constitutive elements and varieties of Euroscepticism in 
candidate countries that distinguish it from Euroscepticism in member states. 
 
2.2. Why is Euroscepticism in candidate countries different from Euroscepticism 
in member states?  
Existing frameworks based on Euroscepticism investigate domestic attitudes towards 
overall European integration and its trajectory in member states, while neglecting the 
fact that the main concerns of political parties in candidate countries concentrate upon 
the prospects for their country’s membership. In this respect, there is a need to 
differentiate between opposition to Europe and opposition to EU membership as they 
imply two distinct phenomena. Therefore, in order to better evaluate party positions in 
accession countries, this study suggests differentiating between Euroscepticism in 
candidate countries and Euroscepticism in member states. Accordingly, 
Euroscepticism in candidate countries involves criticisms of, and reluctance for EU 
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accession reflected as a reaction to EU membership conditions. Euroscepticism in 
candidate countries differs from Euroscepticism in member states because its focus is 
limited to the temporal phase that follows the officialisation of a country’s EU 
candidacy until its accession to the EU. Hence, it scrutinizes the process through 
which a candidate country makes active efforts to comply with EU membership 
conditionality and negotiates the terms of its membership in line with the EU 
membership criteria.  
Overall, Euroscepticism in candidate countries assumes that (1) domestic political 
actors are more likely to concentrate their energy on membership conditionality rather 
than general issues of European integration; and (2) as compliance becomes costly for 
the candidate, and/or the EU fails to give enough incentives for membership, the 
political actors tend to react against EU-led reforms and show reluctance for 
membership.  
What essentially separates Euroscepticism in candidate countries from Euroscepticism 
in a broader sense is its focus on a different phase of European integration. 
Euroscepticism explains a broader process (European integration as a whole), while 
Euroscepticism in candidate countries elaborates on a particular stage (EU accession) 
of this process. Therefore, while Euroscepticism deals with an opposition to European 
integration in general, Euroscepticism in candidate countries primarily aims to explain 
opposition to the EU’s membership conditionality in particular. Moreover, 
Euroscepticism in member states reflects a view from the inside since it evaluates 
European integration through the lenses of member states. On the other hand, 
Euroscepticism in candidate countries brings an outside-in approach since it 
particularly examines the EU accession process through the lenses of candidate 
countries.  
Euroscepticism often signifies an opposition due to certain pre-existing negative 
views about what ‘Europe’ and/or ‘Union’ stand for with regard to historical 
collective memory or domestic ideological standpoints. Therefore, technically, not 
only political actors in member states but also candidate countries may reflect 
Euroscepticism, because negative preconceptions fuel nationalist sentiments and thus 
trigger strong reservations towards joining the EU in the first place. Here, opposition 
does not stem from the EU’s membership conditionality but from the previous 
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experiences of a country with Europe, Europeans and/or other Unions. The main 
focus is opposition to European integration rather than the EU membership. Naturally, 
if you are already opposed to European integration, as a non-member, you 
automatically stand opposed to accession as well. Such negative memories are 
essentially entrenched within the public which is mostly not well-informed about the 
European integration project, and tends to oppose it with reference to the negative 
collective memory they had against Europe, Europeans or other unions. For instance, 
due to their past experiences with the Soviet Union, public opinion in Baltic States 
and Estonia in particular, was negative towards the idea of joining another union, i.e. 
the European ‘Union’ (Mikkel and Kasekamp 2008). Vetik et al (2006: 1086) claim 
that the feeling of inferiority against Germans and the fear of Germanization led the 
Estonian public to forge a ‘reactive identity’ against assimilation under the EU 
umbrella. Moreover, the Munich Agreement of 1938 which resulted in the 
dismemberment of Czechoslovakia and the fall of the country into the hands of Nazi 
Germany under the appeasement policies of Britain and France constitutes a historical 
justification for the Czech hesitation to identify themselves with Western Europe 
(Hanley 2008: 244).  
 
Political parties on the other hand are less reflective of ancient hatred against Europe 
but there were still political actors during accession process who stood opposed to 
European integration with similar justifications. For instance, the League of Polish 
Families (LPR) reflects a negative preconception towards European integration 
depicting the EU as reinforcing the Germanisation of Poland. The LPR leader Roman 
Giertych dismissed the EU as the unwanted realization of a hundred years old plan of 
Bismarck and claimed that with the Polish membership, Germany would finally re-
access Polish lands which Poland had liberated from Germans fifty years ago 
(Lindstrom 2002: 16). Therefore, past experiences with Germany constitute the main 
basis of the LPR’s anti-EU policy. The party could be deemed as Hard Eurosceptic 
since it criticized all aspects of the EU, economic, political and ideological (Zuba 
2009: 334). The LPR campaigned against the 2003 membership referendum and even 
demanded the rejection of the accession treaty (Ibid).  
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Based on the above examples, critics might argue that negative preconception could 
only explain Hard Euroscepticism and/or Euro-rejection. However, negative views 
about Europe and Union do not necessarily culminate into Hard Euroscepticism. It 
also triggers Soft Euroscepticism. As an example, Vaclav Klaus, the leader of the 
Civic Democrats (ODS), even before the Czech Republic started accession 
negotiations, defied European integration claiming it to be ‘too bureaucratic and too 
economically interventionist as a result of its origins in the post-war West European 
social and Christian democracy’ (Hanley 2008: 245-255). Klaus based his criticism on 
the claim that after the signature of the Maastricht Treaty, the EU deviated from its 
original objective of economic partnership to an unrealistic political union ‘to create a 
federal European superstate rivalling the USA’ (Ibid). Nevertheless, he never 
questioned the necessity or desirability of the EU membership for the Czech Republic 
(Ibid). His party, especially while in government, consistently supported the country’s 
EU bid (Ibid). Klaus specifically opposed certain EU policies during the Czech 
Candidacy such as the European Defence Capacity which he found ‘unnecessary, 
impractical and undermining NATO’ (Riishøj 2007: 527-528). Besides, negative 
preconceptions towards Europe or/and Union however might not be automatically 
translated into Euroscepticism. As coined with the term ‘Europragmatism’ by 
Kopecký and Mudde (2002), political parties may still support membership and 
European integration with strategic motivations, for instance, to guarantee the survival 
of the party and the rights of its supporters (e.g. regional parties).  
 
By assuming that opposition to European integration encompasses opposition to EU 
membership, several studies treat negative attitudes in candidate countries as similar 
to Euroscepticism embraced by member states. Such studies overlook the fact that 
party programmes, policy documents, speeches and press statements in candidate 
countries do not reflect much interest in the overall integration project during the 
accession process but rather focus on the candidate’s membership prospects. 
Szczerbiak (2008) suggests that after they refined the concept of Euroscepticism, it 
became nearly impossible to identify who was Eurosceptic in candidate states; 
because, for instance, Polish political parties primarily focused on Polish membership 
prospects during the Polish candidature rather than European integration and its 
trajectory. Such a pragmatic stance is not only applicable to political parties but also 
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to other sub-national actors in the economic domain. Rather than a normative 
commitment to European integration, they are more concerned with the potential 
benefits of membership such as free trade and economic cohesion (Hughes et al 2002: 
335-336). Hence, their reactions to the EU are based on the ‘troubling’ accession 
process rather than the more elaborate discussions on the deepening or widening of 
the EU project (Ibid). Therefore, since Euroscepticism in candidate countries is 
different from Euroscepticism embraced by member states, there is a need to 
elaborate more on how political actors in candidate countries reflect Euroscepticism.  
Euroscepticism in candidate countries stresses  the emerging reactions to the EU’s 
accession conditionality in candidate countries during the membership negotiations. It 
explains that rather than the withdrawal of candidacy, the main motivation behind 
Euroscepticism in candidate countries is to guarantee membership with full benefits. 
In this respect, Euroscepticism in candidate countries emerges out of a candidate 
country’s concerns related to the complicated negotiation process with the EU. It is 
basically a domestic reaction to the uncertainty arising out of the accession 
negotiations with the EU. Political actors remain uncertain on what terms their 
country will be admitted to the EU. That’s primarily the reason behind domestic 
resistance to an EU-led reform process. They don’t desire accession through unilateral 
‘concessions’ to the EU in areas deemed important for national wealth, security and 
sovereignty. They rather aim for membership in their own terms. Besides, the EU’s 
failure to provide concrete and credible membership prospects increase the 
uncertainty and give national political parties more impetus to react against the EU-
led reforms in candidate countries (Rulikova 2004: 36-37). None of the candidate 
countries in the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) -except for the LPR 
(Zuba 2009)- witnessed the rise of an explicitly anti-European party during the pre-
accession process (Rulikova 2004: 40). Instead, most political parties officially 
support membership but ‘schizophrenically’ react to membership conditions which 
would allegedly ‘damage’ the country (Ibid). It is not easy to call all of them ‘Soft 
Eurosceptic’ because their main agenda is EU membership rather than the overall 
European integration project. They do not necessarily challenge the main tenets of 
European integration or its trajectory; they essentially react against the EU’s 
membership conditionality towards their country. Neumayer labels this type of stance 
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observed in the CEECs as ‘Eurorealism’, i.e. a pragmatic way of saying ‘yes, but’ to 
accession without any risk of facing de-legitimization or marginalization (Neumayer 
2008: 142-143).  Eurorealism is very much similar to Euroscepticism in candidate 
countries in terms of narrowing down the scope of the study into the sceptical 
reactions arising out of the accession negotiations. Therefore, there is no need to 
formulate a new term, especially when critical EU stances of candidate countries can 
already be explained with the term Euroscepticism.  Besides, unlike Eurorealism, 
Euroscepticism used for candidate countries not only reflects domestic calculations in 
response to EU conditionality but it also highlights the domestic responses arising out 
of the EU’s perceived selectivity and discriminations in the application of its 
conditionality.  Moreover, Euroscepticism in candidate countries is likely to be 
reversible. More credible membership prospects coupled with the dissipation of the 
perception of bias in the application of EU conditionality can help to dissipate 
negative reactions that arise during the accession negotiations in candidate countries.  
 
 
2.3. What drives Euroscepticism in candidate countries? 
The EU accession process is essentially depicted in the literature as an asymmetrical 
top-down process, in which a candidate country carries out the reforms and adopts the 
norms that the EU dictates for the sake of membership. During this process, according 
to Schimmelfennig (2008: 921), the success of political conditionality is contingent on 
three factors: (a) credible membership conditionality in which the EU promises 
eventual membership provided that a candidate complies with the accession criteria; 
(b) normative consistency which dictates that the EU should be ‘guided only by the 
democratic and human rights performance of the target countries’, without any 
discrimination based on nationality or culture; and finally (c) low political costs of 
domestic compliance with the EU. He argues that most of the times, (a) and (b) are 
met but the fulfilment of (c) has proven problematic; in other words, the main reason 
for non-compliance with EU criteria is the candidate states’ perception that 
compliance with the EU is too costly. Therefore, Schimmelfennig puts forward 
domestic cost-benefit calculations of candidates as determining domestic attitudes 
towards EU conditionality. On the other hand, Schimmelfennig put an emphasis on 
the diminishing credibility of the EU’s conditionality in Turkey following the EU’s 
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selective actions such as the introduction of absorption capacity which led to further 
uncertainty for Turkish membership (Schimmelfennig 2008: 933). Building upon the 
last point, the study aims to emphasize that domestic opposition not only stems from 
domestic considerations but also develops as a reaction to the EU’s selectivity in the 
application of its accession criteria. It is necessary to avoid considering the EU as a 
unified body. On the contrary, it could rather be considered as a multiplicity 
composed of (clashing) multiple actors, societies and cultures; thus it is prone to 
contradictions in its course of action (Biebuyck and Rumford 2012). The existence of 
multiple EU institutions with different agendas and capabilities, and numerous 
member states with differing cultures, social and political structures and interests 
supports the thesis of multiplicity. The unanimity rule behind the EU enlargement 
policy contradicts the depiction of enlargement as a solely technical process and 
emphasizes its political nature. The differing agendas of both member states and 
institutions complicate the decision making over the accession of new members 
hampering a standardized EU approach to each candidate’s accession process. 
Therefore, non-compliance in candidate countries also develops as a reaction to the 
EU’s failure to meet the conditions (a) and (b) outlined by Schimmelfennig (2008).  
 
Overall, there are both domestic and external/EU-led determinants of Euroscepticism. 
Accordingly, first, it develops as a reaction against the EU’s conditional pressures due 
to domestic considerations including, domestic cost-benefit calculations and/or threat 
perceptions (the criterion ‘c’ in Schimmelfennig’s account). Second, it materializes 
against selective external pressures from the EU and its member states (the criteria ‘a’ 
and ‘b’ according to Schimmelfennig). Several important domestic and EU-driven 
determinants of Euroscepticism are outlined in more detail below: 
 
2.3.1. Domestic factors 
Costs of adjustment: Political actors are likely to resort to Euroscepticism if they are 
convinced that social, economic and political costs of compliance with EU 
conditionality outweigh the benefits associated with membership. During the 
negotiation process, candidate countries suffer immediate economic costs (e.g. 
budgetary costs) in return for potential benefits in the medium and long term (Hughes 
et al 2002: 333). These short-term economic costs might also be translated into 
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political costs since domestic electorate may punish politicians who consented to the 
economic burden of the accession process (Ibid). Accordingly, domestic political 
actors take position against the reform process focusing on the costs it will bring to 
the national economy. For instance, in several accession countries including Poland 
and the Czech Republic, domestic opposition to the reform of foreign land ownership 
stemmed from economic concerns that foreign ownership would increase land prices 
enormously at the expense of local buyers (Tesser 2004: 214). Hungarian political 
actors justified their resistance with the claim that the foreign purchase of land would 
create land scarcity (Burger 2006).    
 
Threat Perceptions: Political actors are also likely to adopt Euroscepticism, if they 
believe that compliance with EU conditionality will threaten the integrity of state, 
domestic culture and identity. For instance, the EU-led reforms conferring greater 
rights to minorities were opposed by many political actors in accession countries with 
the justification that such laws would endanger national integrity and sovereignty 
(Morris 2004; Kelley 2004; Solska 2011). Especially, far right parties dismissed the 
EU’s membership conditionality as a threat for national sovereignty and economic 
independence (Neumayer 2008: 147). The Hungarian MIÉP (Hungarian Justice and 
Life Party) even associated the EU membership conditions with the terms of the 
Trianon Treaty that had resulted in the division of Hungarian lands after the First 
World War (Neumayer 2008: 147; Tunkrova 2010: 99).  
 
 
2.3.2. EU-driven Factors 
Uncertainty of membership: Political actors are likely to resort to Euroscepticism, if 
there is an uncertainty of membership in return for the fulfilment of accession criteria. 
The EU’s selective conditionality creates uncertainty regarding the terms of 
accession. However, this does not necessarily translate into uncertainty of the entire 
accession process. In some other instances, the EU’s pressures result in such a 
situation where domestic actors remain uncertain about the prospects of membership. 
It is acknowledged that new candidates face much more uncertainty in their accession 
process than the previous EU applicants since the institutionalization of the 
Copenhagen criteria (Schimmelfennig 2008: 919). However, the EU’s emphasis on 
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‘integration capacity’ coupled with the decision to put future enlargements to 
referendum creates even higher uncertainty about admission even after full 
compliance with membership criteria (Schimmelfennig 2008: 933). Moreover, the 
lack of clear membership perspective due to a clash between a candidate and a 
member state stimulates Eurosceptic reaction. In the cases of Macedonia, Croatia and 
Turkey, bilateral problems with an EU member state prevented the EU from 
guaranteeing accession. Domestic political actors found the EU’s position vis-à-vis 
the bilateral conflict as discriminatory, and grew further reluctant for EU accession 
(Gülmez and Buhari-Gülmez 2008; Koinova 2011; Zorić 2008).  
 
The EU’s selectivity in applying its membership conditionality: Political actors are 
likely to reflect Euroscepticism, if they find the EU’s conditionality selective and/or 
discriminatory. The EU’s conditionality is depicted in the literature as a ‘moving 
target’ which incorporates more and more conditions enforceable to new candidates 
over time (Hughes et al 2002: 333). Besides, it is no longer sufficient for the EU 
candidates to simply adopt the acquis communautaire. The EU has ‘shifted its 
emphasis from the adoption of the acquis, which is seen as a ‘formal’ requirement, to 
a vaguely defined notion of ‘capacity’ for its implementation’ (Ibid). Moreover, the 
consideration of strategic or economic goals can result into an inconsistent approach 
adopted by the EU in pushing for domestic change in different countries (Börzel 
2012). For instance, while the EU is less inclined to put pressure on candidate 
countries having resources (oil, gas) that the EU needs; it tends to put extra pressures 
on countries which are prone to illegal immigration and cross-border crime (Börzel 
2012: 14). Finally, on certain issues such as minority rights, the EU fails to force its 
member states to comply with its conditionality it started to apply to new candidates. 
This differential treatment of members and candidates draws negative reactions in 
many candidate countries (Ram 2003; Schwellnus 2005; Yılmaz 2012). For instance, 
political actors in Poland, the Czech Republic, Macedonia and Croatia explicitly 
justified their reluctance to proceed with the reforms of minority rights on the ground 
that the EU’s application of minority-rights conditionality had been highly 
inconsistent and constituted double standards (Fawn 2001; Koinova 2011; Tesser 
2003).  
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The EU’s ‘perceived’ reluctance towards the accession of a particular country: 
Political actors are likely to become Eurosceptic, if they perceive a remarkable lack of 
will in the EU concerning their accession. There are two main determinants for the 
spread of domestic perception about the EU’s lack of political will. First, the EU puts 
additional preconditions either targeting specifically the membership of a particular 
candidate country or slowing down the overall EU enlargement process. Second, 
political statements of leading European figures against the accession of a particular 
country or propositions such as ‘privileged partnership’ in lieu of full membership, 
provoke negative reactions in the candidate country in question. The Turkish case 
indicates that domestic political actors perceive a strong opposition within the EU 
against Turkish accession. The introduction of additional preconditions such as 
‘absorption capacity’, ‘open-ended negotiations’ and ‘permanent derogations’ to the 
official EU documents of Turkey’s membership negotiations has sparked strong 
protests in the country as it has generally been perceived as an indication of the EU’s 
reluctance against Turkey’s membership (Kirişci 2004; Öniş 2008). 
 
 
2.4. Varieties of Euroscepticism in candidate countries 
It is possible to distinguish two types of Eurosceptic attitudes in candidate countries 
depending on the nature of the EU’s membership conditionality. The first type is 
limited to certain issue areas, consisting of negative reactions against particular 
reforms deriving from the formal EU conditionality. Second, political actors also react 
negatively when the EU applies extra conditionality which specifically targets their 
country. Domestic political actors reject the additional conditions that are designed 
specifically for their own country.  
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2.4.1. Euroscepticism as reaction to the EU’s issue-specific conditionality 
Euroscepticism in candidate countries primarily develops during the negotiation 
process whereby domestic political actors oppose particular EU reforms, either due to 
high costs of compliance or to the perceived threats that those reforms pose to 
national sovereignty and identity (Schimmelfennig 2008; Hooghe and Marks 2008). 
This issue-specific reaction is frequently witnessed in most candidates having to fulfil 
the Copenhagen Criteria. Certain EU-sponsored reforms may be perceived as 
threatening to a country’s sovereignty and/or national interests since they often 
challenge domestic social and political norms and practices, and thus have the 
potential to make significant changes in people’s daily lives. For instance, in Slovakia 
and the Czech Republic, a common negative reaction among political parties was 
observed against ‘the sale of real estate [to foreigners], agricultural and regional 
subsidies and the free movement of labour’ with the motivation to preserve national 
sovereignty and Catholic values (Henderson 2008b: 122). In such case, high costs of 
compliance draw domestic reaction and render the fulfilment of EU conditionality in 
particular sectors problematic. Besides, as in the case of minority rights, the EU’s 
perceived inconsistency in the application of its conditionality to different candidates 
further triggers Euroscepticism. Accordingly, domestic political actors frequently 
point to the EU’s differential treatment of member states or other candidates (Ram 
2003; Schwellnus 2005; Yılmaz 2012).     
Overall, domestic reaction against the EU’s issue-specific conditionality is a form of 
Euroscepticism observed in many (if not all) candidate countries against particular 
EU-led reforms deriving from the Copenhagen criteria. Political parties tend to resort 
not only to domestic factors –such as national sovereignty and pride, national and 
sectoral interests or identity– but also to such EU-led factors as the EU’s inconsistent 
and unfair treatment of a particular policy area in order to justify their issue-specific 
opposition. One of the reforms that draw  such Euroscepticism is the reform of 
foreign land ownership (FLO). Domestic factors mainly play a prominent role against 
the reform of FLO ranging from purely economic fears that foreign ownership may 
increase land prices enormously at the expense of local buyers, to patriotic concerns 
over the loss of national sovereignty and fear of ‘re-Germanisation’ (Tesser 2004: 
214). For instance, in the Polish case, most opposition parties stood against this 
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reform. The Polish Peasant Party (PSL), an agrarian party with 9 % popularity in the 
2001 elections supported Polish membership to the EU but it strongly opposed the 
foreign acquisition of land, forests, or areas containing water sources (Tesser 2004: 
220). Party officials demanded an 18-year prohibition on foreigners purchasing 
agricultural land in Poland (Zuba 2009: 332). The centre-right Solidarity coalition 
(AWS) also opposed land liberalization because of the fear of the ‘German return’ to 
Poland (Tesser 2004: 220). Similarly, the Law and Justice Party (PiS) proposed a 
‘land turnover law’ in order to protect Polish farmers from foreign land speculators 
(Szczerbiak 2008: 232), and party officials threatened to vote NO in the referendum 
unless the ‘membership package’ offered to Poland was substantially improved 
(Ibid.).   
 
Hungary is another example of a state with Eurosceptic political parties opposing land 
liberalisation during accession negotiations. The Hungarian Civic Party (Fidesz), a 
mainstream right-wing party with 41 % popularity in the 2002 elections, was one of 
the most Euro-enthusiast political actors in Hungary, endorsing the ‘return to Europe’ 
motto. However, its eagerness shifted to Euroscepticism as the country started the EU 
membership negotiations. Defending ‘hard bargaining with Brussels’, the party 
declared itself the protector of Hungarian land, and proposed a referendum to prevent 
the EU-led reforms that would enable foreign land ownership in Hungary (Batory 
2008: 270-271).  
 
Another issue that raises tension in candidate countries is the question of agricultural 
subsidies. The EU offered its recent candidates only 25% of what farmers in older 
member countries received. In particular, the countries that heavily rely upon the 
agricultural sector, such as Poland, Estonia and Czech Republic, protested against 
this. In Poland, the PSL, the main party defending the rights of local farmers, strongly 
opposed the EU’s offer to Polish farmers and demanded full subsidies for them 
(Szczerbiak 2008: 237; Riishøj 2007: 517; Zuba 2009: 332). The Self-Defence 
(Samoobrona), a nationalist right-wing party with 10% popularity in 2001 also 
prioritized agricultural subsidies in its EU policy. Denoting the negotiations as a 
threat to Polish farmers, party leaders claimed that with the deal offered by the EU, 
Poland would be permanently relegated to the role of a second-class member (Zuba 
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2009: 333; Szczerbiak 2008: 228-229). Instead, the party explicitly demanded that 
Polish membership be based on equal rights (Szczerbiak 2008: 230). 
 
Other issues that trigger Euroscepticism include identity, human rights and minority 
rights whose reform has proven problematic in candidate countries. In Slovakia, even 
pro-EU parties, the Christian Democratic Movement (KHD) (8.3%) and the Social 
Democrat SMER (13.5%), criticized the EU’s negotiation process intensively. While 
the KDH attacked particular EU-led reforms, such as same-sex partnership and 
abortion (Henderson 2008a: 287), SMER defended in its election campaign the 
preservation of the Bohunice nuclear reactor, standing firm against the EU pressures 
to close it down, and depicting it as ‘a pillar of Slovak economy’ and national pride 
(Ivanov 2008: 161). SMER also demanded the re-opening of various negotiation 
chapters that had already been closed in order not to accept EU membership at all 
costs (Henderson 2008a: 288). The reform of minority rights has been a source of 
intense opposition in Romania. The far-right nationalist Greater Romania Party, 
although giving strategic support to Romania’s EU membership, stood against the 
reforms on the rights of Hungarian and Roma minorities. Its leader, Vadim Tudor, 
even demanded that all ‘Gypsies’ be put in jail, for there was no other solution 
(Goldston 2002: 155).  
 
During the accession process, political party views towards EU integration in 
candidate countries were mainly formed through the prism of membership 
negotiations and there was no tangible reference to the European project and its 
trajectory (Szczerbiak 2008: 237). The criticisms discussed above therefore qualify 
for Euroscepticism applicable to candidate countries. Their reactions can be 
categorized as issue-specific because opposition against EU conditionality is limited 
to particular policy issues.   
 
2.4.2. Euroscepticism in response to the EU’s country-specific conditionality 
The second type of Euroscepticism derives from a general resentment in a candidate 
country against the introduction of additional preconditions for the latter’s accession 
to the EU. Additional membership preconditions on a candidate country usually 
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derive from an ongoing bilateral issue between the candidate country in question and 
an EU member state. The EU either remains indifferent to the constraints inflicted 
upon the candidate in question by an EU member state or puts extra conditions on that 
candidate country to solve the bilateral problem before joining the Union. The main 
reason for this is the member state’s veto power to block the initiation of accession 
negotiations or even freeze an ongoing negotiation process by blocking certain 
negotiation chapters. This triggers resentment in the political parties of the accession 
country towards the EU, which they criticize for failing to be an impartial arbiter. In 
this context, Euroscepticism emerges as a particular reaction to the instrumentaliation 
of the EU’s accession negotiations by an individual member state which seeks to get 
concessions from a candidate country on a bilateral issue that is not directly related to 
EU’s formal membership criteria. The mitigation of such Euroscepticism is directly 
contingent upon the solution of the bilateral issue either through unilateral or 
reciprocal concessions in return for the EU’s membership guarantees. 
 
Unlike the first type of Euroscepticism, Euroscepticism as a reaction to the EU’s 
country-specific conditionality indicates a much bigger uncertainty in the accession 
process because failure to comply with the EU’s additional country-specific 
conditionality threatens to suspend all membership prospects. Besides, the member 
state which is party to the ongoing bilateral issue can block the initiation of accession 
negotiations by using its veto power based on the unanimity rule in the EU’s 
enlargement policy. Correspondingly, domestic political actors in the candidate 
country, which faces such additional pressures, grow increasingly reluctant towards 
EU membership. For instance, Macedonia, a candidate since 2005, has been put under 
pressure by Greece, an EU member since 1981, which has a historical claim on the 
name ‘Macedonia’. Greece has been blocking Macedonia’s EU accession talks since 
2009 despite the European Commission’s recommendation to initiate the negotiations 
with the country. Political actors in Macedonia have reacted strongly to Greece and 
condemned Brussels for being one-sided and precluding Macedonia’s EU bid 
(Marusic 2011). Accusing the EU of inflicting double-standards, the officials of the 
ruling party VMRO-DPMNE even likened the EU’s Macedonian policy to ‘the 
Holocaust’ (Balkan Insight 2011).  
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As previously stated, a member state in conflict with a candidate country can even 
curtail an ongoing negotiation process by blocking the negotiation chapters. For 
instance, the Exclusive Economic Zone issue between Croatia and Slovenia caused 
the curtailment of Croatia’s EU membership negotiations for up to ten months due to 
a Slovenian veto. Correspondingly, reluctance towards membership rose among all 
Croatian political actors, who felt threatened by the Slovenian-led EU pressure to 
choose either the fisheries zone or membership (Zorić 2008). The Croatian Prime 
Minister Ivo Sanader accused Slovenia of ‘blackmailing’ them, and asserted that they 
did not intend to ‘buy the EU membership with the [Slovenian] territory’ (Vucheva 
2008). The Croatian accession negotiations resumed only after Croatia and Slovenia 
agreed to the EU plan of referring the issue to an ad hoc international arbitration 
court. Croatia consented to the plan since the issue of the fisheries zone had become 
the final obstacle to Croatia’s EU membership.  
 
In the Turkish case, the EU’s additional conditionality includes the opening of 
Turkish harbours and aerospace to the Republic of Cyprus and other new member 
states since May 2004 as part of Turkey’s obligations arising out of the additional 
protocol. Turkey defied the EU’s pressures, since it does not officially recognize the 
Republic of Cyprus as the governing authority of the entire island. Correspondingly, 
the EU has partially halted the Turkish accession negotiations by blocking eight 
chapters. Led by the French and Cypriot vetoes, 18 negotiation chapters of Turkey 
remain frozen and this has practically halted the entire accession process. The 
suspension of negotiations with the EU due to the Cyprus question has sparked a 
significant amount of negative reaction in both the government and the opposition in 
Turkey (Gülmez and Buhari-Gülmez 2008). Both claimed that Cyprus conditionality 
was illegitimately introduced due to the political pressures of the Republic of Cyprus, 
which became an EU member in May 2004 despite the ongoing political conflict in 
Cyprus. The main opposition party in Turkey, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), 
criticized that the Cyprus problem took Turkey-EU relations ‘hostage’ prohibiting 
Turkey’s eventual EU membership. Deniz Baykal, the party leader claimed: ‘If 
Turkey fails or is prevented from becoming a member, this is not the end of the 
world’ (Hürriyet 2005). The governing party, the Justice and Development Party 
(AKP), accused the EU of ‘sacrificing’ Turkey for the Greek Cypriots and froze its 
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relations with the EU for six months after the Republic of Cyprus was granted the EU 
Presidency (Vatan 2011a).  
 
Euroscepticism also emerges when domestic political actors perceive strong 
reluctance or indecisiveness within the EU towards their country’s membership. 
Political actors in candidate countries often show reluctance for membership because 
of the perception that the EU’s strategy towards them is ‘unfair’ and discriminatory. 
The ultimate example for such Euroscepticism is the Turkish case3. Turkey’s 
Euroscepticism signals that there is almost no membership incentive for the candidate 
country and the future relations with the EU are in danger. Turkey stands out as the 
only candidate country whose political actors reflect such extreme Euroscepticism due 
to the increasing Turkish perception that the EU remains reluctant towards Turkish 
accession. As previously discussed, the EU introduced additional provisions such as 
‘absorption capacity’, ‘open-ended negotiations’ and ‘permanent derogations’ to the 
official documents regarding Turkey’s accession. Those expressions constituted a 
novelty for the EU’s enlargement policy since they were first introduced to Turkey 
(Kirişci 2004). Another novelty is that a number of top EU politicians4 overtly stood 
against Turkey’s accession and offered instead, cooperation short of full membership 
such as ‘privileged partnership’. In the meantime, due to Turkey’s persistent refusal to 
open its harbours and aerospace to Cyprus, Turkey’s accession negotiations remain 
frozen. Additional preconditions and the lack of clear membership impetus decrease 
the EU’s political leverage on Turkey (Yılmaz 2009b). Therefore, especially after the 
postponement of the accession negotiations, the Turkish government has become even 
less motivated to continue with the EU-led reform process. Government officials 
accused the EU of being indecisive vis-à-vis Turkey’s membership. The Prime 
Minister Tayyip Erdoğan argued that the EU has been dragging its feet over Turkey 
for more than fifty years and he urged EU officials to clearly announce whether they 
really want Turkey in or not (Hürriyet 2011a). Erdoğan claimed that no other 
                                                          
3 British accession process may be compared due to French successive vetoes, but there are two 
essential differences: 1) the EU was not a Political Union back then and had not institutionalized its 
accession conditionality, 2) the UK did not perceive the cultural and religious opposition of the 
European Communities. Instead, it was a strategic rejection of the French President Charles De Gaulle 
who resented Britain as a primary rival to France and grew suspicious of British ties with the USA 
(Bhagwati 1993: 157; Dinan 2004: 6). 
4 such as the former French President Nicholas Sarkozy, German Prime Minister Angela Merkel, 
Austrian chancellor Wolfang Schussel and the EU President Herman van Rompuy.  
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candidate country had faced such unfair treatment Turkey had been suffering from 
(Vatan 2011a) and accused the EU of becoming a unified block against Turkey’s 
accession (Erdoğan 2011). Baykal, the CHP leader, criticized the open-ended nature 
of the negotiations, the absorption capacity of the EU and permanent safeguard 
clauses against Turkey. The CHP leader claimed that such expressions were proof that 
the EU had never considered Turkey’s membership seriously (Hürriyet 2004a). 
Contrary to other cases, such as Croatia and Macedonia in which the end of 
uncertainty for EU accession is primarily contingent on the solution of the bilateral 
problem; the uncertainty towards Turkey’s EU membership is rather multifaceted; it 
thus reinforces the pessimistic opinion that even though Turkey successfully fulfils 
the accession criteria (including the Cyprus conditionality), it will never be admitted 
to the EU (Schimmelfennig 2008: 933). 
 
2.5. ‘Ideology vs. Strategy’ or pure reaction to the EU?: Specifying the main 
hypotheses 
 
So far it has been established that Euroscepticism in candidate countries involves 
domestic resistance to the EU accession process whereby political parties either 
oppose certain EU-led reforms which contradict the domestic economic and political 
status quo, or stand against the EU’s additional conditionality specific to the candidate 
country in question. Both domestic and EU-led factors have been considered as 
constitutive elements of party-based Euroscepticism. In this regard, the chapter will 
benefit from the existing scholarly debates on Euroscepticism in general and discuss 
their relevance for specifying party-based Euroscepticism in candidate countries. 
Accordingly, the main question in the literature is whether party-based 
Euroscepticism is an ideological or strategic choice (Hooghe 2007; Neumayer 2008). 
At this point, the viable question is whether and how party ideology and position 
within the domestic political system have an effect on party stances vis-à-vis their 
country’s EU accession process. 
 
Some scholars are primarily interested in explaining party-based Euroscepticism with 
reference to party ideology (Hooghe et al 2002; Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004; De 
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Vries and Edwards 2009; Conti and Memoli 2012). Accordingly, the main research 
question seems to be ‘to what extent Left-Right divide and Liberal-Conservative dyad 
explain Eurosceptic party behaviours’. Others argue that Euroscepticism is not only a 
reflection of ideological positioning but it also derives from the strategic choice of 
political actors vis-à-vis each other in the domestic political context (Hooghe 2007; 
Neumayer 2008). Rather than ideology, party competition is proposed as a key 
determinant for party attitudes towards the EU. Scrutinizing the positions of parties in 
the national political system, much scholarly attention is devoted to find out whether 
Euroscepticism is essentially adopted by fringe parties having limited electoral impact 
or mainstream parties (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004; Hix 2007; De Vries and 
Edwards 2009). If it is a fringe party attitude, it can thus be argued that the effect of 
Euroscepticism on national politics remains negligible. Another relevant question may 
be based on the government-opposition positioning. Governing parties are usually 
expected to adopt a softer and more cautious policy stance against the EU than when 
they are in opposition (Paterson 1981; Aspinwall 2007). If governing parties reflect a 
Eurosceptic policy line, this will have serious implications on national policy-making 
towards the EU.  
 
Following the ‘ideology vs. strategy’ debate as the main base of discussion for 
Euroscepticism in accession countries, this study will examine whether party ideology 
and/or strategy (party’s electoral popularity and government-opposition positioning) 
have an impact on party attitudes towards the EU accession process. At this point, 
different from the existing literature on Euroscepticism, the study will also take into 
account EU-led factors such as the perception of the EU’s conditionality by the 
political parties of a candidate country. The study will specify six hypotheses to test 
the explanatory power of these three variables (ideology, party competition and the 
EU’s selectivity) on the Eurosceptic reactions of political parties in accession 
countries.    
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Table 1: Key variables concerning party Euroscepticism in candidate countries 
 
        
2.5.1. Party Ideology: Does ideology explain Euroscepticism in candidate countries? 
Party ideology is a construction created ‘through inter- and intra-party competition by 
political actors seeking to differentiate themselves from their rivals and gain political 
capital (legitimacy and various forms of support from citizens such as votes, party 
members, etc.)’ (Neumayer 2008: 137). It is essentially discussed in the literature with 
reference to two main aspects: an economic Left-Right distinction and the GAL 
(green/alternative/libertarian) - TAN (traditionalism/authority/nationalism) dyad 
(Marks et al 2006). The scholarship is rather divided concerning the effects of the left-
right divide on Euroscepticism. Left represents economic equality while Right 
signifies individual economic freedom (Marks et al 2006: 156). Taggart and 
Szczerbiak (2004: 14) argue that ideological positioning on the left-right spectrum 
does not determine whether parties oppose European integration or not. While they 
state that right wing parties seem to be more associated with Euroscepticism in the 
CEECs, they emphasize that there is no clear pattern towards this direction (Ibid). On 
the other hand, although Marks et al (2006: 167-168) do not find a clear association 
between opposing European integration and being either a left wing or right wing 
party in Western Europe, they claim that it is the radical Left parties which may turn 
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out to be more Eurosceptic than the right parties in the CEECs. Others reflect a rather 
eclectic approach claiming that both radical Right and radical Left parties embrace 
Eurosceptic rhetoric in the CEECs (De Vries and Edwards 2009; Markowski and 
Tucker 2010; Conti and Memoli 2012). What differs is their arguments underlying 
their Eurosceptic stances; extreme Right parties tend to protect national sovereignty 
whereas extreme Left parties oppose neo-liberal economic policies that govern 
European integration (De Vries and Edwards 2009). Therefore, the key determinant is 
not their leanings to left or right but their radical political stance (Ibid). In this respect, 
the GAL-TAN distinction of Marks et al (2006) becomes more valuable. Marks et al 
(2006) argue that GAL parties tend to be pro-EU while TAN parties show more 
Eurosceptic reflexes in both Western and Eastern European countries. Regarding the 
effects on Euroscepticism in candidate countries, the extant literature supports this 
thesis in the sense that opposition to EU-led reform process is essentially adopted by 
TAN parties while there is no clear-cut evidence concerning the explanatory power of 
the left-right distinction. Polish politics is a viable example for this. As a Right/TAN 
party, the LPR opposes EU membership in order to preserve national sovereignty 
while Left/TAN party Self-Defence stands against the neo-liberal character of EU-led 
reforms (Markowski and Tucker 2010). Moreover, it is primarily Right/TAN parties 
(the MDF, the FIDESZ-MPP and the MIEP) in Hungary which stood against the 
reform of foreign land ownership, while parties from both Left/TAN (HZDS) and 
Right/TAN (KDH) resisted the same reform in Slovakia (Burger 2006; Tesser 2004). 
Moreover, both the ODS (Right/TAN) in the Czech Republic and the SDSM 
(Left/TAN) in Macedonia stood critical of the EU-led reforms of minority rights 
(Fawn 2001; Koinova 2011). Therefore, the left-right distinction fails to explain the 
observed scepticism in the CEECs during the eastern enlargement process. While 
TAN parties from both left and right demonstrate a critical attitude towards the 
negotiation process, GAL parties advocate the EU-led reforms and are usually less 
critical of the EU as in the cases of the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) in Poland and 
the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD).  
 
Therefore, there seems to be a pattern that TAN parties are more likely to embrace 
EU-sceptic rhetoric than GAL parties. However, this does not necessarily mean that 
all TAN parties are automatically Eurosceptic. Popular TAN parties may pursue pro-
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EU policies on a selective basis in line with their own political agenda. Börzel (2012: 
15) explains that the EU does not only empower liberal (GAL) parties but it also 
empowers non-liberal (TAN) political forces as long as the EU conditionality aligns 
with the latter’s political preferences and survival strategies. That’s why, for instance, 
the EU accession process has been embraced by the Justice and Development Party 
(AKP) of Turkey although the party does not necessarily fall into a pro-Western and 
liberal camp (or GAL category) (Börzel 2012: 16). Similarly, Neumayer (2008: 139) 
argues that the EU accession process may encourage some conservative or ex-
communist TAN parties to embrace pro-EU rhetoric, while some liberal GAL parties 
may end up revising their pro-EU stances due to the difficulties in EU accession 
negotiations. Accordingly, it is important to remember that party ideology in line with 
GAL/TAN dichotomy cannot explain Euroscepticism alone. It is necessary to 
consider other factors such as party competition (mainstream-fringe and government-
opposition positions) and the perception of the EU’s conditionality. In particular, the 
explanatory power of party ideology is likely to diminish when external factors such 
as the EU’s selective application of its conditions and the lack of credible membership 
perspective are considered: such external factors can trigger Euroscepticism in not 
only TAN parties but GAL parties as well. For instance, concerning the European 
debate over the Beneš decrees, not only TAN parties in the Czech Republic, but also 
the Social Democrat ČSSD (GAL) stood against the German and Austrian demands 
for the annulment of the decrees in return for the Czech accession to the EU (Petrovic 
and Solingen 2005: 295). In the light of the discussions above, the study has come up 
with three hypotheses in association with party ideology:  
 
H1: The Left-Right distinction does not have a significant role in explaining 
Euroscepticism. 
H2: TAN parties in accession countries are more likely to adopt Euroscepticism than 
GAL parties. 
H3: Both TAN and GAL parties in accession countries are likely to embrace 
Euroscepticism when the EU’s conditionality is selective or there is no credible 
membership perspective or the EU is perceived to be reluctant towards accession.   
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2.5.2. Party Competition 
 
2.5.2.1.Is Euroscepticism only embraced by fringe parties in candidate countries?  
Opposition to European integration is predominantly associated with peripheral 
parties in Western Europe either at the right or left edge of the national political 
spectrum, while mainstream parties primarily reflect a pro-EU image (Taggart 1998; 
Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004; De Vries and Edwards 2009). Mainstream parties have 
a lot to lose from Eurosceptic discourse because ‘the general consensus around the 
benefits of EU accession are most strongly represented at the ideological heart of a 
country’s party system’ (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004: 5). Fringe parties on the other 
hand, are peripheral in the national political system. They may thus exert anti-
establishment populism. Hence, ‘if the (moderate) establishment is pro-EU, then those 
groups that are likely to gain from undermining the position of the centrist parties and 
the elites are likely to oppose the EU’ (Hix 2007: 137).  
 
Mainstream parties in accession countries are expected to take a pro-EU stance during 
the accession process because EU accession generally empowers and legitimates 
mainstream politics while illegitimating peripheral and anti-establishment political 
forces (Neumayer 2008: 137; Börzel 2012: 13). Mainstream parties are also likely to 
refrain from overtly taking sceptic attitudes towards the EU when public support for 
EU membership is relatively high. Otherwise, they would be perceived as 
undermining their country’s EU membership agenda and their sceptical attitude may 
be counter-productive for their party in terms of losing voters in the elections. For 
example, in the case of Slovakia, the ruling parties which opposed EU membership 
lost their office (Henderson 2008b). Therefore, office-seeking mainstream parties aim 
to ‘defuse the salience of [the European issue] by taking median positions with 
respect to it’ (Marks et al 2002: 588).  
 
However, many candidate countries and the CEECs in particular provide paradoxical 
cases because both the mainstream and fringe parties have commonly taken a critical 
stance against the EU during their accession negotiations (Taggart and Szczerbiak 
78 
 
2004: 15). The ODS in the Czech Republic, the Centre Party in Estonia, the HZDS in 
Slovakia are some of many examples of mainstream parties which take a hard-line 
stance against the EU in accession countries. Hard-line stance in the CEECs towards 
the EU is a depiction of Euroscepticism peculiar to candidate countries, as political 
actors did not emphasize their opposing stance towards European integration but the 
terms of EU membership conditionality (Szczerbiak 2008). European integration is 
extensively considered as a ‘second-order issue’ in Western Europe, whereas EU 
accession remains a popular topic in accession countries since EU-led reforms help 
transform the economic, legal and political structures of candidate countries. During 
the reform process, not only peripheral but also mainstream parties adopt a critical 
stance towards EU conditionality. As previously stated, domestic actors mainly react 
against the uncertainty of the accession process and they aim for EU membership with 
their own terms. In this respect, the hypothesis could be summarized below as: 
 
H4: Electoral popularity does not explain Euroscepticism because both mainstream 
and fringe parties reflect Eurosceptic policies.  
 
 
 
2.5.2.2.Is Euroscepticism an opposition phenomenon in candidate countries? 
There are certain reasons which may lead one to think that governments are less prone 
to be Eurosceptic than the opposition in candidate countries. Governments are 
officially responsive to an international environment, which may discourage a 
populist stance towards the EU during membership negotiations (Paterson 1981: 232). 
Moreover, negotiations have a ‘lock-in effect’ on government; once the EU-led 
reforms have been processed it proves costly to reverse them (Schimmelfennig 2005: 
837; Vachudova 2008: 864). As the country proceeds with the negotiations, 
government is ‘path-dependent/locked-in’ into a predictable course of policy making. 
Finally, the EU accession process provides ‘external legitimation’ that enables 
national governments to ‘sell policies they have long supported’ (Grabbe 2006 in 
Vachudova 2008:864). The EU accession process gives national governments an 
opportunity to push for domestic change without suffering many political 
consequences: the EU process is to blame for all problems associated with costly 
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reforms. For its part, the opposition enjoys little responsibility for the continuation of 
the accession process and tends to criticize the government for being too submissive 
vis-à-vis the demands of an external organization (the EU) and readily advise the 
government to withdraw from the negotiations with the EU (Hanley 2008; Gülmez 
2008). Moreover, during the accession process, the EU empowers liberal pro-
reformist segments of the domestic political elite against nationalist, authoritarian 
and/or post-socialist political parties (Börzel 2012: 13). The EU confers greater 
legitimacy on those liberal political forces which rally popular support to become pro-
EU governments (Ibid). In this respect, governing parties and their supporters are 
expected to be less likely to oppose the EU (Hix 2007: 137). On the contrary, the 
nationalist and authoritarian political actors against whom the EU bolsters liberal 
political actors are expected to take a critical stance against the EU-led reform process 
in their country.  
 
The idea of delegating sovereignty to Brussels in certain fields draws a negative 
reaction especially from opposition parties. Accession negotiations have often 
witnessed the rise of protests from opposition parties accusing governments of being 
‘too soft’/submissive to the EU’s demands at the expense of national sovereignty and 
pride. Opposition often tried to ‘de-legitimize’ governments by blaming them for 
neglecting ‘national interests’ for the sake of EU membership (Neumayer 2008: 148). 
In Poland, the PiS and the PO criticized the EU-led negotiations as relegating Poland 
to a ‘second-class’ membership (Szczerbiak 2008: 232; Riishøj 2007: 522). Both 
parties criticized the government for remaining ‘too soft’ (submissive) during the 
negotiations with the EU (Riishøj 2007: 519-520). Concerning the foreign land 
ownership issue, the Polish opposition including the PiS, the Self Defence and the 
LPR even proposed a no confidence vote for the government (Tesser 2004: 224). 
Similarly, the main opposition parties in the Czech Republic criticized the 
government for its policy of hasty, unconditional and unequal accession which would 
only lead to a ‘second-class’ position for the Czech Republic (Hanley 2008: 253). In 
Hungary, the FIDESz (Alliance of Young Democrats) charged the government with 
‘servility’ towards EU member states by comparing it to ‘Hungary’s obedience to 
Moscow before 1989’ (Neumayer 2008: 149). 
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However, it is notable that Euroscepticism is not only an opposition phenomenon; 
governments may embrace Euroscepticism as well. Especially when there is a general 
perception in the candidate country that accession negotiations have shown an 
inconsistent and unfair treatment by the EU, not only the opposition but also the 
national government of the accession country is likely to resort to Euroscepticism. In 
such cases, opposition and governments usually rally around the idea of ‘national 
cause’ and pride in order to defend the status quo. If the government chooses not to 
ally with the opposition, it risks losing its public support and domestic legitimacy. For 
instance, governing parties in Macedonia, Croatia and Turkey reacted to the EU’s 
pressures to solve a bilateral conflict with an EU member before acceding to the 
Union. In this context, the study advances two hypotheses:  
  
H5: Opposition parties in accession countries are more likely to adopt Eurosceptic 
policies than governing parties. 
H6: Governing parties in accession countries are likely to embrace Euroscepticism 
when the EU’s conditionality is selective and inconsistent or there is no credible 
membership perspective and/or the EU is perceived to be reluctant towards accession.   
 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to offer a detailed discussion of Euroscepticism to analyse 
oppositional stances of political parties against EU membership in recent candidate 
countries in general, and in Turkey in particular. With this motivation, the study 
focused onEuroscepticism in candidate countries in order to emphasize that critical 
attitudes of political parties in candidate countries do not reflect a wholesale 
opposition to European integration. It is rather a reaction against the complex nature 
of EU’s membership conditionality. Euroscepticism in candidate countries is driven 
by both domestic factors (cost-benefit calculus and threat perceptions) and EU-driven 
factors that emphasize the interactionary context between the EU and candidate 
countries (the EU’s selectivity, uncertainty of membership and the EU’s perceived 
reluctance). Accordingly, the chapter introduces two different forms of 
Euroscepticism to explain the nature of domestic reactions against the EU in 
81 
 
candidate countries: (1) Euroscepticism as a reaction to the EU’s issue-specific 
conditionality and (2) Euroscepticism in response to the EU’s country-specific 
conditionality. The former indicates resistance to particular issues/EU-led reforms and 
mainly derives from domestic but in some cases, also external factors. The latter 
involves reactions to the EU’s additional conditions due to a bilateral conflict which 
renders accession rather uncertain or due to the EU’s ‘perceived’ reluctance for 
accession. It hence primarily stems from external/EU factors highlighting the context 
in which the EU and a candidate country interact. Furthermore, the chapter discusses 
whether all parties show Euroscepticism under similar conditions, or whether party 
ideology and electoral strategy play a determining role behind the emergence of party-
based Euroscepticism. With this motivation, the chapter advances three research 
questions to find out whether party ideology, electoral popularity and government-
opposition distinction affect party preferences for Euroscepticism. The study has 
come up with six hypotheses taking also into consideration the EU-driven factors such 
as the EU’s selective application of its conditionality, lack of credible membership 
perspective and the EU’s perceived reluctance for a particular country’s accession. 
The proposed hypotheses in this study suggest that party ideology explains 
Eurosceptic behaviour in the sense that Conservative, Nationalist and Authoritarian 
parties (TAN) are more likely to adopt Euroscepticism while liberal (GAL) parties 
tend to support EU membership process. This argument is in line with the existing 
literature on Euroscepticism. However, there is a need to consider the EU-driven 
factors which are likely to diminish the explanatory power of party ideology in the 
accession process. Furthermore, a party’s electoral potential is likely to hold only 
limited explanatory power over Euroscepticism. Not only fringe parties but also 
mainstream parties reflect Eurosceptic reactions against EU-led reforms. Finally, 
opposition parties are more inclined to reflect Eurosceptic reaction as a strategy to 
weaken pro-reform governments. However, the EU-led factors may undermine the 
explanatory power of government-opposition positioning by forcing governments to 
reflect similar reactions with opposition parties during the accession negotiations.  
 
In the empirical chapters, the dissertation will test the possible effects of the EU-
driven factors and scrutinize the validity of the hypotheses in accession countries, and 
in the Turkish case in particular. Relying on the reforms of minority rights and foreign 
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land ownership, the study will first discuss the relevance of Euroscepticism in 
accession countries in response to the EU’s issue-specific conditionality, and 
scrutinize the credibility of hypotheses in those cases. Afterwards, the research will 
focus on Euroscepticism as a response to the EU’s country-specific conditionality 
dwelling on domestic reactions to the EU’s additional conditions due to a bilateral 
conflict with an EU member state. In the Turkish case, Euroscepticism is not only 
reflected upon the EU’s Cyprus conditionality but it also stems from the perceived 
reluctance of the EU towards Turkey’s accession (if not, ‘Turkey-scepticism’ as 
claimed by Turkish political and academic circles).  
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGICAL CHOICES 
 
This chapter discusses the methodological choices of the study in order to build a 
qualitative enquiry on Turkey’s EU accession process. Qualitative research does not 
aim to discover the reality which is ‘out there’; instead, it seeks to reveal the 
descriptions and narratives of informants about their own ‘reality’ (Guillaume 2002). 
In this respect, the study mainly scrutinizes how Turkish political actors view 
Turkey’s EU accession process and approach the EU’s membership conditionality. 
Nevertheless, qualitative inquiry does not prevent the researcher from using quasi-
quantitative terms such as ‘many’, ‘frequently’ and ‘some’. (Bryman 1988: 127; Read 
and Marsh 2002: 233). The results of a qualitative study can be presented in the form 
of numeric data (Bryman 1988: 127). Hence, the study resorts to simple quantitative 
terms (e.g. the number of interviewees who endorsed the EU-led reforms) for 
exploratory purposes rather than making statistical inferences. 
Adopting a single case study as its primary approach, the study concentrates on 
Turkey and its EU accession process. After explaining why the study adopts a single 
case study, this chapter justifies the selection of political parties and reform areas in 
order to scrutinize domestic political perceptions on Turkey’s EU accession. It also 
explains its choices of categorization as Left/Right and GAL/TAN to differentiate the 
ideological alignments of political parties. Finally, it discusses elite interviewing with 
Turkish parliamentarians as the preferred data collection technique to extract insights 
on current issues associated with Turkey’s EU accession and the usage of 
supplementary sources to check the validity of interview results. The last section deals 
with the challenges and the ethical considerations associated with the methodological 
choices of the study. 
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3.1. Case Study 
This study relies upon the case study method focusing on the Turkish case in order to 
develop in-depth knowledge about the varying domestic political responses to EU 
membership conditionality. A case study is identified as an intensive inquiry 
scrutinizing ‘multiple perspectives of the complexity of a particular project, policy, 
institution, program or system in a real life context’ with an objective to generalize 
across a larger set of projects. (Gerring 2004: 341; Simons 2009: 21). This study 
benefits from a case study as the primary research method because case studies (i) 
provide proximity to reality, (ii) generate an in-depth learning process and (iii) 
produce generalizable data (Flyvbjerg 2006: 236). A case study enables proximity to 
reality since it examines social complexities in ‘real life’ context and tests the ‘views 
directly in relation to phenomena as they unfold in practice’ (Flyvbjerg 2006: 235; 
Simons 2009: 21; Thomas 2011a and 2011b). Accordingly, the study provides the 
first-hand experiences of politicians regarding Turkey’s EU accession process. The 
study examines domestic political reactions to the EU’s membership conditionality 
through open-ended interviews, the review of parliamentary debates and press review.    
A case study also generates a learning process which enables in-depth knowledge of a 
single phenomenon (Flyvbjerg 2006: 224). Such an in-depth analysis permits 
researchers to understand the boundaries of social processes by looking at the 
complex interaction of many factors in few cases which cannot be possible through a 
statistical analysis (Harper 1992: 139; Thomas 2011b: 512). Even if the research data 
acquired from a case study do not aim to make statistical generalizations, their rich 
content provides ‘a path toward scientific innovation’ as it reveals what has not 
previously been discussed in great depth (Flyvbjerg 2006: 227). In this respect, using 
the case study method enables the author to gain a deeper understanding of how 
Turkish politics is affected by the EU membership process and on which grounds 
Turkish political actors justify their stance towards the EU. Having conducted face-to-
face interviews with politicians and scanned minutes from parliamentary debates, the 
study reveals how Turkish politicians perceive the EU and approach Turkey’s 
membership process in great depth. As discussed in the empirical chapters, the study 
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finds that Turkish scepticism towards EU membership primarily stands as a reaction 
to the complex nature of EU conditionality rather than a deep-seated resentment 
towards Europe and its values. Besides, not only domestic factors such as political 
ideology and strategic decision-making but also EU-driven factors such as the EU’s 
selective and discriminatory approach, as well as its perceived reluctance towards 
Turkish accession constitute the main pillars of domestic political contestations 
towards EU membership.      
Finally, a case study can be a useful method for generalization through the 
employment of ‘falsification’ and ‘verification’ (Lieberson 1992: 107). Accordingly, 
it is well-suited for identifying ‘black swans’ in the area of scrutiny (Flyvbjerg 2006: 
228). Especially single-N case study adds to the generalizability of research findings 
since it enables a strategic selection of ‘critical cases’ in order to reach information 
that facilitates logical deduction (Flyvbjerg 2006: 230). Critical cases are the ‘black 
swans’ of social inquiry revealing either ‘most likely’ or ‘least likely’ situations 
through which deductive conclusions such as ‘if this is (not) valid for this case, then it 
applies to all (no) cases’ could be reached (ibid.). ‘Most likely’ cases are primarily 
instrumental in the falsification of an argument. A most likely case for one 
proposition is ‘the least likely for its negation’ (Flyvbjerg 2006: 232). Therefore, if a 
thesis proves false in the most favourable case, then it is most likely to be false for 
intermediate cases (Flyvbjerg 2006: 226). On the other hand, ‘least likely’ cases are 
useful for verification. If a thesis is valid in the least favourable case, then it is likely 
to be valid for intermediate cases (Flyvbjerg 2006: 232). Such deductions enable 
single-N case study to make analytical generalizations, which differ from the 
statistical inferences of quantitative studies (Yin 1994: 10).  
In the literature, Turkey is depicted as an a-typical or ‘least likely’ country in 
comparison to other candidate countries due to its different historical, cultural, 
political, social and economic background (Engert 2010). Unlike the CEECs, Turkey 
did not experience a ‘return to Europe’ during its candidature; conversely, its 
European credentials have often been questioned (İçener et al 2010: 218). Turkey’s 
large population, Islamic identity and geographic proximity to the Middle East have 
frequently been coined to emphasize how different Turkey is from other countries 
(Güneş-Ayata 2003; Ruiz-Jiménez and Torreblanca 2007; İçener et al 2010; Canan-
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Sokullu 2011). Besides, Turkey stands as the only accession country that has been 
waiting for more than four decades to become an EU member and yet its membership 
prospects are still unclear. Therefore, at a first glance, Turkey’s exceptionalism seems 
to preclude its comparability to other countries and compromise the generalizability 
of data generated from the Turkish case. Therefore, Turkish responses to EU 
conditions are generally expected to be different from other candidate countries. 
However, the study finds that there are many overlaps between the responses of 
Turkish political elites and those in other EU accession countries. Similar to the 
CEECs, Turkish political actors particularly construct their EU policy on Turkey’s 
accession with an apparent indifference towards European integration and its 
trajectory. Moreover, reluctance for membership in both Turkey and the CEECs 
involve reactions stemming from the complex nature of the EU’s membership 
pressures in different policy domains, which eventually challenge the domestic 
political and economic status quo. In this respect, ideology and strategy, as well as the 
EU’s selectivity in its conditionality explain domestic responses to EU pressures not 
only in Turkey but also in other accession countries in general. Therefore, studying 
Turkey as a ‘least likely’ case does not preclude deductions. It helps to verify the 
validity of the thesis of Euroscepticism concerning domestic political responses to EU 
conditionality during the accession process.     
 
3.2. On the selection of actors 
This study examines the EU policies of primary Turkish political actors namely, the 
AKP, the governing party, and the CHP and the MHP, the main opposition parties. 
These three political actors are the most popular parties representative of the majority 
of the Turkish electorate. Their combined electoral popularity was around 82% in the 
2007 elections and 89% in 2011. Moreover, while the AKP and the MHP represent 
both liberal and conservative voters standing on the right of the ideological spectrum, 
the CHP represents leftist and social democratic voters. The AKP is the successor of 
the pro-Islamic Welfare Party which traditionally opposed EU membership 
emphasizing the EU’s Christian identity (Dikici-Bilgin 2008). However, upon its 
electoral success, the AKP pursued a pro-EU policy defying the legacy of its 
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conservative predecessor. With the objective to become a catch-all party, the AKP 
won three elections in a row between 2002 and 2011 and currently stands as the most 
popular political party in Turkey. The CHP on the other hand is the oldest political 
party in Turkey. Having embraced a leftist ideology since the 1970s, the CHP has 
been acting as the main opposition party since 2002. Idolizing the EU membership as 
a modernization project, the party however remains sceptical of a variety of EU 
preconditions. The MHP as a far-right party is the second biggest opposition party 
represented in the Turkish Parliament since 2007. Despite its strategic support for 
Turkey’s EU membership, the MHP advances strong criticisms to the EU’s 
membership criteria. Therefore, a special focus on these three parties generates 
comprehensive data on how Turkish mainstream politics approaches EU accession 
and respond to EU membership conditionality. Moreover, the study also examines the 
attitudes of the BDP, a pro-Kurdish party, as a controlling case in order to better 
understand the role of political ideology and strategy on domestic responses to EU 
membership conditionality. The BDP can be considered as a single-issue party since 
the party’s main objective is to work for the solution of the Kurdish problem in 
Turkey. It is a regionalist party implying that the party is primarily organized in the 
South-eastern Anatolia and secures strong electoral potentials in that particular region. 
It is also an anti-establishment party since party officials aim to transform the 
Republic into a loose federation of several autonomous states including a Kurdish 
state. Therefore, its views mostly diverge from those of other parties in the 
parliament. For instance, unlike the mainstream parties who embrace Cyprus as a 
national cause for Turkey, the BDP blames Turkey for invading Northern Cyprus and 
preventing a peaceful settlement in the island. At the same time, the BDP is one of the 
most pro-EU political parties in Turkey, because as a regional party it aims to defend 
'the ethno-territorial minority against the centre and demand for political autonomy' 
through EU accession (Marks et al 2002: 587). The EU stands as an ‘unwitting ally’ 
for regionalist parties such as the BDP against central governments (Jolly 2007: 110). 
EU membership hence becomes a crucial survival strategy for the BDP. According to 
this line of thinking, the BDP is the least-likely party to grow sceptical of EU 
accession. If the BDP reflects similar political attitudes towards the EU conditionality 
with other Turkish parties, then this will capture the reactionary dimension of 
Euroscepticism that transcends purely strategic or ideological competition. If a pro-
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EU single-issue party whose well-being rests on the realization of Turkey’s EU 
membership criticizes the EU and remains reluctant towards membership, then it is 
plausible to argue that EU-driven factors such as the EU’s selective and 
discriminatory conditionality play a decisive role behind the rising political 
contestations in Turkey against EU membership.  
The time period between 2002 and 2013 has been the focus of the study, because it 
comprises two important periods: (i) the years between 2002 and 2006 when Turkey-
EU relations entered a Golden era with the adoption of numerous reform packages 
which triggered the initiation of accession negotiations; and (ii) the period between 
2006 and 2013 during which the bilateral relations entered a dark age with the 
suspension of the negotiations and the remarkable uncertainty of Turkey’s 
membership prospects. The comparison of these two time periods will provide rich 
data in explaining the changing EU stances of Turkish political actors.   
The study particularly concentrates on Turkish political parties rather than public 
opinion because political parties are the prime actors of policy making (Morlino 
2009), while it is an ongoing debate whether public opinion has a remarkable impact 
on political decision-making (Page and Shapiro 1983; Holsti 1992; Burnstein 2003). 
Some studies emphasize the role of public opinion in inducing change in policy-
making (Holsti 1992; Stimson et al 1995; Burnstein 2003); whereas others find its 
effects negligible essentially because (i) policy-making is too complex for public to 
have an opinion on, (ii) most political issues are not salient to the mass public, and 
(iii) policy makers are not necessarily responsive to citizens’ preferences unless 
during elections (Zaller 1990; Jones 1994; Lindaman and Haider-Markel 2002). 
Studies on Turkey indicate a limited impact of public opinion on policy-making 
especially regarding Turkey’s EU accession (Güneş-Ayata 2003; Spiering 2007; 
Yılmaz 2009b). This is not only due to the highly centralized state structure in Turkey 
but also, it is observed that the Turkish public is one of the least informed publics 
among accession countries about the European Union (Güneş-Ayata 2003). The 
Turkish electorate tends to act in line with the EU policies of the political parties they 
vote for. For instance, although the majority of AKP voters is critical of EU accession 
believing that the EU is a Christian Club, the AKP electorate nevertheless supports 
the AKP’s pro-EU policies (Spiering 2007: 177; Yılmaz 2009b: 8-9). Similarly, albeit 
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one of the most Europhile segments of Turkish society, the CHP electorate mostly 
supports the Eurosceptic policies of their party (Yılmaz 2011: 202-204). Moreover, 
analysing political parties is particularly beneficial in terms of obtaining deeper 
insights about Turkey-EU relations through elite interviews, while research on public 
opinion primarily rests on opinion surveys which, albeit important to explain the 
determinants of public support for EU membership (Çarkoğlu and Kentmen 2011), 
fall short of generating in-depth knowledge about the nature of burgeoning Turkish 
scepticism towards EU accession.                
 
3.3. On the selection of cases 
As for the selection of empirical cases, the study focuses on the cases that are 
representative of the EU’s formal conditionality and its additional (country-specific) 
pressures on accession countries. The EU’s formal accession conditionality embodies 
‘the publicly stated preconditions as set out in the broad principles of the Copenhagen 
criteria and the legal framework of the acquis’ (Hughes et al 2004: 526). The EU 
exerts its formal conditionality through adaptational pressures on candidate countries 
in line with the economic and political membership criteria (Saatçioğlu 2009). The 
study selected two examples of the EU’s formal conditionality: the difficult reforms 
of minority rights and foreign land ownership. There are four main reasons behind the 
selection of these reforms as the test cases for the scrutiny of Euroscepticism in 
Turkey. First, the selection of minority rights and foreign land ownership as the main 
cases can be justified with the central place of these reforms in the EU’s membership 
conditionality: the EU attaches crucial value to both minority rights and the 
liberalisation of foreign land ownership, and thus candidate countries’ non-
compliance with those reforms is punishable by suspension of negotiations. Second, 
the reforms under scrutiny are highly politicized cases which may bring major shifts 
in domestic politics and thus generate heated domestic debates, providing a solid 
ground for comparing political party attitudes across accession countries. Besides, in 
the Turkish case, the selected reforms have been adopted despite both strong domestic 
opposition and lack of credible prospects for Turkey’s EU membership. Therefore, it 
is crucial to scrutinize the justifications behind domestic attitudes towards these 
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reforms. Third, the EU enforces a reform process based on the application of the 
Copenhagen criteria5, which was introduced in 1993 and significantly changed the 
traditional (and economistic) ways through which the EU enlargement had been 
approached. For instance, compliance with such norms as minority rights has become 
part of the official preconditions for membership after the introduction of the 
Copenhagen Criteria (Wiener and Wobbe 2002). The selected cases, namely minority 
rights and foreign land ownership, represent the EU’s conditional pressures based on 
both political and economic Copenhagen criteria respectively. Accordingly, the 
reform of minority rights is a good representative of the political accession criteria 
while the EU associates foreign land ownership reform with the economic criteria 
(under the title ‘free movement of capital’ that is a fundamental part of single market). 
Finally, the EU’s formal membership conditionality cannot be taken for granted as a 
standard and non-discriminatory set of conditions. For instance, Rechel (2008) and 
Ram (2003) criticize the EU’s differential treatment of candidates and member states 
concerning the protection of minority rights. Also, Wiener and Schwellnus (2004) 
highlight the selectivity (if not arbitrariness) in the EU’s application of human rights 
conditionality to candidates. Therefore, the study selected minority rights as a case 
that is representative of the EU’s selective conditionality and chose foreign land 
ownership as an example of the EU’s standard conditionality (exerting similar 
pressures on candidate countries) in order to understand whether the EU’s selectivity 
’matters’ in triggering Eurosceptic responses in candidate countries in general and 
Turkey in particular. 
In summary, the case of minority rights represents a reform area in which the EU’s 
application of conditionality has often been described as selective, whereas foreign 
land ownership illustrates a reform area in which the EU adopts a relatively 
standardized approach exerting similar pressures on candidate countries. Freedom to 
buy land across the EU is guaranteed under Article 56 of the Treaty Establishing the 
                                                          
5Membership requires that candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a 
functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market 
forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of 
membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union (EU Council 
1993). 
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European Community prohibiting all restrictions on the movement of capital 
(Trzeciak 2012: 103). The EU attaches priority to the reform since it considers the 
foreign purchase of property having significant impact on competition and the smooth 
functioning of the internal market (Trzeciak 2012: 113). The EU’s approach 
concerning the foreign land ownership reform is standard and rigid in the sense that 
members and candidates do not have an option to permanently opt out (only some of 
them can secure the right to issue temporary derogation up to 7 years if they meet the 
Commission’s specific criteria, as observed in the CEECs). Member states’ failure to 
ensure free movement of capital to nationals of EU Member states is penalized by the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ). However, the case of minority rights is different: 
there is no monitoring instrument adopted in the acquis communautaire to nurture the 
protection of minorities, or any sanctioning mechanism to force member states to sign 
and ratify treaties on minority rights (Pospisil 2006: 5). Besides, ECJ case-law 
demonstrates that the protection of specific minorities might be interpreted as 
contravening the principle of non-discrimination enshrined in EU law; consequently, 
the ECJ privileges the principle of non-discrimination at the expense of minority 
protection (ibid.). 
Apart from its formal conditionality, the EU also issued country-specific pressures on 
Turkey. The study adopts the EU’s Cyprus conditionality as the third empirical case 
representative of the EU’s additional country-specific conditionality. It is crucial to 
study the EU’s Cyprus conditionality because; (i) it is an EU precondition specifically 
targeting Turkey, (ii) it has remarkable impact on Turkish foreign policy, because it 
forces Turkey to open its harbours and airspace to the RoC that Turkey does not 
recognize as the official authority in Cyprus and (iii) Turkey’s failure to comply with 
the EU’s Cyprus conditionality has immediately led to the partial suspension of its EU 
membership negotiations. Turkey long pursued its traditional Cyprus policy defending 
a two-states solution to the long festering Cyprus problem which contributed to a 
deadlock keeping both nations of the island separated. The AKP government 
abandoned this policy and supported the Annan Plan which would unite the two 
communities under a single state. However, the failure of UN plan of reunification 
(the so-called ‘Annan Plan’) in 2004, the admission of the RoC to the EU, and the 
EU’s ensuing pressure on Turkey to open its harbours and airspace to the RoC 
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remarkably shifted the AKP government’s Cyprus policy away from reformism. The 
government’s failure to comply with the EU’s Cyprus condition resulted in a partial 
suspension of the accession negotiations in 2006. Although it previously blamed the 
opposition’s hard-line Cyprus approach for preventing solution to the Cyprus 
problem, the AKP started to reflect a similar hard-line stance after the suspension of 
the negotiations. Therefore, analysing the Turkish political responses to the EU’s 
Cyprus conditionality enables a better understanding of the development of 
Euroscepticism in Turkish politics. If all the political parties under scrutiny 
demonstrate similar reactions to the EU’s conditional pressures concerning Cyprus, 
then their opposition to EU conditionality is not merely shaped by their ideology or 
strategy, but it develops as a reaction to the EU’s precondition specifically targeting 
Turkey.  
Apart from these three cases under scrutiny, the study also devoted a chapter to the 
spreading perception in Turkey about the EU’s reluctance towards Turkish accession 
in order to examine how domestic perceptions influence attitudes towards EU 
accession process. It is crucial to include this chapter because there is a burgeoning 
conviction in Turkey that the EU will never accept Turkish accession due to different 
reasons such as cultural and religious differences. If this conviction proves to be the 
main determinant of Euroscepticism in Turkish politics, then it could be argued that 
the Turkish case is exceptional because other such claims are not observed in other 
candidate countries. In that case, political responses to EU accession criteria are 
supposed to be primarily stimulated by the perception of being unwanted by the EU. 
The CEECs whose membership was facilitated with the frame of ‘return to Europe’ 
did not share a similar experience with Turkey. However, if there are other significant 
causes of Turkish Euroscepticism similar to other accession countries, then Turkey is 
not entirely a distinct case and findings on Turkish political attitudes towards EU 
accession can be comparable to other countries. 
 
3.4. On the selection of ideological categories 
The ‘ideology versus strategy’ debate is popular within the academic literature in the 
analysis of party attitudes towards European integration (Hooghe 2007; Neumayer 
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2008). The study will benefit from this scholarly debate in examining the 
development of scepticism in Turkish politics towards EU accession. The study will 
also evaluate whether this debate still holds true when domestic political actors feel 
discriminated by the EU’s conditionality. Examining the impact of ideology and 
strategy permits comparison between Turkey and other accession countries. This 
comparison necessitates categorization of political parties in accession countries and 
Turkey in particular on the basis of their ideological alignments. The study employs 
classical Left-Right distinction as well as GAL (green/alternative/libertarian) - TAN 
(traditionalism/authority/nationalism) dyad, because being leftist or rightist does not 
necessarily explain whether party has an authoritarian or libertarian political outlook 
(Marks et al 2006). The GAL/TAN classification is claimed to be ‘the most general 
and powerful predictor of party positioning on the issues that arise from European 
integration’ because it focuses on a ‘new politics dimension tapping communal, 
environmental, and cultural issues’ (Hooghe et al 2002: 966). Through GAL/TAN 
categorization, the study will classify political parties not only relying on their 
economic, but also political and cultural views of the world. It will compare and 
contrast the EU policies of traditionalist and libertarian political parties in candidate 
countries. The study not only employs the GAL/TAN distinction to categorize parties 
but also benefits from the findings of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) of 2002 
and that of 2010 in order to determine the identification of the ideological alignments 
of political parties in different accession countries. However, there are some 
limitations to the GAL/TAN classification of the survey. For instance, the suggestions 
of the survey are based on expert feedbacks. Although relying on the views of experts 
is a viable way to estimate political party positions which cannot be directly measured 
(Hooghe et al 2010: 689), expert feedbacks at times produce contradictory and thus 
misleading results concerning the ideological alignment of political parties. For 
instance, according to CHES 2010, multiple Turkish experts evaluated the GAL/TAN 
status of the CHP on a ten-point scale (where 0 is extreme left, 10 is extreme right, 
and 5 is centre). Some experts gave 10 points to the CHP associating it with extreme 
right/TAN, while some gave 0 or 1 identifying it as extreme left/TAN. Moreover, 
some political parties in the CEECs which are depicted as GAL parties by the CHES 
2002 and 2010 can be considered as TAN because of their oppressive policies 
towards civil society and media during their time in government. For instance, the 
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Civic Democratic Party (ODS) in the Czech Republic and the Hungarian Civic Party 
(FIDESZ-MPP) are accepted by the expert surveys as Right/GAL parties. However, 
the ODS governments in the 1990s ‘made blatant efforts to suppress political party 
competition, restrict information and obstruct the regeneration of a politically active 
civil society’ and ‘neglect[ed] to establish an independent civil service, undermin[ed] 
poles of opinion outside of the government, such as universities, non-governmental 
organizations and interest groups’ (Vachudova 2005: 194-195). Similarly, the 
FIDESZ-MPP government pursued a process of ‘systematic destruction of checks and 
balances in the government’, moving Hungary in a more ‘conservative, corporatist-
authoritarian direction’ (Tomini 2012: 2). Therefore, it is more plausible to consider 
these parties as TAN rather than GAL. Even if these parties today claim to pursue 
liberal policies, the study chose to classify them as TAN due to their conservative 
attitudes during the EU accession process.   
Finally, identifying which party is GAL proves problematic for the CEECs due to the 
lack of democratic culture, a consolidated party system and a high degree of 
uncertainty over a successful transformation to market economy and liberal 
democracy (Bielasiak 1997: 24). Therefore, ideological models designed for Western 
European political parties do not fit well in the political context of the CEECs. For 
instance, while Left is identified with ‘change’ and ‘equality’ in the Western context, 
Left represents conservatism and ancien régime in the CEECs (Markowski 1997: 
223). Left parties are the successors of the Communist regime and stand as the 
‘transition losers’ (Marks et al 2006: 159). Carrying the nostalgia for the past, they 
resist liberalisation. It is rather the right-wing parties which defend liberal change 
(Markowski 1997: 223). Moreover, some ex-communist parties ‘liberalized’ their 
political outlook in order not to be marginalized after the fall of communism (Ziblatt 
1998: 135). They embraced ‘social democracy’ as their new political identity, and 
abandoned Marxist rhetoric (ibid.). Some became successful in presenting themselves 
as credible social democrats, while others experienced major difficulties in ‘selling’ 
this vision to the electorate due to their deep-rooted authoritarian image during the 
communist era (Ishiyama and Shafqat 2000: 440). Therefore, it will be misleading to 
automatically accept all ‘social democratic’ parties in the CEECs as GAL.   
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On the other hand, the lack of a broad middle class during the communist years 
further blurred the ideological alignments of political actors in the CEECs after the 
fall of communism. For instance, strong public support for privatization in the initial 
years of independence quickly vaned after a massive privatization wave in the 
CEECs. The new generation of political parties including Meciar’s HZDS in Slovakia 
responded by highlighting ‘national and cultural themes and economic national 
populism than economic liberalization’ (Markowski 1997: 234). Therefore, the GAL 
agendas of newly established political parties after communism got swiftly replaced 
with TAN rhetoric. Notwithstanding these limitations, both the GAL/TAN distinction 
and the CHES data give a general idea about the ideological alignments of political 
parties in accession countries facilitating comparison.   
          
3.5. Data collection 
The study uses interviews as its primary data collection method because it essentially 
aims to learn how Turkish political actors approach Turkey-EU relations. Conducting 
interviews with Turkish parliamentarians provides detailed reflections on Turkey’s 
EU bid and facilitates a better understanding of the current stalemate in Turkey’s 
accession process. It should be noted that interviews do not provide the researcher 
with direct access to ‘facts’ and ‘experiences’ but produce data on how interviewees 
interpret and display their perspectives upon them (Silverman 2011: 168). 
Accordingly, the study will also rely on other primary and secondary sources such as 
parliamentary minutes, official documents (EU reports, party documents), press 
statements of politicians in order to examine the validity of interview findings. The 
author takes note of certain issues associated with the usage of supplementary sources 
such as accession restriction and the issue of reliability, which necessitates the cross-
checking of the source, the context, the targeted audiences and the original intention 
of the document (Dale 2006: 81).        
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3.5.1. Elite interviews 
The study particularly focuses on elite interviewing in order to gather detailed 
information about the EU policies of Turkish political parties, because Turkey’s EU 
accession is primarily an elite-driven process (Akşit et al 2011: 397). Elite interviews 
provide useful insights about ‘the inner workings of the political process, the 
machinations between influential actors and how a sequence of events [i]s viewed and 
responded to within the political machine’ (Lilleker 2003: 208). They enable the 
researcher to gain access to the personal remarks of politicians which cannot be 
reached from ‘official published documents or contemporary media accounts’ (ibid.). 
What happens in politics is mostly inaccessible because it is either ‘unrecorded or it is 
locked away under 30 or 50 year rule’ (Lilleker 2003: 213). Therefore, conducting 
interviews with people who are actively involved in the political process is ‘often the 
only way of uncovering details’ about the topics of academic inquiry (ibid.).  
The EU accession process necessitates the adoption of certain EU-led reforms for 
which the Turkish government needs to acquire the approval of the Parliament, and 
this makes the Turkish Parliament ‘one of the most important actors’ in the 
membership process (Akşit et al 2011: 397). Therefore, it is necessary to conduct 
interviews with Turkish parliamentarians primarily due to two reasons. First, they are 
the main actors of legislation actively taking part in the adoption of EU-led reforms. 
They act as members of important parliamentary committees including constitutional, 
foreign affairs and EU harmonization committees. Therefore, they are informed about 
Turkey’s EU accession process and the EU-led reforms under scrutiny. Second, 
parliamentarians are almost always affiliated with political parties. Top party officials 
are usually parliamentarians, while some members of the Parliament are also 
members of their party’s own assembly. Therefore, Turkish parliamentarians are in a 
position to give feedback about both the workings of their own party about EU 
membership and the EU-led reforms brought before the Turkish Parliament. 
Researchers must already have a good knowledge of the facts about their academic 
research before conducting interviews (Lilleker 2003: 212). This not only gives them 
more academic credibility, but more importantly it ensures that ‘the interviewee 
cannot offer a completely false account of events without being questioned’ (ibid.). 
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Therefore, some scholars claim that interviews should be conducted towards the end 
of the research programme (ibid.). Interviews were conducted in the final years of the 
PhD program between November 2012 and April 2013, mostly because the author 
wanted to gain a detailed knowledge about the EU stances of Turkish political elite 
before conducting the interviews. With this motivation, he consulted the academic 
literature and scanned the official gazette, the national press and parliamentary 
minutes. This provided the author not only the opportunity to find out whether the 
interviewees diverge from the official stance of their parties but it also enabled the 
author to intervene in the case of ambiguous accounts given by respondents during the 
interviews.  
The Turkish Parliament located in the Turkish capital city, Ankara was where the bulk 
of interviews were conducted. Parliamentarians often chose to take the interviews 
either in their parliamentary offices or in the main building where plenary sessions 
take place. In addition, three interviews were held with the deputy leaders of the 
MHP, the CHP and the BDP in party headquarters. There are currently 327 AKP, 134 
CHP, 52 MHP and 26 BDP deputies in the Parliament. The author interviewed 45 of 
them (25 AKP, 15 CHP, 4 MHP and 1 BDP). Interviews account for 8% of Turkish 
parliamentarians in total (45 out of 550). The CHP deputies were comparably over-
represented (11%), while other parties were slightly under-represented (7.7% AKP, 
7.7% MHP, 4% BDP). There are several reasons for such an inconvenience. First, 
officials of the CHP reflected an image of ‘conventional elites’ who ‘regard academic 
investigations as fruitful and valuable to society as a whole’ (Sabot 1999: 330), 
therefore they were comparably much more approachable. On the other hand, most 
officials of the MHP and the BDP with whom the author contacted turned out to be 
‘defensive elites’ reluctant to cooperate (ibid.). AKP deputies rather reflected as 
mixed image, while some made themselves available for academic interviews, others 
proved difficult to reach. Second, there was an issue of attendance. Even though the 
author was present in the Parliament almost every working day during three months, 
he could not find most of the MHP and the BDP officials either in their offices or 
elsewhere in the Parliament. Finally, it was particularly challenging to interview BDP 
officials, because most declined to answer the interview questions as they claimed 
that interviewing with the party’s deputy leader would be sufficient. Difficulty to 
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conduct interviews with BDP officials had already been experienced by others and 
this is mainly explained with the party’s hierarchical structure and single-issue agenda 
(Akşit et al 2011:  398).  
Nevertheless, given the traditionally hierarchical structure of Turkish political parties, 
the study has successfully interviewed the top officials of the four parties including 
Burhan Kuzu (AKP - chairman of the Constitutional Committee), Mehmet Sayım 
Tekelioğlu (AKP- chairman of the EU harmonization committee), Afif Demirkıran 
(AKP – chairman of Turkey-EU joint parliamentary committee), Burak Erdenir (AKP 
- deputy undersecretary of the EU Ministry of Turkey), Faruk Loğoğlu (deputy leader 
of the CHP), Zuhal Topçu (deputy leader of the MHP) and Yüksel Mutlu (deputy 
leader of the BDP).  Moreover, the sample of the study reflects a regional balance. 
The parliamentarians represent 25 different cities from all seven regions of Turkey. 
Naturally, the biggest cities; namely İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir are represented more 
than other cities in the interview sample, as they have the largest portion of seats in 
the parliament. The sample also reflects a gender balance since the proportion of 
female respondents (17.7%) is slightly over the total ratio of women deputies in the 
Parliament (14.4%).  
This study is particularly useful in terms of providing the accounts of Turkish 
parliamentarians who work in the parliamentary commissions such as the EU 
harmonization committee, Constitutional committee, Foreign affairs committee and 
Turkey-EU joint parliamentary committee and personally participate in the making of 
draft EU laws. Therefore, they can offer rich insights concerning the reforms under 
scrutiny and Turkey’s EU membership process. The author interviewed ten members 
(out of 25) of the EU harmonization committee and nine members (out of 25) of 
Turkey-EU joint parliamentary committee in order to obtain in-depth feedback of the 
parliamentarians who played an active role during the EU-led reform process.  
There are several problems associated with elite interviewing. First of all, it is 
difficult to reach political elites although compared to non-elites, locating them ‘might 
seem relatively easy due to their high visibility’ (Mikecz 2012: 482). Turkish 
parliamentarians usually don’t respond to emails. The author could only get response 
from two parliamentarians through electronic correspondence. There are also many 
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gatekeepers in the Turkish Parliament proving the realization of interviews difficult. 
For instance, intensive security measures made it challenging for the author to gain 
access to the Parliament compound. The usage of voice recorder was subject to the 
approval of the parliamentary media office, and it was obligatory to obtain a written 
confirmation from the office every time the author visited the Parliament. 
Furthermore, it was not possible to get an appointment directly from parliamentarians 
bypassing their secretaries and advisors. Besides, booking an appointment was not a 
viable method for successfully conducting interviews with parliamentarians in 
Turkey. They don’t give appointments over the phone; hence the author had to 
personally visit the office of every parliamentarian he aimed to interview, he 
presented a letter of statement explaining why he wanted to conduct interviews, his 
curriculum vitae and business card in order to prove the authenticity of his academic 
credentials. Most parliamentarians refuse to give an appointment at a particular time; 
hence the author had to be present in the Parliament almost 4-5 days a week for a 
three-months period from morning until evening in order not to miss the opportunity 
to interview parliamentarians whenever they were available. Therefore, interviewing 
Turkish political elites proved to be an extremely intensive and exhaustive process.            
Besides, building rapport with the political elite and gaining their trust is a necessary 
but challenging task (Lilleker 2003; Mikecz 2012). The existing literature explains 
that positionality is either a problem or blessing for researchers to obtain valid data 
through elite interviewing (Morris 2009; Mikecz 2012). For instance, being a 
foreigner or outsider may be beneficial for a researcher to achieve a better response 
rate from political elites in some countries such as France, the United States and the 
United Kingdom; while being an outsider can be problematic to reach political elites 
in others such as Jamaica and Estonia due to linguistic barriers, cultural conventions 
and distrust against outsiders (Herod 1999; Sabot 1999; Mullings 1999; Mikecz 
2012). As a citizen of the Turkish Republic, the author was not a foreigner but his 
academic credentials as a PHD candidate from a UK institution attached him an 
‘outsider’ status and actually granted his research an external legitimacy which 
enabled the author to extract detailed views and interpretations from respondents. The 
interviews yielded the fact that Turkish political elites perceive UK universities as top 
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quality and prestigious institutions; they thus tend to take their research seriously. 
Therefore, coming from a UK university proved to be an advantage for the author.    
Finally, the author asked open-ended questions as they provide better access to 
‘interviewee’s views, interpretations of events, understandings, experiences and 
opinions’ (Byrne 2004: 182 in Silverman 2011: 167). Political elites ‘do not like being 
put in the straightjacket of close-ended questions’ (Aberbach and Rockman 2002: 
674). They rather prefer to articulate their views ‘explaining why they think what they 
think’ (ibid.). Open-ended questions thus provide them with the latitude to articulate 
their responses, and give them opportunity to organize their answers within their own 
frameworks (ibid.). The author prepared 6 open-ended questions five of which aimed 
to reveal the approaches of political elites to the reforms of minority rights, foreign 
land ownership, the EU’s Cyprus conditionality and the EU’s ‘perceived’ reluctance 
towards Turkish accession. The author simply asked them to give their personal 
account on those issues. Moreover respondents were asked about the most important 
obstacles to Turkey’s EU membership in order to gain their views about the (internal 
and external) sources of the current stalemate in bilateral relations.   
There are certain shortcomings of asking open-ended questions. In qualitative 
interviews, most of the analytical decisions are made during or after the interview data 
are collected, because open-ended questions force the interviewer to make different 
decisions and ask additional questions according to the reactions of respondents in 
each session (Gomm 2008: 239-240). Naturally, responses to open-ended questions 
are also open-ended. Some respondents devoted much energy to discuss issues that 
may not be directly related to the questions. The author was hence forced to ask 
probing questions to prevent side-tracking and ensure that a valid answer was 
provided. Conducting interviews with open-ended questions is also a time consuming 
process. Compared to close-ended questions, it takes much longer for respondents to 
answer open-ended questions (Aberbach and Rockman 2002: 674). The interviews 
took around 20-30 minutes on average, while some even lasted about an hour. 
Therefore, it took longer to transcribe and analyse the interview findings (ibid.). There 
are also financial costs. Since these interviews take longer time, it was not possible to 
conduct more than 3-4 interviews a day. The author thus had to come to the 
Parliament quite often and spend more than 3 months in Ankara.     
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3.5.2. Ethical considerations 
There are several ethical considerations the author took into account while conducting 
interviews. Informed consent was a key principle the author sought to fulfil. Informed 
consent is the consent of an interviewee which is essentially taken after giving him or 
her a detailed account of the nature and aims of the research and the assurance that 
interviewee can withdraw from the research at any time (Lilleker 2003: 209; 
Silverman 2011: 98). With this motivation, the author prepared a formal letter 
outlining the aims and the usage of the interviews as well as brief information about 
the research. The author emailed these letters to the secretaries of parliamentarians. 
He also orally presented the same information to the parliamentarians at the beginning 
of each interview to make sure he was granted informed consent. Moreover, the 
researcher must convince the respondents that his academic credentials are authentic 
and the interview data will be used for academic purposes only (Jones 2004: 259). In 
order to prove his authenticity, the author provided each parliamentarian with his 
curriculum vitae and business card before the interview. Moreover, the author asked 
for the respondents’ permission for the usage of audiotape recorder during the 
interviews. He both took notes and electronically recorded the interviews in order to 
prevent data loss. He compared the recorded data and his notes in order to receive 
optimum output from interviews. He only took notes when a few parliamentarians 
declined the electronic recording of the interview. As regards anonymity and 
confidentiality, all respondents gave their consent for the usage of their original 
names in the study.    
Obtaining the initial consent of interviewees is not always sufficient for a researcher 
may sometimes be obliged to seek respondent’s consent to use/publish the collected 
data (Lilleker 2003: 212-213; Silverman 2011: 102). Some parliamentarians firmly 
stated that the author must consult with them first before using their names and 
comments in his future publications. Moreover, some respondents preferred to give 
some ‘off the record’ information which they did not want the author to publish. The 
author turned off the audio recorder for brief time periods and remained loyal to 
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respondent demands by not sharing the ‘off-the-record’ interview findings of the 
study.  
Moreover, it is crucial to be aware of the social desirability bias that may compromise 
the findings of self-reporting techniques such as interviewing. According to some, 
giving the impression that the researcher is taking the side of the respondents might 
encourage them ‘to respond favourably, open up to [the interviewer] and give a good 
account of, at least, what they thought about the issue and the debates surrounding 
events (Lilleker 2003: 211). However, this attitude compromises the scientific 
objectivity of the researcher and causes social desirability bias in the respondent’s 
answers. A balanced-impression is a must for acquiring reliable interview data (ibid.). 
During the interviews, the author sought to look neutral and asked additional 
questions in order to check the validity of the answers when he suspected the risk of 
social desirability bias.     
Finally, during the writing-up phase of the PHD thesis, researchers should avoid using 
any sexist or racist language, acknowledge the contributions of other researchers to 
the topic under scrutiny, devote a section to the discussion of the limitations of the 
data used, and explain the implications of the research for the relevant scholarship (De 
Vaus 1991; Homan 1991).  
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CHAPTER IV  
THE REFORM OF MINORITY RIGHTS  
 
 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the variation of Turkish political party responses 
to the EU’s (issue-specific) conditional pressures regarding the reform of minority 
rights. The chapter argues that the main attitudes of Turkish political parties to the 
EU-led reforms of minority rights primarily stem from (1) domestic political 
considerations, i.e. cost-benefit calculations and threat perceptions regarding the EU 
accession, and from (2) the perception that the EU’s pressures of formal 
conditionality are often applied in a selective manner. The findings emphasize that 
domestic resistance to EU-led reforms of minority rights is not peculiar to the Turkish 
case because similar reactions to EU-led reforms of minority rights have been 
witnessed in other accession countries dissimilar to Turkey in terms of economic 
development, political culture, and national identity. Accordingly, the chapter will 
first discuss the EU’s minority rights conditionality and its overall approach towards 
minority rights. It will then scrutinize the political resistance in candidate countries to 
the EU-led minority rights reforms. Turning to the Turkish case, the chapter will first 
focus on the evolution of the minority rights regime in Turkey and then assess the 
political resistance to the EU’s minority rights conditionality in Turkey. Accordingly, 
Turkish political parties (especially the opposition parties, the CHP and the MHP) 
tend to embrace a highly nationalistic stance perceiving the reforms within the scope 
of foreign policy and dismiss them as unilateral concessions to foreigners. The 
observed rise of Euroscepticism in Turkish politics as a response to the EU’s 
conditionality of minority rights also feeds and ‘brings back’ the traditional Turkish 
mistrust against Europeans embodied in the Sèvres Syndrome. After discussing why 
and to what extent major Turkish political parties resist the reforms of minority rights, 
the chapter will compare the official party line with the views of parliamentarians 
through the discussion of interview findings. The interviews suggest that government 
respondents sometimes diverge from the government’s reformist rhetoric and actually 
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reflect Euroscepticism; i.e. they remain reluctant towards the reforms the AKP 
government supports. Moreover, the leadership change in the CHP, the main 
opposition party, has actually had a limited effect on the party’s stance over minority 
rights. The CHP respondents are divided over the expansion of minority rights. The 
interviews, on the other hand, support the hard-line stance of the junior opposition 
party, the MHP. Overall, the chapter seeks to find out whether strategic party 
competition and ideological dispositions determine party attitudes concerning 
minority rights, or Turkish political actors simply react against the EU’s selective 
application of its minority rights conditionality.    
 
4.1. The EU Conditionality on Minority Rights and Responses from Accession 
Countries 
The notion of minority rights was first introduced in 1993 as a political Copenhagen 
criterion enshrining ‘the respect for and protection of national minorities’ in the EU 
(Sasse 2005: 1). The reform has been praised as ‘a prime example of the EU’s 
positive stabilising impact in Central and Eastern Europe’ (ibid.). The expectation is 
that conditionality on minority rights would contribute to the consolidation of 
democracy and human rights in the accession countries and would particularly 
improve the living standards of the long oppressed minority groups. However, the 
application of the EU-led reform remains problematic due to certain impediments 
concerning minority rights. To clarify, despite the intensive efforts of the UN, OSCE 
and the Council of Europe, there is a lack of a consensus in international politics and 
law on what constitutes a ‘national minority’ which remains susceptible to a wide 
range of interpretations (Schwellnus 2005: 56; G. Yılmaz 2012: 121). There are no 
universally accepted practices on a number of minority issues, including minority-
language education, collective versus individual rights, and autonomy versus 
integration (Ram 2003: 47). The minority criterion hence lacks a firm foundation not 
only in international law but in EU law as well (Hughes and Sasse 2003: 5; Sasse 
2005: 5). Moreover, no European standard of minority rights has been established 
within the acquis communautaire to be firmly applicable to each EU member state 
(De Witte 2000; Pentassuglia 2001; Schwellnus 2005). This prevents the EU from 
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offering an ‘easy fix’ to the minority issues in Europe (Ram 2003: 47). Besides, 
different practices of member states prevent common community behaviour towards 
minorities within the EU (Sasse 2005: 5; Schwellnus 2005: 56).  
 
Additionally, the remarkable difference in the EU’s approach towards members and 
its treatment of candidates concerning minority rights is a major concern raised in the 
academic literature (Ram 2003; Schwellnus 2005; G. Yılmaz 2012). The EU’s strong 
pressures on candidate countries concerning the protection of minority rights while 
remaining indifferent to malpractices against minorities in member states are 
perceived as ‘double standards’ by candidates and thus, decrease the legitimacy of the 
EU’s conditionality during its negotiations with candidate countries (Rechel 2008: 
181; G. Yılmaz 2012: 121). For instance, France under the leadership of Nicholas 
Sarkozy deported more than a thousand Roma holding EU passports (nationals of 
Bulgaria and Romania). Lacking necessary enforcement measures, the EU only 
condemned the French government and threatened to take legal action but failed to 
convince France to step back (Traynor 2010). The repressive policy of France against 
Roma still continues even after the Sarkozy administration (Sayare 2012). Moreover, 
while the signature and ratification of the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities and the Charter of Regional and Minority Languages was 
enforced by the EU to candidate countries as a precondition for accession, those 
documents had not been ratified by a number of member states including Belgium, 
France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Greece (Ram 2003: 48). The EU does not 
only discriminate between member and candidate states. It has also applied the 
conditionality of minority rights to accession countries on a selective basis (Wiener 
and Schwellnus 2004: 463). Accordingly, countries experiencing serious problems 
related to minority issues such as Romania with a sizeable Roma community are 
taken into an intensive monitoring and continuous scrutiny while it is adequate for 
others to comply with the minority criterion in general (ibid.). Given such 
discrepancies, it is often argued that the minority rights regime remains a grey area in 
the EU (Schwellnus 2005: 51).  
 
As far as the minority criterion is concerned, the EU believes in the importance of the 
enforcement of certain instruments such as ‘the acceptance of ‘group-specific’ 
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cultural and linguistic rights, power-sharing arrangements, and socio-economic rights’ 
to accommodate between minorities and majorities in a democratic regime (Hughes 
and Sasse 2003: 3). However, concerning the accession process, such political steps 
prove contested and controversial in the recipient countries for they are perceived as a 
threat to nation-state and national sovereignty. This conundrum renders the reform of 
minority rights susceptible to strong domestic opposition during the accession 
process. Nationalistic justifications, such as the preoccupation to protect national 
sovereignty and integrity, and the danger of foreign interference have been raised as 
the main causes for the denial of expanding the rights of minorities. In Estonia, the 
Centre Party [Left/TAN] opposed the EU-led reforms expanding the citizenship rights 
of minorities and vetoed the removal of the Estonian language requirement for 
minority candidates who participate in national elections. Claiming that such reforms 
would constitute a threat to Estonian identity, party officials condemned the 
government for ‘giving in’ to Western institutions’ demands on such sensitive issues 
(Feldman 2001: 16).  
 
Along with the support of opposition parties, Vladimir Meciar’s governing party, 
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) [Left/TAN] rejected all EU-led 
reforms on minority rights and proclaimed Slovak as the only official language, 
minimizing the political influence of the Hungarian minority and limiting the 
authority of local communities (Sasse 2005: 16; Tesser 2003: 512-513). Meciar 
particularly opposed the idea of giving any rights to Roma. He claimed that ‘the 
Roma are a social problem and simply a great burden on this society’ (Kohn 1996: 
179). He even argued ‘if we don't deal with them now, they will deal with us in time’ 
(ibid.). Consequently, the European Commission reported that Slovakia was unable to 
fulfil the political accession criteria and excluded Slovakia from the first wave of 
accession. Slovakia’s accession process was revitalized only after a new government 
took over in October 1998 and agreed to comply with the EU membership criteria.  
 
Similarly, in the Czech Republic, the construction of the Maticni street wall in 1999 
physically separating the Czechs from the Roma minority created much controversy. 
EU officials condemned the construction of the wall and warned the Czech 
government that such a discriminatory decision would threaten their entry to the EU 
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(Fawn 2001: 1204). Vaclav Klaus, the leader of Civic Democratic Party (ODS) 
[Right/TAN], the main opposition of the time, initially defied criticisms and declared: 
‘I see walls in Northern Ireland which are far greater in significance than that in 
Maticni Street and no one threatens to expel Britain from the EU’ (Fawn 2001: 1209). 
Mayor Pavel Tosovsky, a member of the ODS who ordered the construction of the 
wall dismissed the warnings of Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission 
and replied; ‘Prodi? Isn’t his first name Romany? We don’t want to belong to a 
European Union that makes this wall an obstacle to our membership’ (Fawn 2001: 
1204).  
 
Upon foreign pressures, the Czech Parliament adopted a resolution halting the wall’s 
construction. Although the official policy of the ODS was to vote against the 
construction, several party officials supported Mayor Tosovsky and stood against the 
rights of Roma (Fawn 2001: 1203). For instance, the ODS Deputy Chairman Ivan 
Langer stated that people were ‘right to enact private initiatives’ [to protect 
themselves from Roma] (Fawn 2001: 1209). Even during the ODS government, some 
party officials highlighted their opposition to the Roma minority despite 
condemnation from within the party. For instance, the ODS Senator Zdenek Klausner 
proposed relocating Roma from out of Prague and the ODS mayor of Ostrava Liana 
Janackova proposed municipal funding for one-way air tickets for Roma who opted to 
leave for Canada (Fawn 2001: 1203).  
 
In Poland, a draft bill granting greater rights to minorities in 1999 attracted much 
criticism among political parties. The draft EU-led reform foresaw the usage of 
minority languages at state departments and the establishment of a department 
exclusively responsible for minority affairs (Tesser 2003: 500). The officials of the 
agrarian Polish Peasant Party (PSL) [Left/TAN] and the centre-right Solidarity 
coalition (AWS) [Left/TAN] opposed the EU reform for it constituted ‘a threat to the 
integrity of the republic as well as an attempt to ridicule the majesty of the state’ 
(Tesser 2003: 501). The parties justified their opposition on the fear of re-domination 
by Poland’s powerful neighbour Germany (ibid.). They also highlighted the lack of a 
consensual and binding definition of national minority within the EU, diminishing the 
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credibility of the EU-led minority reform further in the eyes of the Polish public 
(ibid.).   
 
The EU’s non-standard conditionality on minority rights depleted the enthusiasm for 
reform in Macedonia. The Macedonian government led by the Social Democratic 
Union of Macedonia (SDSM) [Left/TAN], pioneered the adoption of the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement (OFA) in 2001 to end the armed conflict with ethnic 
Albanians and expand the rights of minorities in line with the EU’s condition for pre-
accession. However, the government then referred to the EU’s deficits in its minority-
rights regime in order to justify its loss of motivation for the reform (Koinova 2011: 
826). The government charged the EU with failing to pressurize Greece and Bulgaria 
to recognize their Macedonian minorities. The main tendency among the Macedonian 
decision-makers was that ‘if neither country was able to change its narrow historical 
vision with regard to the Macedonian nationality, then Macedonians should not be 
obliged to further support ethnic diversity in their own country’ (ibid.). Likewise, 
officials of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) [Right/TAN] stressed the EU’s 
indifference to France’s non-recognition of its minorities and condemned the EU’s 
pressures on Croatia as double standard (Jovic 2006: 93).      
 
Minority rights became a source of intense opposition in Romania as well. The 
government’s initiative to introduce an EU-sponsored Education Law in July 1997 
which granted ‘national minorities the right of education in their mother tongue from 
primary to university education and the possibility of establishing a Hungarian-
language university’ faced fierce opposition in the parliament (Ram 2003: 44). The 
opposition parties especially the Party of Social Democracy (PSDR) [Left/TAN] and 
the Romanian National Unity Party (PUNR) [Right/TAN] strongly opposed the 
legislation that would considerably expand minority rights in the country (ibid.). The 
Romanian government was forced to withdraw the bill but attempted to grant similar 
rights to minorities by issuing an emergency ordinance. However, its enactment was 
again prevented by the opposition votes in the parliament shortly after the 
Luxembourg Council accepted the Commission’s recommendation not to start 
accession negotiations with Romania (Ram 2003: 45). Moreover, the far-right 
nationalist Greater Romania Party (PRM) [Right/TAN] which had given strategic 
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support to Romania’s EU membership, stood against the reforms expanding the rights 
of Hungarian and Roma minorities. The PRM determined a wide range of 
‘unacceptable aliens’ such as Roma, Jews, Hungarians, Chinese and Arabs living in 
Romania and opposed any reform granting further rights to those communities (Borz 
2012: 177-178). During the zenith of the party’s electoral popularity between 2000 
and 2004, Vadim Tudor, the party leader even demanded all ‘Gypsies’ to be put in jail 
for there was no other solution [to prevent crime] (Goldston 2002: 155).  
 
Latvian politics under weak coalition governments had a more difficult experience 
concerning the reforms of minority rights since not only opposition but also coalition 
partners opposed the reforms to the point of withdrawing from coalition. The EU 
pressurized the Latvian government to amend Latvian Language Law and 
Naturalization Law ‘to allow Russian-speaking non-citizens to become better 
integrated into Latvian society’ (Bhatia, unknown: 17). The citizenship reform was 
strongly opposed by the For Fatherland and Freedom/Latvian National Independence 
Party (TB/LNNK) [Right/TAN], a far right nationalist party that feared such 
amendments would render Latvia more susceptible to Russian influence. The party 
officials argued that ‘if all non-citizens were suddenly given voting rights they would 
vote to destabilize Latvia's shaky political scene and even re-annex Latvia to Russia’ 
(Morris 2004: 554). Even during its term in office, the TB/LNNK persistently 
opposed the minority rights laws which ‘grant[ed] citizenship to stateless children and 
eas[ed] language requirements for citizenship applicants over the age of 65’ (Solska 
2011: 1096). The party eventually gave in to the pressures of the EU and the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and adopted the 
reforms (ibid.). The party officials announced that it was in Latvia’s strategic interest 
to become an EU member to offset future threats from Russia (Morris 2004: 558). 
However, the legislation created a crisis within the government since the biggest 
coalition partner; the Democratic Party-Saimnieks (DP-S) [Left/TAN] accused the 
coalition government of being ‘too lenient’ towards the external bodies and withdrew 
from the government (ibid.).  
 
The resignation of the DP-S resulted in a popular referendum in which 53% of the 
voters approved the disputed reforms in October 1998 (Kelley 2004: 91-92; Solska 
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2011: 1096). The new Latvian government formed after the withdrawal of the DP-S 
comprised a coalition of TB/LNNK, the People’s Party (TP) [Right/TAN] and the 
Latvian Way (LC) [Right/GAL]. Despite EU pressure, the coalition government was 
adamant to adopt a new language law placing high priority on ‘protecting Latvian 
language and culture’ and announced it as more important than ‘strengthening 
relations with the EU’ (Kelley 2004: 82). The law put very difficult language barriers 
on the Russian-speaking minority as the criteria for employment and legal services 
amongst others (Kelley 2004: 81). The EU Presidency firmly warned the government 
that the language law would ‘hurt Latvia’s chance to join the EU’ (Kelley 2004: 82). 
The government’s insistence in the nationalistic language law lasted until the Helsinki 
Summit in December 1999 when finally, the governing parties decided that a liberal 
amendment would actually open the EU’s door to Latvia; thus the incentive to join the 
EU prevailed over nationalist stance against minorities in the last minute (Kelley 
2004: 83).    
 
The above examples reflect the fact that EU-led reforms for the protection of minority 
rights became a remarkable source of Euroscepticism in numerous candidate 
countries. The opposing domestic political actors perceived minorities not as an 
integral part of the host society but as foreigners open to manipulation by their 
country of origin. Hence the nationalistic urge to preserve political stability and 
national sovereignty against foreign intrusion played a crucial role behind domestic 
resistance to the expansion of minority rights. Moreover, the EU’s differential 
approach towards members and candidates decreased the credibility of its formal 
conditionality. For instance, the ratification of the Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities was contested in the national parliaments of 
accession countries not only because the ratification would mean the official 
recognition of minorities that had previously been denied such status (Rechel 2009: 
79-80), but also because the convention was neither signed nor ratified by a 
significant number of EU member states (Kochenov 2011: 37). Moreover, as the cases 
of Poland, Macedonia and the Czech Republic illustrate, domestic reluctance to 
proceed with minority reforms was often justified with the EU’s differential, if not 
‘discriminatory’, treatment of member states and candidates over the issue.  
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Concerning the effects of party dispositions on the development of an Eurosceptics 
stance, the findings of the study suggest that parties in accession countries which 
opposed the EU-led reform of minority rights hold mainly TAN ideology (H2), while 
Left/Right distinction (H1) does not play a decisive role in the responses of political 
parties against the EU. It is the TAN ideology which represents a nationalist and 
conservative front that tends to treat the country as a single nation and minorities as a 
threat to the nation or unwanted outsiders. Moreover, some of the mainstream parties 
such as the centre-right ODS in Czech Republic and the centre-left SDSM in 
Macedonia which identified themselves as liberal could be considered as TAN parties 
due to their repressive policies against media and civil society during their term in 
office. This supports the Hypotheses I and II regarding the effects of party ideology 
on Euroscepticism. Moreover, there is evidence in the literature that TAN parties 
including the ODS, the SDSM, and the HDZ in Croatia criticized the EU’s selectivity 
regarding the reform of minority rights. However, there is no tangible evidence 
indicating that GAL parties such as the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) in Poland, 
the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) and Slovak Democratic and Christian 
Union – Democratic Party (SDKÚ-DS) embrace Euroscepticism in response to the 
EU’s selective minority rights conditionality. Therefore, comprehensive research on 
the CEECs is needed to provide supporting evidence for Hypothesis III.   
Regarding party competition over the reforms, the evidence suggests that resistance to 
minority rights reforms is embraced not only by fringe parties but mainstream parties 
as well (H4). The Centre party in Estonia, the PSDR in Romania, the HZDS in 
Slovakia, the LW in Latvia and the ODS could be considered as mainstream parties 
having important electoral potentials. Even the PRM and the PUNR in Romania and 
the TB/LNNK in Latvia which are now considered as fringe parties had once gathered 
considerable public support and experience in office during the EU accession process. 
Their reactions to the EU-led reforms are not to be neglected. Therefore, the evidence 
on minority rights supports Hypothesis IV. Moreover, it is difficult to argue that 
Eurosceptic response to the EU’s conditionality of minority rights is an opposition 
phenomenon (H5). Often, resistance to minority reforms was adopted by opposition 
parties that seek to gain ground against reformist governments through nationalist and 
protectionist rhetoric. However, governing parties too have shown similar reactions in 
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the domain of minority rights and announced their lack of enthusiasm to proceed with 
the EU membership process. Especially, shaky coalitions were shattered due to the 
differences over minority rights as in the case of Latvia. In this respect, TAN ideology 
has a better explanatory power than opposition-government distinction, since 
governing parties with TAN ideology including the HZDS, the TB/LNNK, the SDSM 
and the HDZ primarily stood against the reforms of minority rights. Moreover, the 
EU’s selective attitude towards members and candidates over the issue of minority 
rights met with nationalistic responses from governing parties with TAN ideology and 
inertia in the adoption of the reform as in the case of Macedonia (H6). In this respect, 
there is some supporting evidence for Hypothesis VI, although comprehensive 
research is necessary to understand to what extent the EU stances of governing parties 
are affected by the EU’s selective application of formal acccession conditionality.       
 
The reform on minorities had a similar impact in Turkish politics. Opposition parties 
with TAN rhetoric criticized EU-led reforms of minority rights with the 
preoccupation to protect national sovereignty and prevent foreign interference, while 
the government remained selective in the adoption of reforms.  
 
4.2. The minority rights regime in Turkey 
Minority rights in Turkey have long been governed according to the provisions of the 
Lausanne Treaty of 1923 which granted official minority status only to non-Muslims 
such as Greeks, Jews and Armenians in order to put them on an equal footing with 
Muslim citizens (Toktaş and Aras 2009: 700). Although the status of minority was not 
exclusively based on religion but also included differences in race and language after 
the First World War in Europe, the signatories to the Lausanne Treaty accepted the 
Turkish offer to recognize only non-Muslims as minority in Turkey. According to 
Oran (2007: 37), the Turkish perception of minority dates back to the Ottoman era 
when Muslims regardless of their ethnic origin were portrayed as ‘one nation’ 
[Ümmet] and first-class members of the society whereas non-Muslims were treated as 
foreigners; thus minority.  
113 
 
Moreover, it is argued that the founders of the Turkish Republic barely re-assembled 
the nation divided in the First World War and did not want to further disintegrate the 
country by granting ‘international minority rights to the Muslim flank of the 
population, which formed the bulk of the mosaic inherited from the Ottoman Empire’ 
(Oran 2007: 38). Therefore, communities other than non-Muslims such as Kurds and 
Alevis as well as other non-Muslim groups such as Syriacs, Chaldeans, Assyrians, 
and Nestorians have been traditionally considered outside the scope of Turkey’s 
minority rights regime (Toktaş and Aras 2009: 700; Kızılkan-Kısacık 2010: 12-13). 
Nevertheless, Article 39 of the Lausanne Treaty partially granted de-facto minority 
status to those communities liberalizing the usage of any language in the private and 
public sphere except for the right to education. Paragraph 4 of Article 39 explicitly 
stipulates: ‘No restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish national of 
any language in private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press, or in 
publications of any kind or at public meetings’. However, Turkish governments 
continuously violated those provisions and failed to implement liberty of language 
(Oran 2007: 44). Besides, the anti-terrorism law enacted in 1991 depicted ‘the 
existence of minority groups based on ethnic and linguistic differences’ as a threat to 
national unity and territorial integrity (Oran 2007: 46).    
During the accession process, the EU pressurized Turkey to redefine its minority 
policy in order to include the groups whose minority rights had long been neglected. 
The EU conditionality foresaw a series of reforms including the rights of non-Sunni 
Muslims (Alevis), property rights of non-Muslim religious foundations, the question 
of internally displaced persons, elimination of restrictions on education, revision of 
the curricula at schools in order to remove discriminatory language from textbooks, 
and broadcasting in languages other than Turkish, amongst others (G. Yılmaz 2011: 
7-11).  
The AKP government devoted its energy for the implementation of the EU 
conditionality of minority rights from the outset. The EU membership stimulus has 
become an important trigger for the AKP to push for an unprecedented transformation 
of Turkey concerning minority rights (Kızılkan-Kısacık 2010: 19). The AKP brought 
numerous reforms ameliorating the rights of minorities. For instance, the reforms 
authorized the State’s TV Channel TRT to broadcast in different minority languages, 
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including Kurdish, Arabic, Bosnian, Zaza, and Circassian, allowed the opening of 
private courses for minority languages, legalized the education of minority languages 
at schools, replaced the Turkish names of South-eastern Anatolian villages and towns 
with their former names in other languages and authorized the public use of the letters 
‘q’, ‘w’ and ‘x’ used in the Kurdish alphabet. Although the implementation of those 
reforms has often been problematic, such legislative steps were nevertheless praised 
in the literature as a ‘big leap forward’ for Turkey (Kirişci 2011; G. Yılmaz 2011; 
Kızılkan-Kısacık 2010).  
The AKP government’s efforts to solve the Kurdish problem can also be considered 
in the context of EU conditionality of minority rights. It can be argued that the bulk of 
the EU-led reforms about minorities have been adopted with the AKP’s motivation to 
grant greater cultural rights for the sizeable Kurdish minority in the country. 
However, the long association of the Kurdish problem with the PKK terrorist 
insurgency rendered the impact of the EU-led reforms severely limited. The AKP’s 
reform agenda entitled ‘Kurdish initiative’ faltered as early as 2009 when the 
infamous ‘Habur’ incident resulted in a nation-wide public outcry6.  
 
4.2.1. Political resistance to the reforms of minority rights in Turkey 
EU-led reforms of minority rights attracted severe criticisms from the Turkish 
opposition. Both the CHP and the MHP perceived the minority reforms as an attempt 
to legalize the minority status of Kurds (and legitimize Kurdish separatism), 
breaching the Lausanne Treaty and threatening national integrity. The CHP during the 
Baykal leadership adopted a narrow definition of minority as stipulated by the 
Lausanne Treaty and strictly opposed all EU-led reforms that undermine the Treaty 
provisions. Since the Lausanne Treaty extends recognition only to non-Muslim 
minorities, the CHP opposed the EU’s conditionality to broaden the scope of 
                                                          
6The AKP government permitted several PKK militants to pass the Habur border gate between Turkey 
and Iraq. An ad hoc court was assembled to try the militants and the court swiftly decided to release 
them. The mass celebrations of the freed militants were revealed in national media and drew strong 
public reaction. The opposition held the AKP government responsible for such ‘humiliating’ scenes. 
The AKP abandoned its Kurdish initiative shortly after the incident. For detailed analyses on the 
AKP’s Kurdish initiative, the Habur incident and the Kurdish issue in general, see Somer and Liaras 
(2010); Kirişci (2011). 
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minorities to include other communities such as Kurds and Alevis. Despite the fact 
that the CHP proclaims itself as Social Democrat (Left/GAL), its self-proclaimed 
historical legacy to protect and nurture the Republican regime forced the party 
officials to defy further democratization and gave the CHP a Left/TAN identity. The 
resistance to the EU-led reforms of minority rights in defence of the Lausanne Treaty 
consolidated the party’s image as a Left/TAN party. For instance, the CHP leadership 
opposed the re-opening of the Orthodox Halki Seminary7 relying on the provisions of 
the Lausanne Treaty ordering the strict application of the reciprocity principle 
concerning the question of minorities between Greece and Turkey. Onur Öymen, the 
deputy chairman of the CHP defended the party’s objection as legitimate as long as 
Greece kept denying similar rights to the Turkish minority in Western Thrace 
(NTVMSNBC 2009). Öymen (2007) opposed the redefinition of the notion of 
minority and the expansion of minority rights in Turkey while turning a blind eye to 
the Greek oppressions and violations against the rights of the Turkish minority. He 
accused the EU of creating a double standard by pressurizing Turkey to amend its 
laws on minorities while remaining silent and indifferent to Greek oppressions (ibid.).  
Overall, the CHP’s definition of minority is strictly confined to the provisions of the 
Lausanne Treaty which considers minority rights as a matter of foreign policy rather 
than within the scope of domestic rights and freedoms. Hence, the party has a general 
tendency to interpret any reform of minorities as a concession to foreigners. However, 
the party’s attachment to the Lausanne Treaty does not entirely explain its opposition 
to the reforms. The CHP’s rhetoric on minorities during the Baykal leadership was not 
devoid of nationalistic connotations. Baykal rejected the existence of minorities in 
Turkey considering all different communities as an integral part of the Turkish nation 
and accused the EU of inciting secessionism (Milliyet 2006). In particular, Baykal’s 
CHP refused to recognize Kurds as minorities. In Baykal’s view, Kurds and Turks 
had been living together, getting married together for centuries; therefore almost 
everyone from Western Turkey (identified as mostly Turkish) has family ties in 
Eastern Anatolia (inhabited by large Kurdish population) (Baykal 2006a). He argued 
                                                          
7 It is a Greek Orthodox theological school at the Halki Island (Heybeli Ada in Turkish) near Istanbul 
officially tied to the Greek Orthodox Patriarchy. It was closed down in 1971 according to a law which 
prohibited the establishment of private religious and military schools. The EU pressurizes the Turkish 
government to reopen it as a membership precondition. For a detailed account on the issue of Halki 
Seminary, see Toktaş and Aras (2010).      
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that Kurds didn’t want to be treated separately and what the EU dictated (defining 
Kurds as a minority) would definitely separate Turks from Kurds (ibid.). Baykal’s 
remarks also revealed his negative preconceptions about Europeans. He firmly 
dismissed the notion of minority as a plot used by Europeans against Turks through 
capitulations since the Ottoman era and claimed that the minority issue will be 
brought in front of Turkey time and again as a ‘blackmail device’ (Hürriyet 2004c).  
As a far-right political party, the MHP’s stance on minority rights, especially the 
rights of the Kurdish minority has always been negative similar to its counterparts in 
Western Europe (Öniş 2003). Its firm denial of the notion of ‘Kurdish minority’ and 
conspicuous objection to the Kurdish problem in Turkey has often been considered as 
the main reason behind its electoral success in the late 1990s (Öniş 2003: 34). The 
party has long dismissed any cultural and linguistic rights to Kurdish people claiming 
such acts would reward PKK8 terrorism and constitute a step for the partition of 
Turkey (Avcı 2011b: 441; Öniş 2003: 45). During its term in the office as a coalition 
partner between 1999 and 2002, the MHP objected to substantial EU-led reforms such 
as minority rights, freedom of speech and the abolition of the death penalty with the 
same justification to maintain the integrity of the Turkish state against Kurdish 
separatism (Avcı 2011b: 440). This hard-line stance led to a temporary gridlock in 
Turkey’s reform process. Today, the MHP still denies granting minority status to 
Kurds and rejects the existence of the Kurdish problem. Party officials even charge 
the EU with compromising the integrity of the nation state through a series of reforms 
granting cultural rights to Kurds. The MHP is equally concerned with the EU’s 
attitudes towards the PKK. The party leader demands the EU to play an influential 
role in forcing PKK to surrender and its leader Abdullah Öcalan to be executed 
(Bahçeli 2007). Instead, he claims, the EU remains oblivious to the ever-expanding 
and sophisticated networks of the PKK located in several EU member states (ibid.).  
Similar to Baykal’s CHP, the MHP officials firmly oppose the reopening of the Halki 
seminary and dismiss it as a new form of capitulations9 (NTVMSNBC 2009). 
                                                          
8 pro-Kurdish militant organization recognized by the EU and the US as terrorist.  
9 Capitulations are the bilateral agreements between the Ottoman Empire and European States 
conferring rights and privileges in favour of their citizens who resided and/or traded in the Ottoman 
territories. Those special arrangements were first made with France and then extended to other 
European states. They were abolished with the Lausanne Treaty. The MHP attaches a pejorative 
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Embracing a narrow definition of minority rights relying upon the Lausanne Treaty, 
the MHP leader Bahçeli seeks Greek compliance with the principle of reciprocity 
before granting any further rights to the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey. He 
dismisses the possibility of reopening the Halki seminary unless Greek government 
decides to extend cultural and religious rights to the Turkish minority in Greece. 
Similar to the CHP officials, Bahçeli condemns the EU’s membership pressures as 
pro-Greek, thus as a double standard (Habertürk 2012). The remarks of Semih Yalçın 
(2012), the deputy leader of MHP are even more antagonistic in terms of depicting the 
Greek Orthodox Patriarchate as ‘traitors who backstabbed Turks’ and joined the ranks 
of the enemy during Turkey’s war of independence in the 1920s. He urges Turkey to 
stand firm against the demands of the Patriarchate. He also defends the closure of the 
Halki Seminary in 1971 as a legitimate act in response to the Greek indifference to the 
deteriorating living conditions of the Turkish minority in Greece (ibid.).   
In addition to the main opposition parties, the intolerance of highly conservative 
Turkish society towards minorities proves the adoption of any reform of minority 
rights controversial and encourages the populist stances of political actors against 
minorities. The 2009 report of Binnaz Toprak, a prominent Turkish scholar reveals 
how social pressures and segregation are deeply at work within Turkish society 
against people from different ethnic backgrounds such as Kurds, having religious 
beliefs other than Islam such as Christianity and Judaism, being a member of a 
different sect of Islam such as Alevi, or being a non-believer (Toprak et al 2009).     
Public reactions to the 2004 ‘minority rights report’ drafted by the Human Rights 
Advisory Council affiliated with the Turkish Prime Ministry particularly illustrates 
the widespread scepticism towards minorities in Turkey. The Human Rights Advisory 
Council bringing together bureaucrats, civil society organizations and 
academics/experts, was established by the coalition government in 2001 in order to 
comply with the EU political criteria. İbrahim Kaboğlu (the president) and Baskın 
Oran (a leading member), two academic members of the Human Rights Advisory 
Council drafted a critical report on minority rights regime in Turkey, making 
suggestions such as: de-emphasizing the ethno-nationalist terms such as Turk, re-
                                                                                                                                                                      
meaning to the term as ‘unilateral concessions’. For scholarly research on capitulations, see Bentwich 
(1923); Shaw (1975); İnalcık (2003).  
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writing the Turkish Constitution and all related laws to ‘have a liberal, pluralistic and 
democratic content and with the participation of all organisations of civil society’ and 
ratifying international conventions including the Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities (Human Rights Advisory Board 2004: 7-8). Several 
civil society organizations such as ‘Toplumsal Düşünce Derneği’ [Association for 
Societal Thought] and Kamu-Sen, political parties including the CHP, the MHP and 
the DYP (True Path Party) accused the authors of committing treason against the 
Turkish nation and demanded the dismissal of the report (Oran 2004: 20-21). The 
AKP government criticized the report as a ‘vain intellectual effort’ which was neither 
solicited nor supported by the government (Oran, 2004: 21). A lawsuit was opened 
against the authors of the report charging them with insult against the Turkish nation. 
However, Sadullah Ergin, the Minister of Justice did not give authorization for the 
trial of the authors (Radikal 2009).  
In sum, the Turkish minority rights regime implies a restrictive understanding of 
minority rights reflected in public opinion, political parties, the legislature, judiciary 
and the government. The EU’s interference in this domain has faced serious 
opposition from various segments of Turkish society and politics transcending Left-
Right ideological divisions.  
 
     
4.2.2. The Reform of Minority Foundations 
One of the most intense debates over minority rights reforms was observed during the 
enactment of the EU-led reform granting Turkish non-Muslim minority foundations 
the right to own immovable property. The reform under discussion foresaw certain 
amendments in the Turkish law of foundations (no.5737) in order to bring greater 
liberties to non-Muslim communities and the foundations they own. Currently there 
are one hundred and sixty one active foundations established by non-Muslims since 
1924. With the law regulating the property ownership in 1936 those foundations 
freely acquired immovable property with the sole obligation to declare their purchases 
officially. However, the Turkish Court of Cassation (Yargıtay) ordered in 1974 the 
immovable properties bought after 1936 by minority foundations to be sent to the 
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State Treasury denying the property rights of minorities. Turkish legal experts are 
divided over the issue. Some interpret the issue as a matter of foreign policy (and 
define minority as foreigner) and defend the principle of reciprocity between the state 
of origin of the minority group in question and Turkey. They hence urge both Greece 
and Turkey to jointly grant property rights to their own minority foundations (Aytaş 
2008). Others oppose this argument on the grounds that minorities are Turkish 
citizens and therefore must be entitled to the same rights as the rest of the Turkish 
population without requiring reciprocation from their country of origin (Çağatay 
2011). Hence, this issue should not be read as a question of sovereignty in Turkish 
foreign policy but must be understood as a matter of citizenship rights under domestic 
law (ibid.). The same division over the issue is also visible among Turkish political 
parties. The argument goes that the AKP government approaches the law as a matter 
of citizenship rights and dismisses the reciprocity principle; whereas the opposition 
interprets the immovable property ownership of minorities as a matter of foreign 
policy violating the Treaty of Lausanne. Since the Lausanne Treaty is exalted as the 
founding treaty of the Turkish Republic, the main opposition parties; namely the CHP 
and the MHP dismiss any deviation from the Treaty provisions as a threat to national 
sovereignty.  
The new law of foundations was first introduced to the Turkish Parliament in 2006 as 
part of the EU harmonization process. Although it was enacted by the Parliament, 
Ahmet Necdet Sezer, the President of the time vetoed the law on the grounds that it 
was in contravention with the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty. The law was re-
introduced to the Parliament in February 2008 and accepted by AKP votes. The scope 
of the Law on Foundations was considerably extended. It granted minority groups the 
liberty to establish foundations much more easily, select board members, acquire and 
sell properties, receive funds from abroad, and enjoy tax exemption for the repair and 
restoration of their cultural properties (European Commission 2008: 17). After the law 
went into force, the AKP government returned 181 immovable properties that had 
been confiscated since 1974 to their owners, i.e. minority foundations such as the 
foundation of Aya Yorgi (Hagia Georgios) Church and Kumkapı Meryem Ana 
(Mother Marry) foundation.   
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Again, the opposition firmly dismissed the law alleging that such legislation would be 
in contravention with Article 45 of the Lausanne Treaty enforcing the principle of 
reciprocity with Greece concerning the rights of minorities (Hürriyet 2006a). The 
CHP argued that the EU undermined the reciprocity principle by pressurizing Turkey 
to change its laws while saying nothing to Greece (ibid.). The CHP clearly saw the 
reform as a breach of the Lausanne Treaty and thus a threat against national 
sovereignty (TBMM 2008c). Rahmi Güner, deputy for Ordu dismissed the reform as 
an imposition of the EU and claimed that there was no need in Turkey for such an 
amendment (ibid.). Halil Ünlütepe, deputy for Afyon asserted that the CHP had firmly 
rejected any proposals that would jeopardize the validity of the Lausanne Treaty and 
that reform was no exception (TBMM 2008d). According to Onur Öymen, deputy for 
Bursa and deputy chairman of the party, the reciprocity principle should be seen as a 
‘crucial weapon’ for Turkey without which Turkey would lose its right to have a say 
regarding the rights of Turkish minority in Greece (TBMM 2008f). Tayfur Süner, 
deputy for Antalya criticized the law of minority foundations as an example of the 
EU’s double standards on Turkey (TBMM 2008e). Ali Rıza Öztürk, deputy for 
Mersin explained that the CHP was not against minority rights; it was simply asking 
the Turkish minorities in Greece to have the same rights in return, and without 
reciprocity, the adoption of this law would mean ‘submission to imperialism’ (ibid.). 
The party leader Baykal (2006b) claimed that there was no established EU-norm 
concerning the property rights of minority foundations, and Turkish foundations were 
not entitled the right to own immovable property in Greece; therefore such a reform in 
Turkey would be detrimental to Turkey’s strategic interests. He emphasized the fact 
that the adoption of the new law would abrogate the 1974 decision of the Court of 
Cassation (Yargıtay) (ibid.). In his opinion, this was unacceptable because bypassing 
the Court decision; Turkey would admit that it had acted unlawfully in 1974 (ibid.).   
The MHP’s reactions were focused on the lack of a clear EU norm over the issue and 
the Greek indifference to the reciprocity clause. The party officials argued that the 
notion of ‘minority foundations’ existed only in Greece among all EU members, and 
there was no common EU norm concerning the law under question or an EU position 
regarding Greek denial of rights to the Turkish minority living in Western Thrace 
(TBMM 2008c). The party thus dismissed the EU’s conditionality as contradictory 
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since the EU was pressing Turkey to adopt a law that had no consistent application in 
Europe (TBMM 2008e). Also, MHP officials shared the CHP’s concern that such 
legislation would compromise the validity of the Lausanne treaty. Nevzat Korkmaz, 
deputy for Isparta criticized the law for granting excessive rights to non-Muslim 
communities in Turkey; and thus, being incompatible with the ‘spirit’ of the Lausanne 
treaty (TBMM 2008g). For instance, he claimed that the debated law would facilitate 
the re-acquisition of historical sites such Hagia Sophia by the Orthodox Church 
(ibid.). To conclude, after the parliament passed the law for the second time in 2008, 
the CHP applied to the Turkish Constitutional Court for its abrogation with the 
allegation that the law was in contravention with the Lausanne treaty and the basic 
principles of the Turkish Republic. The Court decided in June 2010 endorsed the 
reformist provisions about the property rights of minority foundations.   
 
4.2.3. Symptoms of the Sèvres syndrome       
The reactions to the law of minority foundations show that the EU’s conditionality of 
minority rights has reignited the inherent ‘Sèvres syndrome’ within the opposition. 
The main opposition parties frame the EU-led reforms as the return of the 1920 
Sèvres treaty undermining Turkey’s territorial integrity. However, since the Turkish 
political parties under scrutiny announce their official support for EU membership as 
a desirable goal for Turkey’s economic, political and democratic development, it can 
be argued that the Sèvres syndrome did not necessarily determine the EU policies of 
Turkish mainstream political parties because they support Turkey’s EU accession. 
Nevertheless, it was used by TAN parties during the membership negotiations for 
accusing the EU of trying to gain as many political concessions as possible from 
Turkey -similar to the defunct Sèvres Treaty- without giving concrete membership 
prospects.     
The CHP claimed that the EU-led reform on minority rights was no different than the 
provisions of the 1920 Sèvres treaty dismembering Turkey; and the same provisions 
were brought in front of Turkey once again (Baykal 2006b). Turgut Dibek, deputy for 
Kırklareli argued that a similar provision concerning the rights of minority 
foundations was already included in Article 140 of the Sèvres Treaty (TBMM 2008g). 
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He claimed that the EU holds the same agenda with Europeans of the past who sought 
to impose the question of minorities to Turkey since the late Ottoman era in order to 
gain leverage against Turks and weaken the Turkish state (ibid.). The party officials 
particularly criticized the AKP government’s reluctance to defend the reciprocity 
principle and claimed that the removal of that principle would make Turkey highly 
susceptible to foreign interference (TBMM 2008f). Öymen, the deputy chairman of 
the CHP even accused the AKP government of treason against the Turkish nation 
(ibid.).          
The MHP’s reactions were even more dramatic. The party officials interpreted the 
introduction of the reform as a reflection of European historical claims over Turkey. 
İsmet Büyükataman, deputy for Bursa blamed the EU for bolstering the everlasting 
Greek agenda to weaken Turkey through the introduction of this law (TBMM 2008e). 
He even claimed that such a reform would facilitate missionary activities to convert 
more and more Turks to Christianity; thus the law carries the potential to ‘dynamite’ 
the foundations of Turkish national identity (ibid.). According to Süleyman Turan 
Çirkin, deputy for Hatay, the provisions of the proposed law were much worse than 
those of the Sèvres treaty because the law, if enacted, would severely damage 
Turkey’s hard-won sovereign rights and bring down the Turkish Republic (ibid.). 
Similarly, Mehmet Şandır, deputy for Mersin dismissed the law as a ‘law of treason’ 
revealing the hidden intentions of Europeans towards Turkey. According to Şandır, 
the adoption of the law on minorities would demonstrate that Europeans may succeed 
in taking the revenge of their defeat in the Turkish war of independence and hence 
make Turkey accept some of the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres (TBMM 2008g). 
Behiç Çelik, deputy for Mersin went even further to claim that the law had been 
drafted -and later submitted to the AKP government- by the Open Democracy 
Foundation owned by George Soros and the lawyers of the Greek Orthodox 
Patriarchate (ibid.). He claimed that such legislation had been designed to bolster non-
Muslim minorities in Turkey and allow them to conduct country-wide missionary 
activities to convert at least 10 per cent of the Turkish population to Christianity in the 
next couple of decades (ibid.).  
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4.3. Reflections of Turkish Parliamentarians on minority rights 
Face-to-face interviews with parliamentarians yield important results which raise 
serious challenges to the credibility of the official stances of the AKP and CHP 
towards minority rights. While the MHP respondents unanimously support their 
party’s official line, the AKP respondents remain somewhat reluctant to the minority 
rights reforms undertaken by their own government. The CHP respondents are 
divided over the expansion of minority rights despite a liberal change of rhetoric 
toward minority rights triggered by the leadership change within the party. Finally, it 
is remarkable that respondents of all three parties share similar views on many 
grounds concerning minority rights.     
 
4.3.1. The AKP Responses 
The AKP respondents essentially develop two main approaches to minority rights in 
Turkey. First, contrary to the allegations of the opposition, government officials 
actually embrace the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty. They acknowledge the rights 
of non-Muslim minorities and emphasize the necessity of conferring even greater 
rights for them. Most respondents also claim that minorities gained considerable 
rights during the AKP government: 
We accept the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty which only recognizes 
non-Muslims as minority. Our minorities have long suffered from the ill-
practices of the state, but the AKP government has become their 
medicine. We helped them a lot. We returned properties to minority 
foundations. We are also sympathetic to the opening of the Halki 
Seminary but technicalities prevent us for the time being. We will 
eventually solve that problem too (Interview with Afif Demirkıran).  
We have been acting in accordance with the provisions of the Lausanne 
Treaty and conferring greater right to non-Muslims in Turkey. For 
instance, we have returned numerous properties to minority foundations 
wrongfully confiscated in the past. (Interview with Mehmet Sayım 
Tekelioğlu). 
Some government officials including Afif Demirkıran, Ali Şahin and Haluk Özdalga 
claim that minorities long suffered in Turkey because the provisions of the Lausanne 
Treaty had never been effectively implemented: 
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Turkey did not entirely remain loyal to the Lausanne Treaty. Turkish 
governments at times undermined the rights of non-Muslim minorities and 
breached the Treaty provisions. The Balkan states party to the Treaty such 
as Greece too undermined the Treaty and turned a blind eye to the Turkish 
minority. We are talking about a multilateral breach of the Lausanne 
Treaty (Interview with Haluk Özdalga). 
However, an important number of the AKP respondents10 disagree with Demirkıran 
and Özdalga. They believe that minorities live in a much better condition than 
Muslims in Turkey. Belma Satır and Tülin Erkal Kara claim that non-Muslims are 
much better-off than Muslims in Turkey, and apart from a few issues, Turkey solved 
almost all their problems. Mehmet Sayım Tekelioğlu argues that Turkey doesn't have 
any problems in its treatment of minorities. Mehmet Erdoğan and Mücahit Fındıklı 
even believe that as regards minority rights, Turkey is in a better condition than some 
West European countries such as Belgium which is culturally split between Flemish 
and Walloons. 
There is also a split within the party over whether to treat minorities as locals or 
foreigners. An important number of the respondents11 highlights citizenship as the 
only determinant for being a local and embrace every citizen as the privileged 
member of the Turkish society. For instance, Mehmet Erdoğan, Mücahit Fındıklı, 
Ruhi Açıkgöz, Fatih Çiftçi, Bilal Macit and Afif Demirkıran stress that every citizen 
is a first-class citizen regardless of religion and ethnicity because every citizen is 
entitled to equal rights and freedoms in Turkey: 
These people (minorities) are the citizens of the Turkish Republic. They 
have been living in these lands for years. Nationalism has become 
obsolete. Today, citizenship is the main determinant of democracy. Every 
citizen is entitled to same rights (Interview with Bilal Macit). 
However, others12 tend to consider non-Muslims as foreigners. For instance, Tülin 
Erkal Kara tends to depict non-Muslim minorities as the close friends of Turkey but 
outsiders anyway. She believes that minorities live in Turkey very comfortably as if 
they are living in their own country.        
                                                          
10 Mehmet Erdoğan, Mücahit Fındıklı, Tülin Erkal Kara, Mehmet Sayım Tekelioğlu, Burak Erdenir, 
Belma Satır. 
11 Mehmet Erdoğan, Mücahit Fındıklı, Ruhi Açıkgöz, Afif Demirkıran, Ali Şahin, Ali Rıza Alaboyun, 
Burak Erdenir, Fatih Çiftçi, Haluk Özdalga, and Bilal Macit. 
12 Tülin Erkal Kara, Belma Satır, Mehmet Kastal and Ülker Güzel. 
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The second aspect of the AKP officials' approach to the concept of minority relates to 
Kurds. The AKP respondents refuse to consider Kurds as minorities. Although 
government officials defend minority rights and an important number of the 
respondents claim that they consider minorities as locals not foreigners, their views 
regarding the status of Kurds reveal the tendency to attribute an inferior status to 
minorities. The AKP respondents emphasize that they consider Kurds as the primary 
component of the Turkish nation. Hence, they do not want to relegate Kurds to such a 
lesser category as minority. Afif Demirkıran believes that people with different ethnic 
background such as Kurds are not minorities but the primary elements of the country 
(Interview with Afif Demirkıran): 
We endorse the Lausanne Treaty and only accept non-Muslims as 
minorities, while we consider all other ethnic groups as the founding 
communities of the Turkish Republic and integral part of the Turkish 
nation. Besides, every citizen is a first-class citizen in Turkey. No ethnic 
group has a privilege over others. We will guarantee this in our new 
Constitution (Interview with Ruhi Açıkgöz). 
We cannot consider Kurds in the context of the Lausanne Treaty since the 
treaty clearly singles out non-Muslim as minorities. However, we must 
confer greater rights to Kurds which we have long denied (Interview with 
Haluk Özdalga). 
 
Although rejecting to see Kurds as a minority, the AKP respondents nevertheless 
acknowledge that Kurds have been segregated and their freedom has been restrained. 
Party officials admit the existence of the Kurdish problem and call for greater rights 
and liberties for Kurdish people. For instance, according to Muzaffer Çakar, Turkey 
must officially recognize the fact that Kurds suffered too long, and confer them their 
long deserved social and political rights without delay. Mehmet Sayım Tekelioğlu 
argues that as long as Kurds learn Turkish, the official language, there is no harm in 
educating in their mother tongue. Mehmet Erdoğan believes that cultural rights such 
as education in mother tongue are the most pressing problems of Kurds to be tackled 
immediately. Moreover, party officials essentially blame the previous government for 
the maltreatment of Kurds and praise their government for improving the living 
standards of the Kurdish population in Turkey: 
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 The real problem is that the Turkish state has long refused the Kurdish 
identity and sought assimilation. The long festering social problem 
became political and eventually led to terrorism. We, the AKP 
government, have separated terrorism from the Kurdish problem. We aim 
to solve the problems of the Kurdish community. We have taken 
unprecedented steps. We have lifted the state of emergency in the Kurdish 
region, dismantled the state security courts, enabled broadcasting in 
Kurdish language etc… These steps were unthinkable fifteen years ago. 
These are the rights of Kurds, not a privilege for them. (Interview with 
Afif Demirkıran). 
 Before the AKP government, Turkey treated Kurds horribly. Kurdish 
villages were ransacked. Kurds were massacred. Kurdish identity was 
denied. With the AKP government, such atrocities ceased. We have taken 
important steps to solve their problems. We still have a long way to go 
before granting all the rights Kurds deserve. Yet, I can firmly say that we 
are on the right path (Interview with Haluk Özdalga).   
 
Contrary to the AKP’s official stance, the majority of government respondents 
emphasize the necessity of respecting the principle of reciprocity in the improvement 
of minority rights in Turkey. Although supporting the amelioration of the living 
standards of minorities in Turkey, party officials13 expect to see similar positive steps 
from other countries especially Greece having a sizeable Turkish minority: 
Religious minorities have been granted greater rights including the 
restitution of immovable properties. We support them but we also desire 
reciprocity. Greece must improve the living conditions of its Turkish 
minority in return. For instance, I wish there had been a mosque in 
Athens. Reciprocal tolerance is what we need in order to secure a 
permanent peace with Greece (Interview with Muzaffer Çakar). 
During the AKP government; minorities were given many rights including 
the restitution of properties. However, the principle of reciprocity is 
crucial. Greece must confer similar rights to its Turkish minority in return 
(Interview with Tülin Erkal Kara). 
There is the issue of reciprocity. We show our goodwill and ameliorate 
the living conditions of our minorities, while Greece still persists in its 
oppressive polices towards its Turkish minority. This is unacceptable 
(Interview with Ercan Candan). 
No matter how unprecedented the steps we take for our minorities, Greece 
continues to undermine their Turkish minority. We desire a win-win 
                                                          
13 Tülin Erkal Kara, Belma Satır, Muzaffer Çakar, Mehmet Kastal, Ercan Candan, Burak Erdenir, 
Ahmet Baha Öğütken,   
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bargain with Greece. For every positive step we take, Greece must do the 
same. After witnessing the ailing condition of Turks in the Western 
Thrace, I am convinced that the principle of reciprocity is a necessity 
(Interview with Ahmet Baha Öğütken). 
 
Some AKP officials claim that they are forced to maintain the principle of reciprocity 
on their agenda essentially due to a massive public pressure in Turkey: 
The AKP government’s policies to ameliorate the rights of minorities 
have been quite successful. However, Turkish public still perceives non-
Muslims as foreigners and requires reciprocity when it comes to the 
extension of minority rights. When we tell them about the rights we have 
given to our non-Muslim minorities, they always ask what Turkish 
minority in the Balkans will get in return. They are right to be concerned 
about their kinsmen abroad but our minorities are not strangers, they are 
our people too. Therefore, we have the duty to take care of them 
(Interview with Burak Erdenir). 
 
Only a minority of respondents considers reciprocity as unimportant: 
The uncompromising behaviours of Greece and the ambivalence of the 
EU can never justify the ill-treatment of our own minorities. We must take 
a good care of them unconditionally (Interview with Haluk Özdalga). 
There are controversies in the responses of the AKP officials. The rights they demand 
for Kurds such as right to education in mother tongue are recognized as minority 
rights in the EU. Resistance to similar reforms in other candidate countries has 
already been discussed in the previous section. There is a consensus in the academic 
literature about the redefinition of the concept of minority in Turkey incorporating 
other ethnic and religious groups such as Kurds and Alevis (Nas 2012, G. Yılmaz 
2012, Buhari-Gülmez and Gülmez 2013). Then, why do the government officials 
insist on excluding Kurds from the category of minority? Also a remarkable number 
of the AKP respondents claim that all citizens are entitled to same rights regardless of 
ethnicity and religion. Then, why do they keep advocating the principle of 
reciprocity? Such controversies may have stemmed from the Sèvres Syndrome well-
entrenched within Turkish politics. In the mindset of many government officials, 
minority is still equal to foreign settler rendering Turkey vulnerable to foreign 
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intrusion. Some respondents refer to negative popular sentiments against minorities 
dating back to the Ottoman era: 
During the Tanzimat reform process in the Ottoman era, European states 
intensively pressurized Ottomans to confer greater rights to non-Muslims. 
Such foreign pressures consolidated the public perception that non-
Muslims were traitors (Interview with Burak Erdenir).      
 
Some party officials refer to the consolidation of hatred against Europeans after the 
Turkish independence war, and consider the confiscation of properties of minority 
foundations by Turkish Republic as a reflection of such negative sentiments against 
foreigners: 
Due to the social and political traumas experienced before and during the 
War of Independence, Turkey developed certain negative reflexes against 
minorities. The establishment of nation-state and nationalism it fuelled 
contributed to negative sentiments against minorities in Turkey. Turkey 
hence developed policies to control and restrict the living space of 
minorities. The confiscation of properties is an outcome of such policies 
(Interview with Ali Rıza Alaboyun).   
After the initial years of the Republic, state authorities confiscated these 
properties based on certain threat perceptions. I understand their 
sensitivities because it was an infant regime trying to maintain its survival 
against foreign intrusion, but today we have a well-established and self-
confident Turkish Republic which will not hesitate to return those 
properties to minority foundations (Interview with Ruhi Açıkgöz). 
 
Moreover, the AKP officials maintain the fear that the expansion of minority rights 
may result in the division of the country. An important number of the government 
respondents highlight the vitality of preserving national security regarding the 
development of minority rights. For instance, Ülker Güzel warns that the EU’s 
pressures for minority rights should not carry a potential to disintegrate Turkey. 
Similarly, Ercan Candan reports that Turkey embraces people from different religious 
and ethnic background as long as they do not constitute a threat to national integrity 
and security. Rıfat Sait contends; ‘if the EU’s pressures for minority rights have a 
potential to divide Turkey, I will resolutely oppose them’. Similarly, Mehmet Erdoğan 
and Mücahit Fındıklı mention possible European attempts to divide Turkey: 
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If Europe forces us to recognize the establishment of an independent 
Kurdish state within our territories, we consider such an act as casus belli. 
We know that some European states including Britain have such agendas 
but we will never let that happen. We will never let Turkey be divided 
(Interview with Mehmet Erdoğan). 
 
References to old hatreds against non-Muslims and the fear that minorities have a 
potential to divide the country point to the Sèvres Syndrome embedded within the 
AKP respondents. Some party officials even share concerns that categorizing Kurds 
as minority carries a potential to divide Turkey. That's why the respondents stand 
against the idea of categorizing Kurds as minority.  
Party officials also reflect discontent with the EU's minority rights pressures which 
they deem as 'discriminatory': 
The Ottoman Empire was a land of minorities. The Ottomans successfully 
governed the Empire with numerous minorities living within its borders. 
On the contrary, throughout history, European imperialism has long 
denied conferring rights to minorities. Today, Europe with such 
imperialistic past pressurizes Turkey to improve its minority rights 
regime. Europe is highly inconsistent and insincere towards Turkey 
(Interview with Rıfat Sait). 
 
Holding similarity with the reactions against the EU in numerous candidate countries, 
the AKP respondents essentially stress the EU's selective minority rights policy which 
is applied much more differently to candidate countries than member states. Party 
officials often compare the EU's ‘carefree’ approach to the minority policies of 
Greece and France with its pressures on Turkey: 
The Turkish minority in Greece cannot even use the word ‘Turk’ in 
public. The irony is that Greece, an EU member, is expected to be more 
advanced than Turkey, a candidate, concerning minority rights; but its 
approach towards minorities is much worse than Turkey. The EU is to be 
blamed for such an outcome, because the EU puts strong pressures on 
Turkey while not putting any pressure on Greece at all. This is a clear 
evidence of the EU’s selective approach towards Turkey (Interview with 
Haluk Özdalga). 
Turkish community in Western Thrace have rights conferred by the 
Lausanne Treaty but Greece never let them use these rights. Why does the 
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EU not pay attention to the injustice against Turks living in Greece but 
only concentrate on the minority rights in Turkey? (Interview with Rıfat 
Sait). 
While we enact reforms of minority rights, Sarkozy forces Roma 
communities out of France. We try to integrate Roma while France tries to 
get rid of Roma, and the EU remains oblivious to France. This diminishes 
the credibility of the EU’s minority rights policy in our eyes (Interview 
with Bilal Macit). 
 
 
4.3.2. The CHP Responses   
Responses of the CHP officials hold similarity to the AKP respondents on many 
grounds. The majority of the CHP deputies embrace the provisions of the Lausanne 
Treaty and defend the principle of reciprocity. They also stand against the redefinition 
of the concept of minority to include Kurds and Alevis. Finally, many party officials 
criticize the EU’s minority rights policy as discriminatory. Most responses indicate 
that the Sèvres Syndrome is remarkably embedded within the CHP officials who 
participated in the interviews. On the other hand, there is a clear split within the party 
over the amelioration of minority rights especially concerning the restitution of 
properties to minority foundations. There is also a small faction within the party who 
reflect a more liberal outlook calling for the redefinition of the concept of minority 
and the revision of the Lausanne Treaty.  
The Lausanne Treaty is overwhelmingly embraced by party officials as the sole 
determinant for minority rights. Hence, the redefinition of the concept of minority is 
firmly dismissed by the majority. Similar to the government officials, the CHP 
respondents express the fear of division considering such an act as detrimental to the 
integrity of the nation state: 
Turkey is a nation state. There may be different ethnic or religious 
communities within the nation but nation state is an umbrella 
representing all differences. Redefining the concept of minority will 
shift the balance in the Turkish society and prove detrimental to the 
integrity of the Turkish state (Interview with Emre Köprülü).  
Every member of Turkish nation must have equal rights. Our 
understanding of ‘Turkish nation’ embraces all people living in Turkey 
regardless of their ethnicity and religion. Thus, we are against racism. 
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However, we are also against any approaches which will divide people 
based on ethnicity and religion, and eventually threaten the integrity of 
our nation state. Our unity must be preserved. External interferences 
fostering minority rights in Turkey have a potential to damage the unity 
of our nation state (Interview with Ali İhsan Köktürk). 
We don’t have to redefine the concept of minority in Turkey, because 
the EU does not consider minorities as a sociological and societal 
phenomenon but a political one. Due to the ongoing Kurdish problem in 
Turkey, the EU automatically considers Kurds as minority. There is no 
need for this. We, the CHP, aim to solve every aspect (economic, social, 
cultural, political, and legal) of the problem based on democratic rules 
(Interview with Faruk Loğoğlu).         
 
Similarly, the majority of the respondents refuse to categorize Kurds and Alevis as 
minorities since they believe such an act undermines the Lausanne Treaty and carries 
a potential to divide the country. Besides, some party officials believe that Alevis and 
Kurds only demand basic human rights which have long been denied by the Turkish 
state. Erdal Aksünger refuses to categorize Alevis as minority but admits that their 
religious and cultural rights have long been undermined. He also accuses the AKP 
government of turning a blind eye to numerous problems of Alevis. Concerning 
Kurds, Atilla Kart argues that Kurds do not see themselves as minority as they only 
demand their basic rights and freedoms. On the other hand, Ramazan Kerim Özkan 
does not believe Kurds suffer from inequality. He claims that in spite of their 
incessant demands for more rights to Kurdish people, they are actually entitled to the 
same rights Turks have. ‘We had a President of Kurdish origin in the past and we 
have Kurdish Ministers in the government’s cabinet today. Therefore, there is no 
inequality between Turks and Kurds’, he contends. Orhan Düzgün claims that the 
extension of minority status to Kurds will be detrimental for themselves:  
Turks have never treated Kurds as minority. Turks and Kurds have 
equal rights in legal terms. Kurdish demands for education in Kurdish 
language do not qualify for minority rights but general human rights. 
Similar human rights problems are not only visible in Kurdish populated 
areas but throughout the country. If Kurds are recognized as minority, it 
will not be beneficial but harmful for them (Interview with Orhan 
Düzgün). 
 
132 
 
Only a minority within the party embrace a more liberal approach towards minority 
rights and urge for the revision of the Lausanne Treaty. Osman Korutürk admits that 
the CHP doesn’t have a unified view on minority rights and emphasizes the 
importance of redefining the concept to confer greater rights to any group currently 
unrecognized as minority by the Lausanne Treaty: 
The Lausanne Treaty was a necessity of the time and successfully 
governed the minority rights regime in Turkey, but now minority rights 
must be redefined in accordance with today’s necessities. This 
redefinition must attach priority to freedom and equality regardless of 
ethnicity, religion and gender. In this respect, the minority rights 
reforms led by the EU are mostly positive reforms, although the 
usefulness of some is open to debate (Interview with Osman Korutürk).    
Similarly, Aykan Erdemir believes in the necessity of transcending the Lausanne 
Treaty in order to successfully govern minority rights in Turkey:  
We, the social democrats, believe that Turkey must embrace the highest 
standards of human rights without any reservation. Lausanne is a reality 
but our aim is to advance Turkey to a full-fledged democracy with a 
fully functioning human rights regime; and when such a day comes, we 
will no longer need the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty to govern 
minority rights in Turkey (Interview with Aykan Erdemir). 
 
Although a minority opinion, such a liberal voice within the CHP is remarkably 
distinct in Turkish politics. Contrary to the allegations of the opposition, the 
government officials overwhelmingly declare support for the Lausanne Treaty. 
During the interviews, the AKP respondents actually never questioned the provisions 
of the Lausanne Treaty governing minority rights. Instead, a critical opinion came 
from the main opposition known for its stalwart attachment to the Lausanne Treaty. 
This, in a sense, points to the split within the party which is much more remarkable in 
the approaches to the improvement of minority rights. Especially party officials are 
divided over the restitution of properties to minority foundations. Accordingly, half of 
the CHP respondents14 believe that minority foundations are the true owners of those 
properties confiscated by the state and support the EU’s pressures for their restitution: 
                                                          
14 Ramazan Kerim Özkan, Gülsün Bilgehan, Atilla Kart, Faruk Loğoğlu, Osman Korutürk, Aykan 
Erdemir and Süheyl Batum. 
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Minorities are our internal affair; we must see their problems as a matter 
of human rights and take necessary steps to solve them. The restitution 
of properties to minority foundations is a positive step in this regard. 
The attitude of the Turkish state in 1974 to confiscate their properties 
was wrong and Turkey has fixed its past mistake by returning those 
properties to their rightful owners (Interview with Gülsün Bilgehan). 
We must return those properties to the minority foundations. Actually, 
we must solve all the problems of the people accepted as minorities by 
the Lausanne Treaty. The AKP government took positive steps to solve 
such problems but these steps are not enough. We must confer greater 
rights to minorities (Interview with Faruk Loğoğlu). 
We have so many Islamic houses of worship across Europe; therefore 
non-Muslim foundations in Turkey must at least be entitled to same 
rights. We must protect their property rights and help them live freely in 
Turkey (Interview with Ramazan Kerim Özkan).    
  
Contrary to Baykal, the reformist respondents of the CHP oppose the confiscation of 
those properties and believe that minorities recognized by the Lausanne Treaty must 
be given full rights and liberties. It can be argued that Kılıçdaroğlu’s positive rhetoric 
toward this issue contributed to the emergence of this positive discourse among party 
officials. However, the other half of the respondents15 overtly declares opposition to 
such a reform. They express concern that such reforms carry a potential to divide 
Turkey. İzzet Çetin argues that steps towards the redefinition of minorities and the 
restitution of properties to minorities remind the final years of the Ottoman Empire 
before its disintegration. ‘I see them as decisive steps to dismantle modern Turkey’, 
he adds. Emre Köprülü is offended by the term ‘minority foundations’. He rather calls 
them foreign spies having motives to divide Turkey. Ömer Süha Aldan justifies his 
opposition with reference to the Sèvres Treaty. Contrary to the supporters of the 
reform who believe that the Lausanne Treaty allows such a reform, Aldan argues that 
such a reform is a serious breach of the Treaty:  
The EU’s pressures on minority rights have rather similarities to the 
provisions of the Sèvres Treaty and they are detrimental to the integrity 
of the Turkish Republic. Turkey can discuss the revision of some issues 
pertinent to minorities but the Lausanne Treaty must not be undermined 
(Interview with Ömer Süha Aldan). 
                                                          
15 Emre Köprülü, Ömer Süha Aldan, İzzet Çetin, Erdal Aksünger, Ali İhsan Köktürk and Orhan 
Düzgün. 
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Some respondents16 require the principle of reciprocity to be respected by EU 
members having minority groups of Turkish origin in return for the restitution of 
properties to minority foundations in Turkey. They also criticize the EU’s approach 
toward the issue as ‘double standard’:  
There is a double standard there. The EU undermines the reciprocity 
principle by ignoring the property rights of Turkish minorities in 
Bulgaria and Greece while intensifying its demands from Turkey 
concerning the rights of minority foundations (Interview with Ali İhsan 
Köktürk).  
 
The criticisms against the EU’s selective approach toward minority rights are shared 
almost unanimously by the CHP respondents17. The common argument is that the EU 
does not treat members and candidates equally, and this creates important double 
standards in the application of its minority rights policy: 
There is no objective criterion to determine minority rights. If you are a 
strong state, you decide who is minority and who is not. For instance, 
Germany does not count Turkish immigrants as minority. France 
doesn’t recognize Bretons and Corsicans as minorities. International law 
permits such arbitrariness. It is not just. While the EU cannot say 
anything to France and Germany, it pressurizes Turkey to recognize 
Kurds as minority. This diminishes the EU’s credibility in our eyes 
(Interview with Süheyl Batum). 
France is a unitary state just like Turkey but the EU doesn’t inflict 
similar pressures on France to revise its minority policy. This decreases 
the credibility of the EU’s minority conditions. Therefore, we see that it 
is not a must for Turkey to re-define the concept of minority in order to 
become an EU member (Interview with Gülsün Bilgehan). 
 
Moreover, Erdal Aksünger claims that the EU has been selective in the application of 
its minority rights criteria in Turkey. For instance, he argues that despite its intensive 
demands for Kurds, the EU does not put any pressure on the Turkish government 
concerning the rights of Alevis. ‘If the EU does nothing to defend Alevi rights, its 
minority criterion holds no meaning for us’, he adds. Finally, the remarks of İzzet 
                                                          
16 Erdal Aksünger, Ali İhsan Köktürk and Orhan Düzgün. 
17 Only Aykan Erdemir did not openly criticize the EU’s approach toward minority rights. 
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Çetin reveal the Sèvres Syndrome in his views. He blames the EU for having an 
ulterior motive to divide Turkey: 
The EU dictates the revision of minority rights regime in Turkey due to 
its overarching plan to increase its influence in the Middle East. This is 
an interference with Turkey’s internal affairs. We did not accept the 
provisions of Lausanne for nothing. The EU’s pressures on Turkey to 
give a minority status to the constitutive elements of Turkish nation 
such as Kurds and Alevis threaten Turkey’s integrity. Such pressures 
stem from the EU’s aim to establish a federal Kurdish state in Turkish 
territories (Interview with İzzet Çetin).    
 
4.3.3. The MHP Responses 
In comparison to other parties, the MHP officials reflect a more or less unified image 
in their responses. They also share most of the arguments raised by the government 
and the main opposition. First of all, the MHP deputies embrace the provisions of the 
Lausanne Treaty as the ultimate rules governing minority rights in Turkey. In this 
respect, party officials oppose the redefinition of minorities and the categorization of 
Kurds as minority, and similar to the AKP and the CHP, they consider every citizen 
as the first-class citizen of Turkey entitled to same rights: 
It is the Lausanne Treaty which regulates minority rights in Turkey 
recognizing minority status only to Armenians, Greeks and Jews. The 
Turkish Republic was founded by all other ethnic communities 
including Turks and Kurds. The Republic considers everybody as first-
class citizens regardless of ethnicity. There is no specific right or 
freedom entitled to a certain ethnic group. Everybody is equal 
(Interview with Nevzat Korkmaz). 
Kurds are not minority in Turkey. I used to be a member of Turkish 
minority in Macedonia and I know what it means to be a minority. You 
must get official authorization for almost everything if you are a 
minority. You must get state authorization if you want to buy a property 
or even get married. There is no such implementation in Turkey. 
Regardless of ethnicity, every Turkish citizen is equal. Only non-
Muslims have been granted minority status by the Lausanne Treaty and 
the rest is outside the scope of minority rights regime. Therefore, I 
refuse to call people other non-Muslims as minority (Interview with 
Lütfü Türkkan). 
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Similar to other parties, the primary reason for the MHP’s opposition to the 
redefinition of the concept of minority stems from the fear that such a re-
categorization may divide the country: 
The redefinition of the concept of minority based on ethnicity will be 
very much problematic for Turkey. Such a policy aims to create new 
nations and divide the Turkish nation. The usage of Kurdish language is 
the first step for division. Such policies may even result into foreign 
military intervention to Turkey in the future (Interview with Zuhal 
Topçu).  
 
Concerning the improvement of minority rights, the MHP officials put forward the 
principle of reciprocity as an indispensable condition. They clearly treat minorities in 
Turkey as foreigners and stand against any reform conferring additional rights to 
minorities unless other countries having Turkish minorities reciprocate with similar 
reforms: 
I support the restitution of properties to minority foundation only if the 
principle of reciprocity is respected. If Turks do not even have the 
freedom to choose their own mufti in the Western Thrace, there is no 
sense in conferring greater rights to non-Muslims in Turkey. State gives 
no financial contributions to mosques in Macedonia, Kosovo and 
Greece; it is the Turkish state which finances the non-Muslim prayer 
houses in Turkey. This is unfair and unacceptable (Interview with Lütfü 
Türkkan). 
Concerning the restitution of property rights of minority foundations, 
the principle of reciprocity is crucial. Turkey cannot offer its minorities 
more than what the Balkan states such as Greece and Bulgaria have 
been granting to their Turkish minorities (Interview with Nevzat 
Korkmaz).  
 
Party officials also share the criticisms against the EU’s approach to minority rights 
raised by the AKP and the CHP. They argue that the EU does not recognize the 
principle of reciprocity, and treats members and candidate differently. Such a 
selective approach decreases the EU’s legitimacy in the eyes of the MHP respondents: 
The EU’s minority rights approach to member states is very much 
different from its conditionality towards third countries such as Turkey. 
It has a different agenda when it comes to minority rights in Turkey. 
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The EU forces Turkey to give such concessions to minorities while 
turning a blind eye to situation of Turks in the Balkans. This is double-
standard and unacceptable (Interview with Nevzat Korkmaz). 
We do not accept the restitution of property rights of minority 
foundations, because the EU doesn’t recognize the principle of 
reciprocity. The EU does not care about the problems of Turkish 
foundations in Europe but demands greater rights for minority 
foundations in Turkey (Interview with Zuhal Topçu).  
 
Moreover, the Sèvres Syndrome is visible in the MHP responses. Some MHP 
officials18 claim that the EU has an agenda to divide Turkey. For instance, Nevzat 
Korkmaz asserts that the EU which united two Germanys; now aims to divide Turkey 
by redefining minorities. Holding similarities to a number of AKP and CHP 
respondents, such a stance reflects a hatred or suspicion toward foreigners in general 
and Europeans in particular.  
 
4.4. Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the resistance of Turkish political parties against the EU-led 
reform process focusing on the controversial reforms of minority rights. Accordingly, 
the two major opposition parties, the CHP and the MHP resisted reforms with the 
nationalistic urge to maintain the status quo and protect national sovereignty against 
foreign intervention. Both parties perceived the reform as a deviation from the 
Lausanne Treaty which equals to the erosion of the Republican principles. They both 
considered minorities as foreigners and treated minority rights as a foreign policy 
issue. Therefore, any improvement of minority rights would mean a concession to 
foreign powers, in particular the Greek neighbour. They claimed that the reform of 
minority rights would empower the minorities’ country of origin at the expense of 
Turkey. The hard-line stance of both opposition parties at times reflected their 
historical suspicion against Europeans. The Sèvres Syndrome was particularly 
observable in their reactions against the reforms conferring immovable property rights 
                                                          
18 Nevzat Korkmaz and Sümer Oral. 
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to non-Muslim foundations in Turkey. The officials of the opposition parties depicted 
the adoption of the reforms as the resurrection of the defunct Sèvres Treaty.   
The study argues that Turkish resistance to reforms of minority rights stems not only 
from domestic cost-benefit calculations and/or threat perceptions of political parties, 
but also the EU’s selective approach upon candidate countries. The EU’s differential 
treatment of member states and candidates faced with strong reactions in Turkey as 
well as other candidate countries. For instance, the nationalistic responses of the CHP 
and the MHP to the EU’s pressures to expand minority rights in Turkey are similar to 
the stances of the ODS in Czech Republic and the SDSM in Macedonia. The Turkish 
opposition parties blamed the EU for remaining indifferent to ‘the Greek oppressions 
and violations against the rights of Turkish minority’ while conditioning Turkey to 
legislate greater minority rights. Similarly, the ODS criticized the EU for being 
oblivious to the walls segregating people in Western Europe while warning the 
Czechs against the construction of the wall in Maticni Street. Likewise, the SDSM 
claimed that the EU issued double standards on Macedonia by preconditioning the 
protection of minorities while failing to put the same pressure on Greece and Bulgaria 
which had refused to confer rights to Macedonians living on their territories.  
The Turkish opposition also stressed the lack of a common minority criterion 
applicable to all Europe as a justification for its rejection of the reforms. Again, it is 
possible to trace parallels between the Turkish party responses and party reactions in 
other candidate countries. For instance, the MHP’s emphasis on the lack of a 
consistent EU norm about minorities holds similarity to the PSL in Poland which 
resisted the EU-led reforms with the same justification. Overall, opposition to 
minority rights in Turkey cannot only be explained with Turkey’s own peculiar 
history and political context but also with the general perception of the EU’s 
inconsistent and selective conditionality concerning the protection of minority rights 
which triggered similar reactions in dissimilar candidate countries.    
Concerning the Turkish case, the MHP’s opposing stance over minority rights 
remains intact (during both as a coalition partner from 1999 to 2002 and in opposition 
afterwards). This rigidity may be largely associated with the party’s ultra-nationalist 
and conservative electorate. The party’s electoral success in 1999 elections was 
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primarily based on its objection to Kurdish separatism and denial of granting minority 
rights to Kurds in particular (Öniş 2003). Finally, the fact that Devlet Bahçeli kept his 
post as the party leader during both terms may also be seen as a contributing factor to 
the MHP’s resolute opposition. The MHP’s hard-line stance both during government 
and opposition shows resemblance to the stances of Right/TAN parties across 
different candidate countries. Especially, it is possible to draw similarities with the 
persisting efforts of the TB/LNNK in Latvia not to confer any rights to minorities 
during both its term in opposition and government. The main reason for such 
resemblance could be seen in the fact that both Turkish and Latvian societies are 
conservative and generally support populist parties to preserve the political status quo 
(Kalaycıoğlu 2007; Solska 2011).  
On the other hand, the leadership change in the CHP had a remarkable impact on the 
CHP’s official rhetoric towards minority rights. Unlike Baykal’s leadership, 
Kılıçdaroğlu’s CHP approached minority rights as an issue of democratization rather 
than a foreign policy matter; thus defended the amelioration of minority rights in 
Turkey. The new leader withdrew the party’s long festering opposition to the re-
opening of the Halki Seminary and the restitution of property rights of minority 
foundations. Party officials prepared new reports and took new initiatives to resolve 
the Kurdish problem. Kılıçdaroğlu held election campaign meetings in Diyarbakır and 
Hakkari, highly populated by Kurdish citizens, to which the Baykal administration 
had not paid any visit since 2002. Kılıçdaroğlu recruited Sezgin Tanrıkulu, former 
lawyer of Abdullah Öcalan (the leader of the PKK) as the deputy leader of the CHP. 
He even stated that he was ready to sacrifice his political career to solve the Kurdish 
problem (Vatan 2012a). Such a dramatic shift in the CHP can be explained with both 
Kılıçdaroğlu’s resoluteness to return the party to its social democratic roots by 
abandoning Baykal’s nationalistic rhetoric, and his personal identity-related 
commitment to expand minority rights. He is both Kurdish and Alevi, thus a member 
of two minority groups in Turkey. This identity factor may have been influential in 
his reformism towards the issue of minority rights in Turkey.  
The interview findings, however, raise serious questions about the reformist stance of 
the governing AKP and the ability of Kılıçdaroğlu to change the CHP’s traditional 
approach towards minorities. To begin with, there are remarkable resemblances in the 
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responses of all three political parties. Surprisingly, the officials of all three parties 
embrace the Lausanne Treaty as the primary document to govern minority rights in 
Turkey. Attachment to the Treaty provisions is not a surprise in the cases of the CHP 
and the MHP who declare allegiance to Ataturk’s principles and actually invest the 
bulk of their resources on the preservation of the Republic. However, the AKP’s 
attachment to the Lausanne Treaty is a novelty since it is the AKP government which 
announced its aim to transcend the Republican principles and establish a post-
Kemalist Turkey (Dağı 2008 and 2012). Although the AKP government seldom 
makes statements about the Treaty concerning minority rights, the interviewed 
government deputies essentially pronounce their attachment to the Treaty provisions. 
This indicates a clear divergence from the AKP’s official line. However, their support 
for the treaty is rather selective. The AKP respondents actually do not remain loyal to 
the Treaty provisions concerning the reform of foreign land ownership (FLO). Many 
AKP officials secure the view that the principle of reciprocity (dictated by the treaty) 
concerning the FLO has become obsolete in the 21st Century, while they defend the 
principle of reciprocity as vital for the amelioration of minority rights. This selective 
attachment to reciprocity reveals the reluctance of the AKP respondents to treat 
Turkey’s non-Muslim minorities as locals; yet they easily embrace people of Turkish 
origin living in other countries as the native people of Turkey. Therefore, the 
interview results definitely run counter to the scholarly works which claim that the 
AKP government considers minority rights within the scope of citizenship rights 
rather than foreign policy (Çağatay 2011). The attachment of the AKP respondents to 
the principle of reciprocity also reveals their reluctance towards the reforms of 
minority rights undertaken by their own government. Such reluctance is visible in 
their remarks concerning the restitution properties to minority foundations. Half of the 
AKP respondents deem reciprocity as a crucial condition for the implementation of 
this reform. The rest who do not hold Greek reciprocity as sine qua non for the reform 
of minority rights in Turkey still protest Greece’s indifference to Turkish minority 
foundations.  
In line with the official stance, the respondents from opposition parties support the 
principle of reciprocity as well. The MHP officials unanimously endorse the official 
line of their party. However, the status of CHP officials is rather dubious. Although 
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embracing the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty and extending rhetorical support for 
the principle of reciprocity, half of the CHP respondents defend the restitution of 
properties to minority foundations without seeking reciprocity from third countries. 
The other half is divided over the issue. While a quarter considers reciprocity as 
indispensable, the other quarter firmly rejects such reforms out of the fear of division. 
The remarks of the pro-reformist respondents can be explained as an allegiance to 
Kılıçdaroğlu’s reformist rhetoric on minorities. However, the other half of the 
respondents still defend a nationalist stance reminiscent of Baykal’s CHP. In this 
respect, a quarter of the CHP respondents reject the reform outright considering it as a 
European plot to dismantle the Turkish Republic. Hence, Kılıçdaroğlu’s reformist 
agenda is not shared by at least half of the CHP officials. This reinforces the claim 
that the CHP is clearly divided between traditional and reformist groups.           
Moreover, while the AKP government does not overtly stand against the 
categorisation of Kurds as minority, the AKP respondents overwhelmingly oppose 
such a classification. Although embracing every citizen as a first-class citizen of 
Turkey; as discussed above, the AKP officials clearly attach a pejorative meaning to 
minority primarily due to the historical negative memories toward Europeans living in 
the Ottoman Empire. Unsurprisingly, this stance is largely shared by the CHP 
respondents and unanimously endorsed by the MHP officials. Apart from a small 
fraction of the CHP deputies, the respondents essentially refuse to depict Kurds within 
the category of minorities. Such a unified stance depicts that negative views against 
minorities have been well-entrenched in Turkish politics. The CHP respondents refuse 
to categorize Alevis as minority either, while the AKP and the MHP officials remain 
silent about Alevis. The main justification essentially shared by all three parties is that 
they consider Kurds (and Alevis) an integral component of Turkish society. 
Moreover, the fear of division is considerably vivid in the remarks of all three parties. 
They share the concern that the redefinition of the concept of minority to include 
Kurds and Alevis carries a high danger for the division of the country. Moreover, the 
Sèvres Syndrome, the suspicion or lack of trust against Europeans, resurfaces when 
the respondents from all three parties lay claims that the EU or a particular EU 
member state has an agenda to divide Turkey. Precisely one fifth of the AKP 
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respondents19 and one fifth of the CHP respondents20 denounce the EU’s hidden 
agenda to dismantle Turkey, while all the interviewed MHP deputies raise such a 
claim against the EU. Moreover, the EU’s conditionality of minority rights is 
criticized by all parties as selective and discriminatory. An important number21 of 
respondents from all three parties think that the EU treats members and candidates 
differently, and such a policy is discriminatory for Turkey. Accordingly, the EU’s 
existing minority rights policy diminishes the credibility of its overall membership 
conditionality.    
Concerning the hypotheses of Euroscepticism, this chapter came up with important 
findings. The debate about the ideology versus strategy has some implications on 
Turkish political party attitudes. Accordingly, the chapter finds that ideology plays a 
significant role concerning Euroscepticism in the case of minority rights. The first 
hypothesis is supported since the Left-Right distinction does not explain Turkish 
political resistance to the reforms of minority rights. Both the CHP (Left/TAN) and 
the MHP (Right/TAN) adopt a critical stance against minority rights with similar 
justifications. Moreover, hypothesis II based on the GAL-TAN distinction finds 
support since TAN ideology is a decisive factor concerning the party preferences 
towards Euroscepticism. TAN parties perceive minority rights as a matter of foreign 
policy and denounce the adoption of the EU-led reforms of minority rights as giving 
unilateral concessions to foreigners. GAL parties on the other hand mainly treat 
minority rights as a matter of democratization and support the expansion of liberties 
for minorities. The (Left/TAN) CHP and the (Right/TAN) MHP used similar 
justifications to protect the integrity of the Republic and maintain national security 
against foreign interferences. Their criticisms even reflected the resurfacing of old 
mistrust against Europeans embodied in the Sèvres Syndrome. On the other hand, 
Kılıçdaroğlu’s rise to leadership initiated the transformation of the CHP from TAN to 
GAL which remarkably shifted the party’s official rhetoric towards minority rights. 
However, the interviews findings demonstate the limited success of such a liberal 
                                                          
19 5 out of 25, namely ;Ülker Güzel, Ercan Candan, Rıfat Sait, Mehmet Erdoğan and Mücahit Fındıklı. 
20 3 out of 15, namely; Ömer Süha Aldan, İzzet Çetin and Emre Köprülü. 
21 More than half of the AKP and the CHP deputies explicitly share their concern while all 4 
respondents from the MHP raise the same claim.   
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transformation within the party. The CHP respondents are clearly divided over the 
expansion of minority rights. Besides, a quarter of the respondents reflects a hard-line 
stance similar to that of the ultra-nationalist MHP respondents dismissing the 
restitution of properties to minority foundations as a European plot to dismantle 
Turkey. Apparently, the CHP has a long way to go before truly transforming itself to 
a GAL party.   
On the other hand, once pro-reformist, the AKP government slowed down the reform 
process after the curtailment of negotiations. Although the government did not 
entirely abandon the reform process, its approach to the reforms of minority rights 
could be considered as selective and inconsistent. While the AKP government 
returned numerous immovable properties to non-Muslim foundations, it has failed to 
re-open the theological school at Halki seminary. Prime Minister Erdoğan made a few 
attempts for an ‘Alevi initiative’ to win the Alevi sympathy, but the government 
opposes the recognition of Alevis’ ‘Cem house’ as a legitimate Islamic house of 
worship. Alevis accuse the Directorate of Religious Affairs of favouring Sunni Islam 
at the expense of the Alevis (Çarkoğlu and Bilgili 2011: 355). Moreover, obligatory 
religion classes at primary and secondary schools ‘ignore the Alevi belief system, 
imposing an exclusively Sunni interpretation of Islam upon students’ (ibid.). Besides, 
in his 2011 election campaign, Erdoğan sought to diminish the popularity of the CHP 
leader Kılıçdaroğlu among conservative electorate by framing him as an Alevi Kurd 
(The Economist 2012). The AKP also abandoned its ‘Kurdish opening’ as early as 
2009 after intensive public criticism. While the government has recently taken new 
steps for resuming negotiations with Abdullah Öcalan to end the PKK violence, 
Erdoğan has announced his willingness to reinstate the death penalty to prosecute 
terrorists (Shafak 2012). These instances indicate the fact that the pro-EU AKP has 
turned out to be a Right/TAN party with its rising authoritarianism and selective and 
inconsistent approach towards the reforms of minority rights. The AKP’s current 
inertia in this domain can be explained with the lack of credible EU membership 
incentives which diminished the AKP’s enthusiasm for reforms as well as domestic 
factors such as ‘its Turkish nationalist ideological and political character, the lack of 
deep[er commitments to] democratic values and its weak administrative capacity 
about the Kurdish issue’ (Çiçek 2011: 24). In addition, the interview findings indicate 
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reluctance in the AKP respondents towards the expansion of minority rights, although 
most refrain from openly criticizing the reforms undertaken by their own government. 
This reluctance increasingly stems from (1) the negative image of minorities in the 
eyes of the AKP respondents based on the experiences of the Ottomans; (2) the EU’s 
selective approach toward minority rights, which is perceived as discriminatory 
against candidate states like Turkey. 
Concerning hypothesis III, the interview results indicate that all three parties criticize 
the EU’s selective approach in its minority rights policy. As previously pointed out, 
the CHP respondents are clearly divided over the enhancement of minority rights. 
Half of the CHP officials are in favour of the reforms and some even question the 
necessity of preserving the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty. Such liberal attitudes 
are reflective of Kılıçdaroğlu’s efforts to transform the CHP into a GAL party. Even 
the emerging liberal wing within the party raise criticism against the EU’s selectivity 
and discriminatory approach in its minority rights policy. Besides, as the control case, 
the BDP, a Left/GAL regionalist party reflects similar reactions to the EU as well. As 
a pro-Kurdish political party, the BDP supports Turkey’s EU accession as it expects 
that through the EU membership process, Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin will gain 
greater cultural, political and administrative rights. Therefore, the party did not 
necessarily oppose EU-led reforms. On the contrary, the BDP officials have quite 
often sought support for their cause from the EU institutions; and they criticized the 
AKP government's handling of the Kurdish problem before the European Parliament. 
However, the BDP’s strong pro-EU stance weakened after EU officials declared 
support for the AKP's ‘Kurdish opening’; and they urged the BDP leadership to 
distance itself from PKK terrorism (Oğuzlu 2012: 233). Correspondingly, the party 
officials accused the EU of having turned 'a blind eye to the unfair treatment of 
Kurdish people' in Turkey (Büyükbay and Merdzanovic 2012). Although giving full 
support to the EU-led reform process, the BDP officials have become convinced that 
the EU has a discriminatory approach towards them giving priority to the AKP 
government’s ‘window-dressing’ policies. Therefore, the Turkish case evidences the 
propensity of liberal (GAL) political actors to adopt Euroscepticism as a response to 
the EU’s selective and discriminatory minority rights policy. Therefore, the Turkish 
case supports the explanatory power of TAN ideology in party-based Euroscepticism; 
145 
 
yet, the EU’s selective approach changes the rules of the game as it causes reactions 
from GAL parties as well.  
Regarding the CEECs, the mainstream literature does not offer much supporting 
evidence that GAL parties turn to Euroscepticism when the EU applies its minority 
rights conditionality in a selective manner. This is probably due to the fact that the 
EU’s selectivity does not necessarily jeopardize the realization of accession, and GAL 
parties continue their support for EU membership regardless of the shortcomings of 
the accession process as long as the membership prospects are certain. In the Turkish 
case, the rising uncertainty of membership prospects following Turkey’s failure to 
comply with the EU’s Cyprus conditionality diminish the EU-enthusiasm of political 
parties in Turkey which also make them more reactionary against the EU’s selective 
application of its conditionality in other reform areas. Yet, comprehensive research is 
necessary to find out to what extent the EU’s selective application of its formal 
conditionality affects the EU discourses of GAL political actors in candidate 
countries.   
Strategic party competition has some degree of influence in the development of 
Euroscepticism in Turkish politics. Accordingly, hypothesis IV is supported since all 
Turkish mainstream political parties reflect Euroscepticism in the case of minority 
rights. Therefore, one does not need to be a fringe party in Turkey to oppose the EU-
led minority rights reforms. Moreover, the government-opposition distinction has 
limited explanatory power in Turkey since government officials reflect a remarkable 
reluctance towards the development of minority rights in Turkey due to the fear of 
division and historical suspicion against non-Muslims/Europeans. Nevertheless, the 
AKP took positive steps to confer greater freedom to minorities until the last couple 
of years. The uncertainty of membership prospects after the suspension of the 
negotiations diminished the AKP’s enthusiasm for reform. Besides, the AKP 
respondents now emphasize the EU’s double standards towards Turkey concerning 
minority rights, although such a critical rhetoric was absent when the bilateral 
relations were progressive during 2002 and 2005. Therefore, the initial years of the 
AKP reign supports hypothesis V rendering the AKP government path-dependent to 
embrace EU-led reforms when the accession process was progressive. However, after 
the suspension of the negotiations, the AKP government’s reformist stance got 
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replaced by inertia. Therefore, in line with hypothesis VI, the uncertainty of 
membership prospects has shifted the AKP government’s reformist stance and led it 
to join the ranks of other EU-sceptic parties. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE REFORM OF FOREIGN LAND OWNERSHIP 
 
Another reform area that draws Euroscepticism in Turkey involves the free movement 
of capital through lifting restrictions against foreigners/non-nationals concerning land 
acquisition. Accordingly, this chapter will first discuss the concept of foreign land 
ownership (FLO) and its application in the EU. Focusing on the main debates over the 
restrictions on FLO across Europe, the chapter will then investigate the political 
resistance to FLO in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) during the EU 
accession process. After examining the political party behaviours towards FLO in the 
CEECs, the chapter will turn to the Turkish case discussing the FLO regime in Turkey 
and the Turkish resistance to the FLO reforms. The findings of the interviews 
conducted with 45 Turkish parliamentarians will be comparatively examined with 
respect to the official discourses of the parties over FLO. The concluding part will 
offer an overall analysis of the domestic resistance to FLO in Turkey and test the 
validity of the hypotheses proposed by this study comparing the findings of the 
Turkish case with the CEECs.    
 
5.1. Foreign Land Ownership and its application in the EU 
FLO is a highly ‘unregulated’ issue in international law which primarily leaves it to 
the discretion of nation states (Hodgson et al 1999: 2). While customary international 
law foresees no restriction on FLO, public international law recognizes the complete 
sovereignty of states over their territories (ibid.). Besides, there are no global 
multilateral treaties which regulate the issue of FLO (ibid.). Although there are some 
instruments adopted by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) such as the Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements, none of them 
directly addresses the issue of FLO (Hodgson et al 1999: 3).  
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Restrictions and reforms regarding FLO are problematic in international law in the 
context of regional international treaties such as the Treaty of European Union and 
bilateral agreements enabling states and regional bodies such as the EU to regulate the 
issue of FLO with their own legal mechanisms (ibid.). Although  EU law does not 
directly regulate land acquisition by foreigners, it nevertheless enables EU nationals 
to buy land in other EU member states (Majoros 2000). Article 54e of the Treaty of 
Rome22 and Article 9 of the Regulation 1612/68/EEC23 of the Council of 15 October 
1968 on freedom of movement for workers provide a legal basis for a national of an 
EU member state to acquire and use land and buildings situated in the territory of 
another member state (Hodgson et al 1999: 21). Besides, the judgements of the 
European Court of Justice clearly dismiss any restrictions that violate EU citizens’ 
right to acquire land since those acts are incompatible with EU law ensuring non-
discrimination and freedom of movement (Majoros 2000: 14). Accordingly, the EU 
defends the freedom of EU-foreigners24 to buy land within the EU territories while 
mainly leaving the status of non-EU citizens to the discretion of member states 
(Mayhew 2000). Although a number of EU member states including Belgium, 
Germany, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom 
place no restrictions on non-EU nationals concerning property acquisition, the failure 
to satisfy the immigration requirements often prevents foreigners from using the 
purchased land for intended purposes (Hodgson et al 1999: 1).   
The EU favours FLO in order to facilitate the smooth transformation of the accession 
country to liberal market economy creating a favourable environment for foreign 
investment; therefore the EU requires all EU accession countries to undertake major 
reforms of their land administration system including the liberalisation of FLO 
(Bogaertsa et al 2002: 30; Hodgson et al 1999: 21; Trzeciak 2012: 113). Besides, sale 
of land to foreigners brings certain economic benefits to the host country. 
Accordingly, it ‘improve[s] productivity, enhance[s] access to capital, technology and 
knowledge, and hence stimulate[s] economic development’ (Swinnen and Vranken 
2009: iii). The EU also attaches importance to FLO reform because ‘successful 
integration in Europe requires the development of a strong territorial identity that 
                                                          
22 See: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/documents/treaties/rometreaty2.pdf 
23 See: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31968R1612:en:HTML 
24 EU citizens who are not nationals of the host EU country. 
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encompasses the entire area’ (Wood 2004: 589). Moreover, EU law sees property in 
neutral terms as ‘real estate’, and its sale and purchase as a straightforward contractual 
bargain (Hilson 2008: 195). Therefore, it perceives any restrictions in national laws as 
an interference with the single market and dismisses them as discriminatory (Hilson 
2008: 194). 
  
However, from a nationalist perspective, land is considered as vital for state 
sovereignty and to be restricted to foreign acquisition. Upon governmental request, 
the EU permitted Austria, Finland and Sweden to issue a temporary restriction against 
FLO of other EU nationals, while Denmark was granted a permanent right to restrict 
the foreign ownership of holiday homes (Mira 2004). Moreover, Greece puts 
limitations on FLO in its border areas while Ireland restricts foreign purchases of 
agricultural land, forests, and water reservoirs (Tesser 2004: 217). Restriction of FLO 
is a common practice across the post-Communist countries too (Verdery 1998: 298). 
In the early 1990s, Latvia, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia 
constitutionally banned FLO (Verdery 1998: 299). In Poland and Estonia, foreign 
acquisition of property was subjected to the permission of local and national 
authorities, while in Lithuania, the new law in 1996 liberalized foreign land 
ownership excluding agricultural lands (ibid.). During EU membership negotiations 
for the eastern enlargement of May 2004, a number of accession countries demanded 
temporary restrictions on foreign purchase of land property. For example, Hungary 
and Slovakia asked for 10 years of transition period while Poland demanded 18 years. 
The Czech Republic demanded a permanent right to derogation on FLO without 
specifying a time period. Only Slovenia and Estonia did not demand any transition 
period (Trzeciak 2012: 108). The EU agreed to confer derogatory rights to most of the 
2004 accession countries up to 7 years while granting Poland a transition period up to 
12 years due to the considerable size of its arable lands and permitting Malta to 
restrict the foreign acquisition of second homes on a permanent basis due to the small 
size of the country (Burger 2006: 572).  
 
There are numerous motivations for restricting FLO in Europe. First of all, foreign 
acquisition of land is seen as a security matter. For instance, selling borderlands to 
non-nationals have often been prohibited with the preoccupation to protect national 
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security, while the sale of arable lands to foreigners has increased national concerns 
for food security (Hodgson et al 1999: 19). Especially, in those countries whose 
economy heavily depends on agriculture such as Poland, agricultural land is a symbol 
of the ‘motherland’ and those countrymen who are tilling it are ‘maintaining the 
nation’ against foreigners (Burger 2006: 574). Since food is central to national 
cultural identity and national survival: ‘having foreign farmers growing food for you 
may thus be seen as a form of national security threat’ (Hilson 2008:196). 
  
Moreover, restrictive measures stem from a preoccupation to prevent foreign 
economic domination, as well as the perceived threat that excessive foreign purchases 
may pave the way for land scarcity (Mayhew 2000; Burger 2006; Hilson 2008). For 
instance, the gap between the purchasing power of applicant countries and that of EU 
member states creates a public fear in Eastern European accession countries that such 
an economic imbalance would impair their citizens’ capacity to buy land across 
Europe while extensively selling their own (Mayhew 2000: 37; Trzeciak 2012: 105). 
Hilson (2008: 195) stands against the EU’s argument that domestic restrictions on 
FLO are discriminatory. He points to the relative differences in land values and 
national wealth between the old and new Member States which raise fears that 
wealthy old members could purchase significant amounts of land from new members 
(ibid.). According to Hilson (2008: 195), ‘[t]o prevent this from occurring could not 
be regarded as discriminatory because equality involves the idea of treating like cases 
alike. And since [old and new member states] are not in a like position as regards their 
wealth; treating them differently is not discriminatory’ (ibid.).  
  
However, economic justifications only partially explain opposition to FLO. 
Nationalism, historical experiences and collective memory against foreigners in 
general or particular states (if not xenophobia) also play an important role behind 
FLO restrictions (Hodgson et al 1999: 20-23). Despite their relative wealth, Denmark 
and Austria issued restrictions on foreign purchase of second homes essentially due to 
their historical anti-German sentiments (Hilson 2008: 195). Similarly, Bogaertsa et al 
(2002: 31) argue that the national historical context plays a determining role behind 
the challenges facing land administration reform in the CEECs. Territorial changes 
following the World Wars resulted in the rise of nationalistic reflexes to oppose 
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foreign land acquisition (ibid.). Especially, in Poland and the Czech Republic where 
the lands formerly owned by Germans had been expropriated, FLO reforms advocated 
by the EU triggered nationalistic resentments (ibid.). For instance, much of the land in 
current Western Poland was owned by Germans before the Second World War. 
Therefore, the Polish public was afraid that Poland’s membership in the EU would be 
an opportunity for Germany to reclaim the real estate lost in the aftermath of the 
Second World War, or buy it cheaply in the market (Trzeciak 2012: 104).  
 
Finally, land is an important component of national identity since it specifies ‘what 
and who is in or out, and what belongs to whom’ (Verdery 1998: 292). Dominant 
discourse in the CEECs is that land is the major attribute of nationhood together with 
language and religion (Trzeciak 2012: 105). Besides, emphasis on kinship and shared 
history is often used as a justification for opposition to FLO since locals identify land 
as the legacy of ancestors and hence secure it as an inalienable symbol of their 
identity (Verdery 1998: 299).  
 
There are numerous restriction techniques including the outright prohibition of FLO, 
restricting the quantity of land available for foreign acquisition and limiting the 
purchase of agricultural, recreational, and border lands (Hodgson et al 1999: 44). As 
part of derogatory rights, accession countries temporarily maintained numerous 
restrictions on EU citizens and legal entities wishing to acquire property. For instance, 
foreigners are not permitted to purchase ‘non-agricultural land in areas along the state 
borders, nature reserves or in the territories of other natural parks’ in Latvia, while in 
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania and Slovakia, non-citizens are not allowed to 
buy agricultural land (Swinnen and Vranken 2009: 7-12). Countries often put 
bureaucratic restrictions such as the requirements for foreigners to get prior 
authorisation, make prior notice of transactions and a post-acquisition notice, and the 
obligation to register the purchased land (Hodgson et al 1999: 44). Moreover, there is 
no common bureaucratic procedure concerning land sale to foreigners. For instance, 
the authorizing institution for FLO is the Ministry of Justice in Denmark while it is 
the Council of Ministers in Cyprus (Hodgson et al 1999: 38). Poland on the other 
hand holds FLO subject to special permission granted by the Ministry of Interior and 
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Administration and the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (Swinnen and 
Vranken 2009: 6). 
 
 
5.2. Political Resistance to the FLO Reform in EU Accession Countries 
 
Legal amendments to liberalize FLO in line with the EU acquis generate heated 
political debates in accession countries. Domestic political actors oppose the FLO 
reform mainly due to economic fears that foreign ownership may increase land prices 
enormously at the expense of local buyers and/or out of patriotic concerns over the 
loss of national sovereignty and nationalistic fears of foreign invasion (Tesser 2004: 
214). The issue of FLO caused serious political clashes in the parliaments of some 
candidate countries and decreased the support for EU membership amongst national 
elites and in the domestic public opinion. 
 
In the Polish case, opposition parties with different ideological leanings stood against 
FLO. The Self-defence [Left/TAN] and the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) [Left/TAN] 
stood firm against the EU-led reform liberalizing the foreign acquisition of land, 
forests and areas containing water sources in order to secure the interests of Polish 
farmers (Batory 2003: 11; Tesser 2004: 220). The justification of such opposition was 
well-grounded in the public fear that excessive sale of land to foreigners would 
threaten Polish livelihoods following Poland’s accession to the EU (Batory 2003: 11). 
Similarly, the centre-right party, Law and Justice (PiS) [Right/TAN], opposed the 
liberal legislations permitting FLO and proposed a ‘land turnover law’ in order to 
prevent speculative buying of Polish lands by foreign investors (Szczerbiak 2008: 
232). The League of Polish Families (LPR) [Right/TAN] and the Self-defence argued 
that Poland should not sign the accession treaty ‘without stricter land sale laws’ 
(Trzeciak 2012: 126). The centre-right Solidarity coalition (AWS) [Left/TAN], the 
governing party between 1997 and 2001, framed FLO as a ‘sell-out of national 
property to foreigners’ and ‘Germans’ in particular (Tesser 2004: 220). The AWS 
insisted on a long transition period for Poland concerning land liberalisation to non-
Polish EU citizens (Trzeciak 2012: 114). Party members demanded 25 years of 
transition period if permanent derogation is not possible (ibid.). The Polish Prime 
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Minister Jerzy Buzek (AWS) explained his party’s strong opposition to FLO with the 
intensity of Polish public fear: ‘We were a country that for many years did not have a 
Polish state and there are social fears connected with the sell out of land to foreigners’ 
(Tesser 2004: 222).    
 
The most intensive political debates concerning the issue of FLO in Poland started 
with the agreement of the Polish government led by the Democratic Left Alliance 
(SLD) [Left/GAL] to reduce the transition period from 18 to 12 years and to allow EU 
citizens to buy second homes in Poland after a seven-year transition period and EU 
farmers to buy land for cultivation after a three-year lease (Trzeciak 2012: 117). 
Correspondingly, the main opposition parties the LPR and the PiS announced that 
‘they would submit a motion to hold a national referendum on sale of land to 
foreigners in connection with the condemnable and scandalous position of the 
government that failed to inform society about the scope of concessions in EU 
accession negotiations with regard to the sale of land’ (ibid.). The LPR made three 
failed attempts to hold referendum on FLO backed by the PiS (Trzeciak 2012: 125). 
The officials of the PSL, a coalition partner of the time, announced its plan to submit 
a regulation to fix the ‘mistakes’ of their senior coalition partner in order to ‘secure 
Poland’s national interests’. Party officials also stated that ‘such an important matter 
as the sale of agricultural land to foreigners [must] be settled favourably and Polish 
agricultural lands [must] be in the hands of Polish farmers’ (Trzeciak 2012: 117). The 
PSL argued that 200.000 hectares of Polish land were already leased to foreigners, 
and party officials threatened to leave the government unless the coalition government 
considered the Polish interests more seriously (Trzeciak 2012: 122). The primary 
reason behind such a strong opposition to the FLO reform stemmed from the public 
concern that the FLO reform would provide Germans with an opportunity to buy up 
their former territories lost to Poland (Wood 2004: 588). Krzysztof Janik, Secretary 
General of the SLD, the senior coalition partner dismissed such concerns by stating 
that ‘it is not necessary to create an atmosphere of impermanence. Those lands [the 
parts of Germany ceded to Poland after World War II] are ours and it will remain that 
way for centuries’ (Tesser 2004: 222-223). The SLD also voiced its criticism against 
its junior partner by stating that the PSL cannot be in both coalition and in opposition 
at the same time (Trzeciak 2012: 126).   
154 
 
 
Similarly, the reform of FLO was rejected in the Czech Republic by major parties 
such as the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) [Right/TAN] and the Communist Party of 
Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM) [Left/TAN] since the general public perception in the 
country was that the liberalisation of FLO would facilitate the erosion of the Beneš 
decrees which protect the Czechs against the property restitution demands of Germans 
and Austrians (Wood 2004: 600). The KSCM proposed a constitutional amendment to 
drastically limit the restitution claims (Kozakova 2003: 2). Apart from Beneš Decrees, 
the ODS also highlighted the necessity to protect domestic financial interests 
pertaining to the issue of FLO (Henderson 2008b: 122). Even Vladimír Špidla of the 
Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) [Left/GAL], the Czech Prime Minister 
between 2002 and 2004, voiced his concerns for German economic domination after 
the liberalisation of FLO in the Czech Republic, although his government did not 
actively take a position against the FLO reform (Tesser 2004: 231). The political 
resistance to FLO in the Czech Republic was overcome after the EU decided not to 
include the annulment of the decrees as a membership precondition.   
 
Negative reactions to FLO have also been witnessed in Slovakia where politicians 
shared a concern over a possible ‘Hungarian return’ (Tesser 2004: 231). After the 
proclamation of the Beneš Decrees, numerous ethnic Hungarians were deported from 
today’s Slovakia and their lands were confiscated by the Czechoslovak authorities. 
During EU accession negotiations, there was a popular belief among Slovak 
politicians that the FLO reforms would enable Hungarians to buy up their previous 
properties in Slovakia (ibid.). For instance, František Mikloško, member of the centre-
right Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) [Right/TAN] and speaker of the Slovak 
Parliament (1990-1992), opposed the EU-led reforms to liberalize FLO with the claim 
that such amendments would ‘put Slovakia once again in the hands of a few 
Hungarian landowners’ (ibid.). Vladimir Meciar, the leader of the Movement for a 
Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) [Left/TAN] and former Prime Minister, accused the 
government led by Mikuláš Dzurinda’s Slovak Democratic and Christian Union – 
Democratic Party (SDKÚ-DS) [Right/GAL] – of readily surrendering to EU pressures 
that forced Slovakia to give concessions to Hungarians who had been expelled after 
the Second World War (Rupnik 2002). 
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Hungary is another example with political parties opposing FLO liberalisation. The 
Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) [Right/TAN], the governing centre-right party 
between 1990 and 1994, defied any attempts to sell the ‘Hungarian motherland’ to 
foreigners (Burger 2006: 573). While in opposition during 1994 and 1998, the MDF 
and other opposition parties in the Hungarian Parliament rallied in order to reject an 
amendment allowing foreign business corporations to acquire real estate in Hungarian 
lands (Tesser 2004: 227). Similarly, the Hungarian Civic Party (FIDESZ-MPP) 
[Right/TAN], a coalition partner between 1998 and 2002, declared itself as the 
protector of Hungarian land and proposed a referendum to prevent the EU reforms 
that would enable foreigners’ land purchase (Batory 2008: 270-271). The party 
included the rejection of the FLO deal with the EU in its campaign for the 2002 
elections (Sitter and Batory 2008: 71).  
 
Similarly, the Smallholder Party (FKGP) [Left/TAN], the other coalition partner, 
rejected ‘selling out the motherland [to foreigners]’ and pledged in its 2002 election 
manifesto to renegotiate the FLO question with the EU (Sitter and Batory 2008: 65). 
Party officials claimed that the adoption of the FLO reform in Hungary would mean a 
pre-mature accession that would subordinate Hungary to the EU and result into a loss 
of national identity (Batory 2001: 16). The extreme-right Hungarian Justice and Life 
Party (MIEP) [Right/TAN] equated EU membership conditionality with the Trianon 
Treaty of 1920 that cost Hungary an important portion of its territories (Tunkrova 
2010: 99). Party officials conditioned their support for EU membership on the full 
guarantee for not selling land to foreigners (Batory 2008: 272). The Hungarian 
government led by the FIDESZ-MPP received a seven-year transitional period after 
the accession, during which prohibitions against foreign purchase of agricultural lands 
would remain in force (Burger 2006: 572). Towards the end of the seven-year 
transition period, the FIDESZ-MPP government declared its will to pass laws that ban 
land purchases by EU nationals in Hungary in contradiction with the EU’s legal 
provisions (FriedlNews 2012). The main reason for such persistent opposition to FLO 
in Hungary is explained with a long established ‘rural-nationalist ideology’ deriving 
from rural over-population and land scarcity (Burger 2006: 575). Following the 
Trianon Treaty of 1920, Hungarians having lost a significant part of their national 
156 
 
territories developed a reactive tendency to equate land with ‘mother earth’ to be 
protected from foreigners (ibid.). Besides, in the aftermath of the Hungarian 
independence from the defunct Soviet Union, the lack of protective laws to restrict 
FLO enabled Austrian citizens to buy considerable amounts of agricultural land in 
Hungary between 1989 and 1994 (Tesser 2004: 225). This intensified nationalistic 
sentiments that land cannot be taken as a simple commercial issue because it is 
‘capital-poor Hungary’s only asset’ which shouldn’t be easily sold to foreigners 
(Tesser 2004: 227).  
 
Contestation against FLO was also witnessed in Slovenia, a strong pro-EU country 
which had already determined its ‘return to Europe’ as a strategic goal even before the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia (Krasovec and Lipicer 2008: 316). The reform of FLO has 
become a source of intense political debate in Slovenia in the late 1990s. The 
Slovenian Parliament amended its Constitution on 14 July 1997 for the first time after 
the Slovenian independence by altering Article 68 which had prohibited foreign 
acquisition of land (except for inheritance) (Albi 2005: 72-73).  
 
The Constitutional change permitting foreigners to acquire land in Slovenia drew 
criticism from opposition parties. Members of the Democratic Opposition of Slovenia 
(DEMOS) [Right/TAN] alleged that the EU-led reform of FLO would transfer 
Slovenian sovereignty from Belgrade to Brussels (Lindstrom 2000). Officials of the 
Slovenian Nationalist Party (SNS) [Right/TAN] and the Democratic Party of 
Pensioners of Slovenia (DeSUS) [Right/TAN] accused the Slovenian Foreign 
Minister, Lojze Peterle, of “destroying the Slovenian state” by giving in to external 
pressures and demanded his removal from office (Lindstrom 2000). The SNS 
announced that the debated EU-led reform of FLO revealed the imperialistic nature of 
the EU (Krasovec and Lipicer 2008: 318). It put strong emphasis on the continuation 
of prohibitions against FLO in Slovenia as one of its main goals during Slovenia’s EU 
accession process (Beichelt 2004). A party official argued that “Slovenes have never 
sold their land so easily. . . . Such law poses a great danger; in fact, we are opening 
the door to the whole world!” (Bandelj 2004: 470). Although the bill was adopted 
with overwhelming majority, even some of the government officials could not conceal 
their reluctance for FLO reforms. The Deputy Prime Minister, Marjan Podobnik, of 
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the ruling Slovenian People’s Party (SLS) [Right/GAL] supported the FLO reform for 
the sake of EU membership but voiced his concerns about loss of Slovenian 
sovereignty (Bandelj 2004: 466). Podobnik similarly stood against the foreign 
ownership of major banks in Slovenia but his government proceeded with bank 
privatization in compliance with the EU’s membership conditionality (Lindstrom and 
Piroska 2007: 122).        
 
The cases discussed above point to the fact that FLO has become a source of intensive 
political debates in many candidate countries. Opposition against FLO reforms 
primarily stemmed from public fears of foreign economic domination and historical 
disputes with other countries. Especially, the collective memory against Nazi 
Germany was highlighted as a justification for rejecting to sell land to foreigners. 
Political actors in candidate countries mainly preferred to raise nationalist and 
populist criticisms against FLO, mirroring the public fear against foreigners, and 
exalted ‘land’ as an inalienable part of national identity. Moreover, some criticized the 
EU for being an imperialistic force endangering their country’s national sovereignty. 
It is mainly because the EU seems to consider FLO within the narrow scope of 
economic freedom while domestic political actors tend to associate land with national 
sovereignty and survival. This is comparable to the case of minority rights which 
witnessed contestations against EU-led reforms due to the generalized domestic 
perception that minorities are foreigners and potential threats to national sovereignty. 
However, FLO differs from the case of minority rights since domestic responses to 
FLO reforms are not justified with the EU’s inconsistent, selective and discriminatory 
application of its membership conditionality. In the case of FLO conditionality, the 
EU adopted a uniform approach to candidate countries that contested FLO, granting 
them a seven-year transition period before opening their lands to foreign purchase. 
Previously, Austria, Finland and Sweden were granted a five-year transition period so 
that they could establish effective land registration systems. The EU also recognized 
the special circumstances of certain countries and decided to extend the transition 
period in Poland to 12 years due to its bigger landmass and population, and permitted 
Malta to restrict the foreign purchase of second homes permanently due to its small 
size. Although the EU’s decision to grant permanent derogatory rights to Denmark 
was criticized by several member states as discriminatory (Mira 2004), there is a 
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general consensus on the fact that the EU is consistent in its application of FLO 
conditionality and increases its legitimacy further by taking into consideration 
domestic concerns about development, land registration, and scarcity. Furthermore, 
unlike the case of minority rights, the FLO domain is subject to the active interference 
of the European Court of Justice, which collaborates with the European Commission 
in ensuring that all member state legislation and practice comply with the principle of 
free movement. 
As regards party ideology, similar to the case of minority rights, it could be argued 
that parties with TAN ideology from both Right and Left constitute the bulk of the 
political opposition to FLO due to their attachment to status quo and nationalism. 
Therefore, resistance to FLO is primarily a TAN phenomenon which builds upon the 
public fear against foreigners. Party competition has a weaker explanatory power over 
Eurosceptic attitudes towards FLO compared to ideology, since TAN parties both in 
government and opposition resist the FLO reforms. The following section will discuss 
the Turkish responses to the reform of FLO in comparison with the cases of CEECs 
discussed above.    
      
5.3. Foreign land ownership in Turkey 
The legal foundations of foreign land ownership were established with the Lausanne 
Treaty of 1923, the Village Act of 1924 and the Land Registry Law of 1934 which 
stipulate the principle of reciprocity concerning the foreign acquisition of real estates, 
do not allow foreign corporations to buy Turkish land, and ban foreign ownership of 
land in villages and military areas. Turkish governments made several attempts to 
liberalize the Turkish FLO regime in 1984, 1986, 2003 and 2005, but the 
Constitutional Court abrogated any legislative attempts to extend foreigners’ rights to 
own land in Turkey. The Court justified its decisions on the grounds that land is a 
crucial element of national security therefore its acquisition by foreigners must be 
restricted; the legislated reforms violate the principle of reciprocity, which is a vital 
legacy of the Lausanne Treaty; and finally, foreign land ownership is often restricted 
in several EU member states (Court decision no. 2005/14). 
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The EU considers FLO within the scope of the free movement of capital and urges 
Turkey to withdraw its restrictions in order enable the smooth functioning of liberal 
market economy and integrate with the EU. The European Commission’s 2008 
progress report on Turkey’s accession highlights the necessity for Turkey to put in 
more efforts to render its legal regime fully consistent with the EU acquis (European 
Commission 2008: 41). The progress report of 2011 deems the steps taken by Turkey 
insufficient requiring an action plan ‘for gradual liberalisation of acquisition of real 
estate by foreigners in line with the acquis and to demonstrate that it is making 
progress towards gradual liberalisation, which is a key element for the accession 
negotiations’ (European Commission 2011: 57).     
The AKP government’s initial attempts to align with the EU accession criteria of FLO 
was faced with objection from the opposition and the EU-led reforms were quickly 
repealed by the Constitutional Court. The suspension of Turkey-EU accession 
negotiations massively slowed down the reform process in Turkey; yet the AKP 
government persisted in its attempts to pass the bill in the Turkish parliament despite 
the fact that Turkey’s EU accession prospects had become remarkably unclear. The 
AKP government introduced another bill about FLO in 2008 which was again 
abrogated by the Constitutional Court in 2011. Finally, the AKP enacted the law of 3 
May 2012 following a heated debate in the parliament. The bill liberalized FLO in 
Turkey and lifted the reciprocity requirement for not only EU nationals but all foreign 
citizens (Sabah 2012). Moreover, the bill conferred greater rights to the Council of 
Ministers concerning the determination of the limits of FLO (ibid.). The main 
opposition party CHP appealed to the Constitutional Court again in order to repeal the 
new law.  
The AKP25 shares the economic justifications of the EU concerning the adoption of 
the reform. The government expects that the FLO reform will attract Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) and bring financial gains that might help to close the national 
budget deficit (TBMM 2008h). The AKP government depicts the principle of 
reciprocity as an obstacle to the world-wide economic development of Turkey. For 
instance, the Turkish minister for Environment and Urban Affairs, Erdoğan 
                                                          
25 See the speeches of Yılmaz Tunç, the AKP deputy for Bartın and Osman Demir, the AKP deputy for 
Tokat, 12 June 2008. 
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Bayraktar, justifies the abrogation of the principle of reciprocity from the FLO 
legislation on the grounds that this would bring Turkey one step closer to become an 
advanced country like many other European countries that do not observe the 
principle of reciprocity (TBMM 2012a). Finally, in order to fend off the main 
opposition’s criticisms, the AKP claims that a remarkable amount of Turkey’s lands 
had been sold to foreigners when the opposition parties (CHP and MHP) were in 
office (ibid.).   
 
5.4. Reactions to the FLO reform from the opposition parties   
Similar to East European accession countries, the Turkish opposition parties 
extensively oppose the FLO reform because, unlike the EU, they interpret FLO as a 
security issue which threatens Turkey’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
During the leadership of Deniz Baykal, the CHP’s view on FLO was based on two 
premises. First, the party differentiated between land and real estate (buildings) and 
opposed foreign ownership of land territory (including forestry, natural resources, and 
agricultural land) deeming it a sacred symbol of national sovereignty (TBMM 2008h). 
Second, the CHP defended the principle of reciprocity urging other states to authorize 
Turkish citizens to buy immovable properties on their territories if they want their 
own citizens to be authorized to acquire real estate in Turkey (ibid.). Accordingly, 
party officials appealed to the Constitutional Court in 2003 and 2005 demanding the 
abrogation of the FLO legislation introduced by the AKP government. The 2003 law 
gave foreign individuals the right to buy land up to 30 hectares and authorized the 
Council of Ministers to bypass legislative limits on the sale of land property to 
foreigners. The 2005 law that passed after the annulment of the 2003 law by the 
Constitutional Court decreased the foreign purchase of land property to 2.5 hectares 
but insisted on authorizing the Council of Ministers to bypass the law. The 
Constitutional Court annulled both pieces of legislation upon the CHP’s application 
highlighting the vitality of ‘national security over short term economic profits’ 
(TBMM 2008h).  
The CHP also proposed a parliamentary inquiry in order to discuss in detail the 
repercussions of the 2003 reform one year after its enactment. Signed by 42 CHP 
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deputies, the proposal intensively criticized the legislation which resulted in an 
extensive sale of Turkish land to foreigners in less than one year (TBMM 2004). The 
CHP questioned the AKP’s insistence for the legislation although there was no strong 
conditional pressure from the EU, and Turkey’s EU membership prospects remained 
unclear (ibid.). Party officials argued that it is not acceptable to justify the FLO 
reforms with mere economic motivations since land is an indispensable element of 
national sovereignty and security as previously stated by the Constitutional Court 
(ibid.). The CHP called the AKP government to reconsider its decision about the FLO 
bill of 2003. However, the motion for parliamentary inquiry was denied by the AKP 
votes that held a majority of the seats in the Parliament following the 2002 general 
elections.   
Similarly, the CHP opposed the AKP’s 2008 proposal which endorsed foreign 
purchase of land up to 10% of village territories. Atila Emek, the CHP deputy for 
Antalya, dismissed the proposal as a threat to national sovereignty which would 
transfer a considerable portion of Turkey’s lands to foreigners (ibid.). According to 
Fevzi Topuz, the CHP deputy for Muğla, with the legislation under debate, the AKP 
aimed to sell lands to foreigners in order to close the national budget deficit the AKP 
government caused over the years (ibid.). Topuz remarked that the AKP undermined 
the Court decisions which forbid extensive sale of land property to foreigners, and 
rushed to bring new legislations depicting them as EU-led reforms (ibid.). 
Party officials criticized the AKP’s tendency to defend the adoption of the reform for 
the sake of EU membership. Onur Öymen, the CHP deputy for Istanbul, emphasized 
the fact that there was no common practice among the EU members concerning the 
liberalisation of FLO (TBMM 2003). Öymen contended that there was no way that 
the EU could pressurize candidate countries to bypass the principle of reciprocity 
(ibid.). He claimed that the AKP had arbitrarily prepared those bills for short-term 
economic benefits and had introduced them to the parliament as if they were part of 
the EU accession criteria (ibid.).         
The CHP particularly emphasized the necessity to preserve the principle of reciprocity 
that represents the sovereign equality of states. As early as 2003, the CHP members26 
                                                          
26 See the speech of Birgen Keleş, the CHP deputy for Istanbul, 3 July 2003. 
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of the Parliament warned the government that the dismissal of such an important 
principle would inflict irreparable damages upon Turkey (TBMM 2003). Fevzi 
Topuz, the deputy of Muğla claimed that the legislation authorizing the sale of 10% of 
village lands had no precedent elsewhere in the world and the adoption of the law 
meant that Turkey could lose a sizeable portion of its coasts to foreigners without 
securing a right to buy similar amount of lands abroad (TBMM 2008h). 
The party also criticized the amendment in the Village Act which granted foreign 
ownership rights in arable lands of Turkish villages. The Village Act of 1924 
prohibited the foreign ownership of agricultural fields. Seeing the Village Act as a 
legacy of Ataturk, CHP officials dismissed the AKP’s amendment as a serious breach 
of Republican principles (TBMM 2003). Reminding Ataturk’s words; ‘Villager is the 
master of nation’, Gürol Ergin, the CHP deputy for Muğla, contended that such 
legislative reform betrayed Turkish villagers relegating them to pariah in their own 
country (ibid.).    
The leadership change in the CHP liberalized its rhetoric towards FLO since 
Kılıçdaroğlu announced his support for more liberal and democratic reforms in 
Turkey including FLO (Kılıçdaroğlu 2010). However, this liberal rhetoric is not 
shared by all in the party. Some party officials applied to the Constitutional Court in 
2012 to repeal similar AKP legislation (CHP 2012). They charged the AKP with 
aiming to sell limitless amounts of land to foreigners for short-term economic gains 
(ibid.). Party officials27 equalled the reform of FLO to ‘treason’ and often portrayed 
the AKP as ‘traitors’ who can’t wait to sell the entire country’ (TBMM 2012a). The 
CHP28 claimed that the amount of land sold to foreigners under the AKP government 
in the last decade (136 Million square metres) was twelve times higher than the land 
sales of previous governments combined (12 Million square metres) (TBMM 2012b). 
Party members often resorted to patriotic discourse in their opposition to the reform. 
Associating ‘land’ with national sovereignty, the CHP officials usually referred to 
Turkey’s war of independence through which those lands were gained (TBMM 
2012a). Party officials29 often accused the government of selling national lands 
                                                          
27 See the speech of Bülent Özcan, the CHP deputy for Aydın, 3 May 2012. 
28 See the speech of Ali İhsan Köktürk, the CHP deputy for Zonguldak, 2 May 2012. 
29 See the speech of Ramazan Kerim Özkan, the CHP deputy for Burdur, 3 May 2012. 
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acquired with the blood of Turkish martyrs (ibid.). However, they also claimed that 
the content of the FLO bill was not in line with the EU’s membership conditionality 
because it foresaw the liberalization of land sale not only to EU nationals but every 
other nationals in the world without seeking reciprocity (ibid.). They argued that the 
AKP brought this bill to facilitate land sale to rich Arabs rather than Europeans 
(ibid.).         
The MHP uses similar arguments in its opposition to the FLO reform. Party officials 
attach priority to the preservation of territorial integrity and the principle of 
reciprocity. The MHP30 urges that the AKP places an expression to the draft law 
guaranteeing the protection of the country’s territorial integrity and respect for 
reciprocity before agreeing to such legislation (TBMM 2008i). Similar to the CHP, 
the MHP officials often charge the government with ‘treason’ and depict the AKP as a 
government enthusiastic to sell national territories for economic gains. The MHP 
exalts Turkish lands as sacred and hard-worn with the blood of Turkish soldiers 
during the independence war (TBMM 2008h). Therefore, the party strongly opposes 
the sale of such strategically important lands based on economic justifications 
(TBMM 2012a). Party officials also believe that the reform proposals have been 
actually drafted and introduced by ‘foreign powers’ who aim to invade the entire 
country (TBMM 2008h). 
The reform under scrutiny was often dismissed by the MHP officials who often 
adopted nationalistic and anti-Semitic discourse. Yusuf Halaçoğlu, the deputy for 
Kayseri, contended that the AKP’s legislation enabled the sale of an enormous 
amount of land to Jews and Armenians. He argued that land sales triggered the 
establishment of the Jewish state in Palestine and blamed the AKP government for 
giving Jews the same opportunity in Turkey (TBMM 2012b). Halaçoğlu alleged that 
34.000 acres of land were sold to Jews in his constituency and it was just the tip of the 
iceberg (ibid.). He also alleged that the reforms would enable ‘ancient foes’ of Turkey 
such as Armenians and Greeks to eventually buy the lands they long aspired for 
(TBMM 2012a).                       
                                                          
30 See the speech of Faruk Bal, the MHP deputy of Konya, 11 June 2008.  
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The MHP officials31 particularly defend the fulfilment of the reciprocity principle 
which should be the only way for a foreigner to buy immovable property in Turkey 
(TBMM 2008h). Oktay Vural, the MHP deputy for Izmir, labels the lack of 
reciprocity as capitulation, a unilateral concession to foreigners (TBMM 2012a). 
Vural stresses the fact that the Lausanne Treaty abrogated all capitulations and 
introduced reciprocity for Turkey’s international transactions; he therefore dismisses 
the reform as incompatible with the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty (ibid.). He also 
charges the AKP with dishonesty since he claims that the government officials 
promised the MHP that the new FLO would observe the reciprocity principle but then 
did not remain loyal to their pledges (TBMM 2012b). MHP officials32 accuse the 
AKP government of using  EU conditions as a pretext to ‘sell out the country’s 
precious lands’ (TBMM 2008h).   
The MHP today demands the inclusion of the expression ‘foreign ownership of 
property can be restricted when national security is at stake’ in the new Turkish 
Constitution (Milliyet 2012). Oktay Öztürk, the deputy for Erzurum, defends the 
MHP’s proposal reiterating the MHP’s allegation that the establishment of the state of 
Israel was made possible due to the ‘grave mistake’ of Arabs who sold massive 
amounts of land to Jews (ibid.). Öztürk argues that the inclusion of such a restrictive 
measure might save Turks from experiencing a similar end or dissolution (ibid.). 
Following the general overview of the main arguments against FLO reforms in 
Turkey, the next section provides original empirical data on the current stances of the 
main parties in Turkey towards the question of FLO. The data discussed below derive 
from face-to-face interviews with 45 Turkish parliamentarians.   
 
5.5. Reflections of Turkish Parliamentarians on the issue of FLO 
In order to gain greater insight into the stances of Turkish political parties towards 
EU-led reforms of FLO, I conducted face-to-face interviews with Turkish 
parliamentarians in Ankara between October 2012 and April 2013. The interviews 
yielded important results comparable to the official discourses of the parties under 
                                                          
31 See the speech of Behiç Çelik, the MHP deputy for Mersin, 12 June 2008. 
32 See the speech of Mehmet Serdaroğlu, the MHP deputy for Kastamonu, 12 June 2008. 
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scrutiny. Interestingly, the AKP deputies primarily reflect a unitary stance giving 
support to FLO mainly based on economic expectations and confirm the official 
policy of their party. However, they demonstrate internal disagreements over the 
question of whether to bypass the principle of reciprocity. On the other hand, some 
opposition deputies draw a slightly more liberal picture than the official discourse of 
their parties. For instance, most of the opposition deputies stated that they did not 
oppose the sale of land to foreigners under the condition of reciprocity. Moreover, 
opposition responses reflect a multiplicity of framings towards the FLO issue ranging 
from very liberal to highly conservative.    
 
5.5.1. The AKP responses  
All the AKP officials I interviewed are very supportive of FLO. They mainly consider 
FLO within the scope of economic liberalisation and claim that FLO will bring 
nothing but economic gains for Turkey. Several party officials33 state the necessity of 
liberalizing FLO in order to attract foreign direct investment (FDI):  
Foreign companies buy land in Turkey to construct factories which 
revitalize Turkish economy. When they decide to leave Turkey, 
they will sell these lands back to us. Therefore, there is nothing to 
worry about. Besides, the European population is getting older and 
they intend to spend their lives in our coastal areas after retirement. 
They spend their wealth in Turkey. If I deny selling them land and 
property, I will prevent an important source of income for Turkey 
(Interview with Ali Rıza Alaboyun). 
 
Another justification raised by the AKP officials34 is that FLO facilitates social and 
cultural dialogue between Turks and Europeans, and contributes to Turkey’s positive 
image in Europe. Similarly, Burak Erdenir, the deputy undersecretary of the Ministry 
of European Union, believes that the liberalisation of FLO enables more and more EU 
citizens to come to live in Turkey and this shows Turkey’s high potential to be 
integrated with the EU.  
                                                          
33 including Abdullah Çalışkan, Ali Rıza Alaboyun, Afif Demirkıran and Muzaffer Çakar 
34 including Fatih Çiftçi, Belma Satır, Mücahit Fındıklı, Muzaffer Çakar and Ali Rıza Alaboyun. 
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Party officials also refer to globalization as a justification for liberalizing FLO. For 
instance, Belma Satır believes that FLO is the norm in a globalized world promoting 
competition for foreign investment and it is actually advantageous for Turkey to be 
preferred as a destination to live and do business by people from different parts of the 
world. Similarly, according to Ercan Candan, globalization has resulted in a paradigm 
shift in the world and now the classical notion of protectionism is outdated. ‘Today, 
everybody is able to go to everywhere. We cannot prevent people from living in our 
country’, Candan states. Afif Demirkıran believes that the world has become a global 
family and as its member, Turkey must liberalize its laws to allow foreigners to 
purchase land.   
Party officials do not believe that FLO imposes any real threat to Turkey. Rejecting 
the opposition’s concerns over loss of national sovereignty, Mehmet Sayım 
Tekelioğlu argues that major powers like Turkey cannot be easily disintegrated or 
destroyed by such small issues as FLO. The favourite expression shared by almost all 
the AKP interviewees against such concerns is that ‘foreigners won’t take away those 
lands in their pockets or on their backs’35: 
If I want, I can buy lands in all EU member states. Even in 
authoritarian states such as Russia and Saudi Arabia36, we can buy 
immovable properties. If our bilateral relations become uneasy, we 
won’t be able to take those properties back to Turkey with us. The 
same is true for foreigners who buy land in Turkey. Their purchases 
do not constitute a threat to our territorial integrity. I don’t see any 
harm in selling land to foreigners. It will bring nothing but economic 
benefits (Interview with Mehmet Erdoğan). 
 
AKP officials particularly emphasize the importance of self-confidence and the 
necessity to leave aside domestic fears against foreigners: 
We shouldn’t be afraid. Turkish politicians often pursued the politics 
of fear but to no avail. If we want to be a great country we have to 
think bigger. We can go nowhere with taboos and fears. We must 
establish our living standards freely and that’s why we need the EU 
and its standards. (Interview with Abdullah Çalışkan).    
                                                          
35The expression was explicitly used by Mehmet Sayım Tekelioğlu, Mehmet Durdu Kastal, Belma 
Satır, Ruhi Açıkgöz, Mehmet Erdoğan, Mücahit Fındıklı, Ali Rıza Alaboyun, Ercan Candan.  
36 Saudi Arabian law of FLO:  
http://www.sagia.gov.sa/Documents/Laws/Real_Estate_by_Foreigners.pdf 
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Similarly, Belma Satır depicts Turkey as a country ‘in love with its own fears’. ‘FLO 
is one of these fears Turkish decision-makers maintained throughout history. We must 
leave fears aside. I see no harm in FLO. We must have self-confidence’; Satır 
contends. Bilal Macit claims: ‘if foreigners choose to live in Turkey, this shows that 
we have become an advanced country and confirms our self-confidence’. Likewise, 
Fatih Çiftçi believes that FLO is a global phenomenon and Turkey as major power 
must show the world its self-confidence by liberalizing FLO. Ahmet Baha Öğütken 
stresses that the increase in foreign demands for Turkish lands indicates that Turkey 
has become an economically advanced country with a fully functioning democracy.  
The government deputies strongly reject the opposition’s allegations that they ‘sell 
out the motherland’ with excessive amount of land sale. They argue that just like 
elsewhere in Europe, Turkey imposes certain limits on foreigners’ right to purchase 
land. ‘We have always been careful to sell land to foreigners based on certain criteria 
such as the size and the location of the property. We don’t sell lands of strategic 
importance such as border areas’, Ülker Güzel states. On the other hand, the AKP 
deputies are considerably divided on the principle of reciprocity. While some deputies 
such as Tülin Erkal Kara, Rıfat Sait, Afif Demirkıran, Ülker Güzel, Mehmet Sayım 
Tekelioğlu and Ahmet Baha Öğütken deem reciprocity as indispensable for Turkey, 
others (including Çalışkan, Çakar, Açıkgöz and Candan) attach less emphasis on it:  
The principle of reciprocity is a political matter. We can be flexible 
with it in order to increase the level of FDI in Turkey. Many 
countries have done such arrangements before. The criticism of the 
opposition is absurd. We can monitor the sale of land to foreigners 
and secure our national interests. We must trust ourselves. FLO is a 
normal phenomenon in a globalized world (Interview with Ruhi 
Açıkgöz). 
As a matter of fact, the principle of reciprocity is not that important. 
We have bypassed this principle not for Europeans but for Arabs, 
since they don’t trust Europeans or Americans [Westerners] but trust 
us [and invest in Turkey] (Interview with Abdullah Çalışkan).  
We no longer observe the principle of reciprocity and this is good for 
our economic development attracting greater FDI. If any problems 
emerge in the future, we can always bring reciprocity back 
(Interview with Muzaffer Çakar). 
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Moreover, some government deputies fail to acknowledge that the new FLO law 
bypasses the principle of reciprocity and claim that Turkey continues to implement 
the reciprocity principle in all its transactions. Although the AKP deputies mostly 
remain loyal to the government’s official discourse in their responses, the split over 
reciprocity is a remarkable indicator of deviation from the party’s FLO policy and 
internal division.   
 
5.5.2. The CHP responses 
Contrary to the radical discourse of the CHP which only accepts foreigner ownership 
of real estate (and dismisses sale of land to foreigners), the interviewed party officials 
support FLO under certain conditions. For instance, they deem it necessary to 
determine an upper limit for foreign land purchases and to unconditionally respect the 
principle of reciprocity. Ali İhsan Köktürk argues that FLO is an integral part of 
human rights, but he also points to the importance of limiting FLO for national 
sovereignty. Likewise, Ömer Süha Aldan supports foreign purchase of houses, 
apartments and land for the purposes of tourism: ‘Foreigners after their retirement can 
buy apartments, even lands in Turkey to spend the rest of their lives, but we must 
determine an upper limit for this [FLO]’. Similarly, Erdal Aksünger does not see FLO 
as a threat to Turkey but he is against the sale of excessive amount of land to 
foreigners. Faruk Loğoğlu, the deputy chairman of the CHP, explains that the EU 
does not set an upper limit for FLO, and stresses the necessity for regulating the issue 
with bilateral agreements respecting the principle of reciprocity. Therefore, party 
officials criticize the government policies which resulted in an excessive amount of 
land sale to foreign persons and companies. Aksünger argues that the AKP 
government has been involved in a series of ‘sham transactions’ bypassing the rule of 
law. He states that a serious number of land properties along the shores of Istanbul 
were sold to Arabs based on the new FLO laws which are still under the examination 
of the Constitutional Court. Atila Kart points to the foreign purchase of arable lands 
in large amounts: 
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We need to differentiate between the sale of property and the sale of 
land. We must put limitations to the sale of land. The current 
situation in Turkey is alarming. There is no official monitoring 
mechanism over the foreign purchase of land. The government either 
overlooks or intentionally promotes the excessive sale of land. For 
instance, one seventh of Konya, my constituency, has been sold to 
foreigners. This is unacceptable (Interview with Atila Kart). 
 
Party officials strongly oppose the government’s economic justifications for FLO and 
emphasize the vitality of preserving national sovereignty and integrity:  
Economic justifications for liberalizing FLO are wrong, because we 
observe similar restrictions in almost all countries in the world in 
order to protect the agricultural lands, sea shores and strategic areas. 
However, Turkey has lifted such restrictions as well as the principle 
of reciprocity and liberalized the sale of lands to foreigners up to 600 
acres per purchase. Such a liberalisation policy endangers Turkey’s 
food security and national sovereignty (Interview with Ali İhsan 
Köktürk). 
 
Aldan believes that an excessive amount of land sale to third-country nationals will 
threaten peace in Turkey. İzzet Çetin claims that the AKP has sold most of the arable 
lands in South-Eastern Anatolia to Israel: ‘If a foreigner buys land, it no longer 
belongs to Turkey but to him/her. Therefore, we must put limitations. If unregulated, 
FLO may turn out to be a threat to national integrity. Money is not everything’.  
CHP officials also highlight the principle of reciprocity as an indispensable condition 
for liberating FLO and blame the AKP government for undermining it due to 
expectations for short-term financial gains. Some deputies refer to the war of 
independence in order to justify the necessity of the principle of reciprocity:  
Reciprocity is a sine qua non for Turkey. Selling lands without 
respecting that principle will seriously threaten Turkey’s national 
sovereignty and freedom. FLO cannot be justified with economic 
gains because the motherland which Turkish people had fought and 
spilled blood for is priceless (Interview with Emre Köprülü). 
 
 There is a popular saying: ‘what matters is land and sheep, the rest is 
all trick’. We must protect our agriculture. You can buy immovable 
properties in the EU but the purchase of land is based on reciprocity. 
The AKP government has lifted that principle. We are not against 
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the sale of land to foreigners but we reject land sale with no limits. 
We won our land with the blood and tears of our ancestors who 
fought in the independence war (Interview with Ramazan Kerim 
Özkan). 
 
While the majority of the respondents give conditional support to FLO reforms, there 
are also factions within the CHP over the issue. For instance, a minority of 
respondents including Aykan Erdemir and Osman Korutürk adopt a more liberal 
approach towards FLO embracing it unconditionally. Erdemir believes that rights and 
liberties are not to be separated from each other: ‘As a social democrat, it is my duty 
to support FLO which is a part of human rights and liberties’, he argues. Similarly, 
Korutürk deems it necessary to adjust all existing regulations to the needs of people 
today respecting freedom and equality. Another small faction within the respondents 
including Orhan Düzgün is not sympathetic towards FLO: 
I am against FLO because the EU is not honest with us. Turkish 
people think that once Turkey becomes an EU member, they will be 
able to buy lands, for instance, in Germany just like Germans buy 
lands in Turkey now. However, nothing is certain. If the EU is 
disintegrated in the near future or Turkey fails to become an EU 
member, the laws we accept today [in order to comply with the EU 
acquis] will be counter-productive for us tomorrow (Interview with 
Orhan Düzgün).      
 
5.5.3. The MHP responses 
The MHP respondents are deeply divided over the FLO reforms. The responses of 
some MHP deputies very much reflect the official discourse of the party since they 
reject FLO outright seeing it as a ‘weapon’ used by foreign powers to divide Turkey. 
For instance, Lütfü Türkkan expresses his concerns over the possibility that land sales 
to foreigners in Turkey might result in the establishment of a Kurdish state within 
Turkish territories:  
It is crucial to know which part of Turkey is desired the most by 
foreigners. We observe a large amount of land sale [to foreigners] in 
the South-Eastern Anatolia and this worries us. We should not forget 
that Israel was established through land purchases (Interview with 
Lütfü Türkkan). 
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While a number of respondents dismiss FLO outright directly reflecting the official 
discourse, some others give less antagonistic responses and declare conditional 
support for FLO similar to the CHP deputies. Zuhal Topçu, the deputy chairman of 
the party, Nevzat Korkmaz and Sümer Oral do not dismiss FLO but require an 
official upper limit for it: 
There is no problem for me if foreigners buy land in Turkey but we 
have a limited amount of lands. We must determine the limits of FLO 
attaching priority to our national sovereignty and territorial integrity 
(Interview with Nevzat Korkmaz).  
 
The MHP officials also underline the principle of reciprocity: 
The liberalisation of FLO without respecting the principle of 
reciprocity is unacceptable. In the EU, you can only buy immovable 
property. Land is owned by the state but here the government’s 
initiatives have made it so easy for foreigners to buy our lands 
(Interview with Zuhal Topçu).    
 
 
5.6. Conclusion 
This chapter traced Euroscepticism in Turkey focusing on the resistance of Turkish 
political elites against the FLO reform. Similar to the case of minority rights, the two 
major opposition parties, the CHP and the MHP resisted FLO reforms with a 
nationalistic urge to maintain status quo and protect national sovereignty against 
foreign intervention. Both parties emphasize the indivisibility of Turkish lands and the 
vitality of the reciprocity principle stipulated by the Lausanne Treaty. The parties 
support foreign ownership of immovable properties (buildings) on the condition that 
the principle of reciprocity is applied indiscriminately. They however strongly oppose 
the sale of lands including forestry, agricultural land, natural resources, strategic areas 
such as military zones and border regions to foreigners. Rejecting the ‘economic 
development’ thesis of the AKP government, the opposition parties interpret ‘land’ as 
more than a means of economic exploitation and attach both patriotic and strategic 
value to it. This constitutes the basis of their opposition to FLO. Both parties make 
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reference to the independence war through which those lands were gained with 
massive casualties, and charge the AKP government with ‘treason’ to the memory of 
national ancestors. Similar political arguments have been raised against the FLO 
reforms in the CEECs where land is seen as the main component of national identity 
and an important legacy of ancestors. Therefore, the critical stances of political parties 
in the CEECs against FLO reforms including the FIDESZ-MPP in Hungary, the ODS 
in the Czech Republic and the PiS in Poland are highly comparable to the Eurosceptic 
attitudes of the CHP and the MHP of Turkey.    
Moreover, the officials of the CHP and the MHP both consider the FLO reforms as a 
violation of the Lausanne Treaty. Both parties regard FLO as a form of foreign 
invasion, thus an issue of national security. However, unlike the CHP, the MHP often 
resorts to anti-Semitic and xenophobic rhetoric in its criticisms and confirms its 
Right/TAN political identity. According to some (Yılmaz 2006), both the MHP and 
the CHP are victims of the Sèvres syndrome, which refers to a Treaty disintegrating 
Ottoman territories and indicates a fear of foreign invasion. This holds similarity to 
the MIEP of Hungary that depicts the EU’s pressures concerning FLO as the 
resurrection of the Trianon Treaty, which ceded two-thirds of Hungary’s territory to 
neighbouring countries in 1920.  
The interviews on the other hand yield interesting results indicating some evidence of 
deviation from the political parties’ official discourses. The AKP officials extend 
overwhelming support to the liberalisation of FLO. They mainly justify their support 
on economic grounds aiming to attract greater FDI. There is also a particular 
reference to Globalization which facilitates the free movement of people around the 
world and pushes countries to review their restrictive policies. Building upon this 
perspective, some party officials reject the principle of reciprocity since they see it as 
a political obstacle in front of economic liberalization and the free movement of 
people. On the other hand, more than half of the AKP deputies attach importance to 
reciprocity and some seem to ignore that the current laws bypass it. This is an 
important deviation from the official discourse of the party. While some AKP 
officials mainly defend the principle of reciprocity in order to promote bilateral 
economic cooperation, some others (Tekelioğlu, Güzel, Sait, Öğütken) suggest 
observing reciprocity to preserve national sovereignty. 
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Concerning the main opposition party (CHP), the responses of the interviewed 
parliamentarians indicate that the leadership change has altered the views on FLO. 
Unlike the official discourse of the CHP during Baykal leadership which dismisses 
FLO and only accepts the foreign acquisition of immovable property on the basis of 
reciprocity; the CHP officials under Kılıçdaroğlu leadership declare conditional 
support for FLO. The majority of the respondents believe in the necessity of 
determining an upper limit for land sale and respecting the principle of reciprocity. 
Moreover, the respondents primarily justify their support for FLO with particular 
reference to basic human rights and liberties, which is not visible in the responses of 
the reformist AKP deputies. This confirms the gradual transformation of the party 
from TAN to GAL. Furthermore, a couple of respondents reflect a very liberal image 
highlighting the importance of conferring liberal rights to people rather than 
protecting the state. Such a liberal approach does not represent the official discourse 
of the party for the time being, yet it holds a symbolic importance in terms of 
indicating a gradual shift in the political outlook of the party after the leadership 
change. Furthermore, the majority of CHP respondents refrain from populist 
references to the independence war and the Lausanne Treaty which were widely used 
by the party officials during the Baykal leadership. Only a few respondents resorted to 
populism; yet they still gave conditional support for FLO. With one exception, party 
officials don’t tend to criticize the EU’s policy regarding the FLO; the main tendency 
is rather to criticize the government for selling significant amounts of land for 
economic gains. Overall, the CHP respondents are not aloof to the idea of FLO but 
still require certain measurements such as respecting the principle of reciprocity and 
determining an upper limit for land sales.      
Finally, the MHP responses partly reflect the official discourse as they are replete 
with populist references to the war of Turkish national independence. Moreover, the 
threat perception indicating a possible division of the country out of land sale is 
shared by a number of respondents who reject FLO outright. On the other hand, some 
responses indicate a deviation from the official discourse endorsing FLO under 
certain conditions. This is a remarkably liberal rhetoric coming from a far-right 
political party.  
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As for the hypotheses of the study, the Left/Right distinction does not necessarily 
determine party contestations against FLO reform. For instance, both the HZDS 
[Left/TAN] and the KDH [Right/TAN] in Slovakia, as well as the LPR [Right/TAN] 
and the PSL [Left/TAN] in Poland stood against FLO reforms. Accordingly, it is the 
TAN ideology which stands out as an important base for opposition to the reform in 
the CEECs. Nationalistic preoccupation to prevent foreign invasion is a common 
justification TAN parties utilized in order to oppose FLO reform. It is similar in the 
Turkish case, since both the CHP [Left/TAN] and the MHP [Right/TAN] opposed the 
reform with nationalistic justifications. On the other hand, the BDP, a Left/GAL party 
also opposed the latest FLO bill in the Turkish Parliament since BDP officials blamed 
the AKP for dictating its own version of FLO which aimed to facilitate land sale to 
Arabs rather than EU nationals. Therefore, a GAL party may oppose the FLO reform 
if the bill is prepared according to the government’s own political and economic 
agenda.       
Concerning the effects of strategic party competition in Eurosceptic attitudes, 
resistance to the FLO reform mainly comes from the opposition parties in Turkey. In 
the CEECs however, party competition has a weaker explanatory power compared to 
ideology since there are examples of TAN parties which stood against FLO despite 
the fact that they were in government. For instance, the PSL in Poland, the FKGP in 
Slovakia, and the MDF and the FIDESZ-MPP in Hungary declared their opposition to 
FLO while in government. The PSL even threatened to leave the coalition 
government if the FLO reform was revised in line with national sensitivities. Such an 
oppositional stance against FLO in the CEECs might stem from the long-standing fear 
that Germans would buy up those lands they had lost after the Second World War 
(Tesser 2004). Moreover, the rural nationalism in Hungary in response to the land 
scarcity in the country emerged after two thirds of Hungarian lands were lost 
following the First World War might explain why TAN governments in Hungary 
stood opposed to the FLO reforms (Burger 2006). Finally, many TAN parties who 
opposed the FLO reform were coalition partners which might have made it less costly 
for them to resist reforms in comparison to single party governments that have more 
to lose unless they act in line with the EU’s accession conditionality (Börzel 2012).   
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In the Turkish case, as a single party government, the AKP [Right/TAN] 
overwhelmingly endorses FLO. Therefore, similar to the reform of minority rights, 
the AKP government despite its TAN attachments continued the FLO reforms. The 
AKP officials who participated in the interviews unanimously support FLO remaining 
loyal to the government’s policy. Yet, the government officials do not necessarily 
associate the reform of FLO with the EU membership process. On the contrary, one 
government deputy (Abdullah Çalışkan) stressed the fact that they did not adopt the 
FLO reform for Europeans but for Arabs. They never refer to the EU’s conditional 
pressures while justifying their support for FLO. Similarly, the opposition officials 
believe that the reform was not dictated by the EU but was a self-initiative of the AKP 
government. This is the main reason why the Left/GAL BDP strongly opposed the 
government’s latest bill of FLO in 2012. Yüksel Mutlu, the deputy leader of the party, 
explains that the BDP extends strong support to FLO for it is a human right. She also 
refers to globalization which shrank the world enabling different cultures to live 
together and emphasizes the necessity of conferring people the right to own property 
wherever they wish to live (Interview with Yüksel Mutlu). However, the BDP joined 
the main opposition to criticize the reform of FLO brought by the AKP government in 
2012 (TBMM 2012a). Hasip Kaplan, the BDP deputy for Şırnak claimed that the 
government's bill would enable foreigners to buy the lands they could not invade 
through use of force (Radikal 2012a). He also criticized the withdrawal of the 
principle of reciprocity from the legislation: ‘A Saudi Arabian Sheikh can buy up our 
lands easily while we are not even permitted to buy a tent in his country’ (ibid.).  
Finally, unlike the reform of minority rights, there are no examples of parties in the 
CEECs and in Turkey criticizing the EU for applying its FLO condition in a selective 
and discriminatory manner. Therefore, it could be argued that issue-specific 
Euroscepticism regarding the FLO reform essentially emanates from domestic factors 
involving ideology and strategy in Turkey as well as the CEECs.  
   
 
 
176 
 
CHAPTER VI 
THE EU’S CYPRUS CONDITIONALITY ON 
TURKEY 
 
This chapter discusses whether/how the EU’s country-specific conditionality 
contributes to the emergence of Euroscepticism in a candidate country. Previous 
chapters that dealt with the issue-specific conditions of the EU -focusing on the 
reforms of minority rights and foreign land ownership- explained the rise of 
Eurosceptic attitudes in candidates mainly with domestic factors such as political 
ideology and strategy. This chapter focuses on the EU’s conditions that target a 
specific candidate country and finds that in the case of country-specific conditionality, 
the explanatory power of domestic factors decreases. Country-specific conditionality 
of the EU is defined in this chapter as the EU’s extra preconditions for membership 
imposed on a candidate country due to an ongoing dispute between the candidate in 
question and an EU member state. Often, the solution of the bilateral conflict is 
introduced by the EU as a precondition for accession. Such extra membership 
conditionality is usually perceived as discriminatory and faces serious objections by 
political actors in the candidate country of interest. Therefore, Euroscepticism rises as 
a reaction to the EU’s extra conditionality associated with the political pressures of an 
EU member state that seeks to gain leverage in a bilateral conflict. 
In this respect, the chapter will begin with a brief discussion of the EU’s country-
specific conditionality and then provide examples from candidate countries which 
have faced additional membership preconditions due to a bilateral conflict with an EU 
member. After examining domestic responses in Macedonia regarding the name issue 
with Greece, reactions in Croatia against the maritime border dispute with Slovenia 
and resistance in the Czech Republic to the annulment of Beneš decrees, the chapter 
will turn to the Turkish case and discuss the Eurosceptic responses of the Turkish 
political elite against the EU’s Cyprus conditionality. Briefly discussing the Cyprus 
problem, the EU’s Cyprus policy and Turkey’s Cyprus policy, the chapter will 
177 
 
scrutinize Turkish responses to the EU’s Cyprus conditionality in detail. The results 
of the parliamentary interviews will be discussed in comparison with the official 
discourses of the political parties in question. The conclusion will summarize Turkish 
responses to the EU’s Cyprus conditionality and examine the validity of the general 
hypotheses of the study to find out to what extent Euroscepticism in response to the 
EU’s country-specific conditionality is affected by party ideology and party 
competition. 
 
6.1. The EU’s country-specific conditionality and responses from accession 
countries  
 
This chapter argues that Euroscepticism is not only associated with issue-specific 
conditionality. It also emerges in candidate countries as a response to the EU’s 
country-specific conditionality. Domestic reactions intensify when the EU applies 
additional preconditions for membership due to a bilateral issue between a candidate 
country and an EU member state. Euroscepticism is thus a particular stance against 
the instrumentalisation of EU accession negotiations by an individual member state 
which seeks to get concessions from a candidate country on a bilateral issue that is not 
directly related to the EU's official membership criteria. The EU thus inherits the 
extant bilateral problem and under the pressures of the EU members, it fails to act as 
an impartial problem solver towards the candidate country. The member state that is a 
party to the conflict can use its veto power to block the initiation of accession 
negotiations or even freeze an ongoing negotiation process by objecting to the 
negotiation of individual chapters. Under such circumstances, the EU remains 
indifferent to the constraints inflicted upon the candidate by the member state and/or 
puts extra preconditions on the candidate country to solve the bilateral problem before 
joining the Union. As a result, political parties from different ideological backgrounds 
in the accession country of interest start to resist the EU’s additional pressures and 
even end up losing their initial motivation to join the EU. The mitigation of this 
reactionary stance is directly contingent upon the solution of the bilateral issue either 
through reciprocal compromise or unilateral concessions given by the candidate 
country in return for EU membership guarantees. It is crucial to scrutinize these cases 
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primarily because in every case, a member state forces the EU to introduce the 
solution of a bilateral conflict as an accession pre-condition for a candidate country. 
In some cases (Macedonia and Croatia), member state pressure temporarily prevents 
the negotiation process while in others (the Czech Republic), the EU manages to 
withstand the pressures of member states and continues the accession process without 
curtailment. In this respect, it is crucial to study how political parties in different 
countries respond to similar external pressures. These cases are also directly 
comparable to the Turkish case, because Turkey has been facing similar pressures 
from the EU due to its bilateral conflict with a member state, the Republic of Cyprus 
(RoC).  
The EU’s country-specific conditionality does not only stem from a bilateral conflict 
between member and candidate. The domestic political context of a candidate country 
might complicate the accession process as well. For instance, the EU denied opening 
accession talks for Croatia unless two war criminals, Ante Gotovina and Janko 
Bobetko, were returned to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) (Jovic 2006). The EU’s pressures were resisted by political actors 
in Croatia primarily because the public considered Gotovina and Bobetko as heroes 
rather than criminals (Jovic 2009). Such country-specific conditions are essentially 
introduced by the EU in order to enforce the respect for the rule of law and democracy 
in the candidate country. On the other hand, the EU’s conditionality stemming from a 
bilateral conflict is introduced due to the pressures of a member state, which aims to 
solve the bilateral conflict in its own desired way by using its veto power. Such EU 
conditions face resistance in the candidate country and are dismissed as 
discriminatory and unfair. Eurosceptic responses against this conditionality hence 
deserve greater attention as domestic political actors justify their oppositional stance 
by rejecting injustice and discrimination. Below are some cases in which domestic 
political actors rally against the EU’s country-specific conditions and generate 
Eurosceptic responses.                          
The Republic of Macedonia, a candidate since 2005, has been put under pressure by 
Greece that has a historical claim on the name ‘Macedonia’. Greece considers 
Macedonia as historically and exclusively a Greek name and asserts that its use by the 
newly formed ex-Yugoslav republic implies a territorial claim to the northern Greek 
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province of Macedonia (Panagiotou 2008: 228). Greece has persisted in its efforts to 
block Macedonia’s entry to major international organizations such as the EU and the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization until a mutually acceptable solution is reached 
(ibid.). However, neither Greece nor Macedonia seem to agree on a common solution 
since Greece considers the name ‘Macedonia’ as its red line and remains resolute to 
prevent its usage outside its borders, while the Macedonian government 
wholeheartedly defends its liberty to choose any name just like all other states 
elsewhere in the world (Mavromatidis 2010). Greece has been blocking Macedonia's 
EU accession talks since 2009 despite the European Commission's recommendation 
to initiate the accession negotiations. The Greek government even considers putting 
the EU membership of Macedonia to popular referendum as a last resort to prevent its 
accession (Tziampiris 2012: 158). The series of blockades against Macedonia 
triggered nationalist resistance (Koinova 2011: 826). Domestic political actors 
showed strong reactions to Greece and condemned Brussels' one-sidedness which has 
been precluding Macedonia's EU bid (Balkan Insight 2011). Blaming the EU for 
inflicting double standards, the officials of the nationalist government under the 
Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) [Right/TAN] 
even compared the EU's Macedonian policy to ‘the Holocaust’ (ibid.). The Social 
Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) [Left/TAN] officials particularly referred to 
the name dispute as a serious problem that diminished Macedonian enthusiasm to 
proceed with EU-led reforms (Koinova 2011: 826). Macedonia’s EU membership 
currently remains frozen and its government accuses Greece of showing no interest in 
finding a middle ground to help them proceed with EU membership negotiations 
(MINA 2011). Tziampiris (2012: 165) explains that Macedonian accession is only 
possible if Macedonia satisfies Greek demands regarding the name dispute. 
Similarly, the maritime border dispute between Croatia (official EU candidate since 
2004) and Slovenia (EU member since May 2004) caused a temporary curtailment of 
Croatia's EU membership negotiations due to the Slovenian veto. Following 
Yugoslavia’s dissolution, there was a dispute between the two emerging countries 
over the demarcation of the maritime borders on the bay of Piran (Mackelworth et al 
2011: 648). Croatia defended the principle of the equidistance line adopted by the 
1982 UN Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS). However, Slovenia dismissed 
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the equal share of the bay claiming to be a disadvantaged state due to its limited 
access to high seas (ibid.). Upon acquiring the rotating EU Presidency in January 
2008, Slovenia presented this issue as a dispute between the EU and a third country 
violating the neutral position of the Presidency (Mackelworth et al 2011: 653). After 
Croatia provided documentation for several negotiation chapters that prejudged the 
border despite the lack of a settlement, Slovenia vetoed eleven negotiation chapters 
that were technically ready to open, and caused a considerable stagnation in Croatia’s 
accession process (Jutarnji 2008). The Slovenian government even stated its 
willingness to hold a referendum on Croatian accession had the dispute persisted 
(Whitman and Juncos 2009: 196). The Slovenian veto caused strong nationalistic 
reaction in Croatia. Stjepan Mesić, the President of Croatia (2000-2010) and the 
former top official of the Croatian People's Party – Liberal Democrats (HNS) 
[Right/GAL] firmly defied the Slovenian demands for concessions:   
The political elite in Slovenia think they can abuse their EU and 
NATO membership to blackmail Croatia. In other words, they want to 
block our negotiations on joining the EU and NATO if we do not 
accept their demand to settle the border problem through political 
negotiations (Pejic 2009).  
 
Similarly, the Croatian Prime Minister and the HDZ [Right/TAN] leader Ivo Sanader 
accused Slovenia of blackmailing Croatia and asserted that Croatia did not intend to 
'buy EU membership with the [Croatian] territory' (Vucheva 2008). Sanader’s 
unexpected resignation from government was interpreted in the Croatian media as a 
reactionary move against the Slovenian veto (Covic 2012: 4). The extreme right 
Croatian Party of the Right (HSP) [Right/TAN] too deemed the Slovenian veto as the 
main obstruction for Croatia and refused to sacrifice Croatian national interests for the 
sake of EU membership (Stojarova 2012: 154). The EU accession negotiations 
resumed only after Croatia and Slovenia agreed to an EU-led plan of bringing the 
issue in front of an ad hoc international arbitration court (Sancin 2010). Croatia 
consented to the plan only after receiving the EU’s guarantee for membership.  
Finally, the strained relations between the Czech Republic and Germany over the 
Beneš decrees triggered anti-EU campaigns in the Czech Republic. The decrees had 
ordered the deportation of 2.5 million Sudeten Germans and Magyars from 
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Czechoslovakia in the mid-1940s37. During the accession process of the Czech 
Republic, Austria and Germany put pressure on the EU to introduce the annulment of 
the decrees as an official membership precondition. However, the Czech people 
considered the Beneš decrees a ‘national cause’ and a part of the ‘necessary de-
Nazification process’ in Czechoslovakia at the time (Cordell and Wolff 2005: 257). 
The public support for the maintenance of the decrees reached 80% in 2002 and the 
major political parties were unified in their support for the decrees. The KSCM 
[Left/TAN] praised the decrees as a legitimate reaction to Nazi Germany’s annexation 
of the Czech Sudetenland and opposed its annulment for such an act would enable the 
realization of the ‘German land claims, control of publishing companies and cultural 
influences’ (Petrovic and Solingen 2005: 292). Similarly, the ODS [Right/TAN] 
defended the decrees as part of Czech national pride and the party leader Vaclav 
Klaus threatened to cast a negative vote in the referendum unless the EU guaranteed 
that Austria and Germany would not make claims against the Czechs based on the 
decrees (Petrovic and Solingen 2005: 294). Also, the Czech Social Democratic Party 
(ČSSD) [Left/GAL] repeatedly declared its support for the decrees (Petrovic and 
Solingen 2005: 295).        
During the 2002 election campaign, the Beneš decrees were embraced as a national 
cause to fuel negative public sentiments against the EU by the ODS and the KSCM 
(Hanley 2008: 247). Even the Czech Prime Minister and the leader of the ČSSD 
Milos Zeman, referred to the Sudeten Germans as ‘Hitler's fifth column’ defending 
the Beneš decrees against Austrian criticisms. Zeman claimed; ‘[t]he Sudeten 
Germans should be happy that they were only “transferred”. Can you really demand 
reconciliation with traitors?’ (Nagengast 2003: 340). The Czech Lower House passed 
a unanimous (161 to 0) resolution in April 2002, ‘refusing to discuss or reopen this 
matter, let alone “apologize” for the expulsion of Germans’ (Petrovic and Solingen 
2005: 292). Despite the German and Austrian pressures, the EU Commission decided 
not to put the annulment of the Beneš decrees as a pre-condition for Czech 
membership. The Commission justified its decision based on expert opinions which 
stated that the decrees were no longer legally binding; therefore there was no need for 
annulment (Cornides 2009: 218, Kingsland 2002: 7). Moreover, the EU emphasized 
                                                          
37 For details on the Beneš decrees, see Nagengast (2003). 
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the fact that once an EU member, the Czech Republic would have to open its borders 
to Sudeten Germans giving them liberty to buy properties in Czech lands (Cornides 
2009: 219). Hence, the benefits of ‘political and economic integration, free movement 
of goods and services, of persons and capital’ were deemed greater for the victims of 
the Beneš decrees than ‘any compensation…granted by unwilling governments’ 
(ibid.). This was a decisive factor for the Czech accession to the EU as the opinion 
polls in 2002 indicated a strong public rejection of EU membership, had the 
annulment of the decrees been introduced as a precondition (Hanley 2008: 362). 
Overall, country-specific preconditions for EU membership stimulate Euroscepticism 
in candidate countries having bilateral issues with member states. It is plausible to 
argue that Euroscepticism against the EU’s country-specific conditionality is not an 
opposition phenomenon. When there is a ‘national cause’ at stake and when domestic 
political actors are convinced that the EU unfairly prioritizes member states over 
them, government and opposition are unified in their resistance to the EU’s 
conditionality. In all three examples, both governments and opposition parties resist 
the EU’s pressures on what is perceived as a ‘national cause’. In this context, 
ideological preferences cannot explain political party behaviour towards the EU, since 
all major political parties coming from different ideological backgrounds dismiss the 
EU’s country-specific condition as discriminatory and unacceptable. In Macedonia, 
both the SDSM [Left/TAN] and the VMRO-DPMNE [Right/TAN] opposed the 
country-specific pressures of the EU. Similarly, the HDZ [Right/TAN] and the HSP 
[Right/TAN] showed similar tendencies in Croatia; and the KSCM [Left/TAN], the 
ODS [Right/TAN] and the ČSSD [Left/GAL] of the Czech Republic adopted 
common attitudes against the repeal of the Beneš decrees.  
Finally, such a common reactive Eurosceptic stance is reversible once resolute steps 
are taken for the solution of the conflict and the EU no longer considers the solution 
as an official membership precondition. Accordingly, the above examples indicate the 
EU’s potential to reverse such domestic resistance bypassing the pressures of member 
states. For instance, the EU took a successful political initiative not to include the 
annulment of the Beneš decrees as a membership precondition for the Czech Republic 
despite the pressures of Germany and Austria. Moreover, the EU’s pressures 
convinced Slovenia to pursue a legal solution to its conflict with Croatia through 
183 
 
international arbitration. Despite the EU’s potential to play an important role in 
convincing Greece and Macedonia on a joint solution to the name issue the prospects 
for a solution remain unclear so far, and the membership of Macedonia is still 
uncertain. This constitutes the main reason behind the rising Euroscepticism in the 
country.   
Similar political reactions are also observed in the Turkish case against the EU’s 
Cyprus conditionality. The next section provides a short discussion of the Cyprus 
problem. It will then focus on Turkey’s Cyprus policy in general and the Turkish 
responses to the EU’s Cyprus conditionality in particular.    
 
6.2. A Brief Discussion of the Cyprus problem and the EU’s Cyprus policy 
Surviving under the yoke of various rulers, the island of Cyprus was annexed to the 
Ottoman Empire in 1571. It was governed by Turks until 1878 when its 
administration was granted to Britain as a reward for the British assistance in quelling 
a rebellion in Egypt. After the outbreak of the First World War, Britain annexed the 
entire island as it fought against the Ottomans. The British rule intensified the social 
separation of the island since Britain established separate institutions for Turks and 
Greeks and denied conferring greater administrative rights to Greek Cypriots although 
their population exceeded 80% of the entire island (Christou 2004: 30). This policy 
not only instilled anti-British sentiments in Greek Cypriots but also ‘pre-empted any 
possibility for the achievement of a political understanding between Greeks and 
Turks’ (ibid.). Greek Cypriots always considered the island as an integral part of the 
Hellenic civilization, and the ideal of enosis (union with Greece) had long been on the 
agenda since the 19th Century (Christou 2004: 31). The British rule revitalized the 
Greek Cypriot quest for enosis (ibid.). However, the push for achieving enosis also 
reinforced the ethno-national identity of Turkish Cypriots in return (Christou 2004: 
32).  
After centuries of subordination to foreign powers, the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) was 
established in 1960 under the joint rule of Cypriot Greeks and Cypriot Turks. The 
London–Zurich accords officialised the ‘bi-national independence and political 
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equality and administrative partnership of the two communities’ (Müftüler-Bac and 
Güney 2005: 282). According to the provisions of the accords, Britain, Greece and 
Turkey were recognized as the guarantors of the Republic. However, the Greek 
Cypriot leadership remained critical of the agreement for it was not a result of a 
compromise between the two Cypriot communities but between Greece and Turkey 
(Kedourie 2005: 650). The Greek Cypriot attempts to amend the Constitution 
generated heated debates in the island which led to inter-communal violence (ibid.).    
The outbreak of the fight between Turkish and Greek Cypriots in late 1963 
culminated in the isolation of the Turkish community into enclaves and resulted in the 
forced evacuation of the Turkish representatives from the government of Cyprus at all 
levels (Müftüler-Bac and Güney 2005: 283). The 1964 Resolution of the UN Security 
Council was interpreted as the recognition of the Greek Cypriot government as the 
legitimate ruler of the RoC and in 1968, the UN established a mechanism of inter-
communal talks bringing together the representatives of two communities to negotiate 
the terms for ‘a system of local government which would give Turkish-Cypriots a 
degree of autonomy without endangering the unity of the state’ (Souter 1984: 663). 
The talks lasted on and off until the Turkish military entered the northern part of the 
island in 1974 as a response to a coup d’état in Cyprus allegedly perpetrated by the 
Colonels junta of Greece. Turkey responded with a military intervention to maintain 
the security of Turkish Cypriots as their guarantor state according to the provisions of 
the Treaty of Guarantee. The Turkish intervention divided the Island into two zones 
and the partition was further consolidated with the unilateral proclamation of the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)38 in 1983. The bi-zonality was later 
confirmed by the UN through the delineation of the Green Line, which has been under 
the control and surveillance of the UN forces since 1974. The UN then sponsored 
peace talks for a settlement based on a state with ‘single sovereignty, single 
citizenship and comprising two politically equal communities in a bi-communal and 
bi-zonal federation’ (Nugent 2000: 135). However, while Greek Cypriots were seen 
as consistently supportive of a solution based on UN sponsorship, the stance of the 
Turkish Cypriot leadership under Rauf Denktaş was regarded as obstructive to the 
                                                          
38 The self-proclaimed TRNC is only recognized by Turkey, which has maintained its troops in 
Northern Cyprus since 1974 to date. 
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UN’s peace plans due to its insistence on a settlement based on two separate states 
(ibid.).  
Anastasiou (2009) calls the Cyprus problem an ‘anomaly’, because the two 
communities on the island have conflicting approaches to the problem which make it 
impossible to solve. Using the advantage of being internationally recognized as the 
sole official authority in the island, Greek Cypriots always choose to approach the 
conflict with legalistic lenses raising the issues of ‘military occupation, refugees, 
human rights violations, the fate of missing persons, property rights’ (Anastasiou 
2009: 133). On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots consider the Cyprus problem 
primarily as a political matter rather than a legal one, because they secure more than a 
half-century-old fear that Greek Cypriots will always attempt to ‘marginalize and 
even annihilate’ them (Anastasiou 2009: 132). This sharp difference in the 
perceptions of the two communities long determined their conflicting stances towards 
a UN-mediated settlement. That’s why Greek Cypriots have been praised by the UN 
as pro-solution and Turkish Cypriots have been considered as obstructive to the UN’s 
peace plans.        
The EU’s relations with Cyprus were mainly economic until the Commission’s 1993 
opinion in favour of the RoC’s accession (Christou 2004: 61). The EU believed that 
the accession of the RoC would constitute a catalyst for peace in the island (Christou 
2002; Tocci 2005; Anastasiou 2009). EU officials and Greek Cypriot authorities 
shared the hope that the linkage between Turkey’s EU accession and the solution of 
the Cyprus problem would force Turkey to take a more compromising position vis-à-
vis Cyprus (Christou 2002: 8; Christou 2004: 62). However, the EU’s pressures were 
resisted by Turkey and Turkish Cypriots essentially because the incentives the EU 
offered neither addressed the security concerns of Turkish Cypriots, nor did they draw 
‘Turkey further in to the EU structures’ (Christou 2002: 21). Nevertheless, coming to 
power in 2002, the reformist AKP government abandoned Turkey’s hard-line position 
towards Cyprus and supported the UN-sponsored Annan Plan. The EU’s main 
strategy was to reinforce the UN-initiated efforts to achieve a settlement before the 
accession of the RoC. However, the Annan Plan was rejected by the majority of 
Greek Cypriot participants to the referendum despite the positive vote of Turkish 
Cypriots. The EU had managed to induce ‘the Turkish side to abandon its traditional 
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secessionist nationalism and opt for a reunified Cyprus’; however, it failed to 
persuade Greek Cypriots about the necessity of the EU membership of a unified 
Cyprus (Anastasiou 2009: 130). According to Diez et al (2006: 576), the EU’s 
‘lukewarm approach’, which put no strong pressure on the RoC to reach a solution on 
the Cyprus problem in return for EU membership, ‘did not foster the belief of Greek-
Cypriot policymakers that concessions to the other side should be made’. Similar to 
the UN, the dominant impression in the EU was that Denktaş’s uncompromising 
approach had drawn Turkish Cypriots away from a solution, and the Greek Cypriot 
community had a much more positive image concerning the willingness to resolve the 
Cyprus problem (Christou 2002; Engert 2010). This led the EU to accept the Greek 
Cypriot government’s EU accession despite the perseverance of the conflict. When 
the Greek Cypriot leadership revealed its intention to reject the Annan plan, it was too 
late for the EU to counteract as the accession treaty had already been signed (Engert 
2010). By accepting the membership of a divided Cyprus, the EU imported all the 
legal and political aspects of the Cyprus problem (Anastasiou 2009: 133). Since then, 
the EU has failed to reciprocate the latent desire of Turkish Cypriots to integrate, 
because the EU’s subsequent attempts to lift the economic embargo and provide 
financial aid to Northern Cyprus were prevented by the Greek Cypriot veto (Sözen 
2010: 82). The EU also disengaged itself from the peace process after the failure of 
the Annan plan primarily due to pressing issues such as the Lisbon treaty and the 
Eurozone crisis along with the lack of information and interest of most EU member 
states on the Cyprus problem (Sözen 2010: 83).  
 
6.3. Turkey’s Cyprus policy  
Turkey adopted a ‘hands-off’ policy towards Cyprus until 1960s when Cyprus 
became a national cause and since the 2000s, Turkish decision-makers have 
succumbed to self-criticism about Cyprus (Doğan and Asma 2008). Having endorsed 
British rule on the island, Turkish decision-makers did not initially consider Cyprus a 
matter of Turkish foreign policy. The words of the Turkish Foreign Ministers, 
Saadettin Sadak and Fuad Köprülü, who rejected the existence of the Cyprus problem 
benchmarked the Turkish indifference towards the Cyprus question in the 1950s 
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(TBMM 1950). However, after the eruption of inter-communal violence following the 
disagreements over the new Cypriot Republic, Turkey started considering Cyprus as a 
matter of national security. Due to its geographical proximity to the Turkish mainland, 
Turkish political elites perceived Cyprus both as an imminent threat and an integral 
part of Turkey’s national security (Kaliber 2009). Cyprus was thus depicted as an 
‘invaluable geostrategic asset’, which at the hands of hostile powers (Greece) would 
jeopardize Turkey’s security since it could be used both as a base to attack Anatolia 
and as a means to encircle Turkey in the Mediterranean (Suvarierol 2003: 56-57; 
Kaliber 2009: 106). The policy of preventing enosis and increasing the Turkish 
influence on the island has thus become the foundation of Turkey’s Cyprus policy 
(Kaliber 2005 and 2009). Turkey threatened to attack Cyprus twice in 1964 and 1967 
as a response to the ethnic violence on the island. Ismet İnönü, the Turkish Prime 
Minister of the time, resisted the warnings of the United States (US) aiming to prevent 
Turkish intervention on the island. The invasion of Cyprus in 1974 was justified as a 
decisive step against the imminent realization of enosis which would jeopardize 
Turkey’s national security (Suvarierol 2003: 57). After the proclamation of the 
TRNC, Turkish governments intensified their efforts for the preservation of the bi-
zonality in Cyprus and the safety of Turkish Cypriots through the survival of the self-
proclaimed Turkish Cypriot government. Although supporting the UN-mediated 
peace efforts, Turkey attached priority to the continuity of the TRNC which then 
constituted the core of Turkey’s ‘traditional’ Cyprus policy (Gülmez 2007). Cyprus 
has become a national cause in Turkey and a taboo which ‘severely constrained 
democratic debate and the capacity of subsequent governments to intervene in the 
substance of the existing policy’ (Kaliber 2012: 225).    
After the Cold War, Turkey’s Cyprus policy started to change. Turkey’s EU 
membership perspective enabled pro-EU Turkish politicians including Mesut Yılmaz, 
the deputy Prime Minister of the time, to question the validity of the securitized 
perspectives on Cyprus (Zambouras 2001). Yılmaz dismissed Turkey’s traditional 
Cyprus policy as a mere reflection of the Sèvres Syndrome and urged for its revision 
during Turkey’s EU membership process (Zambouras 2001: 363-364). The AKP 
government further altered Turkey’s approach towards Cyprus in order to make use of 
the emerging opportunities for economic cooperation in the eastern Mediterranean 
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and to become ‘an activist regional power’, in addition to the quest for EU 
membership (Kaliber 2009: 122). However, after the rejection of the Annan plan and 
the EU accession of the RoC, the EU started to pressurize Turkey to open its harbours 
and aerospace to the RoC that was not officially recognized by Turkey as the 
legitimate authority of Cyprus. Upon Turkey's rejection to comply with this 
membership condition, the EU partially froze the Turkish accession negotiations by 
refusing to negotiate eight accession chapters (European Commission 2012: 5). The 
suspension of the accession negotiations shattered the reformist agenda of the AKP 
government to de-securitize Turkey’s approach towards Cyprus and foster peace and 
cooperation in the island. The AKP government and opposition parties have since 
then been unified in their resistance to the EU’s Cyprus conditionality and charged the 
EU with discrimination against Turkey. Below is the comparative discussion of the 
political party responses to the EU’s country-specific conditionality about Cyprus.  
 
6.4. The AKP government and Cyprus  
Upon its landslide victory in the 2002 elections, the AKP determined that the solution 
of the Cyprus problem was one of its main foreign policy goals. Blaming the 
traditional Cyprus policy of Turkey as a stumbling block against solution, the AKP 
leader Tayyip Erdoğan, announced that they were not going to be ‘hawks’ regarding 
Cyprus (Hürriyet 2002). Erdoğan’s famous expression, ‘no solution is not a solution’ 
became the rhetoric of the party’s Cyprus policy. The AKP swiftly changed Turkey’s 
Cyprus policy taking the risk of being framed as ‘traitor’ by the nationalist circles in 
Turkey and Northern Cyprus (Yılmaz 2011: 194). Oğuzlu (2012: 234) explains that 
the AKP took such a risk in order to make sure that the RoC’s membership would not 
constitute a threat to Turkey’s EU accession. In addition, Theophylactou (2012: 104) 
claims that the government also aimed to remove a major financial burden from 
Turkey’s shoulders by solving the conflict and withdrawing Turkish troops from the 
island. Contrary to previous Turkish governments, the AKP did not reject the link 
between the Cyprus question and Turkey’s EU membership; it praised the Annan plan 
as a means to a permanent solution and supported Mehmet Ali Talat, the pro-EU 
Turkish Cypriot politician who became Prime Minister in the 2004 general elections. 
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Upon the rejection of the referendum in 2004, the AKP government made an offer to 
the EU that Turkey would open its harbours and airspace to the RoC in return for the 
lifting of economic embargoes on Northern Cyprus (Gülmez 2007: 135). However, 
the proposal was rejected by the EU (ibid.). Turkey’s accession negotiations were 
soon suspended after Turkey’s insistence not to open its harbours and airspace to the 
RoC.    
The suspension of the negotiations severely affected the Cyprus policy of the AKP. 
The party’s reformist rhetoric was replaced with charges against the EU, and the 
statements of party officials signalled a return to the traditional Cyprus policy of 
Turkey. The AKP accused the EU of 'sacrificing' Turkey’s EU membership for Greek 
Cypriots and announced that Turkey would never give up on Turkish Cypriots for EU 
membership (Çelenk 2007). Tayyip Erdoğan declared that they wouldn’t tolerate the 
EU’s ‘double-standards’ regarding the Cyprus problem, and he threatened to 
withdraw Turkey’s EU membership bid (Radikal 2008). The Turkish Prime 
Minister’s latest remarks indicate a decisive return to Turkey’s traditional Cyprus 
policy. Erdoğan rejected the existence of the RoC and claimed; ‘[t]here are the Greek 
Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot administrations; and there is a green line in between. 
However, the EU does not see the line’ (Vatan 2012b). He also stated that the Greek 
Cypriot administration cannot take any decision on behalf of Turkish Cypriots since it 
has no authority over Northern Cyprus (Vatan 2011b). Similarly, Egemen Bağış, the 
Minister of EU Affairs and Turkey’s chief negotiator with the EU, held the EU 
responsible for the current impasse in the island which also prohibits Turkey’s 
accession. Admitting that the Cyprus problem had become the most important 
obstacle against Turkey’s EU entry, Bağış claimed that the EU had lost its impartiality 
by awarding the uncompromising Greek Cypriots with membership (Euractiv 2011b). 
He also rejected the EU’s pressures on Turkey to open its harbours and airspace to the 
RoC since he did not want Turkish Cypriots to pay the price for Turkey’s accession 
by being further isolated (ibid.).   
Also, Cemil Çiçek, the speaker of the Turkish Parliament and a leading member of the 
AKP, announced that EU membership was not sine qua non for Turkey. Çiçek argued 
that if Turks were obliged to choose either EU membership or Northern Cyprus, they 
would not hesitate to prefer their ‘Cypriot brothers’ (Milliyet 2011c). Beşir Atalay, 
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the Deputy Prime Minister, announced that Turkey has a ‘plan B’ regarding the 
Cyprus problem: withdrawing its quest for EU membership and campaigning in 
favour of the recognition of Turkish Cypriot independence (Euractiv 2012). Even 
Yaşar Yakış, the former Turkish Foreign Minister who had once expressed the AKP 
government’s willingness to give concessions on the Cyprus problem in order to 
achieve Turkey’s EU accession, recently announced that Turkey would never trade 
Northern Cyprus over EU membership (Yakış 2002 and 2009). Finally, Abdullah Gül, 
a former top AKP official and the current President of Turkey, criticized the EU’s 
decision to grant the EU presidency to the RoC and claimed that the EU’s Cyprus 
policy would make the Cyprus problem unsolvable. He argued that such an act would 
de facto confirm the existence of two separate states in the island (Euractiv 2011a). 
The AKP government froze its relations with the EU for six months after the RoC 
took the rotating EU Presidency.  
Overall, the AKP’s agenda to swiftly reform Turkey’s Cyprus policy has proven short 
lived. Party officials mistakenly believed that the Cyprus problem would be resolved 
during Turkey’s EU membership process. On the contrary, the problem itself stood as 
a major impediment to Turkey’s accession. The reformist Cyprus policy of the AKP 
has quickly been replaced with the traditional Cyprus rhetoric of Turkey since the 
AKP government found the EU’s Cyprus approach discriminatory for both Turkish 
Cypriots and Turkey. Party officials believe that the EU rewarded the RoC by 
accepting its membership despite its negative vote in the referendum on the Annan 
plan while further isolating Turkish Cypriots who had voted ‘yes’ to reunification 
(Öniş 2010: 365). Also, the EU granted important political leverage to the RoC which 
could use it to block Turkey’s accession process (Avcı 2011a: 413). The AKP 
government even questions the willingness of the EU to accept Turkey’s membership. 
The failure of the Annan plan and the EU’s Cyprus conditionality on Turkey 
considerably mitigated the legitimacy of the EU in the eyes of the AKP, which lost 
enthusiasm for Turkey’s EU accession as well as the solution of the Cyprus problem 
(Oğuzlu 2012; Öniş 2010; Yılmaz 2011). Erdoğan and his aides still refuse to open 
Turkey’s harbours and airspace to the RoC because they do not believe their 
compliance will either solve the problems of Turkish Cypriots or facilitate Turkey’s 
EU accession.     
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6.4.1. The views of the AKP Members of the Parliament  
The interview results are very much supportive of the AKP’s official discourse on 
Cyprus policy. The government officials mainly declare their support for a peaceful 
settlement in Cyprus. The majority of the respondents39 defend any solution which 
embraces the will of Turkish Cypriots; while only a minority of the AKP deputies 
urge that the EU should recognize the two-state model on the island. Hence, the 
priority is mostly given to the preservation of the rights and liberties of Turkish 
Cypriots rather than the establishment of federation or separate states on the island. 
Moreover, the respondents40 firmly claim that the AKP government did its part for a 
long lasting solution in the island by supporting the Annan plan in 2004. Mustafa 
Elitaş and Belma Satır find their government’s Cyprus policy reform unprecedented. 
Belma Satır particularly praises the government’s support for the Annan plan as 
revolutionary in comparison to the previous Turkish governments which, in her view, 
never desired the solution of the Cyprus problem and always considered Cyprus as 
political leverage to maintain Turkish interests against foreign powers. Ercan Candan 
admits that the AKP’s support for a peaceful settlement in Cyprus was very risky as 
the Turkish public long considered the Cyprus problem as a national cause and 
supported the traditional Turkish policy. 
The AKP officials are, however, highly pessimistic about the prospects for peace on 
the island since they question the EU’s willingness to solve the Cyprus problem in an 
equitable way. The EU is blamed for its ambivalent approach which not only 
prevented a solution based on the Annan Plan but also further isolated Turkish 
Cypriots. The accession of the RoC without a precondition to solve the Cyprus 
problem is depicted as the EU’s critical mistake which granted the Greek Cypriot 
authority important leverage to stand as a stumbling block against solution. Muzaffer 
Çakar and Ahmet Berat Çonkar share the concern that the EU’s Cyprus policy has 
made the Cyprus problem much more complicated and harder to solve, because 
admitting Greek Cypriots while further marginalising Turkish Cypriots only 
                                                          
39 including Fatih Çiftçi, Bilal Macit, Burak Erdenir, Ahmet Baha Öğütken, Abdullah Çalışkan, Tülin 
Erkal Kara and Afif Demirkıran. 
40 Tülin Erkal Kara, Belma Satır, Mustafa Elitaş, Ercan Candan and Ali Rıza Alaboyun explicitly argue 
that Turkey did more than it could in Cyprus for a peaceful settlement.   
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contributes to the deadlock in the island. Similarly, Bilal Macit claims that Greek 
Cypriot accession not only undermines the will of Turkish Cypriots but also ensures 
the prevention of a solution. The AKP deputies find the EU’s Cyprus policy highly 
contradictory to the EU’s own values and principles:  
The EU was wrong to accept the Greek Cypriot membership since it is 
contrary to its own principles which prohibit the membership of a state 
with ongoing border conflicts (Interview with Ali Rıza Alaboyun). 
The EU breached its own norms by admitting Greek Cypriots. The EU 
suffers from crisis when it undermines its own norms and values. The 
Euro-zone crisis is a remarkable example. The accession of the Greek 
Cyprus accelerated the eruption of the Euro-zone crisis (Interview with 
Ali Şahin).  
The EU’s Cyprus policy contradicts its own principles which favour 
pacta sunt servanda. The EU will be eventually forced to take a step 
forward concerning the Cyprus problem but it has already lost its 
credibility in our eyes (Interview with Canan Candemir Çelik). 
 
The government MPs also accuse the EU of failing to live up to its promises in return 
for Turkish Cypriot support to the Annan plan. According to Ercan Candan, the EU 
forgot its promises to conduct direct trade with Turkish Cypriots and grant financial 
assistance to Northern Cyprus in return for a yes vote in the referendum following the 
RoC accession. Abdullah Çalışkan contends that the EU did not remain loyal to its 
promises, because it lacked the will to embrace Turkish Cypriots. 
According to the government officials, the ambivalence of the EU’s Cyprus policy 
primarily stems from two main factors. First, the EU does not consider Turkish 
Cypriots and Greek Cypriots as equals and hence does not seek an equitable solution 
in the island: 
The EU’s Cyprus policy is wrong all along. The EU has never 
considered Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots as equal nations but 
treated Greek Cypriots as the owners of the island. This approach 
stands as an impediment to an equitable solution to the conflict. The 
EU should force the Greek Cyprus to make real efforts for a solution 
on the basis of the Annan plan. However, the EU has neither the 
capacity nor the willingness to do that (Interview with Ali Rıza 
Alaboyun).  
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The EU was not impartial in its approach to the Cyprus problem as it 
favoured Greek Cypriots by admitting them to the Union without 
precondition. The EU hence sabotaged a possible solution based on the 
Annan plan (Interview with Fatih Çiftçi) 
The EU has been treating Turkish Cypriots as minority and imposing 
its own terms on them. However, the EU must realize the fact that it is 
Greek Cypriots who oppose an equitable solution to the Cyprus 
conflict (Interview with Ali Şahin). 
The EU must put pressure on Greek Cypriots to seek for an equitable 
solution in the island but the EU does not seem to care about solving 
the Cyprus problem (Interview with Ahmet Berat Çonkar). 
 
The second determinant of the EU’s ambivalent approach toward the Cyprus problem 
is, according to the AKP officials, the EU’s unwillingness to accept Turkey’s EU 
membership. Many government MPs claim that the EU has been using the Cyprus 
problem as an excuse to deny Turkey’s accession. According to Afif Demirkıran, the 
EU is aware of its mistake in Cyprus but it never steps back, because there is no such 
will in the EU towards Turkey’s accession. Burak Erdenir argues that the Cyprus 
problem is just a pretext for the EU to keep Turkey out. He claims that even if the 
Cyprus conflict is settled, the EU will create other obstacles to deny Turkey’s 
membership. Ahmet Berat Çonkar argues that the EU can withdraw its Cyprus 
conditionality on Turkey if it really wants Turkey’s accession, but there is no such 
will in the EU. The lack of willingness within the EU towards Turkey’s accession has 
been highlighted by almost all the AKP respondents as the primary reason behind the 
EU’s controversial approach towards the Cyprus problem:  
The EU aimed to scare Turkey off by admitting Greek Cypriots. It has 
no intention to accept Turkey’s membership; the EU let Cyprus in with 
the motivation to keep Turkey out. If Turkey becomes an EU member, 
it will be much easier to solve the Cyprus problem (Interview with 
Ruhi Açıkgöz).   
The EU is not the right actor to solve the Cyprus problem. The conflict 
must be solved under the auspices of the UN. Besides, the Cyprus 
problem and Turkey’s EU membership are totally unrelated issues. 
The EU uses it as an excuse to prevent Turkey’s accession (Interview 
with Abdullah Çalışkan). 
Cyprus stands as an important obstacle against Turkey’s EU 
membership. France and Germany who oppose Turkey’s accession 
194 
 
wholeheartedly support this obstacle. That’s why Europe with 500 
million people has become the servant of a small island with 600 
thousand people (Interview with Burhan Kuzu).    
The EU jeopardizes its vital relations with Turkey, a major power for 
the sake of Cyprus, a small island. This is mainly because the EU is 
not governed rationally. Europe is still engulfed with conservatism and 
religious dogma which fuel public opposition against Turkey’s 
accession (Interview with Rıfat Sait). 
 
Overall, the AKP deputies find the EU’s Cyprus policy unfair and discriminatory. The 
EU is held responsible for the failure of the Annan plan and the lack of a solution on 
the island ever since. The AKP respondents unanimously emphasize that the EU has 
lost its credibility and they no longer consider the EU trustworthy. An overwhelming 
majority of the AKP officials reject the EU’s pressures on Turkey to open its harbours 
and airspace to the RoC, as they don’t believe that such an act will facilitate the 
solution of the Cyprus problem or Turkey’s EU membership. The respondents41 
mainly believe that even if Turkey complies with the EU’s Cyprus conditionality, the 
EU will never accept Turkey’s membership. This is a big step back from the AKP’s 
2006 efforts to convince the EU to lift its embargo in Northern Cyprus as a quid pro 
quo for opening the Turkish harbours and airspace to the RoC (Gülmez 2007: 135). 
This confirms the drastic change in the AKP discourse on Cyprus, reflecting an 
increasing distrust in the EU and the Greek Cypriot government. A shared belief 
among the government officials is that the RoC will make further demands for 
political concessions if Turkey opens its harbours and airspace to them 
unconditionally: 
Greek Cypriots don’t want to share the ruling mechanism of the 
Republic of Cyprus. They don’t consider Turkish Cypriots as equals 
but only as a minority. We don’t trust them. If we open our harbours 
and airspace, they will demand more concessions because they don’t 
want to reach a permanent solution. They are happy with the current 
stalemate (Interview with Ali Rıza Alaboyun).  
 
                                                          
41 Mehmet Erdoğan, Mücahit Fındıklı, Mehmet Durdu Kastal, Burak Erdenir, Tülin Erkal Kara, Pelin 
Gündeş Bakır, Abdullah Çalışkan, Mustafa Elitaş, Ahmet Berat Çonkar, Ruhi Açıkgöz, Ahmet Baha 
Öğütken, Bilal Macit and Ali Rıza Alaboyun explicitly stated this expression during the interviews. 
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Only a minority of the AKP officials still believe in the importance of establishing 
trade relations with the RoC: 
If opening harbours and airspace means the recognition of Cyprus, 
then I reject it. Nevertheless, there must be a middle ground which 
would enable Turkey to trade with Cyprus without necessarily 
recognizing the Cypriot government (Interview with Muzaffer Çakar). 
 
 
6.5. The CHP and Cyprus  
The Republican People’s Party (CHP) has long defended the traditional Cyprus policy 
of Turkey bolstering the survival of the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus (TRNC). Turkey’s ‘traditional’ Cyprus policy was actually invented by the 
CHP. It was founded by the CHP leaders Ismet Inönü who defied the US President 
Lyndon Johnson’s warnings over Cyprus in 1964 and Bülent Ecevit who gave the 
order for Turkish military intervention to Cyprus in 1974. Although in a different 
political party (Democratic Left Party - DSP), Ecevit later dismissed the Annan plan 
as a ‘trap’ for Turks, and Şükrü Sina Gürel, Foreign Minister in Ecevit’s cabinet 
threatened the EU that Turkey would be unified with Northern Cyprus, if the RoC 
became an EU member (Milliyet 2002). Therefore, despite its rhetorical support for 
EU membership, the CHP praises Cyprus as a ‘national cause’ and gives priority to it 
over Turkey’s EU accession.  
Deniz Baykal, the CHP leader between 1992 and 2010, wholeheartedly defended 
Turkey’s long established Cyprus policy and became a loyal supporter of the status 
quo in Cyprus. He criticized the association of Turkey’s EU membership bids with the 
solution of the Cyprus problem (Celep 2011: 429). As early as 2002, Baykal warned 
the AKP government about the perils of the RoC’s accession to the EU for Turkey. 
He claimed that this would grant the RoC crucial leverage to hamper Turkey’s EU bid 
(Baykal 2002). He opposed the Annan Plan on the grounds that the plan, if accepted, 
would eliminate the Turkish identity in Northern Cyprus relegating Turkish Cypriots 
to minority position and shatter the current bi-zonality which provided peace and 
security to the island for decades (Celep 2011: 429). Onur Öymen, the deputy leader 
of the party, claimed that the adoption of the Annan Plan was effectively ‘selling out’ 
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Cyprus and ‘losing it as the Ottomans lost Crete’ (Baudner 2012: 933). After the 
failure of the Annan plan, Baykal urged the AKP government to work for the 
international recognition of the TRNC.      
The CHP's sceptical stance towards the EU was exacerbated by the EU’s Cyprus 
conditionality. Baykal found it unfair that the EU pressurized Turkey to resolve the 
Cyprus problem while admitting the RoC without such precondition. He argued that 
the EU could ‘never convince Aristotle, Descartes or Goethe about such a double 
standard policy’ (Baykal 2002). Baykal also put strong pressure on Erdoğan not to 
sign the EU’s additional protocol that would lead to a ‘scandalous official recognition 
of the RoC’ by Turkey (Hürriyet 2005). He even claimed: 'if Turkey fails in its 
membership bids or is prevented by the EU from becoming a full member, this is not 
the end of the world' (ibid.). Onur Öymen criticized the informal EU rule (called the 
‘Luxembourg Rule’) which dictates that the EU supports a member country against a 
non-member no matter what (Öymen 2011). He claimed that the EU can never be 
impartial about the Cyprus problem unless both states compete on equal terms as EU 
members (ibid.). 
The new CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, although adopting pro-EU rhetoric, 
dismisses the EU's Cyprus conditionality as the EU’s ‘gravest mistake’ (Kılıçdaroğlu 
2010: 25). Like Baykal’s CHP, the new CHP firmly rejects the treatment of the 
Cyprus problem as an EU precondition for Turkey’s membership (CHP 2011a: 124). 
Kılıçdaroğlu supports a solution under the auspices of the UN which is based on the 
sovereign equality of two states under a federation similar to the Annan plan (CHP 
2011b). Otherwise, he insists that Turkey must invest its resources for the 
international recognition of the TRNC (ibid.). He considers the TRNC as an 
independent state having better democratic culture and human rights records than 
Turkey, and demands the EU to remain loyal to its promises and enable direct trade 
with the TRNC (Haber Kıbrıs 2013).  
Overall, the CHP until Kılıçdaroğlu long favoured the status quo in Cyprus and 
rejected the UN-led solution. It was often seen as reflecting an uncompromising and 
conservative (TAN) stance towards the EU-led reform process in Turkey. However, 
the leadership change revised the CHP’s ideological standing with a liberal (GAL) 
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agenda. Unlike Baykal, Kılıçdaroğlu supports a viable solution similar to the Annan 
Plan. Yet, despite such ideological shift from TAN to GAL, Kılıçdaroğlu’s CHP still 
refuses to comply with the EU’s conditions regarding the RoC, because it dismisses it 
as double standard. Besides, it defends the recognition of the TRNC as the second 
best option. It criticizes the EU’s Cyprus policy after the failure of the Annan plan as 
a major mistake and expects the EU to keep its promises to the TRNC. The CHP is 
still opposing the EU’s Cyprus condition even after a remarkable ideological shift in 
the party’s official rhetoric following the leadership change, because party officials 
continue to perceive the EU’s Cyprus approach as discriminatory, unfair and thus 
unacceptable. 
 
6.5.1. The views of the CHP Members of the Parliament  
The interview results indicate that the officials of the main opposition party CHP 
partly share the AKP’s views although there are remarkable differences as well. Both 
parties defend an equitable solution to the Cyprus problem respecting the will of 
Turkish Cypriots and blame the EU for its ambivalent approach which has proven 
detrimental to Turkey and Turkish Cypriots. Moreover, the CHP responses confirm 
that the leadership change from Baykal to Kılıçdaroğlu has not modified the CHP’s 
sceptical stance towards the EU’s Cyprus conditionality. The CHP deputies are 
largely divided over the reform of Turkey’s Cyprus policy.  
Just like the government, the CHP deputies support a long lasting peace in the island 
although divided over the future of the Turkish Cypriot community. An important 
number of party officials defend the international recognition of the TRNC reflecting 
the legacy of Baykal’s Cyprus policy. Almost half of the CHP respondents42 
emphasize the importance of maintaining bi-zonality and equal sovereignty of 
Turkish Cypriots urging the EU to recognize a two-state model in Cyprus:  
The only viable option for peace is the recognition of two separate 
authorities in the island. This is the worst nightmare of Greek 
Cypriots. If the EU endorses the possibility of recognizing the two-
state model in the island, this will force Greek Cypriots to make an 
                                                          
42 including Emre Köprülü, Osman Korutürk, Süheyl Batum, Orhan Düzgün, Ali İhsan Köktürk, 
Ramazan Kerim Özkan and Atilla Kart. 
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effort for a solution. Otherwise, in the current circumstances, it is 
extremely difficult to solve the Cyprus problem (Interview with 
Osman Korutürk). 
 
Correspondingly, the other half43 reflects a more liberal approach leaving the issue to 
the discretion of the Turkish Cypriots: 
Northern Cyprus must take its own decisions. If they want a single 
state, that’s fine for us as long as the rights and freedoms of Turkish 
Cypriots are guaranteed. If they want the existing two-states model, 
that’s fine as well (Interview with Erdal Aksünger).      
 
On the other hand, CHP officials reflect a more unified image while talking about the 
EU’s approach towards the Cyprus problem. They primarily consider the EU’s 
Cyprus policy as double-standard which protects Greek Cypriots and isolates the 
Turkish Cypriots: 
The EU’s approach towards the Cyprus problem is double-standard 
because it ignores the pre-1974 period in Cyprus and pretends the 
Turkish Cypriot people had not suffered from the Greek Cypriot 
oppression before the Turkish military intervention in 1974. The EU 
embraces the Greek Cypriot stance mainly due to the fact that Greece 
as an EU member puts pressures on the EU. The EU’s impositions on 
Turkey are unacceptable (Interview with Ali İhsan Köktürk). 
We regret to see that Turkish Cypriots have been further marginalized 
after the EU membership of Cyprus although they had made 
considerable efforts to solve the Cyprus conflict by accepting the 
Annan plan in the referendum. Conversely, Greek Cypriots were 
awarded with EU membership although they had rejected the Annan 
plan. This shows the EU’s double-standard (Interview with Ramazan 
Kerim Özkan). 
The EU lost its credibility after the failure of the Annan plan. The EU 
itself defended the plan but awarded the Greek Cypriots who had 
rejected it and further marginalized Turkish Cypriots who had 
embraced it. I no longer trust the EU concerning the Cyprus problem 
(Interview with Orhan Düzgün). 
 
                                                          
43 including Erdal Aksünger, Gülsün Bilgehan, İzzet Çetin, Faruk Loğoğlu, Kemal Ekinci and Aykan 
Aydemir. 
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Similar to the AKP officials, the CHP respondents also blame the EU for failing to 
remain loyal to its promises after the referendum: 
The EU did not keep any promises after the 2004 referendum. 
Essentially, the EU adopted an ambivalent approach towards Cyprus 
as it never reflected a solid stance to put pressure on Greek Cyprus 
which turned out to be the real obstacle against a solution based on the 
Annan plan (Interview with Faruk Loğoğlu).   
 
Another common argument shared by the CHP officials is that the real obstacle for 
peace in the island is the EU’s failure to prevent the Greek Cypriot government from 
abusing its position as an EU member and challenging both Turkish Cypriot and 
Turkish interests: 
The EU’s Cyprus policy was a failure and the EU officials admit it. 
The EU long believed that Turkish Cypriot leadership was the main 
stumbling block against solution. However, the real problem turned 
out to be the Greek Cypriot leadership. The EU could have adopted a 
different approach by granting a semi-membership status to Greek 
Cyprus conditioning the full membership on the solution of the Cyprus 
problem. Until then, the EU could have denied political rights to Greek 
Cypriots such as veto power, while recognizing all other economic and 
social rights gained through accession (Interview with Osman 
Korutürk).  
The conflicting agendas of Turkey and Greece resulted in such a crisis 
in the island. Turkey actually adopts a solution under the auspices of 
the UN, but Greeks and Greek Cypriots have been abusing the 
leverage of EU membership by pressurizing the EU to extract 
concession from Turkey (Interview with Kemal Ekinci).  
The results of the referenda reflect the fact that if there is a reasonable 
plan to bring peace to the island, Turkish Cypriots will accept it; but 
the real problem is to convince the Greek Cypriots. The EU must draw 
lessons from its mistakes (Interview with Faruk Loğoğlu). 
 
On the other hand, the CHP responses diverge from those of the AKP deputies on 
several points. First, the respondents not only blame the EU and the Greek Cypriot 
administration but also accuse the AKP government for failing to govern the Cyprus 
peace process in Turkey’s favour:  
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The AKP government thought that the Annan plan would facilitate the 
solution but the AKP failed to see that the Annan plan only limited the 
policy options of Turkey towards Cyprus and the result of the 
referenda in the island further catalyzed the division of Cyprus. Today, 
it is almost impossible to find an equitable solution to the Cyprus 
problem. Therefore, not only the EU but also the AKP government is 
equally responsible for this stalemate. Self-criticism and a new 
approach for a solution are necessary in both sides (Interview with 
Atilla Kart).  
 
The CHP officials also hold the AKP government responsible for the curtailment of 
Turkey’s accession negotiations following the AKP government’s failure to formulate 
a viable policy to avoid the ‘additional protocol crisis’ with the RoC:  
The EU deceived the AKP government when Turkey signed the 
additional protocol. The EU officials assured the AKP that Turkey’s 
signature would not constitute a formal recognition of Cyprus but they 
later rejected the AKP’s declaration following the signature of the 
protocol. The AKP should have had a written guarantee from the EU 
before signing the protocol. We don’t want to be deceived by the EU 
again (Interview with Süheyl Batum). 
It was evident that the signature of the additional protocol would prove 
problematic and would bar Turkey’s path for EU membership but the 
government did not listen to our warnings. Now, not only the Cyprus 
problem has become unsolvable but also Turkey’s prospects for EU 
membership have been lost (Interview with Gülsün Bilgehan). 
 
Unlike the AKP officials, the CHP deputies do not entirely shut the door to the EU 
and the RoC. Accordingly, half of the CHP respondents44 do not dismiss the idea of 
opening borders to the RoC. Some CHP officials essentially demand an official 
guarantee from the EU that such an act does not constitute the recognition of the RoC 
and require the lifting of international economic, political and social embargoes in 
Northern Cyprus:  
It is not a problem for Turkey to open its harbours and airspace to 
Greek Cypriots. It is actually advantageous for Turkey as it will most 
probably render Greek Cypriots economically dependent on Turkey. 
However, in return, Greek Cypriots must sign a direct trade protocol 
                                                          
44 including Ramazan Kerim Özkan, Gülsün Bilgehan, Burak Erdenir, Osman Korutürk, İzzet Çetin, 
Faruk Loğoğlu, Süheyl Batum. 
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that allows Turkish Cypriots to trade with the rest of the world freely 
(Interview with Osman Korutürk). 
Turkey must open its harbours and airspace to Greek Cyprus. 
However, the EU must give Turkey an official guarantee that this does 
not mean the recognition of the RoC (Interview with Süheyl Batum). 
 
Some CHP deputies reflect even a more liberal stance claiming that if it truly wants to 
become an EU member Turkey must fulfil the EU’s Cyprus conditionality without 
any reservation: 
Turkey must fulfil all its obligations arising out of its EU candidacy. 
The EU’s condition for Turkey to open its harbours and airspace to 
Cyprus is one of these obligations and the Turkish government must 
fulfil it (Interview with Faruk Loğoğlu). 
If you would like to become an EU member, you must fulfil your 
obligations arising out of membership conditionality. The EU’s 
Cyprus conditionality is one of such obligations Turkey must fulfil if it 
wants to become a member. If the equal treatment of all EU members 
is one of the accession criteria, then Turkey cannot turn a blind eye to 
the EU’s demands regarding Cyprus, an EU member (Interview with 
İzzet Çetin). 
Had Turkey fulfilled all other membership obligations and had the 
Cyprus problem remained the only obstacle against Turkey’s EU 
accession, it would make sense to negotiate whether to open our 
harbours and airspace to the RoC. However, Turkey still has so much 
to do for membership. Nevertheless, social democratic principles 
dictate that Turkey must use all its resources to successfully finish the 
EU accession negotiations. Turkey must keep all its communication 
channels open for the EU and must always be ready for a compromise. 
This does not mean ‘concession’; it means a ‘reciprocal 
understanding’ (Interview with Burak Erdenir). 
 
On the other hand, the split within the party is remarkable in this issue since the other 
half of the respondents45 reject such an act as it will mean the recognition of the 
Republic of Cyprus and further isolate Turkish Cypriots: 
Even if the EU guarantees Turkish accession, Turkey should not open 
its airspace and harbours to Greek Cypriots in return, because such an 
                                                          
45 including Emre Köprülü, Atilla Kart, Erdal Aksünger, Ali İhsan Köktürk, Ömer Süha Aldan and 
Orhan Düzgün. 
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act constitutes de facto recognition of Greek Cypriots as the main 
rulers of the island. This is contrary to Turkey’s Cyprus policy which 
demands equal rights for Turkish Cypriots. Therefore, I reject any 
external impositions on Turkey to leave aside its long established 
Cyprus policy (Interview with Ali İhsan Köktürk).    
 
However, unlike the AKP officials, the CHP respondents who refuse the opening of 
harbours to Greek Cypriots do not justify their opposition with the lack of trust 
towards the EU. The AKP deputies primarily reject it because they do not believe that 
the EU will give any guarantee for Turkish accession in return. The CHP deputies 
reject it even if the EU guarantees accession because they essentially see the Cyprus 
problem as a ‘national cause’ completely different from Turkey’s EU membership. 
An official even dismisses the opening of harbours as an act of treason and the 
selling-out of Cyprus (Interview with Emre Köprülü).  
 
6.6. The MHP and Cyprus  
The far-right nationalist MHP sees the Cyprus problem as a ‘national cause’ and 
Turkey’s internal matter (KKTC Medya 2013). Rather than establishing peace under 
the auspices of the UN or the EU, the MHP favours a revisionist solution: Northern 
Cyprus will either remain as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) or 
become Turkey’s 82nd city (MHP 2003: 37). The party has always been against the 
linkage between the solution of the problem and Turkey’s EU accession, and treated 
them as separate matters for Turkey. During its term in government between 1999 and 
2002, party  officials firmly denied giving any ‘concessions’ to Greek Cypriots in 
return for Turkey’s EU membership (Yeni Şafak 2001). Moreover, the possibility of 
Cypriot accession to the EU was condemned by party officials as ‘an attempt to 
complete the Greek Megali Idea and to turn Cyprus into yet another Crete cleansed of 
its Muslim Turkish heritage’ (Canefe and Bora 2003: 129). Overall, the MHP acted as 
a steadfast guardian of the TRNC within the Turkish government (Tank 2002). Party 
officials even threatened to leave the coalition had the Turkish government decided to 
make concessions on the Cyprus issue (Loizides 2002: 441).  
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The MHP’s hard-line stance over the Cyprus problem did not lose momentum after 
the party was relegated to opposition following the AKP’s landslide electoral 
victories. The MHP stood against any compromise on the Cyprus problem despite the 
fact that the problem itself became a major stumbling block against Turkish EU 
accession (Öniş 2003: 45). Party officials firmly dismissed the Annan plan as ‘the 
destruction of Cypriot Turkishness under the name of political solution’ (Yanık 2012: 
223). They alleged that the plan threatened the future of Turkish Cypriot community 
relegating them to minority, and accused the AKP government of sacrificing Cyprus 
for the sake of EU membership (Avcı 2011b: 443). The party leader Devlet Bahçeli 
charged the AKP with forcing Turkish Cypriots to say ‘Yes’ in the referendum on the 
Annan Plan and declaring war against the Turkish Cypriot Leader, Rauf Denktaş, who 
opposed the Annan plan (Bahçeli 2004). The failure of the Annan plan was welcomed 
by the MHP as a ‘blessing’ for the future of the TRNC (MHP 2009: 2).    
The party also targeted the EU as the main obstacle in front of an equitable solution 
on the island. It accused the EU of destroying the prospects for the resolution of the 
Cyprus conflict by accepting the membership of the RoC (MHP 2003: 18). In its 
opinion, the EU membership of the RoC enabled Greece and Cyprus to achieve their 
long anticipated ideal of enosis (MHP 2003: 9). Furthermore, the MHP blamed the 
EU for having ‘deceived’ the Turkish Cypriot community. Party officials argued that 
the EU had promised to lift economic restrictions to Northern Cyprus in return for a 
‘yes’ vote in the Annan referendum, but not only did the EU not keep its promise but 
it also managed to place the solution of the Cyprus problem as an official precondition 
for Turkish accession (MHP 2009: 2). The MHP particularly charged the AKP 
government with surrendering to the EU’s demands and shattering the long 
established Cyprus policy of Turkey.  Party officials claimed that the government had 
extended a de facto recognition to the RoC as the representative of the entire island by 
signing the EU’s additional protocol (ibid.). They depict the AKP government’s offer 
to open harbours and airspace in return for the lifting of isolations in Northern 
Cyprus, as ‘treason’. Mehmet Şandır, the deputy leader of the party claimed that by 
making such offers the AKP had ‘sold out Cyprus and accepted Enosis’ (Hürriyet 
2006b).  
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The MHP currently perceives the EU's Cyprus conditionality as the major obstacle for 
Turkey's membership. The official reports of the MHP about Turkey’s EU policy 
claim that EU accession was strictly conditional upon the recognition of the RoC 
(MHP 2009: 7). It is argued that the EU primarily uses membership as a 
‘blackmailing device’ to force Turkey to officially recognize the RoC, withdraw its 
troops from the island and accept NATO membership of the RoC (MHP 2003). The 
MHP declares that it attaches greater importance to the independence of Turkish 
Cypriots under the TRNC than Turkey’s EU accession (MHP 2003: 37). Overall, the 
MHP’s hard-line policy over Cyprus persists as its far-right nationalism remains 
intact. Labelling any attempts for a compromise on the island as an act of treason, the 
MHP justifies its uncompromising policy with the EU’s discriminatory approach in 
the Cyprus problem. In this case, its ideological standpoint constitutes the main 
driving force behind the MHP’s Cyprus agenda and the EU’s ambivalence over 
Cyprus consolidates this hard-line stance.     
 
6.6.1. The views of MHP members of the Parliament 
The interviews conducted with MHP deputies hold parallel to the official discourse of 
the party. Party officials essentially embrace Cyprus as the national cause of Turkey, 
highlight the importance of the TRNC’s survival and stand against the EU’s Cyprus 
conditionality. Similar to both the CHP and the AKP, the EU’s Cyprus policy is 
criticized by MHP officials46 as double-standard and the Greek Cypriot nationalistic 
stances are framed as the real obstacle in front of a solution on the island. In support 
of AKP officials, the MHP deputies also emphasize that the EU has lost its legitimacy 
in Cyprus: 
The EU has lost its power and harmony. From now on, what the EU 
dictates about the Cyprus problem is unimportant. As long as Turkey 
remains strong, the EU will have to adjust itself to what Turkey says 
about Cyprus. Not the other way around (Interview with Lütfü 
Türkkan). 
The EU’s Cyprus policy is unacceptable because instead of 
pressurizing Greek Cyprus to make an effort for a solution, the EU 
                                                          
46 Zuhal Topçu, Sümer Oral, Nevzat Korkmaz and Lütfü Türkkan explicitly denounced the EU’s 
Cyprus policy as double standard and unacceptable.  
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acts as if Turkey is the main stumbling block against the solution of 
the Cyprus problem. Therefore, the EU is not to be trusted (Interview 
Zuhal Topçu). 
 
Different from the AKP and the CHP, there is a consensus among the MHP 
respondents towards the necessity to maintain a two-state model in the island. Party 
officials believe that the EU must abide by a two-state system in Cyprus if it really 
wants a long lasting solution: 
We believe that Turkey should never give concessions to Greek 
Cyprus. Turkey has done its best to contribute to a solution but the 
current stalemate primarily stems from Greek Cypriots. From now on, 
the only viable strategy for Turkey is to work for the international 
recognition of the TRNC’s statehood (Interview Zuhal Topçu).  
The EU must accept that there are two equal nations and states in 
Cyprus. After the proclamation of the TRNC in 1983, violence ended 
and peace prevailed in the island. Unless the EU admits this reality and 
endorses the equality of the two nations, its Cyprus policy is doomed 
to failure (Interview with Nevzat Korkmaz). 
 
Moreover, the MHP officials seem to have lost their faith and patience for an 
equitable solution since they suggest radical action for Turkey to secure its own 
interests: 
Turkey must immediately find a solution to the Cyprus problem, it is a 
bleeding wound. The world does not officially recognize the TRNC. 
Besides, the Turkish military presence is not appreciated by Turkish 
Cypriots. Therefore, there are two options: Whether Turkey will leave 
the island alone or make the Northern Cyprus its 82nd city (Interview 
with Lütfü Türkkan).           
 
Finally, party officials strongly oppose the EU’s demands for Turkey to open its 
airspace and harbours to the Republic of Cyprus: 
Even if the EU guarantees accession, Turkey should not open its 
harbours to Greek Cyprus because we can never be sure whether the 
EU will remain loyal to its promise. The EU must make serious efforts 
to regain its credibility in our eyes before asking for concessions 
(Interview Zuhal Topçu). 
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6.7. Conclusion 
Overall, the EU’s country-specific conditionality arising out of a bilateral conflict 
between a candidate and a member state, results in intensive Euroscepticism in the 
candidate country. Political parties defy external pressures since the bilateral conflict 
is considered as a national cause by the public, and hence compliance proves too 
costly for governments. Moreover, the veto power of EU member states grants them a 
crucial leverage over the bilateral issue and forces the EU to introduce additional 
preconditions for accession. Therefore, candidates feel discriminated by the EU’s 
extra conditions which jeopardize their own accession process. The name issue 
between Macedonia and Greece, the maritime border dispute between Croatia and 
Slovenia, and finally the issue of the Beneš decrees between the Czech Republic and 
Germany triggered nationwide Euroscepticism. All major political actors in those 
candidate countries regardless of their ideology resisted the EU’s country-specific 
pressures in an attempt to protect national interests.   
Similarly, the EU’s Cyprus conditionality attracts strong negative reaction from all 
major political parties in Turkey. The CHP and the MHP perceive the Cyprus problem 
as the ‘red line’ of Turkish foreign policy, having priority over EU accession. Even 
the leadership change in the CHP didn’t have much of an effect in the CHP’s Cyprus 
policy. Although the CHP’s new leader Kılıçdaroğlu voices his desire for a long 
lasting solution under the auspices of the UN, he refuses to comply with the EU’s 
Cyprus conditionality since he does not trust the EU’s impartiality over the Cyprus 
problem. The AKP’s initial attempts to de-emphasize the traditional ‘red line’ thesis 
with its support for a united Cyprus failed after the Greek Cypriot rejection of the 
Annan Plan and the EU’s additional Cyprus conditionality on Turkey. The AKP 
abandoned its reformist stance and joined the opposition parties in condemning the 
double-standards of the EU following the suspension of the accession negotiations in 
2006. The major Turkish political parties blame the EU for shattering the hopes for a 
peaceful solution in the island, and dismiss the EU’s Cyprus conditionality as a 
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deviation from global standards that attach a primary role to the United Nations in the 
resolution of such international conflicts as Cyprus (Buhari-Gülmez 2012: 83).  
In order to control for political ideology in explaining domestic responses to the EU’s 
country-specific (Cyprus) conditionality, the views of the Democratic Society Party 
(BDP) have been examined as well. The BDP's stance on Cyprus is highly distinct. 
The BDP perceives both Turkey and the EU as imperial forces threatening the 
freedom of Cyprus and preventing the peaceful co-existence of the two Cypriot 
communities (Interview with Yüksel Mutlu). Sırrı Süreyya Önder, the BDP deputy for 
Istanbul, argues that the TRNC is not a legitimate state but a ‘puppet’ of Turkey 
(Radikal 2012b). Ertuğrul Kürkçü, the BDP deputy for Mersin, depicts Turkey's 
military presence on the island as 'invasion' (Radikal 2011). He believes that every 
Turkish Cypriot wants the Turkish army out of the island (ibid.). These statements 
confirm the ‘anti-establishment’ nature of the party’s policy understanding. 
Nevertheless, the BDP joins the other Turkish parties in dismissing the EU’s decision 
to admit the RoC as an unacceptable double-standard that has further alienated the 
Turkish Cypriots (TBMM 2012c). Party officials also blame the EU for using the 
Cyprus conflict as a ‘blackmailing device’ against Turkey (ibid.). This example 
substantiates the fact that dissimilar political actors give similar Eurosceptic responses 
in Turkey if they believe the EU treats their country unfairly. 
Similarly, the interviews confirm the argument that the government and the 
opposition in Turkey are unified in their criticism of the EU’s Cyprus policy. They 
consider the EU’s Cyprus conditionality as double standard and unfair for both 
Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community. The Greek Cypriot administration is 
equally held responsible for preventing a solution on the island and barring Turkey’s 
EU accession. In particular, officials of both the AKP and the MHP seem to have lost 
hope for an equitable solution on the island. They have also lost their faith in the 
EU’s capability and willingness to solve the problem. The EU is no longer considered 
credible and trustworthy. Accordingly, almost all of the respondents from the AKP 
and the MHP reject the EU’s conditionality on Turkey to open its harbours and 
airspace to the RoC. In their opinion, Turkey’s compliance with this condition won’t 
help Turkey become an EU member or solve the problems of the Turkish Cypriots. 
What is equally striking is that the government MPs essentially associate the lack of a 
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solution in the Cyprus problem with the EU’s reluctance to accept Turkey’s EU 
membership. Accordingly, the EU is discriminatory in its Cyprus policy, because the 
continuation of the Cyprus problem is likely to delay, if not prevent Turkey’s EU 
accession.    
On the other hand, the CHP deputies are less unified but also less pessimistic in their 
responses. There is a clear split within the party over the Cyprus problem. The 
leadership change created such a divide since it gave voice to liberal thoughts within 
the party but did not erase nationalist elements. The reformist wing of the CHP 
reflects a far more liberal approach towards the EU’s Cyprus conditionality in 
comparison with other parties. Accordingly, a half of the CHP respondents fuels 
optimism for Turkey-EU relations with respect to the Cyprus problem since they 
deem it necessary for Turkey to open its harbours and airspace to the RoC if it truly 
wants to be an EU member. A number of CHP deputies call for Turkey to comply 
with the EU’s Cyprus conditionality without reservation. This is a remarkable split 
from Kılıçdaroğlu’s own policy stance to resist the EU’s Cyprus conditionality. On 
the other hand, the remaining half of the CHP informants stick to the old guard 
rhetoric of the Baykal leadership which defends Turkey’s pro-status quo policy. They 
consider the Cyprus problem as a national cause and dismiss any effort for a 
compromise as ‘selling out’ Cyprus. The split within the party over the Cyprus 
problem shows that the CHP is not yet detached from nationalist (TAN) ideology, 
although the Kılıçdaroğlu leadership aspires for a liberal (GAL) turn within the party. 
Actually, almost none of the CHP respondents entirely share the official stance of 
Kılıçdaroğlu’s CHP. The views of the liberal wing are far more liberal than the 
Cyprus stance of Kılıçdaroğlu, while the conservative wing rather reflects Baykal’s 
views. The Cyprus stance of conservative CHP respondents is very much close to the 
nationalist (TAN) rhetoric of the MHP deputies which opposes any compromise in 
Turkey’s traditional Cyprus policy, even if the EU guarantees full membership in 
return. They both insist on maintaining the two-state model on the island and embrace 
a zero-sum game rhetoric in line with the Sèvres Syndrome provoking Turkish 
establishment to fear foreign plots. The MHP officials go even further and offer a 
unilateral solution to the problem by either abandoning Cyprus or annexing Northern 
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Cyprus reflecting the MHP’s nationalist motto ‘either love it or leave it’ (Ya sev ya 
terk et, in Turkish).   
The main reason for the oppositional stance in the AKP is actually different in 
comparison with the MHP and the nationalist wing of the CHP, since the AKP 
officials do not consider the Cyprus problem as a national cause to protect against 
foreign powers but a problem to be solved by any means necessary. However, they 
oppose the EU’s Cyprus conditionality, since they no longer trust the EU’s 
willingness to solve the problem and accept Turkish accession. This confirms the 
hypotheses of the study that the country-specific conditions of the EU draw 
Euroscepticism from all segments of domestic politics rendering the government-
opposition positioning and the ideological differences less important. This is 
essentially due to the generalized perception of the EU’s conditions as discriminatory 
and detrimental to Turkey’s membership prospects. Examples derived from other 
candidate countries (Macedonia, Croatia and the Czech Republic) and the Turkish 
case, demonstrate similar tendencies: all major political parties resisted the EU’s 
country-specific conditionality since it was not only too costly to give up a ‘national 
cause’ for the sake of accession but also political actors felt increasingly 
discriminated against by the EU.  
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CHAPTER VII 
TURKISH POLITICAL PERCEPTIONS OF 
RISING TURKEY-SCEPTICISM IN THE EU 
 
This study has so far discussed the reactions of mainstream political parties in Turkey 
against two types of EU membership conditionality: issue-specific and country-
specific. Eurosceptic political stances in candidate countries mainly result from the 
uncertainty of the EU accession process. Concerning the EU’s issue-specific 
conditionality, political actors resist the uncertainty of the terms of EU accession. As 
discussed previously, parties oppose certain EU-led reforms that are perceived as 
unilaterally dictated by the EU in a top-down manner. They rather desire membership 
in their own terms. They resist because they cannot be certain under what conditions 
they will be admitted to the EU. That’s why certain political groups oppose the 
reforms of minority rights and foreign land ownership as they don’t desire EU 
accession by giving ‘concessions’ to the EU in those areas deemed important for 
national wealth, security and sovereignty.  
On the other hand, the EU’s country-specific conditionality generates profound 
uncertainty as it is usually based on a bilateral conflict with an EU member that 
jeopardizes the accession process. Political actors of the candidate country in question 
become increasingly reluctant towards EU membership, because the EU’s country-
specific conditionality threatens to suspend membership unless they comply with the 
EU’s terms. For instance, the failure to comply with the EU’s Cyprus conditionality 
has directly stalled Turkey’s accession. Turkish political actors resist this 
conditionality since they are reluctant to trade their ‘national cause’ with EU 
membership. The dissipation of uncertainty arising out of the EU’s country-specific 
conditionality is essentially contingent on the solution of the bilateral problem in 
question. For instance, Croatia’s membership perspective has become clear only after 
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Croatia and Slovenia agreed on a joint plan to solve their bilateral problem in 
compliance with the EU. However, in the Turkish case, domestic political actors 
strongly believe that the uncertainty over EU membership will not dissipate even if 
they comply with the EU’s Cyprus conditionality. The expressions in the EU’s 
official documents such as absorption capacity, the anti-Turkish membership rhetoric 
of certain European statesmen and the curtailment of the accession negotiations have 
contributed to the development of a strong conviction among Turkish political elites 
that the EU does not desire Turkish accession.  
Unlike the case of Croatia whose compliance with the EU’s additional conditionality 
deriving from its conflict with Slovenia sufficed to continue its accession process, the 
uncertainty towards Turkey’s EU membership is rather diffuse and multipronged; it 
thus creates a perception that even though Turkey complies with the EU’s accession 
criteria (including the country-specific ones), the EU will never accept its 
membership.  
This research does not claim that the EU is in any sense opposed to Turkish accession 
as if it was a unitary bloc. It rather argues that certain developments in Turkey-EU 
relations in the last decade have contributed to the burgeoning of such a perception in 
Turkey. Perceptions ‘matter’ in the Turkish context since they have contributed to the 
shift in the Turkish political discourses and actions towards scepticism against the 
EU. It is thus necessary to discuss how the burgeoning Turkish perception about the 
EU -that the EU fell prey to far-right nationalism, xenophobia, Islamophobia and 
‘Turkey-sceptic’ elements- feeds into Euroscepticism in Turkey. With this motivation, 
the chapter will first explain the main elements and developments that have resulted 
in severe criticisms against the EU in Turkey and have led over time to the spread of 
the perception that the EU would never admit Turkey’s membership. Secondly, the 
chapter will examine party programmes, public statements and parliamentary 
speeches of party officials to demonstrate that widespread perception of Europe as 
‘Turkey-sceptic’ is strongly reflected in Turkish elites’ political discourses. The 
chapter will then discuss the findings of the interviews conducted with Turkish 
parliamentarians which seek to find out to what extent the perception concerning the 
EU’s reluctance towards Turkey’s accession is shared by party officials. Overall, it 
finds that Turkish political elites strongly believe in the existence of reluctance within 
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the EU over Turkish accession, and this diminishes their enthusiasm for membership. 
Regardless of whether they are in government or in opposition, Turkish political 
parties from different ideological backgrounds highlight the lack of will in the EU 
towards Turkey’s accession.  
Nevertheless, the study argues that this negative perception of the EU stands as an 
important, yet insufficient factor behind the rising Euroscepticism in Turkish politics 
today, because it fails to explain why the AKP government continued the reform 
process during 2002 and 2006 even though the Turkish claims against the EU’s 
reluctance towards Turkish membership were already present. It was the rising 
uncertainty of membership prospects after the suspension of the negotiations in 2006 
which altered the EU policy of the AKP government, diminishing its EU-enthusiasm 
and emphasizing the EU’s reluctance or undecidedness towards Turkish accession as 
the main reason behind the current stalemate in bilateral relations.  
 
7.1. Main determinants of Turkish perceptions towards the EU 
During the initial years of the AKP government (2002-2004), Turkey–EU relations 
gained momentum and Turkey’s EU accession process became progressive. Yet, 
certain expressions in the European Commission’s progress reports and the 
negotiating framework document were interpreted by Turks as detrimental to 
Turkey’s membership prospects. The opposition highlighted the danger those 
expressions would bring to Turkey’s European bid. For instance, the phrase ‘open-
ended process’ suggests that the accession negotiations do not guarantee an automatic 
membership to Turkey. According to Sedelmeier (2010: 424), this is a clear break 
away from the EU’s previous enlargement policy and generates a notion that the EU 
will not grant accession even if Turkey meets the conditions. Moreover, the insertion 
of ‘absorption capacity’ as an implicit additional criteria for the EU’s new 
enlargement waves indicates that even if Turkey meets all the conditions, the EU can 
still say no to full membership based on its institutional, political, economic, social 
and cultural dynamics (Emerson et al 2006: 3). Absorption capacity highlights ‘the 
empirical and ‘objective’ limits to what current EU structures can accommodate and 
suggests that these limits have been or are close to being reached’ (Vibert 2006: 2). 
213 
 
Plus, the introduction of ‘long transition periods, derogations, specific arrangements 
or permanent safeguard clauses’ concerning freedom of movement of persons, 
structural policies or agriculture in the negotiating framework document implies that 
such freedoms might be permanently prohibited to Turkey even if it becomes an EU 
member. Permanent safeguards have no precedent in the history of enlargement. The 
EU’s common practice is the transitional arrangements up to 7 years while the EU 
adopted these permanent arrangements only for Turkey (Kirişçi 2004: 91). These 
terms were interpreted by Turks as symptoms indicating the EU’s growing reluctance 
to grant full membership to Turkey (Öniş 2008: 41).  
The reluctance within the EU over Turkish accession has been largely associated with 
the rising Islamophobia and right wing politics in Europe (Bunzl 2005; Özyürek 2005; 
Canan-Sokullu 2011). Depicting the European concerns over Turkey’s EU accession 
as ‘by far the most crucial aspect of Islamophobia’, Bunzl (2005: 505) explains how 
Turkey’s EU membership aspirations set in motion a series of political campaigns 
against Turkish accession in several EU member states, and far right political parties 
enjoyed a fertile ground to gain electoral success in, for instance, France and Austria. 
The argument that ‘Islam is external and even antithetical to the culture of the EU’ 
has been increasingly defended by right wing political actors in Europe to reject 
Turkey’s membership (Özyürek 2005: 509). The former French President, Nicolas 
Sarkozy, and German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, shared concern that Turkey’s 
‘inclusion would permanently disrupt the cultural harmony among the European 
populations, bringing an end to all their attempts to build a united and strong 
‘European state’’ (Yılmaz 2007: 305). The President of the EU, Herman Van 
Rompuy, highlighted the same concern when he claimed; ‘the universal values which 
are in force in Europe, and which are also fundamental values of Christianity, will 
lose vigour with the entry of a large Islamic country such as Turkey’ (Barber 2009). 
Likewise, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, Former French President warned about the ‘end 
of Europe’ in case of Turkish membership. ‘Privileged partnership’, as an alternative 
to membership, has been particularly supported by right wing political elites in 
Germany, France and Austria (İçener 2007: 421-422). Those elites have also been 
vetoing the implementation of a visa liberalisation regime for Turkey. That’s why 
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Turkey remains the only EU candidate whose citizens are required to have a 
Schengen visa for visiting the EU (Bürgin 2012: 884).  
The campaign against Turkish accession has become a strong electoral strategy for 
right wing political actors in Western Europe since it resonates well with public 
opinion. Recent studies indicate a clear public opposition to Turkey’s membership 
(Canan-Sokullu 2011). There is a burgeoning fear in the European public that 
‘Islamisation of Europe’ will most likely ‘come about through Turkey’s EU 
membership’ (Canan-Sokullu 2011: 484). Besides, the failure of Turkish immigrants 
to be integrated into European countries damages the image of Turkey and plays a 
determining role behind the public resenment towards Turkish accession (McLaren 
2007). In Western European countries, Turkish immigrants are still perceived as 
foreigners (Spruyt and Elchardus 2012: 806). Consequently, propaganda against 
Turkey’s EU membership promises to secure a crucial electoral base in European 
countries such as France, Austria and Germany that are host to a significant number 
of Turkish immigrants. Such campaigns are run, for instance, by almost all political 
parties in Austrian national elections (Bunzl 2005: 506). Opposition to Turkish 
accession was also the most popular election strategy used by right wing parties 
during the 2004 European elections (ibid.).  
This has led to the emergence of a new concept, ‘Turkey-scepticism’ to emphasize the 
EU’s reluctance towards Turkey’s accession which was not only about the EU’s 
‘enlargement fatigue’47 but also about Turkey’s social and cultural differences 
(Güneş-Ayata 2003; Canan-Sokullu 2011). However, it is too far-fetched to claim that 
the EU as a unified bloc opposes Turkey’s accession. Additional conditions in the EU 
documents for Turkey, rising Islamophobia in Europe, public distaste for Turkish 
immigrants and the right wing propaganda against Turkey’s EU entry don’t prove the 
existence of Turkey-scepticism in the EU. Yet they still contribute to the 
crystallization of a perception in the Turkish political elite that Europe is Turkey-
sceptic. The suspension of eight negotiation chapters by the EU along with the French 
blockade on five other chapters not only led to a deadlock in Turkey’s EU accession 
                                                          
47 A general post-accession reticence within the EU towards further widening in favour of a greater 
focus on deepening integration across Member States. For detail, see Szołucha (2010).  
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process, but further strengthened the Turkish perception that the EU was ‘dragging its 
feet’ to delay, if not impede Turkey’s membership.  
 
7.2. The EU’s ‘perceived’ reluctance for Turkish accession and Responses of 
Turkish Political Elite   
This section discusses how the EU’s ‘reluctance’ towards Turkish accession resonates 
within Turkish political parties and how it affects their EU policy. Following the 
suspension of the accession negotiations in particular, Turkish political parties (the 
AKP government especially) have shared the concern that the EU does not want 
Turkish accession and hence that it will never accept Turkey’s membership.    
 
7.2.1. The AKP government: from indifference to strong criticism 
Pioneering the legislation of several ‘harmonization packages’ soon after forming 
single-party government in Turkey, the AKP devoted much energy to complying with 
the Copenhagen criteria. Its advances towards steady economic development and 
improved democratization triggered the golden age of Turkey–EU relations resulting 
in the initiation of accession negotiations (Öniş 2008: 38). However, suspension of the 
accession negotiations with Turkey in 2006 was a decisive moment for the AKP’s EU 
policy. While previously refraining from any criticism against the EU, AKP officials 
adopted a highly critical approach to the EU. Prime Minister and party leader, Tayyip 
Erdoğan, on several occasions criticized the EU’s lack of decisiveness towards 
Turkey. Arguing that the 10 new EU members were comparably in a much lower 
status than Turkey both in terms of democratic and economic development, Erdoğan 
claimed that the EU admitted the latter rather than Turkey for political reasons 
(NTVMSNBC 2010). He asserts that there are particular political motivations behind 
the opposition to Turkey’s membership within the EU, such as Turkey’s young and 
huge population, Muslim identity, proximity to conflict areas such as the Middle East 
and great economic potential to constitute a strong rival to major EU member states 
(ibid.). Claiming that the EU had been dragging its feet over Turkey for more than 50 
years, Erdoğan demanded EU officials clearly announce whether or not they really 
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intended to let Turkey in (Hürriyet 2011a). Erdoğan threatened the EU by stating that 
although they had been patiently working for membership for so long, their patience 
had its limits (ibid.). He argued that no other candidate country faced such ‘unfair’ 
treatment like Turkey and claimed that now there were 27 EU member states to 
‘mock’ Turkey (Vatan 2011a). 
The Turkish Prime Minister has recently reacted to the EU’s insistence on issuing 
visas to Turkish citizens while it lifted visa requirements for the rest of the EU 
candidate countries. Stating the fact that even the citizens of South American 
countries such as Bolivia and Paraguay do not need a visa to enter the EU, Erdoğan 
found the EU’s persistence to issue visas on Turkey incomprehensible (Hürriyet 
2011b). He said that if the EU was willing to be an exclusive Christian club, the EU 
politicians should explicitly announce that they did not want Turkey in, and thus 
Turkey would go its separate way (ibid.). He argued that the EU’s cryptic approach 
was likely to force them to reconsider their position towards Turkey’s EU accession 
(Bild 2011).  
Erdoğan (2011) accused the EU of acting as a unified block against Turkey’s 
accession. He complained that Turkey had not even been invited to attend EU 
summits anymore after the then French President, Nicholas Sarkozy, and the German 
Chancellor, Angela Merkel, had taken over (Bild 2011). He denounced Sarkozy and 
Merkel for mobilizing an unholy alliance reflecting fascist tendencies against Turkey 
(ibid.). Similarly, Egemen Bağış, the former Chief Negotiator of Turkey with the EU, 
raised harsh criticisms blaming the EU for remaining reluctant towards Turkey. He 
claims that although the European Commission commends Turkey’s progress in 
numerous fields, the EU still prevents Turkey’s smooth progress towards membership 
by blocking several negotiation chapters arbitrarily (Hürriyet 2010a). He asserts that it 
is meaningless to open and close negotiation chapters if the EU has no intention of 
giving Turkey full membership (Hürriyet 2010b). Bağış also declares that the EU’s 
‘insincere and inconsistent’ attitude towards Turkey is increasingly criticized by more 
and more people in Turkey (Milliyet 2011a).  
Concerning the EU’s ongoing visa restrictions to Turkey, Bağış argued that the EU 
was negotiating visa liberalization with even third world countries such as Moldova, 
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excluding Turkey (Yeni Şafak 2011). ‘In the last 50 years, the EU made constant 
efforts to dissuade Turkey. However, we will not be the ones to pull the plug. We will 
let the Europeans do it’, the chief negotiator asserted (Milliyet 2011b). Bağış also 
directed his criticisms on the ‘Turkey-sceptic’ EU statesmen such as Merkel and 
Sarkozy. Blaming them of being ‘myopic’, Bağış claimed that Turkey will not give in 
to this opposition and persevere on its quest for membership (Yeni Şafak 2009). 
Other cabinet members also occasionally raised criticisms underlying the EU’s 
reluctance for Turkey. Sadullah Ergin, the Minister of Justice, stressed the possibility 
for the EU to refrain from granting membership even if Turkey fulfils all the 
necessary conditions (Vatan 2010a). Ergin stated that they would not tolerate such a 
move and would retaliate by going their own way (ibid.). Cemil Çiçek, the speaker of 
the Turkish Parliament, announced that EU membership was not sine qua non for 
Turkey. Çiçek argued that if Turkey was obliged to choose either EU membership or 
Northern Cyprus, they would not hesitate to prefer their Cypriot brothers (Milliyet 
2011c). Abdullah Gül, the President of Turkey and former Foreign Minister declared 
that ‘the world doesn’t end with the EU’, emphasizing Turkey’s willingness to 
develop significant relations with the rest of the world (Le Figaro 2011). 
The AKP’s pro-EU activism ceased after the curtailment of the accession negotiations 
and the pro-EU stance of the party was replaced with harsh criticisms against the EU. 
The AKP officials blamed the EU for derailing Turkey’s membership process. They 
question why the EU started the membership negotiations if Turkey was not wanted 
in the EU. The party officials frequently declare that they will go their separate way if 
the EU persists on its current policy towards Turkey. It is even stated that Turkey’s 
EU membership is not indispensable. As a reaction to the suspension of the 
negotiations, the AKP slowed down the reform process and even delayed 3 
negotiation chapters fit for negotiation (Euractiv 2011). Nevertheless, the AKP 
continues its membership quest and will let the EU ‘pull the plug’ if necessary. Unlike 
the party’s previous manifestoes, the 2011 manifesto criticized the rise of Turkey-
scepticism in Europe and emphasized the fact that the AKP will insist on working for 
Turkey’s eventual membership in spite of the ‘unfair and ungrounded’ opposition of 
certain EU member states (AKP 2011). 
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7.2.2. The CHP: Increasing criticisms towards the EU 
Unlike the AKP government, the main opposition party adopted a critical stance 
towards the EU from the outset of the AKP’s landslide victory in 2002. Its election 
manifesto highlights the necessity for securing equal membership conditions without 
any double standards for Turkey (CHP 2002). Shortly after the curtailment of the 
negotiations in 2006, a new manifesto promptly indicates that the CHP supports ‘full 
membership only’ and rejects any ‘unfair treatment and double standards’ by the EU 
(CHP 2007). The party programme adopted in 2008 even threatens to withdraw the 
CHP’s pro-EU stance if the Turkey-sceptic proposal to offer Turkey privileged 
partnership instead of full membership gains ground in the EU (CHP 2008). Similarly, 
the 2011 manifesto underscores the vitality of full membership having equal rights 
with the rest of the members. The manifesto asserts the CHP will take every measure 
to make sure the EU withdraws any safeguard clause against Turkey (CHP 2011b: 
125). The party’s Euroscepticism still persists today. However, in order to fully 
comprehend the CHP’s EU policy during the AKP era, it is crucial to compare and 
contrast the perceptions of two party leaders towards the EU; Deniz Baykal and 
Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu.  
Deniz Baykal, the leader of the CHP from 1992 to 2010, initially signalled a solid 
pro-EU stance. As the Foreign Minister of Turkey for a brief period, Baykal devoted 
much energy to the conclusion of the customs union with the EU in the early 1990s 
(Ayata and Güneş-Ayata 2007: 223). However, after the 2002 elections, he 
incessantly criticized Turkey’s accession process following the AKP government’s 
accelerated march towards EU membership. Baykal was highly sceptical of the EU’s 
approach which would allegedly derail Turkey’s accession process. During Baykal’s 
leadership, the CHP focused its criticisms primarily on additional clauses and right 
wing politicians in the EU. For instance, Baykal asserted the ‘open-ended’ process 
signals the EU’s reluctance against Turkish accession and its intention to convince 
Turkey of the merits of a kind of ‘privileged partnership’ (Hürriyet 2004a). He was 
also convinced that ‘absorption capacity’ was proof that the EU intends to deny 
Turkey’s membership (Baykal 2004b). Besides, he believed that ‘permanent 
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safeguards’ would mean the permanent denial of free movement to Turks, and 
indicate the EU’s willingness to offer Turkey a second-class membership (Hürriyet 
2004a). Similarly, Onur Öymen, the deputy chair of the party was convinced that such 
additional clauses were developed by the Turkey-sceptic EU member states in order 
to derail Turkey’s membership process (Öymen 2005). He explicitly stated that the 
CHP was not against the EU, but was against Turkey-sceptics who were pressurizing 
the EU to inflict double standards upon Turkey (ibid.). 
Baykal’s CHP not only questioned the EU’s sincerity towards Turkey, but also 
accused the AKP government of failing to take resolute steps against Turkey-sceptic 
politicians in Europe. Blaming Merkel for resorting to Turkey-sceptic rhetoric to 
secure electoral success in German elections, Baykal denied any communications 
with her even during her visits to Ankara. Moreover, Baykal (2009a) considered 
Sarkozy’s opposition as a fundamental obstacle against Turkey’s EU membership. He 
particularly condemned the Constitutional amendment in France to hold a referendum 
on Turkey’s EU accession. He argued: ‘Turkey will rescue the princess kept as 
prisoner in a giant’s den, which is on the seventh floor of a cave on the highest 
mountain and get through all the traps again to climb down’. However, at that point 
the EU will say: ‘Let’s ask what the French people think’ (Radikal 2004). After 
Merkel and Sarkozy reiterated their co-decisiveness for granting Turkey only a 
privileged partnership, Baykal (2009b) denounced their statement as ‘rude, 
antagonistic and reckless’ and warned the AKP government that inaction might give 
Turkey-sceptics more courage to stand firm against Turkey. Supporting Baykal, Şükrü 
Elekdağ, the CHP deputy for İstanbul, claimed that France and Germany hijacked the 
EU’s decision-making structure in order to leave no option for Turkey other than 
‘privileged partnership’ (TBMM 2009b). He was certain that the EU under the 
influence of these two leaders would never accept Turkey’s accession (ibid.). Öymen 
blamed the AKP government for its inaction against Turkey-sceptic politicians, and 
urged the Turkish Parliament to adopt a resolute stance against them (TBMM 2009a). 
With this motivation, the CHP submitted a proposal for parliamentary inquiry signed 
by 25 CHP deputies in order to discuss in a private session how to react to these 
additional clauses along with the oppositional stances of certain EU member states 
(TBMM 2011b). However, the motion was rejected by AKP votes. The CHP even 
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demanded that Erdoğan freeze the negotiations arguing such a resolute move would 
constitute a firm warning to the EU leaders who were still undecided about accepting 
Turkey’s membership (Hürriyet 2004b). 
After the negotiations stalled and the pro-EU activism of the AKP slowed down, the 
CHP seized the opportunity to fill the void and act more pro-European. Baykal 
worked for establishing contacts with pro-Turkish European social democrat 
politicians. He also tried to reinforce dialogue with EU officials through visits to 
Brussels, Berlin and London. Finally, in 2008, the CHP became the first Turkish 
political party ever to open an office in Brussels. However, those steps proved 
ineffective as the CHP failed to offer a solid strategy to revitalize Turkey–EU 
relations. Besides, the CHP’s image in the eyes of the EU was considerably negative. 
The CHP was accused of inhibiting Turkey’s progress for EU membership with its 
hard-line stance (The Economist 2009).  
Kılıçdaroğlu’s rise to leadership raised hopes in the EU pertinent to the prospects for 
the CHP’s capability to abandon its Eurosceptic stance and become an influential pro-
EU actor for Turkey’s EU accession. Kılıçdaroğlu frequently reiterates the CHP’s 
support for Turkey’s EU membership and promises to make a fresh start in Turkey’s 
relations with the EU (BBC Turkish, 2010). He acknowledges the failure of the CHP 
to explain its EU policy to the Europeans (Ibid). He admitted that they became much 
more aware of their image in Europe as a hard-line party after their visit to Brussels 
and Berlin, and promised that Turkey’s EU accession would be top priority after the 
CHP becomes government (Kılıçdaroğlu 2010).  
On the other hand, Kılıçdaroğlu remains loyal to the principles spearheaded by 
Baykal that are fair membership negotiations with no double standards and full 
membership having equal rights with the rest of the members (CHP 2011b: 124). 
Kılıçdaroğlu’s CHP argues that it will take every measure to make sure the EU 
withdraws any safeguard clause against Turkey (ibid.). The new CHP also pledges to 
work for assuring similar accession processes for all candidate countries without any 
double standards (ibid.).  
Kılıçdaroğlu also does not refrain from expressing his concerns about the EU’s 
‘mistakes’ towards Turkey. He condemns the EU’s Cyprus conditionality on Turkey 
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as the gravest mistake to shatter Turkey’s membership process (Kılıçdaroğlu 2010: 
25). He also argues that the outright opposition of an increasing number of European 
politicians against Turkey’s EU membership reflects the EU’s incompetence and 
indecisiveness on Turkey’s accession (ibid.). Nevertheless, differently from his 
predecessor Baykal, Kılıçdaroğlu calls the EU ‘mistaken’ not ‘reluctant’. He also 
fuels optimism by urging both sides to focus on the future and ‘not be bogged down 
by mistakes made by either side in the past’ (ibid.).  
On the other hand, Kılıçdaroğlu essentially believes that the AKP’s rising 
authoritarianism stands as a major obstacle against Turkey’s EU membership. Taking 
up Baykal’s flag, he pioneered a NO campaign during the 2011 Constitutional 
Referendum to deny 25 constitutional amendments most of which were deemed 
crucial for EU membership. Actually, the CHP was willing to approve all but three 
amendments48, which would allegedly undermine the rule of law in Turkey and render 
the justice system tied to the AKP government. However, the party was forced to say 
no to the entire reform package since all 25 amendments were to be voted in a single 
referendum at once. The CHP also reacted to EU’s support for the Constitutional 
amendments. Kılıçdaroğlu particularly accused EU officials of overlooking the danger 
behind some of the amendments that would further empower the AKP rule rather than 
contribute to the rule of law. 
The criticisms of Kılıçdaroğlu’s CHP originate primarily from the fear that some of 
the reforms the AKP introduces might undermine the advance of the rule of law and 
democracy in Turkey and thus, have negative repercussions on Turkey’s EU 
membership prospects (Kılıçdaroğlu 2012). Kılıçdaroğlu accuses the AKP of 
deceiving the EU with pro-EU rhetoric and abusing the membership process for 
strengthening its authority rather than empowering democracy (CNN Turk 2011). 
Arguing that Turkey’s EU membership might take a hundred years with the current 
speed of the negotiations, he blames the AKP government for completely losing its 
faith over Turkey’s accession (Euractiv 2011). Besides, he also blames the EU for 
overlooking the potential dangers those amendments might carry against Turkish 
democracy.  
                                                          
48The disputed reforms included the changes in the number and the election procedures of members of 
the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors, and the new 
arrangements for party closures. 
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7.2.3. The MHP: The EU as a ‘Christian Club’ 
The junior opposition party is known for its hard line stance over the EU long before 
the AKP era (Öniş 2003). Always sceptical of the EU’s agenda about Turkish 
accession, the MHP has recently grown more resistant to EU-led reforms. Party 
officials share the perception that the EU remains reluctant to accept Turkey’s 
membership. The MHP’s reactions hold similarity to both Baykal’s and Erdoğan’s. 
Endorsing Deniz Baykal’s arguments, the MHP focuses its criticisms on additional 
clauses and Turkey-sceptic right wing political elites in the EU. Moreover, in line 
with Erdoğan’s stance, party officials are highly convinced that the EU acts as a 
Christian Club. 
To begin with, the MHP firmly believes that additional clauses reflect the EU’s 
tendency to tie Turkey to the EU as a second-class partner (TBMM 2009a). For 
instance, it dismisses the term ‘absorption capacity’ since it confirms the EU 
reluctance for Turkey (MHP 2005: 4). The party blames Austria for enforcing the 
term ‘absorption capacity’ to Turkey and criticizes the AKP government for failing to 
prevent Austria (ibid.). Moreover, the MHP argues that ‘open-ended negotiations’ is a 
different way of saying no to Turkey’s EU membership (MHP 2005: 2). Similar to the 
CHP, the MHP interprets ‘permanent safeguards’ as a path toward ‘second-class’ 
membership. Party officials claim that by agreeing to such a clause, the AKP 
government officially endorsed the double standards inflicted upon Turkey (MHP 
2005: 20-21). The party leader, Devlet Bahçeli, is convinced that the additional 
clauses confirm the EU’s decisiveness to grant Turkey anything but full membership 
(Hürriyet 2008).   
The MHP also focuses on the propaganda of right wing European leaders against 
Turkey’s EU entry. Nicholas Sarkozy is depicted as the most popular European 
politician who aims to shatter Turkey’s accession hopes (MHP 2009: 1). Party 
officials are convinced that Sarkozy intentionally blocked 2 additional negotiation 
chapters during the French Presidency although Turkey was technically eligible to 
open them (TBMM 2009a). Moreover, the MHP members of Parliament believe that 
France and Austria intentionally made constitutional amendments to popularly deny 
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Turkey’s EU accession (TBMM 2010a). Faruk Bal, the deputy for Konya argues that 
it is just a false hope to bypass France and Austria, and then become an EU member 
(ibid.). Afif Akkuş, deputy for Mersin, blames the AKP government for lacking a plan 
to overcome the challenges these two countries pose (TBMM 2010d). Faruk Bal does 
not believe that Turkey could successfully lobby and change the minds of the Turkey-
sceptic French and Austrians due to the enduring negative memories against Turks in 
the past (ibid.). Since Turkey’s EU membership fate is dependent on those people, 
‘Turkey’s accession process remains a shattered dream’, Bal adds (ibid.).      
Party officials also take a hard-line stance against Germany’s anti-Turkey stance. 
They claim that the German position against Turkey’s EU accession results in the ill-
treatment of Turkish immigrants by the state authorities and encourages xenophobia 
and racism in the German public (TBMM 2009c). Just like Baykal of the CHP, 
Bahçeli, the party leader denied any communication with Merkel during her visit to 
Ankara in 2010 condemning her opposition to Turkish accession.   
Similar to the AKP, the party also labels the EU as a Christian Club (MHP 2009: 6). 
According to Mehmet Şandır, deputy for Mersin, Sarkozy and Merkel oppose Turkey 
because of religious difference (TBMM 2008a). Similarly, Deniz Bölükbaşı, retired 
ambassador and the MHP deputy for Ankara refers to the difference in religion which 
nurtures deep-seated biases against Turkey in Europe (TBMM 2009b). He even 
claims this negative position cannot be reduced to Sarkozy and Merkel (ibid.). ‘The 
EU as a whole remains reluctant to Muslim Turkey; that’s why Turkey incessantly 
faces additional conditions which are not in line with the Copenhagen Criteria’; 
Bölükbaşı contends (ibid.). 
Finally, privileged partnership is dismissed outright by the MHP. Party officials even 
perceive it as a conspiracy against Turkey pioneered by the EU itself. They claim that 
the EU has an agenda to officially prepare Turkey for privileged partnership, because 
it no longer uses the term ‘full membership’ in its declarations on Turkey since 2007 
(TBMM 2010b). They are convinced that ‘privileged partnership’ has become the 
EU’s new official policy towards Turkey (TBMM 2009b).   
Overall, official party lines confirm the burgeoning reluctance in the Turkish political 
elite against EU membership, essentially developed in reaction to the EU’s perceived 
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opposition or unwillingness for Turkish accession. Although leadership change in the 
CHP has shifted the focus on the AKP’s carefree (or indifferent) approach to the EU, 
all three major parties share the same conviction that the symptoms discussed above 
indicate the EU’s lack of will to absorb Turkey. In the next part, results of interviews 
conducted with 45 parliamentarians will be discussed to compare individual 
perceptions with the official party line.   
 
7.3. Reflections of Turkish Parliamentarians 
The elite interviews reflect important results. The AKP respondents are firmly 
convinced that the Turkish government did its best for membership, and blame the EU 
as solely responsible for the current stalemate. They believe that the EU is a rather a 
‘Christian Club’ and Europeans are scared of Turkey. Party officials not only embrace 
the official party line but also increasingly reflect their disappointment with the EU. 
The interviews suggest that most AKP respondents seem to have erased EU accession 
from their minds.  
The CHP officials blame the AKP’s authoritarianism for the deadlock in Turkey’s EU 
bid. Although divided on many issues, party officials almost unanimously bolster 
Kılıçdaroğlu’s stance against the AKP and put the EU’s reluctance on the back 
burner. MHP officials on the other hand, mostly confirm the official stance which is 
lenient to Baykal’s arguments on the EU.   
 
7.3.1. The AKP respondents 
Findings of the interviews with the government officials support the AKP’s official 
stance. The AKP respondents almost unanimously49 declare loss of enthusiasm for 
membership due to the opposition within the EU against Turkey. Almost all the 
government officials interviewed claim that the EU does not want to accept Turkey’s 
membership and that’s why the EU’s approach towards Turkey is unjust, insincere 
and double standard. According to Abdullah Çalışkan, it will take only a single day 
                                                          
49 With the exception of Haluk Özdalga.  
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for the EU to accept Turkey, if the EU is willing to do so. Similarly, Burak Erdenir 
reminds us of an American proverb; ‘if there is a will, there is a way’. Erdenir claims 
that the EU accepted the membership of former Soviet Republics overnight, although 
most were not ready. ‘When it comes to Turkey, there is no way. We can’t open new 
negotiation chapters, because there is no will in the EU’. Berat Conkar agrees that the 
EU can resume negotiations with Turkey lifting its blockade over 18 chapters, if it 
really desires Turkish accession. ‘There is a lack of will in the EU. Hence the real 
problem for Turkey’s membership is political rather than technical’, Conkar argues. 
Finally, Afif Demirkıran is convinced that there will be no doubt about the EU’s 
reluctance unless the EU revitalizes bilateral relations: 
The EU hasn’t opened a single chapter for two and half years. We no 
longer hold meetings with EU officials. The EU-Turkey joint 
parliamentary committee is now almost defunct. The political blockade of 
the negotiation chapter continues. Especially, the French blockade created 
discontent in the Turkish public. Besides, the EU hasn’t yet withdrawn the 
visa requirement for Turkey. The EU must take radical actions to resume 
Turkey’s accession process. Otherwise, we will be certain that the EU is 
opposed to our accession (Interview with Afif Demirkıran).   
 
Only a minority of respondents50 remain undecided about the EU’s stance towards 
Turkey although admitting the existence of opposition within the EU: 
The EU doesn’t have a unitary voice towards Turkey. A number of 
members desire Turkish accession while others oppose it. Hence, it is 
unfair to claim that the EU doesn’t want us. It is equally unfair to argue 
that the EU entirely desires our membership (Interview with Mehmet 
Sayım Tekelioğlu).    
There are divergent views within the EU concerning Turkish accession. 
Hence, it is not fair to state that the EU wants or does not want Turkey’s 
membership. The majority desires Turkish membership, although there 
are many Turkey-sceptics in the EU as well. Liberals support Turkey 
while conservatives oppose it. Liberal-conservative duality marks a 
historical clash engulfing Europe for centuries. Mostly, it is the liberals 
who prevailed over conservatives. I hope same applies to the Turkish case 
(Interview with Haluk Özdalga).    
 
                                                          
50 Mehmet Sayım Tekelioğlu and Hauk Özdalga. 
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Party officials are almost unanimously convinced that Europeans are biased against 
Turks primarily due to Turkey’s large population, different culture and most 
importantly, its Muslim identity. Ülker Güzel disagrees with the popular bias that 
millions of Turks will rush to the EU to deplete local jobs. She is certain that no one 
will leave Turkey since Turks are devoted to their own country. Ercan Candan claims 
that Europeans hinted their reluctance towards Turkey many times by underlining 
cultural, geographic and religious differences. Mustafa Elitaş says he is fed up with 
being judged by Europeans due to its different culture and religion. Similarly, 
Abdullah Çalışkan and Rıfat Sait are critical of the European prejudices against 
Turkey’s population and Islamic identity:  
Turkey’s large population and Muslim identity are the main determinants 
of the EU’s reluctance. That’s why the EU tries to delay our accession as 
long as it can. We are very much annoyed with the EU’s approach. Our 
enthusiasm and faith in Turkey’s accession have been depleted. I don’t 
believe the EU will ever accept Turkey’s membership (Interview with 
Abdullah Çalışkan). 
Europe is full of biases against Turks. Our different religion has always 
been a deciding factor for Europeans to distance themselves from us. They 
have always considered Turks as religious zealots but conversely it is the 
Europeans who are obsessed with religion. (Interview with Rıfat Sait). 
 
Many government respondents also point to the rising Islamophobia across Europe. 
Bilal Macit explains that they no longer consider the EU as a beacon of economic 
development but a breeding ground of Islamophobia which facilitated the rise of far 
right political parties across Europe. Similarly, Pelin Gündeş Bakır and Tülin Erkal 
Kara highlight the threat Islamophobia poses to Turkey’s EU entry:  
Xenophobia, racism and Islamophobia are on the rise in Europe. Far right 
parties gain ground and mobilize their electorate against Muslims who 
will allegedly steal their jobs. Public opposition to the Turkish accession 
stems from the burgeoning Islamophobia in Europe. Elder Europeans are 
particularly opposed to Turkey. We must convince the European public 
that Islam and democracy are compatible (Interview with Pelin Gündeş 
Bakır).     
Europeans are scared of us. Especialy, the rising Islamo-phobia draws 
Europe away from Turkey. They treat us like ‘niggers’51. Turkish people 
                                                          
51 Racial insult against Africans. For detail, see Kennedy (2000). 
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living in Europe are exposed to racism, discrimination and violence 
(Interview with Tülin Erkal Kara).      
 
In addition, almost all AKP respondents see the EU as a ‘Christian Club’ which will 
keep its door shut to Muslim countries such as Turkey. They believe that there is a 
powerful lobby within the EU against Islam. According to Ahmet Baha Öğütken, had 
Turkey been a Christian country, it would already been admitted to the EU. ‘Turkey is 
ready to open all the negotiation chapters but the EU doesn’t permit us. This is 
because the EU wants to remain as a Christian club.’ Öğütken adds. Berat Conkar 
believes that no matter how secular European society has become, there is always a 
‘Christian Club’ mentality engulfing their subconscious. Several AKP deputies52 
explicitly state that the EU accepted the membership of several countries including 
Greece, Bulgaria, Portugal and Romania just because they are Christian, although 
these countries actually damage the EU’s economy:  
The leader of my previous political party, Necmeddin Erbakan always 
called the EU Christian Club. I see that he was right all along. Bulgaria 
and Romania became EU members despite their mediocre economic 
performance and the lack of democratic consolidation. Would the EU still 
accept them, had they been Muslim? Absolutely not! The EU’s actions 
convince us that a Muslim country has no place in the EU (ınterview with 
Ali Rıza Alaboyun). 
The EU puts additional conditions such as the Cyprus problem to delay 
our membership. None of the new EU members fully comply with the 
Copenhagen Criteria. Such discrimination tells me that the EU desires to 
remain a Christian Club. Turkey is the only Muslim candidate country and 
it has suffered the most during its candidature. Europeans fear us. They 
don’t want us in, but they cannot tell it to our face (Interview with 
Mehmet Erdoğan). 
Christian conservatism forces Europeans to drag their feet over Turkey. 
This tells us that the EU couldn’t transcend its narrow vision of Christian 
Club. We even observe the hints of a Crusade mentality here. We 
remember the Srebrenica massacre where Dutch soldiers turned a blind 
eye to the slaughtering of Muslims at the hands of Christian Serbs. Europe 
still retains its religious fanaticism which will be its very end (Interview 
with Rıfat Sait). 
 
                                                          
52Ahmet Baha Öğütken, Ali Rıza Alaboyun, Merhmet Erdoğan, Yıldırım Ramazanoğlu, Mehmet 
Kastal and Bilal Macit 
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Some AKP officials53 also believe that the presence of Turkish immigrants across 
Europe, and biases against Turks throughout history contribute to the negative image 
of Turkey in the EU: 
Turkish immigrants in Europe couldn’t be well integrated to the host 
society. Cultural and religious differences play an important role behind 
this. In addition, Europeans have never abandoned their historical biases 
against Turks. In many European towns, there are monuments honouring 
their local people killed by Turks (Interview with Burak Erdenir). 
 
An overwhelming majority of the respondents is also convinced that the EU’s 
negative approach towards Turkey is primarily influenced by two major member 
states, namely; France and Germany. According to party officials, these countries are 
scared of losing their powerful position within the EU after Turkish accession. Ali 
Şahin contends that the EU is practically governed by Germany and France, and that’s 
essentially why the EU has been dragging its feet over Turkey for decades. Similarly, 
Fatih Çifçi admits that the majority of the EU members at least rhetorically support 
Turkey; but he also claims that the opposition of France and Germany dominates the 
EU’s decision-making mechanism. In support of Şahin and Çiftçi, Berat Conkar 
charges France and Germany with hijacking the EU’s enlargement policy. Burhan 
Kuzu states that the two countries intentionally use the Cyprus problem as an excuse 
to block Turkey’s membership and criticizes the EU of remaining oblivious to such 
Turkey-sceptic actions. Ali Rıza Alaboyun argues that the leap of faith in Turkey 
towards EU accession has been essentially exacerbated by the anti-Turkey 
propaganda of France and Germany. Muzaffer Çakar explains that these countries aim 
to prevent Turkish accession because they consider Turkey a powerful rival to 
challenge their privileged position within the EU. Similarly, Belma Satır argues that 
Turkey’s young and dynamic population, its political stability and economic growth 
scare France and Germany. Ruhi Açıkgöz even speculates that those two countries 
aim to establish a federal European state: 
The EU has become a backyard of these two countries. Their ultimate aim 
is to establish the United States of Europe (USE) in which there is no 
place for Turkey. They fear that Turkey will gain excessive power and 
                                                          
53 Belma Satır, Ülker Güzel, Burak Erdenir. 
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influence within the USE at their expense. Therefore, they rather defend 
privileged partnership for Turkey. (Interview with Ruhi Açıkgöz).  
 
The interview findings clearly confirm the AKP’s leap of faith towards EU accession. 
Almost all respondents are certain that the EU is unwilling to accept Turkey’s 
membership and that’s why it creates new obstacles to delay accession as long as it 
can. Endorsing the statements of the Prime Minister Erdoğan, they want the EU to be 
clear about Turkey’s accession: 
We rather prefer Europeans to honestly and openly declare their final 
decision on Turkey so that we make our future plans. They don’t desire 
our accession due to our cultural and religious difference but cannot spell 
it out. They rather want us to withdraw our application (Interview with 
Ruhi Açıkgöz).  
 
Party officials speak hopelessly of Turkey’s chances for membership. As a reaction, 
the AKP respondents reflect Euroscepticism. Most parliamentarians stress that Turkey 
no longer needs the EU. Conversely, they believe that the EU, which has been 
suffering from the Euro-zone crisis, desperately needs Turkey: 
Turkey is on the rise and the EU is falling down. The EU now needs 
Turkey more than Turkey needs the EU. Delaying Turkish accession is 
counter-productive for the EU. Many EU members suffer from economic 
crisis. Had Turkey been a member, it would be a net contributor to the re-
construction of European economy (Interview with Yıldırım 
Ramazanoğlu).  
 
Besides, party officials attach less value to membership while highlighting the 
importance of adopting the EU’s standards. For instance, Bilal Macit gives priority to 
the accession process through which Turkey will be able to comply with the 
Copenhagen Criteria. ‘I don’t care whether we become an EU member or not, as long 
as we successfully adopt the EU’s standards’, he adds. A claim shared by many is that 
membership is not indispensable for Turkey54. Some respondents even dismiss 
                                                          
54This opinion was explicitly highlighted by 13 AKP officials; namely, Ali Şahin, Abdullah Çalışkan, 
Ercan Candan, Mustafa Elitaş, Ali Rıza Alaboyun, Canan Candemir Çelik, Tülin Erkal Kara, Ahmet 
Baha Öğütken, Mehmet Kastal, Mücahit Fındıklı, Mehmet Erdoğan, Burhan Kuzu and Bilal Macit.  
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accession as it will probably damage the Turkish economy. Mücahit Fındıklı and 
Mehmet Erdoğan argue that the EU’s ever-growing economic crisis renders it a less 
favourable target for Turkey. Ahmet Baha Öğütken believes that Turkey only needs 
the EU’s standards, not membership. ‘In the case of accession, we will only be the 
EU’s henchman, anyway. Accession won’t be much of a use to us’, Öğütken explains. 
Similarly, Mehmet Kastal emphasizes the vitality of the Copenhagen Criteria for 
Turkey’s development. ‘We name them ‘Ankara Criteria’ and we go our separate 
way, if it comes to that point’, argues Kastal.  
The AKP respondents firmly dismiss any deals the EU offers which will be short of 
full membership. They have become reluctant for EU membership but they don’t 
desire other options such as privileged partnership. They either want Turkey to be a 
full member or to go its separate way: 
The EU definitely does not want Turkish accession but cannot admit it, 
because it doesn’t have a luxury to lose Turkey. The EU considers 
offering a sort of special partnership to Turkey rather than full 
membership. But this is not enough for us. Either the EU grants us full 
membership, or we go our own way (Interview with Burhan Kuzu). 
Europeans have been increasingly discussing alternative deals with 
Turkey other than full membership. If Turkey will not be able to join the 
EU, then why did we establish the Ministry of European Union in the first 
place? (Interview with Burak Erdenir). 
 
The AKP respondents even spell out some alternative plans against EU membership. 
Some officials focus on a closer partnership with Russia while others talk about union 
with the Middle East: 
Turkey is not dependent on the EU. For us, EU membership is not 
indispensable. Turkey has a capacity to create alternative options. We are 
working on a project called ‘The Middle East without borders’. Similar to 
the EU, we aim to establish ‘Middle Eastern Union’. People with different 
ethnic and religious backgrounds had happily lived together for centuries 
during the Ottoman Empire. However, the delimitation of borders brought 
chaos. We will withdraw borders with our Middle Eastern brothers and 
make the Middle East stronger and prosperous than ever (Interview with 
Ali Şahin). 
The EU is insincere. We don’t trust the EU. Unless it takes serious steps 
to revitalise Turkey’s membership perspective, we will go our separate 
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way. Alliance with Russia is an alternative we take into consideration 
(Interview with Mustafa Elitaş). 
 
Nevertheless, some AKP respondents also admit the reversibility of their 
Euroscepticism on the condition that the EU takes an initiative to revitalize Turkey’s 
accession process. For instance, Mehmet Sayım Tekelioğlu believes that the negative 
image of the EU is temporary. ‘If the EU decides to take positive steps toward 
Turkey’s accession, its credibility will be restored immediately’ he claims. Ali Rıza 
Alaboyun shares this optimism and states that if the EU decides to take positive steps 
for Turkish accession, Turkey will regain its motivation for membership. ‘However, 
the EU has lost its credibility in our eyes. If it wants our accession, it should take the 
first step for it’, Alaboyun contends.     
 
7.3.2. The CHP respondents 
Responses of the main opposition party officials differ remarkably from those of the 
AKP respondents. Although they similarly emphasize the EU’s reluctance to accept 
Turkish accession, they stress that the AKP’s failure to comply with EU criteria is the 
main reason for alienation between Turkey and the EU. The AKP officials believe 
that they have done the best they could for membership and hold the EU solely 
responsible for the stalemate in Turkey’s accession. The CHP respondents, however, 
argue that the AKP government’s rising authoritarianism has swiftly driven Turkey 
away from the EU. Almost all of the CHP officials55 explicitly mark the AKP 
government as the prime suspect for Turkey’s failure to become an EU member. The 
CHP deputies blame the AKP for making Turkey a religious and authoritarian country 
at the expense of democracy and human rights. They also claim that the government 
has long used the EU accession process as a cover for its parochial agenda to 
consolidate its political authority. For instance, according to Gülsün Bilgehan, the 
AKP government crippled Turkish democracy through concerted efforts to persecute 
the Turkish press and change the Republican system. She believes that the AKP’s 
authoritarianism drives Turkey away from the EU. Emre Köprülü claims that the AKP 
                                                          
55 With the exception of Ramazan Kerim Özkan and Ali İhsan Köktürk. 
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government uses EU membership as political leverage to gain domestic influence. 
‘The increasing authoritarianism and conservatism in Turkey along with corruption 
and the erosion of democracy during the AKP government draw Turkey away from 
EU membership’, he argues. Similarly, Erdal Aksünger dismisses the AKP 
government’s attachment to the EU as a delusion and believes that the AKP is much 
more attached to the Middle East. ‘During the AKP era, Turkey has become similar to 
Arabia due to its fictive economic growth, rising corruption, conservatism and 
authoritarianism’, Aksünger asserts. Faruk Loğoğlu agrees with Aksünger as he 
claims that the AKP government has never been attached to Turkey’s EU membership 
objective; but it has long used the accession process as an excuse to consolidate its 
authoritarianism. ‘Today, the AKP has no membership perspective’, he adds. Almost 
all of the CHP respondents share the same arguments highlighted above. In 
comparison to other topics discussed throughout the dissertation, the stance against 
the AKP’s authoritarianism so far stands as the only policy line on which almost all 
CHP officials concur. They raise almost the same arguments to criticize the 
government’s EU policy. In agreement with the views of the parliamentarians 
discussed above, Atila Kart, Ömer Süha Aldan, İzzet Çetin, Osman Korutürk, Aykan 
Erdemir, Orhan Düzgün and Süheyl Batum explicitly emphasize that the AKP is 
primarily responsible for the current problems in bilateral relations since it uses EU 
accession as an excuse to consolidate its authority: 
The AKP has never supported EU membership. It deceived the EU and 
pretended to be pro-European in order to consolidate its power. Turkey is 
becoming more and more conservative and religious. The AKP is driving 
Turkey away from the EU (Interview with İzzet Çetin).            
The AKP government is against modern European values; it dismisses 
them as corrupt. It rather aims to become the leader of the Islamic world. 
The governing party has an agenda to raise the Islamic civilization above 
European civilization, but this is not possible. Such an agenda of the AKP 
is the primary obstacle against Turkish accession (Interview with Osman 
Korutürk).        
The AKP uses EU accession as a tool to consolidate its authority. The 
government almost entirely abandoned its pro-EU policy. The AKP 
officials’ rhetoric towards the EU is threatening: ‘Either you accept our 
membership or we go our separate way’. This is wrong. This is not how 
you govern Turkey’s EU membership process. (Interview with Ömer Süha 
Aldan).    
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On the other hand, the CHP deputies mostly share the AKP’s belief that the EU is 
reluctant towards Turkish accession. A clear majority of the CHP respondents (11 
deputies) strongly believe that the EU has never desired Turkish accession. Only four 
deputies56 think the EU is undecided. The main opposition mostly shares the 
government’s pessimism towards the EU. For instance, Erdal Aksünger claims that 
the EU remains indifferent to the breaches of democracy and human rights in Turkey. 
According to him, it is because the EU fears Turkish accession. ‘It is scared of having 
a border with Iraq, Iran and Syria’, he adds. Süheyl Batum believes that the EU 
deceives Turkey with the false hope of membership. He believes that the EU has lost 
its credibility and leverage over Turkey. Similarly, Gülsün Bilgehan criticizes the 
EU’s reluctance towards Turkey. ‘Had they really wanted Turkey, we would have 
already been an EU member’, she contends. Ömer Süha Aldan too believes that the 
EU does not desire Turkish accession. ‘Once a member, Turkey will have the 
majority of seats in the European Parliament. Besides, Turkey’s large population is an 
intimidating factor for the EU’, Aldan argues. According to Osman Korutürk, the EU 
doesn’t want Turkey’s accession but does not want to lose Turkey either; hence it tries 
to ‘anchor’ it to EU structures without accepting it as a full member:  
Although Turkey has so many issues concerning the functioning of 
democracy and human rights, the EU’s progress reports don’t address 
such discrepancies adequately in order not to drive Turkey completely 
away from Europe. The EU hence desires to tie Turkey to itself without 
granting full membership (Interview with Osman Korutürk). 
 
Two deputies57 draw an even more pessimist picture of Turkey’s EU bid as they don’t 
believe the EU has ever desired Turkish accession, and they don’t think Turkey will 
ever be admitted to the EU: 
I never believed that the EU would one day accept Turkish accession. I 
never trusted the EU and still don’t trust it. The EU never wanted 
Turkey’s membership. I don’t believe it will ever endorse our accession 
(Interview with İzzet Çetin). 
                                                          
56 Aykan Erdemir, Atila Kart, Faruk Loğoğlu and Hasan Ören.  
57 Emre Köprülü and İzzet Çetin. 
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The EU doesn’t desire our accession. It never has. I see Turkey’s EU bid 
as such; Turkey is ready to give almost every concession to join the 
Union, while the EU makes every diplomatic move not to accept Turkey 
(Interview with Emre Köprülü). 
On the other hand, according to some respondents, the EU has a right to be reluctant 
towards Turkish accession. Interestingly, they boldly state that Turkey does not fit in 
the profile of a true European country: 
Some member states under the leadership of France and Germany oppose 
Turkish membership. I believe that they have rightful concerns about 
Turkish accession. For instance, the large and unskilled population of 
Turkey is a major concern. Even western Turks are reluctant to have 
immigrants from South-Eastern Turkey. Hence, it is quite reasonable that 
the EU member states don’t desire such a huge influx of unskilled and 
uneducated people from Turkey (Interview with Orhan Düzgün). 
Consider yourself living in an affluent neighbourhood, and a bunch of 
gypsies want to construct tents in your area. Would you accept them as 
your neighbours? The EU does not want a ‘mite’ sucking blood from its 
body. We first need to learn how to become European. Adopting EU-led 
reforms is not enough. We must reform our mind free from 
authoritarianism and religious conservatism. Otherwise, we must forget 
about EU membership (Interview with Kemal Ekinci). 
We have so many issues like the Kurdish problem waiting to be tackled. 
How can the EU accept our membership if we fail to solve our own 
problems? We must put more effort to become an EU member. Bulgaria 
worked 24 hours a day for membership; we must do the same. We should 
not hide behind excuses (Interview with Hasan Ören). 
 
The self-criticism reflected by these CHP officials is nowhere to be found in the AKP 
responses. Most AKP officials are rather convinced that Turkey has become very 
advanced. They believe that the EU desperately needs Turkey while Turkey doesn’t 
have a need for the EU anymore. On the contrary, some CHP members believe that 
Turkey needs EU membership more than ever due to the rising authoritarianism under 
the AKP government. For instance Aykan Erdemir and Orhan Düzgün state that their 
support for EU membership increased during the AKP era. They believe that 
accession stands as a remedy for the shattered image of Turkey: 
The increasing authoritarianism of the AKP government made me realize 
that EU membership has become an indispensable project for Turkey 
especially in terms of improving human rights and freedoms. The more 
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authoritarian Turkey gets, the more important EU membership quest 
becomes for Turkey. Now, we need the EU more than ever (Interview 
with Aykan Erdemir).    
 
Moreover, unlike the AKP officials, almost none of the CHP respondents see the EU 
as a Christian Club. Only Ömer Süha Aldan claims that the EU considers itself a 
Christian Club, that’s why it maintains negative biases against Turks and secures 
doubts about Turkish accession. Most rather dismiss such a claim. For instance, half58 
of the CHP respondents see it as a paranoid idea which is not to be taken seriously. 
Some others59 point to the European attachments to Christianity, while some60 claim 
that segments within the EU are inclined to depict the EU as a Christian Club; but 
they still don’t want to label the EU as such: 
There are many in Europe seeing the EU as a Christian Club, but there are 
also social democrats in Europe more sympathetic to Turkey. Therefore, 
the EU’s reluctance is not ultimate. There is a way out for Turkey. 
(Interview with Hasan Ören). 
Christianity is still a dominant force in Europe. The EU’s indifference to 
the ill-treatment of Muslims in European countries is worrisome. 
Nevertheless, labelling the EU as a Christian Club is an overstatement 
(Interview with Emre Köprülü). 
 
Overall, the CHP deputies essentially consider the EU’s reluctance towards Turkey as 
a secondary obstacle; they rather emphasize the AKP’s policies as the most important 
threat against Turkish accession to the EU. Party officials firmly believe that Turkey 
must first complete its reforms successfully and then worry about the EU’s reluctance. 
The CHP officials are also relatively optimistic about Turkey’s eventual membership: 
The Turkish public is manipulated by the government to believe that the 
most important obstacle is the rising Islamophobia, xenophobia and 
Turkey-scepticism. Yes, there are some Europeans opposing Turkish 
accession but first we should complete the reform process. Only then we 
will have a luxury to worry about Turkey-scepticism. It is actually 
unimportant whether Europeans desire Turkey or not in its current shape. I 
                                                          
58Osman Korutürk, Orhan Düzgün, Atila Kart, Faruk Loğoğlu, Gülsün Bilgehan, Aykan Erdemir, 
Süheyl Batum and Ramazan Kerim Özkan 
59Ali İhsan Köktürk, Erdal Aksünger and Emre Köprülü. 
60 Hasan Ören, Kemal Ekinci and İzzet Çetin.  
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believe that the EU will definitely desire Turkey’s membership when it 
successfully completes its reform process (Interview with Aykan 
Erdemir).   
The EU is unsure whether it wants Turkey or not. Especially, the anti-
Turkey propaganda of France and Germany directly affects the EU’s 
policy towards Turkey. Nevertheless, these are not insurmountable 
obstacles for Turkey. If Turkish decision-makers take politically 
consistent steps towards accession without any agenda to use the 
accession process for their parochial interests, Turkey can eventually 
become an EU member in spite of the EU’s uncertainty towards Turkey 
(Interview with Atila Kart).    
The EU doesn’t want Turkish membership. It does not want to extend its 
borders to the Middle East. Nevertheless, we must first consolidate our 
democracy and achieve political and economic stability. Then we should 
worry about European reluctance to Turkish accession (Interview with 
Ömer Süha Aldan). 
Turkey-sceptic EU member states, I call them parasites, contribute to the 
current stalemate in the bilateral relations. Nevertheless, either way, I 
believe Turkey will eventually become an EU member (Interview with 
Faruk Loğoğlu).  
 
7.3.3. The MHP respondents 
The answers of the MHP officials are similar to those of the CHP but with an 
important difference. The MHP deputies agree with the CHP in the sense that they 
hold both the EU and the AKP government responsible for the deadlock in Turkey’s 
accession process. However, their prime suspect is the EU rather than the AKP. The 
MHP deputies are convinced that the EU’s approach towards Turkish accession is 
highly selective. They believe that the European public perceive Turks as a threat and 
hence fear Turkey’s membership. Moreover, certain EU member states such as France 
never step back from their anti-Turkey policies. Nevertheless, party officials are 
largely divided over whether the EU desires Turkey’s membership or not. All four 
MHP officials have different answers to this question. For instance, while Zuhal 
Topçu firmly argues that the EU is definitely reluctant towards Turkey, Nevzat 
Korkmaz rather depicts the EU as undecided: 
The EU doesn’t want Turkish membership. Had Europeans desired our 
membership, they would not have kept us waiting for 50 years. They 
constantly put more and more obstacles to Turkey. No matter what we do 
237 
 
for the sake of accession, the EU always comes with new demands 
shattering our hope and motivation for eventual membership (Interview 
with Zuhal Topçu). 
The EU is undecided over Turkish accession. It is aware that the notion of 
Global Power Europe is not possible without Turkey. Hence, it cannot 
close the door to Turkey. However, it refrains from opening the door to 
Turkey essentially due to its large population and the historical biases of 
Europeans against Turks. (Interview with Nevzat Korkmaz). 
 
Moreover, Sümer Oral emphasizes the anti-Turkey policies of certain member states 
such as France and claims that such policies are not applicable to the EU as a whole. 
On the other hand, Lütfü Türkkan claims that whether the EU wants Turkey or not 
isn’t important as long as the EU does not have a capacity to absorb the huge Turkish 
population. Türkkan admits that the EU actually has a right to be reluctant about 
Turkish accession: 
Certain EU member states conduct campaigns against Turkish accession 
and affect the EU’s approach to Turkey. Especially, the French opposition 
to Turkey has become decisive in the curtailment of the accession 
negotiations. Even the replacement of the President Sarkozy with Socialist 
Hollande has not had an effect on the anti-Turkey stance of France. 
Nevertheless, it is wrong to assume that the EU as a whole embraces such 
anti-Turkey campaigns (Interview with Sümer Oral).   
It doesn’t matter whether the EU wants Turkey or not. The EU can never 
absorb Turkey of 80 million people. A huge population with high 
unemployment rate will further damage the EU’s ailing economy. 
Besides, Turkey’s Muslim identity and distinct culture are other sources 
of concern within the EU. I don’t blame them. If I were the EU, I would 
oppose the membership of such a different country too (Interview with 
Lütfü Türkkan).   
 
On the other hand, the MHP officials reflect a more unified image in other topics. For 
instance, almost all respondents61 either depict the EU as a Christian Club or 
exclusively Christian. For instance, Zuhal Topçu believes that the EU is actually a 
Christian Club, and Turkey’s Muslim identity and huge population scare Europeans. 
‘They always live in a Christian paradigm in which they see no place for Turkey’; 
Topçu contends. Lütfü Türkkan emphasizes the fact that all EU members are 
                                                          
61 With the exception of Sümer Oral. 
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Christian. ‘I don’t know whether the EU is a club but I can assure you it is Christian’, 
he adds. In addition, the MHP respondents are essentially convinced that the EU has 
an agenda to divide or dismantle Turkey. Nevzat Korkmaz argues that the EU has 
always perceived Turkey as a threat; that’s why it supported or remained in different 
to the movements which aim to dismantle Turkey. According to Zuhal Topçu, the EU 
aims to break the integrity of Turkish nation state through the reform process in which 
some reforms have a serious potential to divide Turkey. ‘This evidences the 
reluctance of Europeans to accept Turkish accession. The EU’s unwillingness 
diminishes Turkish enthusiasm for membership’, Topçu argues. Lütfü Türkkan 
approaches the issue from a Realist perspective. He claims that the EU does not desire 
a powerful Turkey: 
I am not sure whether Europeans aim to divide Turkey, but even if they 
do, this is not morally wrong in International Relations. Every 
international actor seeks to maximize its own interests and dividing a rival 
is one method for it. We just need to take precautions against it (Interview 
with Lütfü Türkkan). 
 
The MHP are also unified in their reactions to the AKP’s EU policy. Similar to the 
views of the CHP respondents, party officials hold the governing party responsible for 
the deadlock in Turkey’s EU membership process. They claim that the government 
could still have made some progress in Turkey’s European vocation despite the EU’s 
selective approach. The MHP officials don’t trust the AKP government. They don’t 
believe that the AKP wholeheartedly supports EU accession. Conversely, they share 
the CHP’s view that the government draws Turkey away from the EU: 
The AKP government is largely responsible for the momentum lose in 
bilateral relations. The AKP has long been pretending to support Turkish 
accession; instead it aims to use the membership process as an excuse to 
consolidate its political domination in Turkey (Interview with Nevzat 
Korkmaz).  
The current government increasingly drives Turkey away from 
democracy. Hundreds of journalists are now in jail for opposing the 
government. This is another major obstacle for Turkish accession 
(Interview with Lütfü Türrkan).  
Despite the growing European reluctance towards Turkey, the AKP 
government would still have made progress in Turkey’s EU process. 
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However, the AKP government chose to blame EU member states for the 
stalemate and ceased the reforms. Besides, the AKP’s threatening rhetoric 
further damaged the strained relations. The AKP does not sincerely want 
EU membership. Instead, it uses EU accession process as a leverage to 
increase its popularity at home. Turkey needs a new government that will 
repair the broken relations and help Turkey’s EU accession process regain 
momentum (Interview with Sümer Oral). 
 
Overall, apart from Sümer Oral, almost all the MHP officials interviewed are quite 
pessimistic about Turkey’s EU membership prospects. They criticize the AKP’s 
negligent policy understanding towards the EU, but they have lost hope primarily due 
to the EU’s anti-Turkey stance: 
The EU’s criteria have become increasingly threatening over the years. 
Each year, the EU’s progress reports have become even harsher towards 
Turkey. The EU’s official documents usually threaten not to accept 
Turkey unless it complies with additional conditions such as Cyprus. I 
have actually lost my faith over the possibility of Turkey’s EU accession 
(Interview with Zuhal Topçu). 
I resemble EU membership to club membership. You pay its price and get 
services in return. In the case of EU membership, you pay the price but 
there is no service available to you. Moreover, the EU is no longer in a 
good shape to serve you well. Turkey’s EU membership is now just a 
dream for Turks and the EU doesn’t want to wake them up (Interview 
with Lütfü Türkkan). 
 
 
7.4. Conclusion 
Overall, the three major Turkish political parties think that the EU does not desire 
Turkey’s membership and it thus creates additional obstacles for membership (such as 
the Cyprus conditionality) and suggests alternative types of privileged partnerships 
instead of full membership. Turkish political parties target right-wing European 
political elite and hold them responsible for the negative propaganda against Turkey 
across Europe. Besides, the AKP and the MHP essentially emphasize Islamophobia 
gaining ground in Europe and depict the EU as a ‘Christian club’. The CHP under 
Baykal focused on the EU’s discriminatory approach towards Turkey. After the 
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leadership change, the Party has become much more concerned about the AKP’s 
carefree approach to EU membership and its rising authoritarianism both of which are 
likely to drive Turkey away from the EU.   
Although it is too far-fetched to claim that the EU particularly opposes Turkey’s 
membership and European society is entirely Turkey-sceptic, there is an intensive 
perception gaining ground in Turkish politics that Europeans don’t desire Turkey in 
the EU. The interview findings clearly indicate such a tendency in the mindset of 
Turkish political elite. The interviews confirm the Turkish reluctance for EU 
membership as a reaction to the EU’s unwillingness towards Turkish accession. All 
45 respondents share the belief that the EU is either reluctant or undecided about 
Turkey’s membership. Apart from three respondents62, almost all the parliamentarians 
stress that the EU’s reluctance for Turkish accession diminishes their enthusiasm for 
membership. This confirms the argument that Euroscepticism in reaction to the EU’s 
country-specific conditionality weakens the the effect of party ideology on Turkish 
attitudes. Turkish political actors from different ideological backgrounds spell out 
their scepticism against EU accession as a reaction to the EU’s discriminatory 
conditionality towards Turkey. Similarly, officials from both government and 
opposition indicate their reluctance towards membership in reaction to the EU’s 
perceived unwillingness for Turkey. This is primarily because Turkey’s membership 
perspective has become unclear and Turkish political actors believe the EU puts 
forward unique conditions such as the solution of Cyprus problem and the 
introduction of permanent safeguards, to delay Turkish accession as long as possible. 
On the other hand, the AKP officials are convinced that the EU is solely responsible 
for the stalemate in Turkey’s European vocation, whereas the opposition respondents 
also blame the AKP’s EU policy which, in their view, has been drawing Turkey away 
from the EU.  
The responses of the AKP officials are in full conformity with the official party line. 
Party officials claim that the AKP government has done its best to keep Turkey’s EU 
bid alive but it is the EU’s reluctance towards Turkey which damages bilateral 
relations. The AKP respondents essentially believe that Turkey’s large population and 
                                                          
62 Lütfü Türkkan of the MHP has already been opposed to EU membership, so his stance remains 
unaffected, while Aykan Erdemir and Orhan Düzgün of the CHP state that the EU’s attitudes did not 
affect their support for membership.   
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Islam negatively affect the EU’s approach towards Turkey. The government officials 
blame the EU for acting like a ‘Christian Club’. In response, they become reluctant 
for EU membership. Many stress the importance of the EU accession process rather 
than membership. They believe the compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria will be 
sufficient for them. Some deputies focus on the potential disadvantages of 
membership such as the socio-economic costs of adjustment or the likelihood of a 
second-class membership (indicating only a weak role for Turkey in the EU decision-
making), to justify their increasing aloofness to Turkey’s EU accession. Nevertheless, 
this resistance proves reversible as some AKP deputies admit that their 
Euroscepticism will swiftly shift back to EU-enthusiasm, if the EU takes positive 
steps to revitalize bilateral relations.  
The opposition, however, doesn’t believe that it is fair to put all the blame on the 
EU’s shoulders. The CHP respondents almost unanimously believe that the AKP 
government’s rising authoritarianism is the primary reason behind the current 
stalemate. Actually, the stance against the AKP is the only area the CHP respondents 
are not divided about. Both nationalist and liberal deputies emphasize that the AKP, 
not the EU, is the prime suspect for the stalemate in Turkey’s accession process. The 
CHP respondents still reflect loss of enthusiasm for EU membership due to the EU’s 
reluctant or selective approach towards Turkey. Nevertheless, they explicitly highlight 
that the AKP must take the lion’s share. Some CHP respondents declare that the 
AKP’s rising authoritarianism has led them to become more supportive of Turkey’s 
EU membership (seeing the EU as a shelter against AKP’s authoritarianism). Unlike 
the AKP respondents, they believe Turkey needs the EU more than ever. Party 
officials also don’t believe that the EU is a ‘Christian Club’ and some CHP officials 
empathize with the EU’s hesitation about Turkish accession. They believe that the EU 
is not wrong to be concerned about ‘absorbing’ such a problematic country. There is 
only a minority63 that reflects a hard-line stance towards the EU. They believe that the 
EU has never wanted Turkish accession; hence it is not to be trusted. The mistrust for 
Europeans indicates a symptom for the Sèvres Syndrome. Nevertheless, it seems to 
have fallen sharply after the resignation of Deniz Baykal whose criticisms had 
focused on the ‘EU threat’. During the zenith of the bilateral relations under the AKP 
                                                          
63 Emre Köprülü and İzzet Çetin. 
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government, Baykal essentially focused his criticisms on the EU’s reluctance and its 
‘double standards’ towards Turkey, while condemning the AKP’s over-enthusiasm for 
membership. Now that the AKP’s authoritarianism has become more noticeable and 
its enthusiasm for Turkey’s membership has weakened, the CHP under Kılıçdaroğlu 
leadership has changed its hostile tone towards the EU and has become much more 
critical of  the AKP’s role in the deadlock. 
The criticisms of the MHP respondents, on the other hand, are more focused on the 
EU. They agree with the AKP officials that the EU is a ‘Christian Club’ and their 
scepticism towards the EU has even worsened to the point of losing faith in Turkey’s 
membership. Moreover, the symptoms of the Sèvres Syndrome are much more visible 
in the MHP responses since they explicitly declare that the EU has an agenda to 
divide Turkey. Nevertheless, the MHP officials also point to the AKP’s rising 
authoritarianism which creates additional obstacles for Turkey’s EU accession. 
According to the respondents of the CHP and the MHP, the AKP is hiding behind the 
EU’s selective policies; it could still have made progress in Turkey’s EU bid despite 
the EU’s reluctance, but it remains unwilling to govern Turkey’s troubled EU 
membership process.  
Finally, when we examine the response of the BDP officials (as the control group) 
concerning the EU’s approach towards Turkey, we see that the strong belief that the 
EU remains hesitant or reluctant towards Turkish membership is well embedded 
within Turkish politics. The BDP is one of the most pro-EU political actors in Turkey 
since as a regional party, it aims to defend 'the ethno-territorial minority against the 
centre and demand for political autonomy' (Marks et al 2002: 587). Yet, the BDP too 
believes that the EU is reluctant towards Turkey: 
The EU doesn’t want Turkish membership. They [Europeans] are 
dragging their feet. The EU has been suffering an economic crisis. 
Besides, Turkey has a large population. Most Turks are low skilled and 
poor. Unemployment is a serious problem in Turkey. The EU fears that its 
economy will most definitely collapse if it opens its border to Turkey 
(Interview with Yüksel Mutlu).        
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Overall, statements of all four political parties confirm the burgeoning Turkish 
perception that the EU is unwilling to accept Turkey’s accession, although they raise 
different justifications. The AKP and the MHP are convinced that Turkey’s Islamic 
identity and rising right-wing conservatism in Europe are the main determinants of the 
EU’s current policy towards Turkey. On the other hand, according to the BDP, 
Turkey’s potential membership is perceived by Europeans as a serious economic 
burden to the EU’s ailing economy. Finally, the CHP shares economic and political 
justifications but rejects religious arguments. Therefore, although having different 
ideological alignments, all four political parties in Turkey share the same belief 
against the EU. Therefore, ‘Turkey-scepticism’, an EU-driven factor, explains the rise 
of Euroscepticism in Turkish politics.  
However, it is an important, yet insufficient determinant. It has a strong explanatory 
power regarding the opposition’s Euroscepticism but it falls short of explaining the 
EU policy of the AKP government. The AKP government pursued a pro-EU policy 
despite the propaganda of right-wing European politicians against Turkey’s 
membership. The opposition had already raised claims about the EU’s reluctance 
towards Turkish accession right from the outset of the AKP’s first term in 
government. However, the AKP turned a blind eye to the opposition’s claims and 
continued the EU-led reform process. It was only after the suspension of the 
negotiations that the AKP focused on the EU’s unwillingness towards Turkey. 
Therefore, during 2002 and 2006 when the EU gave credible membership incentives 
to Turkey, the AKP government took a strategic decision to continue its pro-EU 
stance despite the opposition’s claims of Turkey-scepticism in the EU. It was the 
rising uncertainty of membership prospects following the suspension of negotiations 
which led to the AKP government’s volte face in its EU discourse. It was only then 
that the AKP shared the opposition’s allegations about the EU’s lack of will to accept 
Turkey’s membership. The AKP respondents explain their disappointment with the 
suspension of negotiations which is a turning point in their views towards the EU. 
They admit that the AKP government took a great risk by continuing the EU-led 
reform process despite reservations about the EU’s approach to Turkey. The 
suspension of negotiations brought a serious uncertainty to Turkey’s EU bid and led 
the AKP government to revise its pro-EU stance.     
244 
 
 
 
CHAPTER VIII  
CONCLUSION 
  
This chapter draws some conclusions, addresses potential criticisms and discusses 
some limitations and implications of the study. This PhD project scrutinizes why 
Turkish mainstream politics turned against EU membership, a primary quest of 
Turkish foreign policy since 1963. When the AKP leadership came to power in 2002 
and initiated the EU-led reform process with accelerated pace, its efforts proved 
successful to initiate the accession negotiations in 2005. However, Turkey’s failure to 
comply with the EU’s Cyprus conditionality (i.e. its failure to open its harbours and 
airspace to the Republic of Cyprus) brought the bilateral relations into impasse and 
led to the partial suspension of negotiations in 2006. As indicated in Chapter I, 
scholarly discussions analysing Turkey’s political stance towards EU membership are 
either focused on domestic factors such as party competition and ideological 
alignment or the Cyprus conflict as an external constraint, in order to explain the rise 
of domestic resentment towards the EU among Turkish political elites. Alternatively, 
this study reveals that the Turkish stance towards EU accession is not mono-causal; 
instead it is multi-faceted in nature and it can be better explained with the interplay 
between domestic and external factors that paved the way for a negative political 
environment in Turkey towards the EU. Accordingly, the study argues that until 2006, 
the factor of political ideology (in terms of GAL/TAN divide) explains the 
opposition’s attitudes towards the EU reforms, while the governmental approach 
could be described as more strategic than ideological. However, since the partial 
suspension of negotiations in 2006, both the opposition and government in Turkey 
have reflected similar sceptical attitudes towards the EU irrespective of their ideology 
or competition strategies. Instead, they emphasize the role of EU-driven factors –
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especially, the rising uncertainty over Turkish membership and the EU’s ‘perceived’ 
reluctance to accept Turkish accession– in complicating Turkey-EU relations.  
The existing literature lacks systematic and comparative analysis of fluctuating party 
preferences in Turkey towards the EU. Instead, scholarly works concentrate on a 
single party and tend to underestimate the reactionary and dynamic nature of Turkish 
sceptical attitudes towards the EU process (due to, for example, their overemphasis on 
historical scepticism based on the Sèvres syndrome). By taking into account the 
changing attitudes of three mainstream parties (AKP, CHP and MHP) and an anti-
establishment party (BDP) towards the EU during the accession negotiations this 
study aims to fill this particular gap. Besides, the study suggests differentiating 
between Euroscepticism in member states and Euroscepticism in candidate countries. 
Euroscepticism applicable to member states means opposition to the notion of 
European integration in a broader sense, while Euroscepticism in candidate countries 
particularly means opposition to the EU membership process. The prevailing 
literature overwhelmingly employs the concept of Euroscepticism in the analysis of 
party positions towards EU membership in accession countries (including Turkey), 
without showing awareness of this analytical distinction. However, a critical stance 
against EU accession does not reveal much about the deeper position of a party 
towards European integration; thus it indicates a different form of Euroscepticism. It 
is crucial to emphasize this difference in order to better explain the critical EU 
discourses of political parties in accession countries and Turkey in particular . 
Chapter II gives a detailed account on Euroscepticism in candidate countries putting a 
special emphasis on changing political party attitudes towards EU membership during 
accession negotiations. By resorting to Euroscepticism, this study seeks to highlight 
the contextual character of Turkish political party attitudes towards Turkey’s 
accession to the EU by focusing on the complex nature of EU conditionality that can 
shift the EU stances of political actors in Turkey. The study discusses Euroscepticism 
in candidate countries under two main categories  in response to the complications of 
the EU’s accession criteria. First, Euroscepticism in candidate countries develops as a  
response to the EU’s issue-specific conditionality. It hence involves an opposition to 
particular reforms deriving from the EU’s formal membership conditionality 
applicable to every accession country. Domestic political actors resist certain EU-led 
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reforms either due to high costs of compliance or due to the perceived threats against 
their state’s national sovereignty. Second, Euroscepticism arises from the EU’s 
country-specific conditionality andit involves a more intensive political resistance, as 
domestic political actors oppose the EU’s extra conditionality which specifically 
targets their own country. In sum, the study benefits from the concept of  
Euroscepticism in explaining the changing political attitudes of Turkish political 
parties as a response to the complex nature of EU membership conditionality 
(comprising both issue-specific and country-specific conditions).  
Chapter III discusses the methodological choices of the study. It explains the rationale 
behind the selection of the Turkish case and the use of elite interviewing as a primary 
data collection technique. The empirical chapters (IV, V, VI and VII) provide a 
detailed analysis of Turkish reactions to the EU’s adaptational pressures through a 
closer look at two problematic reform areas under the EU’s formal issue-specific 
conditionality (minority rights and foreign land ownership) and two cases of country-
specific pressures (the EU’s Cyprus conditionality and the rising Turkish suspicion 
that the EU won’t accept Turkey’s membership due to cultural, religious and political 
differences). Overall, the study argues that Turkish reluctance for EU membership is 
multi-causal and involves a reactionary dimension. Not only endogenous but also 
exogenous EU-driven factors explain the rise of Euroscepticism in Turkey at different 
stages. In summary, domestic factors such as ideology and party competition had 
considerable explanatory power over Eurosceptic responses of the Turkish political 
elites when there were clear incentives towards Turkey’s EU accession (2002-2006). 
However, after the partial suspension of the negotiations (2006 to 2013), EU-driven 
factors including the rising uncertainty of membership and the EU’s ‘reluctance’ 
towards Turkish accession, have become more important than domestic factors like 
ideology and strategy in explaining the rise of Euroscepticism in Turkish politics.  
Euroscepticism as a reaction to the EU’s issue-specific conditionality was observed  
among Turkish political actors in the case of  the EU-led reforms of minority rights 
and foreign land ownership. The main opposition parties (the CHP and the MHP) 
defied the reform process with a self-proclaimed duty to protect the integrity of the 
Turkish Republic against any dangers which the EU accession process might bring. 
Although operating at the different ends of the Left-Right spectrum, both parties 
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shared common TAN arguments to deny greater rights to minorities and foreigners. 
For its part, despite its conservative (TAN) background, the AKP government adopted 
a pro-reform approach using the EU accession process to provide external legitimacy 
for its minority rights policy and rally public support for its well-orchestrated efforts 
to solve the long festering Kurdish problem of Turkey. The AKP government also 
supported the FLO reform by emphasizing that it would stimulate foreign direct 
investment and decrease the budget deficit. Therefore, contrary to the main opposition 
parties which acted according to their ideological alignments, the AKP government 
took a strategic choice to stay on the EU path despite its conservative background.     
However, after the partial suspension of the negotiations in 2006 which left Turkey’s 
accession perspective in limbo, the ensuing developments in Turkish politics 
diminished the credibility of the ‘ideology versus strategy’ debate. Although it 
previously abstained from demonstrating a critical stance towards the EU, the AKP 
government has increasingly become reluctant to proceed with the EU-led reform 
process. Instead, it adopted a selective approach towards EU conditionality, adopting 
certain reforms such as Foreign Land Ownership while opposing others like the 
Cyprus conditionality. Moreover, the interview results demonstrate that most AKP 
respondents are in agreement with the opposition concerning the expansion of 
minority rights. The increasing uncertainty of Turkey’s EU membership diminished 
their enthusiasm for reform and let them return to their conservative (TAN 
ideological) concerns about minority rights. The interviewed parliamentarians from 
the government reported that they opposed the categorization of Kurds as a minority, 
because they assumed that minority meant an inferior status. They also fear that such 
categorization carries the potential to divide Turkey, a statement that reinforces the 
historical Sèvres syndrome in Turkey. In brief, since the partial suspension of 
accession negotiations, the AKP respondents started to raise similar TAN arguments 
of the mainstream opposition parties in Turkey with regard to the expansion of 
minority rights. Moreover, the AKP respondents joined the opposition in their 
criticisms of the EU’s selective approach toward minority rights. An important 
number of respondents from all three parties claim that the EU treats members and 
candidates differently as regards the question of minority rights, and this proves 
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counter-productive for EU-Turkey relations. This criticism has gained ground only 
after 2006 when Turkey’s accession prospects became highly uncertain.  
The AKP’s selectivity towards EU conditionality is also visible in the case of FLO 
reform. Opposition parties, including the pro-reform BDP, are convinced that the FLO 
reform the AKP seeks to embrace is not in compliance with the EU’s FLO 
conditionality, because the new FLO law foresees the liberalisation of land ownership 
not necessarily for EU nationals but for particularly Islamic countries who are willing 
to buy land in Turkey. Therefore, they believe that the AKP brings its own version of 
FLO reform to table and this is not in line with the EU’s FLO criterion. Some AKP 
parliamentarians admit that the latest legal amendment to FLO was made in order to 
attract more Arab investment, not with the objective of complying with the EU’s 
accession criteria as some had believed. It is plausible to argue that the suspension of 
the negotiations not only decreased the AKP’s enthusiasm to proceed with the reform 
process, but also encouraged the government to go outside the scope of the EU acquis 
when adopting new laws. Therefore, the opposition blames the AKP for ‘walking 
away’ from the EU context in its legislation. 
As discussed above, domestic reactions to EU-led reforms  have been mostly adopted 
by opposition parties with TAN ideology who aimed to weaken the pro-reformist 
AKP government. On the other hand, the government gave strategic support for 
Turkey’s EU membership process. As long as the EU provided Turkey with credible 
membership incentives, the AKP government continued the reform process, fending 
off the opposition’s criticisms. However, the EU’s Cyprus conditionality led to a more 
intensive domestic resistance, since failure to comply with this condition jeopardizes 
Turkey’s membership prospects. After the partial suspension of the negotiations, the 
AKP abandoned its reformist discourse on Turkey’s Cyprus policy. The AKP 
respondents unanimously indicate that they no longer trust the EU’s impartiality over 
the Cyprus problem. Besides, they are convinced that opening Turkish borders to the 
RoC will neither solve the Cyprus problem nor guarantee Turkey’s EU membership. 
A remarkable volte face in the AKP’s Cyprus policy reflects the political impact of 
the country-specific conditionality of the EU on Turkish politics. Both opposition and 
government stand against the EU’s Cyprus conditionality and even the BDP, an anti-
establishment (and pro-EU) party has begun to express the same arguments as the 
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mainstream parties. A surprisingly broad consensus has emerged among Turkish 
politicians to emphasize the EU’s ‘double standards’ towards Turkey.  
The EU’s Cyprus conditionality is not the only EU-driven factor that fuels extensive 
Euroscepticism in Turkish politics. There is also a growing perception among Turkish 
politicians that the EU has become rather reluctant towards Turkish accession. The 
main opposition parties have long emphasized the claim that the EU is unwilling to 
accept Turkish membership (as early as the initial years of the AKP government). 
However, the AKP government turned a blind eye to the opposition’s allegations and 
remained at the EU’s negotiating table. The partial suspension of the EU negotiations 
was a decisive factor in the government’s changing rhetoric towards the EU. The 
AKP interviewees compare the EU to a ‘Christian club’ believing that Turkish 
membership is opposed on religious grounds. They state that they may be looking for 
alternative partnership with the Middle Eastern countries and/or Russia. Similar 
pessimism is shared by the opposition parties (the CHP, the MHP and the BDP), who 
are convinced that the EU is dragging its feet on the question of Turkey’s 
membership. Turkish opposition parties also blame the AKP government for 
abandoning its pro-EU policy so quickly and using the EU’s reluctance towards 
Turkey as an excuse for halting the reform process.  
 
8.1. Discussion of the Hypotheses 
Six hypotheses are outlined by the study to test the effects of party ideology, strategy, 
and EU-driven factors on the development of Eurosceptic politics in Turkey. The 
discussion of the first three hypotheses reveals the fact that ideology holds only 
limited explanatory power in explaining the Turkish case.    
H1 states that the Left-Right distinction has a limited (if at all) role in explaining 
Euroscepticism in candidate countries. The Turkish case confirms this hypothesis 
because both Left-wing and Right-wing parties (the CHP and the MHP) reflect 
Euroscepticism. The literature on Euroscepticism previously attached a subtle role to 
the Left/Right distinction highlighting the bases of support for or opposition to the EU 
project with reference to different economic interpretations of European integration 
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(Aspinwall 2002). Increasingly, greater importance is attributed to the explanatory 
power of the libertarian/authoritarian (GAL/TAN) distinction in inducing party-based 
Euroscepticism (Marks et al 2006; Hooghe and Marks 2008). Following this trend, the 
study emphasizes the GAL/TAN distinction as a possible key determinant for 
Euroscepticism. 
H2 claims that TAN parties in accession countries are more likely to adopt 
Euroscepticism than GAL parties. This is only partly supported in the Turkish case. 
The CHP and the MHP as TAN parties reflect Euroscepticism with the claim that 
some aspects of the EU-led reform process are detrimental to Turkey’s national 
sovereignty and integrity. However, the AKP government persisted until 2006 in 
Turkey’s reform process despite its TAN ideology. Therefore, although Eurosceptic 
parties are primarily TAN parties in the Turkish case, this does not necessarily mean 
that all TAN parties automatically pursue Eurosceptic policies.  
H3 examines whether the effects of ideology on Euroscepticism are diminished by 
EU-driven factors in accession countries. Accordingly, the hypothesis argues that both 
TAN and GAL parties in accession countries are likely to embrace Euroscepticism 
when the EU’s conditionality is ambivalent or inconsistently applied to candidates 
and members and when there is a rising uncertainty over membership related for 
instance to the EU’s perceived reluctance towards enlargement. The findings of the 
study support the hypothesis, as the EU-driven factors (as defined above) are 
emphasized by both GAL and TAN parties that reflect Eurosceptic reactions. Apart 
from the conventional opposition based on TAN ideology, Turkish political actors 
with a GAL agenda such as the BDP and the liberal/pro-reformist wing of the CHP 
are critical of the EU’s selectivity in the application of its minority rights criterion 
(Euroscepticism in response to the EU’s issue-specific conditionality). They also 
criticize the EU’s Cyprus conditionality and share the conviction that the EU is 
reluctant to accept Turkey’s membership (Euroscepticism in response to the EU’s 
country-specific conditionality). The AKP government has also started to express 
similar criticisms after the partial suspension of accession negotiations.  
The remaining three hypotheses discuss the validity of party competition in explaning 
Turkish Euroscepticism. Compared to party ideology, the study finds a stronger link 
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between the strategic choices of the selected parties related to party competition and 
Euroscepticism between 2002 and 2006. However, the increasing uncertainty of 
membership prospects (an EU-driven factor) since 2006 seems to have diminished the 
explanatory power of strategy.  
H4 aims to reveal the association between a political party’s place in the national 
party system and its propensity to adopt Euroscepticism in an accession country. 
According to some, sceptical attitudes towards European integration are reserved to 
fringe parties (Aspinwall 2004; De Vries and Edwards 2009). Alternatively, this study 
assumes that both mainstream and fringe parties may reflect Eurosceptic reactions 
during accession negotiations. Confirming this, the selected cases demonstrate that 
not only fringe parties like the BDP, but also the mainstream parties including the 
AKP, the CHP and the MHP have reflected Euroscepticism at different stages of the 
accession negotiations. In this context, the distinction between fringe and mainstream 
is not particularly useful in this study. 
H5 relates to the effects of the ‘government-opposition’ distinction on Euroscepticism 
in candidate countries. It follows the claims that opposition parties in accession 
countries are more likely to adopt Eurosceptic attitudes than governing parties. The 
research findings support this claim in the case of issue-specific Euroscepticism 
because the latter is essentially adopted by opposition parties aiming to undermine the 
popularity of the government. For its part, by embracing a pro-EU stance, the AKP 
government has sought to receive external legitimacy from the EU and delegitimize 
its political opponents in the domestic arena. One may argue that the government-
opposition positioning has greater explanatory power than ideology in the Turkish 
case, since the AKP government –despite its TAN ideology– remained pro-EU. 
However, since 2006 the AKP has joined the ranks of Eurosceptics, neutralising the 
effects of government-opposition competition.  
H6 examines whether EU-driven factors decrease the explanatory power of party 
competition (the government-opposition distinction) regarding Euroscepticism in 
candidate countries. The hypothesis suggests that not only the opposition but also the 
governing parties in accession countries are likely to embrace Euroscepticism when 
there is a general perception in the domestic arena that (i) the EU’s conditionality is 
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inconsistent and selective, (ii) there is a rising uncertainty over their EU membership, 
and (iii) the EU lacks the political will for further enlargement. The opposition parties 
reflect the significance of EU-driven factors while justifying their resistance against 
the reform of minority rights. However, the factor of strategy explains the AKP 
government’s attitudes towards the EU conditionality better than the EU-driven 
factors before the partial suspension of accession negotiations. The AKP government 
continued the reform process despite the opposition parties’ claims about the EU’s 
selective application of its minority rights criterion. Moreover, the EU’s perceived 
reluctance for Turkish accession often emphasized by the opposition parties did not 
have a remarkable impact on the AKP’s EU policy before the partial suspension of the 
negotiations. Therefore, between 2002 and 2006, strategy played a key role in the 
AKP’s pro-EU activism contrary to the EU-driven factors that ignited Eurosceptic 
responses in opposition parties.  
From 2006 onwards, the increasing uncertainty of Turkey’s membership has 
diminished the effect of the strategic alignment of the AKP government. Since then, 
the AKP officials have adopted Euroscepticism highlighting the EU’s inconsistent and 
discriminatory approach to minority rights and Cyprus conditionality as well as the 
EU’s ‘lack of will’ towards Turkey’s accession. Therefore, the AKP adopted 
Euroscepticism as a response to the EU’s both issue-specific and country-specific 
conditions following the curtailment of EU negotiations which brought high levels of 
uncertainty for Turkey’s membership prospects. Accordingly, the EU’s selectivity and 
its perceived reluctance towards Turkey are influential upon opposition parties but 
cannot explain the AKP’s resort to Euroscepticism without taking into consideration 
the rise of uncertainty over membership.              
Overall, the study’s key findings regarding the rise of Euroscepticism in Turkish 
politics are:  
1-Although Eurosceptic attitudes are frequently adopted by parties with TAN 
ideology, not all TAN parties are Eurosceptic. It is important to look at government-
opposition positioning and the state of negotiations with the EU.  
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2-Strategy may have a greater role than ideology in explaining Euroscepticism in 
Turkey since the AKP government with TAN ideology supported the EU-led reform 
process to acquire both external and internal legitimacy until 2006. 
3- NOT all EU-driven factors have an equal impact on Euroscepticism. The EU’s 
selectivity in its conditionality and its reluctance towards Turkey’s EU membership 
may have influenced opposition party attitudes, but is not sufficient to explain why 
the Turkish government waited until 2006 before resorting to Eurosceptic arguments 
emphasizing the EU’s selectivity and reluctance towards Turkish accession. In the 
case of the AKP, party strategy prevailed over EU-driven factors before the 
curtailment of accession negotiations.   
4- The EU-driven factor that matters the most is the increasing uncertainty about 
membership. If uncertainty of membership increases to an unacceptable extent, both 
ideology and strategy lose their explanatory power. In that case, both government and 
opposition parties (having either TAN or GAL ideology) start to reflect common 
Eurosceptic reactions. 
Overall, as illustrated below (Figure 1), ideology is at the centre of political attitudes 
towards EU conditionality in Turkey. However, strategy can contain ideology and 
decrease its explanatory power especially in the discussion of the governmental 
attitudes towards the EU. Finally, the uncertainty of membership prospects tends to 
decrease the role of ideology and strategy in terms of reinforcing unlikely alliances 
among different political parties against the EU regardless of their ideological 
alignments or strategic preferences.    
254 
 
 
Figure 1: Three main determinants of Euroscepticism in Turkish politics: party 
ideology, strategic decision-making, and uncertainty regarding EU accession.  
The analytical distinction between the EU’s issue-specific conditions and country-
specific  conditionality is useful in terms of uncovering the role of different factors at 
different stages of the EU process. For instance, the GAL-TAN distinction generally 
explains Eurosceptic responses to the EU’s issue-specific conditionality better than 
Euroscepticism arising from the EU’s country-specific conditions.  The EU’s issue-
specific conditionality is primarily opposed by parties with TAN ideology in Turkey. 
While the opposition TAN parties have consistently been  resorting to this type of 
Euroscepticism since 2002, the AKP government reflecting TAN ideology embraced 
it in relation to minority-rights reforms after 2006. The increasing uncertainty about 
Turkey’s membership has encouraged an emphasis on EU-driven factors (the EU’s 
reluctance towards Turkey’s accession and its ‘double-standards’ in its Cyprus 
conditionality) ruling out ideology and party competition as the main determinants of 
Eurosceptic attitudes in Turkey. Irrespective of their ideology and strategies, all of the 
selected parties (the AKP, the CHP, the MHP, and the BDP), have converged towards 
a common position on Turkey-EU relations. In this context, country-specific 
additional criteria (Cyprus conditionality) coupled with uncertainty over membership 
paved the way for a broad consensus around Eurosceptic arguments in  Turkey. 
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EU Conditionality Type Of EU 
Conditionality 
Euroscepticism 
under Low Level 
of Uncertainty  
(2002-2006) 
Euroscepticism 
under High Level of 
Uncertainty  
(2006-2013) 
MINORITY 
RIGHTS 
Issue-specific CHP and MHP AKP*, CHP, MHP 
and BDP* 
FOREIGN LAND 
OWNERSHIP 
Issue-specific CHP and MHP AKP*, CHP, MHP 
and BDP 
CYPRUS Country-specific CHP and MHP AKP, CHP, MHP and 
BDP 
RELUCTANCE 
TO TURKISH 
ACCESSION 
Country-specific CHP and MHP AKP, CHP, MHP and 
BDP 
Table 2: The effects of the level of uncertainty over Turkey’s membership on Turkish 
Euroscepticism in the selected domains. *Selectivity in supporting the EU-led 
reforms.  
 
8.2. Contributions of the study 
This research aims to bring theoretical and empirical innovations. First of all, it offers 
a theoretical contribution to the literature by differentiating between Euroscepticism 
in member states and candidate countries to better understand and explain political 
party responses to EU conditionality in candidate states during the accession 
negotiations. A particular focus on Euroscepticism in candidate countries is well-
suited to explain the Turkish case, because it (i) categorizes domestic political 
reactions based on the complex nature of EU conditionality involving both formal 
issue-specific and additional country-specific pressures; (ii) focuses on both domestic 
and external/EU-driven factors behind domestic resistance to the accession process; 
and (iii) enables the comparison of Turkey with other candidate countries focusing on 
the negotiation process.  
As regards empirical contributions, the study provides a two-pronged comparative 
perspective to the study of party positions towards the EU involving the comparison 
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of the attitudes of different Turkish political parties with one another (internal 
comparison) and the comparison of the EU policies of Turkish political parties with 
those of other candidate countries (external comparison). It first offers an internal 
comparison of Turkish politics as it discusses the EU stances of primary political 
parties in Turkey, namely the AKP, the CHP and the MHP, and takes into 
consideration the attitudes of the pro-Kurdish BDP (as a control case). Therefore, it 
aims to refine the prevailing approaches to Turkey-EU relations which limit their 
focus to single party attitudes towards EU accession process (Canefe and Bora 2003; 
Doğan 2005; Patton 2007; Gülmez 2008; Avcı 2011a and 2011b; Celep 2011; İçener 
and Çağlıyan-İçener 2011). Following the emerging literature that suggests comparing 
multiple parties in Turkey (Öniş 2009 and 2010; Yılmaz 2011; Baudner 2012; 
Gülmez 2013b), this study will be the first to comparatively discuss the EU policies of 
all four political parties that are represented in the Turkish Parliament. 
This comparison essentially reveals that as the uncertainty of Turkish membership 
increases, all political actors give similar Eurosceptic responses despite their 
differences. It is particularly notable that two diametrically opposed parties in terms 
of ideology, namely the MHP (ultranationalist party) and the BDP (pro-Kurdish anti-
establishment party) show the same reactions to the EU’s Cyprus conditionality and 
the EU’s reluctance towards Turkey’s accession. This has a crucial implication for 
Turkish politics. Despite their differences, political parties in Turkey secure a 
potential to unite against the EU as a reaction to EU-driven factors. The reactionary 
dimension of Euroscepticism in Turkey implies the reversibility of this phenomenon. 
If domestic parties can unite against the EU, they can also work together for Turkish 
membership invalidating ideological and strategic barriers. In this sense, 
Euroscepticism in candidate countries (Turkey in particular) should not be understood 
as a deep-seated, predetermined and fixed opposition to Europe and its ideals (which 
stands as a broader definition of ‘Euroscepticism’ primarily applicable to member 
states). On the contrary, Euroscepticism in candidate countries involves domestic 
reactions to the EU’s conditionality on particular issues and the EU’s extra 
conditions towards particular countries during the accession negotiations, while 
supporting EU membership in principle. It is thus crucial to consider the EU-driven 
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factors as well as domestic factors while trying to grasp the rise of sceptical attitudes 
in a candidate country.  
Moreover, the interview findings make a series of empirical contributions to the 
extant literature on the comparison of Turkish political parties by revealing intra-party 
divisions. First of all, government officials turn out to be more conservative and 
nationalistic than their party’s liberal political rhetoric whereas the MHP respondents 
often express more liberal attitudes, especially regarding FLO reform, than their ultra-
nationalistic party. Second, contrary to the mainstream literature which considers the 
AKP as immune to the Sèvres Syndrome, most AKP respondents carry the fear of 
division and define the EU as a ‘Christian Club’. This is an important innovation, as 
the AKP government has long been praised as a liberal force for Turkey shaking the 
foundations of the ancien régime which instilled the fear of division and hatred 
against Europeans (Kirişci 2006; Fuller 2008; Guida 2008; Yavuz 2009; Nefes 2013). 
The interviews, however, reveal the fact that some government officials are not much 
more different in their perceptions than the Kemalist establishment they aim to 
dismantle.  
Third, there is an emerging literature on the leadership change in the CHP and a 
common argument is that Kılıçdaroğlu leadership took tangible steps towards 
liberalising the CHP that had succumbed to TAN inclinations during the Baykal era 
(Celep 2011; Baudner 2012; Oğuzlu 2012; Öniş 2012; Özipek 2012; Yanık 2012; 
Gülmez 2013a; Kaliber 2013). Yet the literature also contends that it is still too early 
to make a true assessment due to lack of a comprehensive analysis measuring the 
‘Kılıçdaroğlu effect’ on the party’s ideological alignment (Celep 2011; Yanık 2012). 
Öniş (2012: 148) claims that Kılıçdaroğlu’s rise to party leadership has divided the 
CHP into two camps: defensive nationalists versus social democrats. This study 
provides original data to substantiate this claim. The interview findings highlight that 
Kılıçdaroğlu’s rise to party leadership triggered a liberal transformation of the party; 
yet such transformation stands as an unfinished project since he could not erase the 
nationalist camp from the ranks of the party. Supporting Öniş (2012), the interviews 
indicate that the CHP is currently divided between an emerging reformist wing and 
the old guard nationalist establishment. Such a split is particularly clear in the case of 
minority rights and the EU’s Cyprus conditionality. While half of the respondents 
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urge for the expansion of minority rights without seeking reciprocity, the other half 
reflects Baykal’s hard-line approach and remains aloof to the idea of expanding 
minority rights in Turkey. Some party officials report that those reforms may be 
instrumentalised by the EU which, they suspect, holds a hidden agenda to dismantle 
Turkey. Concerning the EU’s Cyprus conditionality, nearly a half of the CHP 
respondents defend equitable solution to the problem and urges Turkey to open its 
harbours and airspace to the RoC if it truly wants to be an EU member. However, the 
other half strongly defends the status quo on the island following the previous CHP 
leadership.  
It is fair to argue that the CHP is evenly divided into two camps; while a half of the 
CHP respondents tend to identify the CHP with social democracy and individual 
freedoms; the other half remains as a nationalistic conservative camp preoccupied 
with the preservation of the Republican principles reminiscent of the Baykal era. 
Therefore, the ‘new’ CHP has not become a centre of attraction for the Turkish 
electorate since the party has not yet finished its liberal transformation. The CHP’s 
failure to free itself from the shackles of its self-proclaimed legacy to protect the 
Republic precludes the party’s potentials to rise to government.  
Finally, the study offers an external comparison of the Turkish case. As discussed 
above, it compares the Turkish case with other candidate countries. Despite its 
political, historical, geographical and cultural differences, it is still possible to 
compare Turkey with other former and current candidate countries. The research finds 
that political actors in dissimilar countries give similar responses to similar EU 
conditions not only out of domestic considerations (ideology and strategy) but due to 
EU-driven factors (the EU’s discrimination and/or reluctance towards candidate, and 
rising uncertainty of membership due to the EU’s extra conditionality) as well. 
Political parties not only in Turkey but also in other candidate countries raise similar 
nationalistic justifications to oppose many EU-led reforms. For instance, domestic 
resistance to the reforms of both FLO and minority rights is essentially based on the 
preoccupation to protect national integrity against foreigners. Moreover, candidate 
countries having bilateral problems with EU member states are forced by the EU to 
solve the conflict before accession, and such additional preconditions tend to trigger 
negative reactions in the domestic arena. Despite their ideological differences, 
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political actors in an accession country can perceive the EU’s conditionality as 
‘double-standard’ and adopt a common critical stance against the EU process. 
Accordingly, Turkish reactions to the EU’s Cyprus conditionality are comparable to 
the Macedonian reactions to the EU’s membership precondition to change its name, 
and the Croatian reactions to the EU’s precondition to solve its problem with Slovenia 
about the fisheries zone. Therefore, the innovative argument here is that despite 
domestic peculiarities, EU pressures that are perceived as discriminatory and thus, 
reinforcing the uncertainty of membership are likely to lead dissimilar political actors 
in dissimilar countries to give similar responses.   
Overall, the study highlights that the EU’s additional country-specific political 
conditionality can feed into the Eurosceptic discourses of Turkish political parties. 
Nevertheless, as discussed in Chapter VII, the current negative atmosphere in Turkey 
towards EU membership may be reversed if necessary steps are taken by both Turkey 
and the EU. Many government and opposition members report that they are ready to 
abandon their sceptical stance towards the EU once they are offered more concrete 
membership prospects. It is crucial to note that the EU-led reform process is likely to 
persist despite low accession prospects, albeit on a selective and uneven basis (Börzel 
2012). Numerous attempts to codify different EU-led reforms by the single-party 
government that holds the majority of the posts in the Turkish Parliament have been 
vetoed by the main opposition party CHP. In the Turkish constitutional system, the 
main opposition party holds the right to submit new laws to the Turkish Constitutional 
Court. So, the CHP succeeded in having many laws annulled by the Turkish 
Constitutional Court, which has often been accused by pro-government circles of 
representing the CHP’s Kemalist and Nationalistic mentality (Celep 2011). In this 
context, the success and viability of the EU-led reform process in Turkey depend on 
the collaboration between the government and the main opposition party64.  
The rising Euroscepticism in the AKP and the opposition parties can be mitigated if 
Turkey is permitted to resume the accession negotiations in return for full compliance 
with the official Copenhagen Criteria. In such case, the interviews demonstrate that 
the AKP government is likely to return to its pragmatic pro-EU policy stance, and the 
                                                          
64The far-right MHP will be persistent in its EU-sceptic stance in order to retain its nationalist 
electorate. Nevetheless, it will remain the only EU-sceptic party in the parliament which will not 
jeopardize the EU-led reform process. 
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CHP led by Kılıçdaroğlu would abandon its Eurosceptic stance despite the existence 
of a nationalist faction that reflects the Sèvres syndrome within the party. The liberal 
transformation of the CHP will gain momentum with the revitalization of Turkey’s 
EU accession process and thus, the nationalist faction that was dominant in the Baykal 
era will not be able to dominate the EU discourses of the CHP under Kılıçdaroğlu. 
Concrete membership prospects can also have a positive effect in domestic politics in 
Turkey facilitating the adoption of a new Constitution in line with the EU acquis and 
the solution of the Kurdish problem. However, if the EU fails to dissipate the 
widespread perception that the EU will never admit Turkey due to the latter’s cultural 
and religious differences, it is likely to lose its political leverage on Turkey. 
For their part, Turkish political actors must be ready to promote a viable solution to 
the Cyprus problem. If the EU follows a different strategy on the Cyprus problem by 
pressurizing not only Turkey but also the RoC to agree on an equitable solution (for 
instance by disallowing the RoC to veto the EU’s relations with North Cyprus and 
Turkey), this will provide enough stimulus for Turkish political actors to extend 
support for the opening of Turkey’s harbours and airspace to the RoC. The interviews 
reveal the fact that the AKP officials wait for such an EU initiative that can help them 
explain their future concessions about the Cyprus question to the Turkish public. 
Moreover, at least half of the CHP respondents suggest that they would agree with the 
opening of Turkey’s borders to the RoC in return for more credible incentives from 
the EU. They fear that by playing the ‘Cyprus card’, certain EU members seek to 
delay, if not cancel, Turkey’s accession due to different political reasons. This means 
that Turkey’s compliance with the Cyprus conditionality may lead to further demands 
for political concessions instead of facilitating Turkey’s EU membership. In sum, a 
remarkable positive step from the EU may reverse the negative atmosphere in Turkey-
EU relations mitigating the Euroscepticism currently engulfing Turkish politics.          
                
8.3. Limitations of the Study 
Having outlined the main contributions of the PhD research, this section discusses 
certain limitations of the study which primarily stem from methodological choices 
involving the strategy of case selection and employment of a single-N case study.  
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8.3.1. Trade-off between multiple cases and in-depth analysis 
A focus on multiple reforms limits in-depth analysis. For instance, had the PhD 
project been on the reform of minority rights, a detailed inquiry on the Kurdish 
problem and the peace process initiated by the AKP government would have been 
possible. Launching the process in 2009, the AKP government aimed at solving the 
long festering Kurdish problem and the PKK violence once and for all. The peace 
talks continue between the imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan and Turkish 
authorities regarding the amelioration of Kurdish cultural rights and liberties, a 
general amnesty for PKK militants and the freedom of Öcalan in return for the PKK’s 
retreat from Turkish soils and the eventual termination of the PKK violence. Turkish 
Armed Forces and the PKK militants jointly announced a temporary ceasefire in 
2013. However, the talks proceed slowly and the PKK forces have not yet fully 
evacuated their posts within Turkish territories.  
Moreover, it was not possible to include voluminous details of the Cyprus problem, 
which dates back to late 1950s and involves numerous actors and strategies including 
the UN, the USA, Russia in addition to the EU, Turkey, Greece, the UK and Cypriot 
communities. The study briefly discussed the main aspects of the Cyprus conflict and 
devoted its energy to the analysis of Turkey’s failure to comply with the EU’s Cyprus 
conditionality. Yet, a brief rather than detailed analysis of the Cyprus problem did not 
compromise the main findings of the study, because this PhD project exclusively 
aimed at examining Turkish political responses to the EU’s Cyprus conditionality 
rather than the Cyprus problem itself. Therefore, for the purposes of the study, it is 
vital to reveal the main justifications behind Turkish reactions to the EU’s Cyprus 
conditionality rather than discussing who is right and who is wrong in the Cyprus 
conflict.         
 
8.3.2. Other actors and reform areas  
Another potential limitation is that the study could have focused on other actors 
and/or reform areas in order to scrutinize the rising Euroscepticism in 
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Turkey.Concerning actors, business elites are often considered as key economic 
players in Turkey’s EU membership process. Pro-EU organizations such as the 
Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (TÜSIAD), the Economic 
Development Foundation (IKV) and the Turkish Economic and Social Studies 
Foundation (TESEV) long lobbied for Turkey’s EU accession and gave full support to 
the EU-led reform process (Eylemer and Taş 2007: 564; Türkmen 2008: 151). On the 
other hand, pro-Islamic organizations such as the Independent Industrialists and 
Businessmen Association (MÜSIAD) and the Turkish Confederation of Businessmen 
and Industrialists (TUSKON) long remained cautious towards Turkey’s EU 
membership, but they both decided to extend support for Turkey’s accession process 
after the AKP came to power in 2002 (Eylemer and Taş 2007: 564-565). Therefore, 
the position of the Turkish business elites towards the EU’s issue-specific and 
country-specific conditions before and after the suspension of the negotiations could 
have been studied in comparison to the position taken by the political actors. Not only 
Turkey’s centralized structure that emphasizes political elites at the expense of 
business elites and other actors such as bureaucrats, but also the polarised nature of 
the Turkish business elites reflecting the ideological competition of government and 
opposition led this study to focus on political party actors.   
Regarding EU-led reforms,  freedom of expression and the establishment of an 
ombudsman could have been studied since they triggered domestic resistance during 
the EU negotiations. For instance, both the CHP and the MHP opposed the EU’s 
condition to abrogate Article 301 of the Penal Code, designed to penalise those who 
denigrate ‘Turkishness’. This reform was encouraged by the EU in order to improve 
the freedom of expression in Turkey. The opposition parties defended that Article 301 
protected the dignity and honor of the Turkish nation (Yılmaz 2011: 196). Both the 
CHP and the MHP strongly criticized its abrogation and voted against its annulment. 
Onur Öymen, the deputy chairman of the CHP blamed the EU for liberalizing insult 
instead of the freedom of expression in Turkey (Hürriyet 2006b). Oktay Vural, the 
MHP deputy for İzmir even charged the government with ‘treason’ due to the 
government’s support for decriminalizing insult to Turkish state and nation (Radikal 
2008).   
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The opposition parties also raised objections to the establishment of ombudsmanship 
out of fear that the AKP government would only recruit an ‘AK-budsman’, a pro-
AKP ombudsman instead of an autonomous and impartial one (Buhari-Gülmez 2011: 
480-481). Likewise, the EU-led reforms of competition policy and cooperatives have 
been equally opposed by the opposition deputies who denounced that the 
government’s bills were incompatible with the EU acquis (TBMM 2010a and 2010b). 
Although these reforms constitute viable test cases for the discussion of 
Euroscepticism in Turkish politics, due to time and space constraints, it was not 
possible to study all of them. Nevertheless, the opposition’s reactions to the reforms 
such as the establishment of an ombudsman and the annulment of Article 301 
generally demonstrate the role of ideology in explaining the rise of scepticism in 
Turkey towards the EU, while strategy explains the AKP government’s reformist 
outlook (Gülmez 2013a). In this sense, the selected cases, namely foreign land 
ownership and minority rights capture the general context and arguments that can be 
used to explain domestic reactions in other reform areas. 
 
8.3.3. Some major developments  
A particular focus on the selected cases also limits detailed discussion of certain 
developments during the period under scrutiny that may have an effect on Turkey-EU 
relations. There are three major incidents in Turkey which were closely monitored by 
the EU, including the Ergenekon trials, the 2010 referendum on Turkish constitutional 
amendments and the 2013 anti-government protests.    
The Ergenekon trials: Following a terrorist attack against the judges of the Council of 
State (Danıştay) in 2006, the police conducted a series of operations to arrest 
hundreds of high-ranked army officers, journalists and academics with the allegation 
that those figures planned a coup d’état against the AKP government. Convinced of 
the existence of a terrorist organization operating under the name of ‘Ergenekon’, 
public prosecutors prepared thousands of pages-long indictments regarding the 
suspects’ linkages to the so-called ‘Ergenekon’ terrorist organization65. The 
opposition (the CHP and the MHP in particular) stood against those trials arguing that 
                                                          
65 For two different views on the Ergenekon case; see Jenkins (2010) and Grigoriadis and Özer (2010). 
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the law suit was opened with the AKP’s motivation to persecute political dissent. The 
EU took an ambivalent stance towards the Ergenekon trials. It initially expressed its 
full support to the trials and praised them as ‘an opportunity for Turkey to strengthen 
confidence in the proper functioning of its democratic institutions and the rule of law’ 
(European Commission 2010: 7). However, as the progress reports depict, the EU 
refrained from confirming the existence of a terrorist organization called ‘Ergenekon’ 
and reiterated its warnings about ‘the time lapse between arrests and the presentation 
of indictments to the court’ (ibid.). The EU also expressed concerns that the high 
volume of journalist detentions and arrests might result in self-censorship (European 
Commission 2010: 20). Similarly, the European Parliament issued warning to the 
AKP government ‘not to allow legal proceedings to be used as a pretext to exert 
undue pressure on critical journalists, academics or opposition politicians’ (European 
Parliament 2010: 4).  
The trials have recently resulted in life sentences for several high-ranked generals and 
long years of imprisonment for the rest of the convicts. Although the court decisions 
were praised by the AKP government as a decisive moment to ‘bring down the coup 
plotters to their knees’ (Anadolu Agency 2013), Turkish public opinion is still divided 
over the existence of a pro-coup terrorist organization that operates under the name of 
Ergenekon (Vela 2013). The verdicts were increasingly interpreted in international 
media as ‘political revenge’ taken against the Kemalist establishment which long 
stood as an obstacle against the rise of political Islam in Turkey (The Economist 
2013). For its part, the EU finds the indictments too general to validate the sentences 
(Butler 2013).  
The 2010 Referendum: Another major event was the referendum that took place on 12 
September 2010 about 25 Constitutional amendments most of which were considered 
important for Turkey’s EU accession. In support of the amendments EU officials 
announced that such legislation would facilitate Turkey’s bid for full EU membership 
(The Economist 2010). Although they desired a new Constitution instead of 
amendments, liberal segments within Turkish society supported the reform package 
with the motto of ‘Yes, but not enough’ (Migdalovitz 2010: 11). On the other hand, 
the CHP and the MHP pioneered a ‘NO’ campaign for the referendum. In fact, the 
opposition was willing to approve all but 3 amendments, as they were convinced that 
265 
 
the latter would undermine the rule of law in Turkey and render the justice system 
tied to the AKP government. The disputed reforms comprised the changes in the 
number and the election procedures of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme 
Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors, as well as the new arrangements for party 
closures. The CHP criticized the EU’s support for the Constitutional amendments 
with bon pour l’orient (good for the East) mentality overlooking the risks that the 
amendments might undermine the rule of law and democracy in Turkey (Gülmez 
2013a: 322). The BDP did not vote in the referendum as a reaction to the AKP’s 
failure to include their demands for greater Kurdish rights in the reform package 
(Migdalovitz 2010: 12). The Constitutional amendments were adopted in the 
referendum with a 58% ‘Yes’ vote. The EU welcomed the popular endorsement of the 
amendments and declared that the referendum results confirmed the resoluteness of 
the Turkish nation to become an EU member. However, according to some scholars, 
the referendum results only confirmed an emerging polarization within the Turkish 
political elite and society (Kalaycıoğlu 2012).  
The 2013 anti-AKP demonstrations: The AKP government’s recent hard-line policies 
encroaching individual liberties including alcohol consumption and abortion have 
triggered resentment among different social segments in Turkey. Negative reactions 
to the government reached a climax after the Prime Minister, Erdoğan, announced in 
late May 2013 the construction of a shopping mall at the heart of Istanbul replacing 
the ‘Gezi’ park of Istanbul’s Taksim square. Brutal police response to 
environmentalist demonstrations triggered nation-wide anti-AKP protests. The 
mainstream Turkish media failed to broadcast the demonstrations, yet many people 
gathered information through social media and international news agencies, and 
joined the protests. Erdoğan never stepped back from his hard-line approach to the 
protests and denounced the protesters as ‘extremists’ and ‘looters’. The massive usage 
of water cannon and pepper gas by the police cost the lives of 6 protesters along with 
thousands of injured. Lasting about a month, the demonstrations had certain 
implications for Turkish politics. First, they revealed the authoritarian face of the 
AKP government and confirmed the burgeoning unrest within the public against 
governmental policies. Second, they uncovered the fact that the mainstream media in 
Turkey is not free from government interference. Third, the demonstrations unified 
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people from different ethnic, cultural, social, economic and political backgrounds 
against the government undermining the prevailing cleavages such as Left/Right or 
Turk/Kurd. On the other hand, they further polarized the society into the opponents 
and proponents of the AKP.           
The EU expressed concerns over the police crackdown on the protesters and 
pressurized the government to communicate with the protesters to prevent further 
casualties (Baydar 2013). The European Parliament issued a resolution condemning 
the AKP government’s handling of the demonstrations. It condemned the attempts of 
the Turkish mass media to censor the broadcasting of public demonstrations and 
called on the government to ‘put an end to its authoritarian style of governing’ 
(European Parliament 2013: 4). The AKP government dismissed the EU’s criticisms 
as hypocrisy and denounced them as interference with Turkey’s internal affairs 
(Today’s Zaman 2013). The officials of the European Commission stated that the 
Commission would prepare its ‘toughest’ progress report on Turkey criticizing the 
government’s authoritarian response to the Gezi demonstrations (Hürriyet Daily News 
2013). According to some observers, the AKP’s hard-line approach to public protests 
nullified Turkey’s chances of becoming an EU member (Baydar 2013).    
These three developments were important markers of the AKP’s rising 
authoritarianism. All these events took place after the suspension of the negotiations 
and they contributed to the crystallisation of the AKP’s Eurosceptic rhetoric. A 
detailed analysis on these events, however, could not be possible due to  time and 
space constraints.   
 
8.3.4. On generalisation  
This project examines a single country: Turkey. There is also a comparative 
dimension in the study examining not only the attitudes of Turkish political parties 
but also those of main political parties in different candidate countries. The existing 
literature provides numerous cases from the CEECs facilitating comparison, but a 
comprehensive analysis of domestic political responses to EU conditionality in the 
CEECs necessitates more in-depth research. For instance, compared to party 
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competition, TAN ideology better explains Euroscepticism in Latvia and Poland, 
because although they were in government, coalition partners continued to oppose the 
EU-led reforms of minority rights and FLO due to their nationalistic stances. 
However, this does not provide sufficient data to make generalisations in the rest of 
the accession countries. It requires more comprehensive research to find out how 
being a single-party government or a coalition partner affects political parties’ 
propensity to reflect Euroscepticism. Moreover, the prevailing literature does not offer 
much supporting evidence in the CEECs regarding the claim that GAL parties turn to 
Euroscepticism when the EU applies its minority rights conditionality in a selective 
manner. This PhD project primarily focusing on Turkish politics cannot make such 
generalisations. In order to reach such comprehensive conclusions, it is necessary to 
conduct a meticulous review of primary (election manifestos, parliamentary speeches, 
party reports) and secondary (press statements, academic literature) sources 
concerning the responses of political parties in each accession country to the EU’s 
accession criteria. It will only then be possible to make generalisations about the key 
determinants of Eurosceptic politics in accession countries.   
Nevertheless, it is possible to use the findings derived from the Turkish case in order 
to understand the general trends in other candidates. As previously pointed out, if a 
thesis is valid in the least favourable case, then it is likely to be valid for intermediate 
cases (Flyvbjerg 2006: 232). Turkey is not only different from other candidate 
countries in terms of its geography, demography, culture and history but also unlike 
other countries, there is an increasing perception among Turkish political elites that 
the EU specifically stands against Turkey’s accession. If all Turkish actors base their 
EU stance primarily on this perception, then their responses to EU conditionality 
cannot be generalized as they have a unique source of contestation against the EU. 
However, the study reveals that Turkish political actors do not necessarily base their 
entire EU stance on the critique of a rising ‘Turkey-scepticism’ in Europe. The AKP 
continued its pro-EU policies especially between 2002 and 2006 despite the fact that 
political opposition to Turkish accession had already been observed especially in 
France, Germany and Austria. It was the suspension of negotiations which decidedly 
altered the AKP’s discourse on the EU. Party officials currently highlight their 
frustration with the rising opposition within the EU to Turkey’s accession. 
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Nevertheless, this reactive stance seems to be tactical since some party officials stress 
the fact they are more than willing to return to their pro-EU stance provided that the 
EU takes a positive step to revitalize Turkey’s membership process. Besides, the 
opposition claims that the AKP uses this rhetoric just to cover up its own loss of EU-
enthusiasm. Many opposition interviewees argue that despite the suspension of 
negotiations the AKP could have continued with the EU-led reform process, but it 
chose not to. Moreover, the CHP deputies explicitly state that the most important 
obstacle for Turkey’s EU accession is not the EU’s reluctance towards Turkey’s 
membership but it is the rising authoritarianism of the AKP.  
The study, however, acknowledges that it is not possible to make generalisations 
based on the findings of the interviews, because the total number of interviewees (45) 
only amounts to 8% of the Turkish parliamentarians in total (550). Therefore, the 
interview findings are not to be considered as representative of the entire Turkish 
parliament.Nevertheless, the interviewees included one third of the total members of 
the Turkish Parliamentary Committee on EU Harmonization and Turkey-EU Joint 
parliamentary committee. Plus, in compliance with the hierarchical structure of 
political parties and committees, the author interviewed the deputy leaders of the 
studied political parties and the chairmen of different Parliamentary Committees 
including EU harmonization committee, Committee on Constitution, and Turkey-EU 
Joint parliamentary committee. In this regard, the findings of the interviews provide a 
general context about the leading arguments within the selected political parties. 
Moreover, they are useful in terms of revealing certain political views that contradict 
the official party rhetoric.   
Overall, the findings of this study indicate that it is the rising uncertainty regarding 
the membership prospects that led to the intensification of Turkish political 
constestation against the EU. Turkish claims regarding the existence of ‘Turkey-
scepticism’ had already populated political agendas in Turkey before the curtailment 
of the accession negotiations; but the AKP government continued with the reform 
process anyway. It was only after the suspension of negotiations that the government 
joined the opposition in criticizing the EU. On the other hand, the rising uncertainty of 
membership is not unique to the Turkish case. Macedonia and Croatia experienced 
similar additional conditions due to a bilateral conflict with an EU member and their 
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resistance to those conditions rendered their accession process highly uncertain. 
Therefore, Turkish responses to the EU’s accession conditionality are not necessarily 
unique and can be compared to other countries. Acordingly, Turkish reactions to the 
EU-led reforms of minority rights and FLO can be used to verify the effects of the 
ideology-strategy debate on Eurosceptic party behaviours in accession countries. 
Moreover, the EU’s selective and discriminatory application of its conditionality faces 
with strong opposition not only in Turkey but in other candidate countries as well. 
Therefore, the Turkish case contributes to the development of a tentative argument 
that despite domestic peculiarities, political actors in dissimilar countries may respond 
similarly to similar EU conditionality (if they share a similar (TAN) ideological 
position or if the EU’s conditionality is applied in a selective and even discriminatory 
manner).   
 
8.4. Answering questions and addressing potential criticisms 
The following section aims to answer possible questions about Turkish 
Euroscepticism and address potential criticisms. In particular, the changing attitudes 
of the AKP officials towards the EU’s conditional pressures raise the question of 
whether the governing party has experienced an ideological shift from GAL to TAN. 
Another question is about the AKP government’s possible pragmatism. Some scholars 
claim that the pro-EU stance of the AKP government was only half-hearted (if not 
mere ‘window-dressing’) and by adopting a pro-EU rhetoric, the AKP sought to gain 
an upper ground against its domestic opponents (Çınar 2008; Baudner 2012; Kaliber 
2013). If this is the case, it implies that the AKP’s recent disillusionment with EU 
membership is not a reaction to the EU’s controversial approach to Turkey’s 
membership, but it is only a tactical move of the AKP to blame the EU for the 
alienation between Turkey and the EU. Moreover, the so-called ‘Sèvres Syndrome’ 
and its effects on Turkish mainstream politics need to be further discussed in order to 
better explain the rising scepticism in Turkey against EU accession. If Turkish 
responses to EU-led reforms stem essentially from historical collective memory about 
European invasion during the First World War, then domestic contestations qualify as 
the examples of Euroscepticism in its broader definition (opposition to European 
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integration) rather than Euroscepticism in candidate countries that is largely based on 
reactionary and reversible attitudes against the EU accession process. The final 
question is about whether the term Euroscepticism which focuses on the critical 
discourses against EU accession is only applicable to the Turkish case or it can 
explain the rise of  critical EU discourses in other candidate countries as well.  
 
8.4.1. Is there an ideological shift in the AKP government? 
As previously discussed, the AKP government’s pro-EU stance has been replaced 
with Euroscepticism following the suspension of negotiations in 2006. A crucial 
question here is whether this meant the AKP government’s ideological shift from 
GAL to TAN, since the AKP’s reformist agenda that initially emphasized liberalism 
and freedoms was substituted by an Eurosceptic discourse that is, on the contrary, 
highly authoritarian. However, such a drastic change from liberalism to conservatism 
in the AKP’s ideological positioning seems unrealistic and it is actually questionable 
whether the AKP has ever been a GAL party in the first place.  
The AKP is the successor of the pro-Islamic Welfare Party (RP) which was closed 
down in 1998 by the Turkish Constitutional Court on the grounds that it aimed to 
dismantle the Turkish Republic and establish Islamic rule (Shariah) in Turkey. Many 
AKP founders including the Prime Minister Erdoğan and the President Gül came from 
the ranks of the RP either serving as Mayors for the RP or Ministers in the RP’s 
cabinet in 1990s. However, with the establishment of the AKP, those political figures 
pursued a reformist agenda to abandon the conservative and Islamist tradition of their 
predecessors, because the ‘military-civilian coup’ on 28th February 1997 challenged 
the capability of pro-Islamic political actors to survive in a secular Turkey (Çınar 
2008: 111; Yavuz 2009: 15). The RP was closed down shortly after the coup and its 
leaders were temporarily banned from politics. The AKP liberalized its political 
discourse in order not to share the fate of its predecessor, the RP (Çınar 2008: 110). 
The AKP’s liberal outlook also stemmed from the need for external legitimacy such 
as the support of the EU to withstand strong ‘regime actors’ like the military and the 
judiciary in Turkey (Yavuz 2009: 28). Besides, party officials embraced 
democratisation as a viable way to liberalise the Islamic way of life in Turkey (Çınar 
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and Duran 2008: 30). Therefore, the party was not part of the liberal political tradition 
but strategically embraced a liberal rhetoric in order to survive in the Turkish political 
system and expand religious freedoms in Turkey.        
With an attempt to establish the AKP as a mainstream liberal party, party officials 
defined it as a Conservative Democrat party comparable to Christian Democrats in 
Germany in particular and Conservative parties in Western Europe in general (Cizre 
2008: 3). The party opposed the label of ‘Islamist’ and expressed its dissent with the 
politicization of religion (Çınar and Duran 2008: 31). In search for external 
legitimacy, party officials even sought the membership of the Socialist International 
although the party did not have a Social Democratic outlook (AKP 2007). Its 
reformist agenda and resoluteness for Turkey’s EU membership enabled the AKP to 
recruit liberal political figures including Cemil Çiçek and Köksal Toptan who used to 
be cabinet members for centre right governments during the 1990s. Similarly, popular 
Social Democrats such as Ertuğrul Günay and Haluk Özdalga joined the ranks of the 
party to raise the profile of the AKP as a ‘catch-all’ party. Moreover, the party 
received the blessing of liberal journalists such as Mehmet Altan and Hasan Cemal 
who believed the AKP government would dismantle authoritarian Kemalist structures 
in Turkey (in particular, the prominence of the Turkish army in politics) and clear the 
path for Turkey to become a truly democratic country respecting the rule of law and 
individual freedoms. Similarly, Turkish academia welcomed the AKP’s reformist 
political agenda naming the party as ‘conservative globalist’ and expected the party to 
successfully mobilize the masses for EU membership (Öniş 2007). The AKP was 
praised as the bringer of Kantian peace to Turkey that had long been living in a 
Hobbesian paradigm (Kirişci 2006). Some even depicted the rise of the AKP as a 
harbinger of ‘New Turkey’ releasing itself from the shackles of the ancien régime 
(Fuller 2008; Yavuz 2009: 43).  
However, the AKP’s liberal democratic intentions were open to debate. Secular 
circles in Turkey were never convinced that a pro-Islamic party could be transformed 
into a liberal democratic party overnight (Çayır 2008: 63). The AKP’s professed 
liberal outlook not only generated suspicion among the secular elites but also faced 
the criticisms of some Islamic segments. While secularists accused the AKP of 
pursuing a hidden agenda to establish an Islamic regime in Turkey, some pious 
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Muslims blamed the party for betraying Islam by embracing the values of Western 
liberal and capitalist societies (Ibid).  
The sincerity of the AKP’s pro-EU stance was equally questioned. According to 
Börzel (2012: 15), the AKP’s support for the EU process was merely strategic. The 
AKP government supported the EU accession process as long as the EU’s 
conditionality aligned with its political preferences and survival strategies. The EU’s 
support was the AKP’s survival strategy through which it aimed to gain political 
leverage against its domestic rivals (Çınar 2008). Accordingly, the AKP used the 
EU’s conditional pressures for both lifting the obstacles against Islamic freedoms in 
Turkey and garnering the EU’s support against the ultra-secularist veto players such 
as the Army, Judiciary and the CHP (Saatçioğlu 2010). Therefore, the AKP’s pro-EU 
stance was highly strategic aiming to consolidate its domestic authority in Turkey 
through external legitimation provided by the EU.  
Moreover, the AKP lacked a practical democratization agenda independent from the 
EU’s accession criteria (Çınar 2008: 122). Therefore, the loss of membership 
prospects greatly diminished the AKP’s motivation to comply with the Copenhagen 
Criteria, which was the ‘only game in town’ governing the AKP’s agenda of 
democratization and individual freedoms. Without credible membership incentives, 
the AKP abandoned its reformist agenda and stalled the democratization process with 
almost no political cost at home thanks to its unrivalled electoral popularity (Çınar 
2011: 21). Therefore, the main component of the AKP’s liberal agenda was the EU-
led reform process whose curtailment led the AKP to return to its conservative roots. 
Besides, the AKP’s Islamic agenda conflicted with the EU reform process. For 
instance, the 2005 decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on the 
Leyla Şahin case66 served to legitimize the headscarf ban in Turkey and therefore, it 
was a decisive moment for the AKP to lose its enthusiasm for liberal reforms and 
return to its pro-Islamic rhetoric (Öniş 2007: 254; Çınar 2008). Finally, especially 
after the 2007 elections, the AKP consolidated its electoral power and no longer 
needed the EU’s support in order to survive and establish its authority in the Turkish 
                                                          
66 A law suit against Turkey opened by a medical student, Leyla Şahin as regards the Turkish legal ban 
on the usage of the Islamic headscarf at universities. The Court upheld the ban by 16 votes to 1 
deeming it necessary for protecting the principle of Secularism in Turkey. For the judgement, see 
ECtHR (2005). 
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political system. Therefore, not only did the governing party abandon its enthusiasm 
for the unclear EU path but it also grew increasingly authoritarian at home. This led to 
anti-government protests and the government resorted to conservative arguments in 
order to justify its violent suppression of public protests. Overall, it can be argued that 
the AKP was always an authoritarian (TAN) party. What pushed it to pursue liberal 
politics and act like a GAL party for a while was the motivation to increase its 
domestic and external legitimacy by showing support to Turkey’s EU accession 
process. After the EU failed to offer credible membership prospects, the AKP 
abandoned its liberal agenda and turned back to its TAN rhetoric coupled with 
conservative (and even authoritarian) politics at home. 
 
8.4.2. The AKP’s support for EU membership: Pure pragmatism?  
If the AKP has always been a TAN party, how genuine is its support for EU 
membership? The pro-EU activism of the AKP during the initial years of its 
government has been largely attributed to its quest for external legitimacy to survive 
under the Kemalist threat (Çınar 2008; Yavuz 2009; Baudner 2012; Kaliber 2013). 
According to that account, the AKP’s support for EU membership was highly 
instrumental (Kaliber 2013: 27). Hence, the AKP’s burgeoning resentment for EU 
membership could be explained as a strategic choice rather than a reaction to the 
increasing uncertainty of Turkey’s membership prospects (Kirişci 2009; Kaliber 
2013). AKP leaders support Turkey’s EU membership, ‘only when they think that this 
best serves either the national interest or their own electoral purposes’ (Kaliber 2013: 
65). Having consolidated its electoral power and political authority, the AKP no 
longer needs the EU as leverage against its domestic political adversaries, and 
consequently it seeks to develop partnership with non-European countries (Kirişci 
2009; Kubicek 2011; Baudner 2012). Besides, the decision of the ECtHR in the Leyla 
Sahin case indicates that investing on Europe does not necessarily help the AKP in its 
overarching quest to bring more religious (Islamic) freedoms to Turkey (Çınar 2008; 
Öniş 2009; Baudner 2012).  
This line of thinking implies that the AKP had never aimed for EU membership but 
just instrumentalised the EU accession process as a shield against its domestic rivals. 
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It is a fact that the AKP has consolidated its political authority by absorbing Kemalist 
veto powers and has become an undefeated champion in the general elections. It is 
also true that the AKP government chose not to persist in its pro-EU quest and rather 
sought partnership outside Europe. The interview findings indicate the conviction of 
most AKP respondents that Turkey no longer needs the EU. They also explain the 
AKP’s recent efforts to seek alliance with the Middle East and Russia. However, 
contrary to the expectations of the existing literature, the interviews reveal that the 
AKP respondents are not actually indifferent to Turkey’s Europeanisation. Most 
government interviewees highlight their desire for Turkish accession to the EU and do 
not dismiss Turkey’s EU membership as unimportant. Some even admit that they 
turned to the East because the EU turned their back on them. A number of 
government officials explicitly state that the AKP will swiftly return to its pro-EU 
policy if the EU takes a positive step towards Turkish accession. According to the 
respondents, the AKP’s current aloofness to the EU is essentially a reaction to the 
EU’s negative approach to Turkey. Therefore, it would be misleading to view the 
AKP’s EU policy through purely instrumental/strategic lenses. Despite its pragmatic 
approach to Turkey’s Europeanization, the AKP did not officially abandon its quest 
for EU membership and highlights that its current disillusionment is a reaction to the 
EU’s ‘reluctant’ stance towards Turkey’s accession. 
  
 
8.4.3.Where does the ‘Sèvres Syndrome’ fit in the discussion of Turkey’s 
Euroscepticism? 
As previously discussed, the ‘Sèvres Syndrome’ refers to ‘fear of plots by external 
enemies, especially the Western countries, and their alleged internal collaborators –
ethnic and religious minorities in Turkey– to weaken, carve up and terminate the 
existence of the Turkish Republic’ (Nefes 2013: 252). Fear of division is well-
entrenched within the Turkish society and its symptoms have been noticeable in the 
discourses of mainstream political parties in Turkey especially regarding their views 
of the EU-led reform process. Accordingly, an important question may arise with 
respect to the association between Euroscepticism and the Sèvres Syndrome: Is the 
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Sèvres Syndrome the direct cause of domestic scepticism towards the EU? Other 
related questions include: Do Turkish political actors who traditionally reflect the 
Sèvres Syndrome in their discourses actually reflect opposition to European 
integration rather than  opposition to EU accession? Do only opposition parties 
employ the Sèvres Syndrome in their discourses or does the AKP government carry 
similar fears towards Europeans as well?   
    
The Sèvres Syndrome delegitimizes the West and fuels mistrust against Western 
states. Hence, it dictates to Turks not to ‘enter into economic, political and cultural 
pacts and alliances with the Western world’ (Yılmaz 2006: 12). In this respect, it is 
expected that the victims of the Sèvres Syndrome demonstrate principled opposition 
to Turkey’s EU accession. Therefore, politicians who secure such a ‘siege paranoia’ 
(Guida 2008) are supposed to be opposing European integration as a whole, since the 
Sèvres Syndrome prohibits partnership with Western institutions. However, 
mainstream political parties in Turkey do not necessarily base their EU policies on the 
Sèvres Syndrome. All political actors under scrutiny support Turkey’s EU accession 
as membership is expected to contribute to the development of democracy, human 
rights and economy in Turkey. Therefore, it can be assumed that the Sèvres Syndrome 
remains dormant as it does not directly influence party support for EU accession. 
Turkish political parties grow reluctant toward EU membership when the reform 
process contradicts their political and economic agenda. Controversial EU-led reforms 
such as minority rights and the Cyprus conditionality may have resurrected the old 
mistrust against Europeans. Especially regarding the reform of minority foundations, 
both the CHP and the MHP compared the reform to the provisions of the Sèvres 
Treaty and alleged that the reforms carried a potential to weaken (if not divide) 
Turkey. The interview results indicate a similar trend since one fifth of the CHP 
respondents and all MHP interviewees are of the opinion that some EU-led reforms 
including minority rights confirm the EU’s hidden agenda to dismantle the Turkish 
Republic. Therefore, it is plausible to argue that the Sèvres Syndrome, although 
embedded within Turkish politics, is not the direct cause of Euroscepticism but rather 
a reflection or consequence of Euroscepticism in Turkey. The EU-led reform process 
and the suspension of negotiations have triggered sceptical reactions in Turkish 
political parties. In response to the EU’s ‘discriminatory’ policies towards Turkey, 
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domestic political actors resort to historical suspicions towards Europeans in order to 
further delegitimize the EU’s conditionality in the eyes of the public.   
   
Besides, the mainstream literature assumes that the primary political actors reflecting 
the Sèvres Syndrome are the CHP and the MHP (the main opposition parties) due to 
strong attachments to the Republican regime; while depicting the AKP government as 
immune to the syndrome due to its reformist agenda (Guida 2008; Göçek 2011; Nefes 
2013). However, the interview results indicate that the AKP officials are not 
completely immune to the Sèvres Syndrome. The fear of division is extensively 
visible in the responses of the government officials. Almost all AKP respondents 
dismiss the idea of granting Kurds a minority status because they believe Kurds 
qualify for a better category: ‘co-founders of Turkey’. They fear that categorizing 
Kurds as minority carries a serious potential to divide Turkey. This argument is not 
different from the MHP’s claim that the EU creates ‘artificial minorities’ in Turkey 
(Nefes 2013: 254). Moreover, the AKP officials are convinced that conferring 
excessive rights to minorities might result in the division of the country. One fifth of 
the AKP respondents report their belief that the EU pursues policies to divide Turkey. 
Apart from the fear of division, the AKP respondents essentially depict the EU as a 
‘Christian Club’ acting with a ‘Crusader mentality’ against Turkey’s accession. 
Unlike the opposition, the AKP government’s Euroscepticism developed following 
the suspension of the negotiations. Accordingly, critical remarks against the EU 
reflecting the Sèvres Syndrome came only after the AKP had lost its hope for EU 
membership. Therefore, contrary to mainstream depiction of the AKP government as 
immune to the Sèvres Syndrome, this study finds that based on the interview results, 
AKP officials increasingly reflect the Sèvres Syndrome and carry a fear of division by 
foreigners. They also increasingly embrace the idea that uncertainty over Turkish EU 
membership highlights the EU’s Christian identity allowing anti-Islamic (or 
Islamophobic) tendencies coming from within Europe. Overall, the effects of the 
Sèvres Syndrome on Turkish attitudes towards the EU cannot be thought of 
independently of the level of membership prospects and the state of Turkey-EU 
relations. Deterministic approaches that overemphasize the Sèvres Syndrome cannot 
explain why there is a general consensus on  EU membership in Turkey.        
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8.4.4. Is Turkey an exceptional case of Euroscepticism?  
Essentially, the study aimed at explaining the rising scepticism in Turkish politics 
towards EU membership. The findings of the study indicated that Turkish domestic 
actors did not focus their criticisms on European integration per se, but Turkey’s EU 
membership process in particular. Therefore, the study suggested differentiating 
between Euroscepticism in member states defined as opposition to European 
integration and Euroscepticism in candidate countries implying contestations against 
the accession process in order to better explain Turkish political attitudes during the 
accession negotiations. , This analytical differentiation is useful because  it 
bothreveals the difference between Turkey and member states in terms of critical EU 
discourses, and it facilitates the comparison of Turkey and other candidate countries. 
Accordingly, the study highlights that Eurosceptic political actors in both Turkey and 
other candidate countries focus their criticisms on the EU’s accession conditionality 
rather than the overall European integration and its future.  Euroscepticism in 
response to the EU’s issue-specific conditionality is frequently observed in different 
accession countries in Central and Eastern Europe. In particular, TAN parties often 
opposed the same EU-led reforms with similar justifications. For instance, 
nationalistic urges to preserve political stability and national sovereignty against 
foreign intrusion played a crucial role behind domestic resistance to the expansion of 
minority rights. The EU’s differential approach towards members and candidates in 
the application of its minority rights criterion further decreased the credibility of its 
conditionality. Reactions of political parties in the CEECs are comparable to those of 
Turkish political actors. Especially, minority rights policies of the TB/LNNK in 
Latvia are highly comparable to the MHP since both parties showed persisting 
objection against minority rights reforms during both their terms in opposition and in 
government. Moreover, the policies of Macedonia’s SDSM and Turkey’s CHP hold 
similarities as both parties demonstrate reluctance towards the EU’s conditionality of 
minority rights emphasizing that their kinsmen’s minority status was rejected in EU 
member states. It is also remarkable that both the HDZ of Croatia and Turkey’s AKP 
express similar concerns over the EU’s ‘double standards’ in the application of its 
minority rights condition. Officials of both parties emphasize that it is unjust for the 
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EU to put pressure on them concerning the improvement of minority rights while, for 
instance, overlooking the ill-treatment of Roma by the French government.   
Likewise, the reform of FLO faced political resistance amongst national elites in 
CEECs, just like in the Turkish case. Similar patriotic claims such as ‘the selling out 
of motherland to foreigners’ were employed to stand against the reform of FLO not 
only by the MHP and the CHP in Turkey but also the FKGP, the MIEP and the 
FIDESZ-MPP in Hungary, the SNS and the DeSUS in Slovenia, the HZDS and the 
KDH in Slovakia, and the LPR, the Self Defence and the PSL in Poland.    
Besides, the EU’s country-specific conditions further stimulate domestic opposition in 
candidate countries having bilateral issues with various EU Member States, since 
candidates felt discriminated by the EU’s extra conditions. Similar to Turkish political 
resistance to the EU’s Cyprus conditionality, political parties in the Czech Republic, 
Macedonia and Croatia were unified in their objections to the EU’s preconditions 
stemming from a bilateral conflict with an EU member. Mainstream political actors in 
the Czech Republic namely the ODS, the CSSD and the KSCM were unified in their 
opposition to the Austrian and German demands regarding the annulment of the 
Beneš decrees. Similarly, despite their political rivalry, both the SDSM and the 
VMRO-DPMNE in Macedonia joined forces to criticize the EU’s extra conditionality 
requiring the settlement of the name issue with Greece. Finally, both mainstream 
(HDZ) and fringe (HSP) parties in Croatia objected to the EU’s additional 
membership conditionality arising out of a bilateral conflict with Slovenia. Similar to 
the Turkish case, political parties resisted the EU’s conditionality with the conviction 
that the EU pursued discriminatory policies against their country.   
Concerning the debate over ideology versus strategy, unlike the Turkish case, party 
ideology holds a greater explanatory power than strategy in the CEECs. Accordingly, 
TAN parties oppose EU-led reforms while GAL parties are more likely to support the 
reform process. Moreover, TAN parties in the CEECs reflect Euroscepticism not only 
in opposition but also in government as well. For instance, the PSL (Right/TAN) in 
Poland threatened to withdraw from the coalition government against the reform of 
FLO, while the DP-S (Left/TAN) actually resigned from government in Latvia in 
reaction to the EU-led reform of minority rights. Moreover, the HZDS (Right/TAN) 
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government in Slovakia long opposed the EU’s pressures for the improvement of 
minority rights. On the other hand, the AKP government in Turkey actually defended 
EU-led reforms although it was a Right/TAN party. The AKP resorted to 
Euroscepticism only after the suspension of the negotiations which created a deep 
uncertainty for membership. The AKP’s strategic support for the accession process 
can be explained with the fact that the pro-Islamic AKP government needed external 
legitimation in order to survive in the Kemalist political system, and the EU accession 
process empowered the AKP government against its Kemalist rivals (Börzel 2012). 
Therefore, despite its TAN identity, the AKP government supported the EU-led 
reform process in Turkey.   
As in the Turkish case, when the EU’s country-specific conditions are perceived as 
discriminatory, party ideology and party competition lose their explanatory powers in 
the CEECs. The EU’s country-specific conditions faced domestic resistance 
transcending both the government-opposition positioning and TAN-GAL distinction. 
For instance, the EU’s pressures on Macedonia to change its name due to the Greek 
demands unified both opposition (the SDSM) and the government (the VMRO-
DPMNE) against the EU. Moreover, in the Czech Republic, not only TAN parties 
(including the centre-right ODS) but also the CSSD government reflecting Left/GAL 
ideology opposed the EU’s conditional pressures about the annulment of the Beneš 
decrees.  
This study reveals that Turkish responses to EU membership conditionality do not 
stem from a deep-seated opposition to the overall European integration project. 
Instead, they largely reflect domestic reactions to the complex nature of the EU’s 
membership pressures. The EU’s formal conditionality is generally rejected by 
opposition parties with a more conservative (TAN) ideological outlook whereas the 
EU’s additional country-specific pressures are contested by all the selected Turkish 
parties regardless of their ideological backgrounds and strategic choices. Similar 
trends can be observed in many other candidate countries. Domestic responses to EU 
conditionality stem not only from ideological alignments or strategic party 
positioning, but they also develop as a response to the EU’s selective and 
discriminatory approach in the application of its conditionality as well as to the 
uncertainty over membership prospects. In this sense, Turkey’s EU accession process 
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is not entirely a distinct case, since Turkish responses to EU conditionality are not 
necessarily different from those of other accession countries. 
Overall, by differentiating betweenEuroscepticism in member states and candidate 
countries, the study innovatively explains how political parties in Turkey and in other 
candidate countries respond to the complex nature of the EU’s membership 
conditionality. Highlighting the importance of interplay between EU-driven and 
domestic factors, the study refines the prevailing literature that overemphasizes the 
domestic determinants of Euroscepticism and overlooks the dynamic and reversible 
character of political party responses to EU conditionality. As observed in the Turkish 
case, EU-driven factors often result in the formation of unlikely alliances among 
different political parties against the EU regardless of their ideological alignments or 
strategic preferences. Consequently, there is a need to take EU-driven factors 
seriously since the EU’s handling of the accession process has a remarkable impact on 
the EU stances of political parties in accession countries. 
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Appendix I. Interview Questions 
 
 
1-What are the major obstacles to Turkey’s EU membership today? 
 
2-As you know, according to the Lausanne Treaty, only non-Muslims 
have been officially recognized as minority. During the EU membership 
process, the scope of minority has been extended to cover ethnicity as 
well. How do you view this change? 
 
3-What do you think about the restitution of property rights of non-
Muslim foundations in Turkey? 
 
4-What do you think about the EU-led reform facilitating foreign land 
ownership in Turkey? 
 
5-How do you view the EU’s membership conditionality for Turkey to 
open its harbours and airspace to the Republic of Cyprus?  
 
6-Do you think that the EU wishes Turkey’s accession? 
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Appendix II. List of Interviewees 
 
THE AKP RESPONDENTS 
 
Name Constituency date of interview 
Mehmet ERDOĞAN Gaziantep 1 November 2012 
Mücahit FINDIKLI Malatya 1 November 2012 
Durdu Mehmet KASTAL Osmaniye 6 November 2012 
Mehmet Sayım TEKELİOĞLU İzmir 7 November 2012 
Burhan KUZU İstanbul 7 November 2012 
Muzaffer ÇAKAR Muş 7 November 2012 
Rıfat SAİT İzmir 14 November 2012 
Bilal MACİT İstanbul 21 November 2012 
Ülker GÜZEL Ankara 21 November 2012 
Yıldırım Mehmet RAMAZANOĞLU Kahramanmaraş 6 February 2013 
Ruhi AÇIKGÖZ Aksaray 6 February 2013 
Ali Rıza ALABOYUN Aksaray 19 February 2013 
Mustafa ELİTAŞ Kayseri 20 February 2013 
Ercan CANDAN Zonguldak 21 February 2013 
Fatih ÇİFTÇİ Van 28 February 2013 
Afif DEMİRKIRAN Siirt 28 February 2013 
Canan CANDEMİR ÇELİK Bursa 28 February 2013 
Tülin ERKAL KARA Bursa 28 February 2013 
Ali ŞAHİN Gaziantep 28 February 2013 
Pelin GÜNDEŞ BAKIR Kayseri 28 February 2013 
Mihrimah Belma SATIR İstanbul 28 February 2013 
Abdullah ÇALIŞKAN Kırşehir 28 February 2013 
Ahmet Berat ÇONKAR İstanbul 29 February 2013 
Burak ERDENİR  6 March 2013 
Haluk ÖZDALGA Ankara 30 April 2013 
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AFFILIATIONS OF THE AKP RESPONDENTS 
Name 
Membership in Parliamentary committees/Position in 
the Party 
Mehmet 
ERDOĞAN 
Committee on Industry, Trade, Energy, Natural Resources, 
Information and Technology 
Mücahit FINDIKLI 
Head of the Committee on Industry, Trade, Energy, 
Natural Resources, Information and Technology 
Durdu Mehmet 
KASTAL 
Committee on Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Affairs 
Mehmet Sayım 
TEKELİOĞLU 
Head of the Committee on EU Harmonization 
Burhan KUZU 
Head of the Committee on Constitution 
Muzaffer ÇAKAR 
Committee on Environment and Committee on Education, 
Culture, Youth and Sports 
Rıfat SAİT 
Committee on Foreign Affairs 
Bilal MACİT 
Party’s Parliamentary Clerk 
Ülker GÜZEL 
Committee on Human Rights Inquiry 
Yıldırım Mehmet 
RAMAZANOĞLU 
Committee on Turkey-EU Joint Parliamentary Committee 
and Committee on EU Harmonization 
Ruhi AÇIKGÖZ 
Committee on National Defence and the Turkish 
delegation to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly 
Ali Rıza 
ALABOYUN 
Committee on Foreign Affairs and Head of the Turkish 
delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly 
Mustafa ELİTAŞ 
Deputy Chairman of the AKP’s Parliamentary Group 
Ercan CANDAN 
Spokesperson of the Committee on EU Harmonization 
Fatih ÇİFTÇİ 
Committee on Constitution 
Afif DEMİRKIRAN 
Committee on EU Harmonization and Head of Turkey-EU 
Joint Parliamentary Committee 
Canan CANDEMİR 
ÇELİK 
Committee on Constitution 
Tülin ERKAL 
KARA 
Turkish Delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe 
Ali ŞAHİN 
Committee on EU Harmonization 
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Pelin GÜNDEŞ 
BAKIR 
Committee on Turkey-EU Joint Parliamentary Committee 
and Committee on EU Harmonization 
Mihrimah Belma 
SATIR 
Committee on Constitution 
Abdullah 
ÇALIŞKAN 
Committee on Foreign Affairs 
Ahmet Berat 
ÇONKAR 
Committee on Foreign Affairs and Turkish Delegation to 
the NATO Parliamentary Assembly 
Burak ERDENİR 
Deputy Undersecretary of the Ministry of European Union 
Haluk ÖZDALGA 
Committee on EU Harmonization 
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THE CHP RESPONDENTS 
Name Constituency Date of Interview 
Ali İhsan KÖKTÜRK Zonguldak 1 November 2012 
Emre KÖPRÜLÜ Tekirdağ 1 November 2012 
Ramazan Kerım ÖZKAN Burdur 6 November 2012 
Hasan ÖREN Manisa 7 November 2012 
Kemal EKİNCİ Bursa 7 November 2012 
Atılla KART Konya 13 November 2012 
Aykan ERDEMİR Bursa 13 November 2012 
Orhan DÜZGÜN Tokat 14 November 2012 
Osman KORUTÜRK İstanbul 15 November 2012 
İzzet ÇETİN Ankara 6 February 2013 
Gülsün BİLGEHAN Ankara 6 February 2013 
Faruk LOĞOĞLU Adana 21 February 2013 
Süheyl BATUM Eskişehir 28 February 2013 
Erdal AKSÜNGER İzmir 28 February 2013 
Ömer Süha ALDAN Muğla 7 March 2013 
 
 
AFFILIATIONS OF THE CHP RESPONDENTS  
Name Membership in Parliamentary committees/Position 
in the Party 
Ali İhsan KÖKTÜRK Committee on Justice 
Emre KÖPRÜLÜ Committee on Environment 
Ramazan Kerım 
ÖZKAN 
Committee on Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Affairs 
Hasan ÖREN Committee on Industry, Trade, Energy, Natural 
Resources, Information and Technology 
Kemal EKİNCİ Committee on Public Works, Reconstruction, 
Transportation and Tourism 
Atılla KART Committee on Constitution 
Aykan ERDEMİR Committee on Turkey-EU Joint Parliamentary 
Committee and Committee on EU Harmonization 
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Orhan DÜZGÜN Committee on National Defence 
Osman KORUTÜRK Party’s spokesman for the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs 
İzzet ÇETİN Committee on Plan and Budget 
Gülsün BİLGEHAN Turkish Delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe 
Faruk LOĞOĞLU Deputy leader of the CHP responsible for Foreign 
Affairs 
Süheyl BATUM Committee on Constitution 
Erdal AKSÜNGER Committee on Industry, Trade, Energy, Natural 
Resources, Information and Technology 
Ömer Süha ALDAN Committee on Justice 
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THE MHP RESPONDENTS 
Name Constituency Date of Interview 
Lütfü TÜRKKAN Kocaeli 14 November 2012 
Zuhal TOPÇU Ankara 19 November 2012 
Nevzet KORKMAZ Balıkesir 21 November 2012 
Sümer ORAL Manisa 28 February 2013 
 
AFFILIATIONS OF THE MHP RESPONDENTS 
Name Membership in Parliamentary committees/Position in the 
Party 
Lütfü TÜRKKAN Committee on EU Harmonization 
Zuhal TOPÇU Deputy Leader of the MHP and member of the Committee on 
EU Harmonization 
Nevzet KORKMAZ Committee on Constitution 
Sümer ORAL Committee on Plan and Budget 
 
 
THE BDP RESPONDENT 
Name Date of Interview Position in the Party 
Yüksel MUTLU 6 March 2013 Deputy Leader of the BDP 
responsible for Foreign Affairs 
 
 
